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PART 8.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

MOROCCO.

July to December 1893.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Morocco.

PART 8.

No. 1.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received July* 6.)

(No. 180.)

My Lord, *Madrid, July* 3, 1893.

THE "Imparcial" contains a telegram from Melilla, dated yesterday, at 5·30 P.M., stating that the Pashas of Frapana, Benizicar, and Mazuga, with a large suite, have had a conference with General Margallo.

The object of the meeting was to attempt to dissuade the Spanish authorities from pursuing the construction of the Spanish fort of Sidi Zueriach, which would, the Moors think, interfere with the Kabyle Cemetery.

The tone of the Moors was that of a friendly appeal to the goodwill of the Spaniards.

General Margallo replied that he would submit to the Spanish Government the Petition of the Kabyles, but warned them against taking any course but that of request, under the penalty of severe punishment.

The writer goes on to say that the site chosen for the fort is declared by technical opinion the only one possessing the necessary strategical conditions, and that it cannot be altered, but he thinks that, if persisted in, a rupture will take place between the garrison and the neighbourhood.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

No. 2.

Sir West Ridgeway to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received July* 6, 3·44 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, July* 6, 1893, 2·55 P.M.

I LEAVE 20th instant. Could not Satow meet me in London? It is important, I think, that we should meet, and there is no urgency here, as Sultan has left Fez.

No. 3.

Sir West Ridgeway to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received July* 7, 2·5 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, July* 7, 1893, 12·10 P.M.

AM leaving this on 20th. Kindly apply to Admiralty for Her Majesty's ship "Bramble" gun-boat at Gibraltar to convey myself and party thither on that date according to custom.

No. 4.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir West Ridgeway.

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July* 7, 1893.

I SHOULD prefer that you should remain at your post until the 1st August, or until Mr. Satow arrives to relieve you.

No. 5.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received July* 8.)

(No. 182.)
My Lord, *Madrid, July* 4, 1893.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 180 of the 3rd July, the "Imparcial" announces that the works at the fort of Sidi Guariach are proceeding. General Margallo has informed the Pashas of the Kabyles that he cannot entertain Petitions on the subject, which can only be discussed between the Governments of Morocco and Spain.

Meanwhile, he threatens signal punishment ("terrible castigo") to any Moors who attempt to interrupt the work.

The Kabyles are reported as much agitated, and disturbances are feared.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

No. 6.

Conjoint Foreign Committee of the Jewish Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received July* 10.)

My Lord, 36, *Finsbury Circus, London, July* 7, 1893.

ENCOURAGED by the benevolent sympathy with which your Lordship and your predecessors have treated the affairs of our co-religionists in Morocco, we venture once more to trouble your Lordship with reference to the condition of the Mellah at Mogador, and the continued ill-treatment of the Jews of Morocco City by the present Governor.

As regards the former question, we beg to remind your Lordship that on the 30th June, 1892, the Marquis of Salisbury was good enough to inform us that Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Mogador had reported that he understood from Kaïd Ragogy that he had discovered a suitable site for the required buildings, and had instructed the Government architect to prepare plans for the same, which the Kaïd would submit to the Sultan without delay. The action of the Kaïd, Lord Salisbury added, encouraged the hope that if funds could be found by the Sultan, the efforts which had already been made would have practical results.

Since the receipt of this letter no further progress apparently has been made in the matter, and, in consequence of other incidents in Morocco, we thought the time inopportune to trouble your Lordship on the subject. Now, however, that a new British Minister has been appointed to the post at Tangier, we venture to ask your Lordship kindly to instruct him to endeavour to secure the completion of this reform which is so urgently needed. We are told by Mr. Reuben Elmaleh, of Mogador, that the necessary plans have been prepared by the Government architect, and that it is believed that the Sultan could find the necessary funds for the buildings, but he states that if there should be any difficulty on financial grounds, the Jewish community at Mogador would be willing to erect the necessary buildings on the site being handed over to them; or, if the Sultan would build, the community would guarantee a remunerative rental. It is hoped that this suggestion on the part of the Jewish community may assist the completion of the work.

As regards the continued ill-treatment of the Jews of Morocco City by the Governor of that place, we desire earnestly to press upon your Lordship that there is no prospect of putting an end to the existing persecution of the Jewish community except by the

removal of the present Governor. We venture therefore to hope that your Lordship will see fit to instruct the British Minister at Tangier to press upon His Majesty the Sultan the necessity for superseding Hadj Mohamed Ouida.

We have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR COHEN,
President, Jewish Board of Deputies,
JULIAN GOLDSMID,
President, Anglo-Jewish Association.

No. 7.

Aborigines Protection Society to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received July* 13.)

My Lord, *Broadway Chambers, Westminster, S.W., July* 12, 1893.

I HAVE the honour, by direction of the Committee of the Aborigines Protection Society, to address your Lordship with reference to previous correspondence with Her Majesty's Government respecting the system of Consular protection now in force in Morocco, and especially to my letters of the 23rd January, 1891, and the 20th April, 1892, addressed to the Marquis of Salisbury.

As it is announced that Mr. Satow is about to proceed to Morocco as Her Majesty's Minister to the Court of the Sultan, our Committee ventures to express the hope that he will be instructed by your Lordship to institute such inquiries, and, if practicable, to enter into such negotiations as may tend to remove the evils that are generally recognized as incident to the working of the protégé system.

Our Committee is aware of the great improvements that have in recent years been effected by Her Majesty's Consuls within the range of their action and influence, but it respectfully reiterates its opinion, that adequate reforms can only be secured by the adoption of arrangements between Her Majesty's Government, the other Powers concerned in Morocco, and the Court of the Sultan, by which institutions more or less resembling the Mixed Tribunals now organized in Egypt may be established in Morocco.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. R. FOX BOURNE,
Secretary.

No. 8.

Foreign Office to Conjoint Foreign Committee of Jewish Associations.

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, July* 13, 1893.

I AM directed by the Earl of Rosebery to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th instant referring to certain matters which closely affect the interests of your co-religionists in Morocco.

In reply, I am to state that the attention of Mr. Satow, who is shortly proceeding to Morocco as Her Majesty's Minister, will be called to your representations.

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 9.

Sir West Ridgeway to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received July* 15.)

(No. 104.)
My Lord, *Tangier, June* 30, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for your Lordship's information, reports of inquiries held into two claims preferred against the Moorish Government by British subjects. The ordinary procedure would have been to admit these claims without any preliminary inquiry, and to have added them to the already swollen list of unsettled claims. One of the proposals which it is my intention to make to your Lordship when I submit my Report on the general question of claims is that claims by British subjects should be promptly and fully inquired into locally before they are admitted as valid. During my tour along the coast I availed myself of the presence of Mr. Allan Maclean, Consul-designate at Dar-al-

Baida, and Captain Count Gleichen to cause a local inquiry into the two cases now reported.

In one case, that of the robbery of Mr. Forde's agent, I proposed to the Sultan that a Commissioner should be sent to co-operate with Mr. Maclean in inquiring into and, if possible, settling the case. The Principal Private Secretary of the Vizir for Foreign Affairs was nominated for the purpose, but with the usual Moorish apathy and disregard for time, he did not arrive in time, indeed, so far as I know, he has not yet arrived. Mr. Maclean accordingly made an *ex parte* inquiry, the result of which has been to convince me that Mr. Forde's claim is sound, and is one which can be justly pressed on the Sultan. But the most satisfactory feature in connection with the inquiry was the release of the son of Mr. Forde's employé who had been unjustly imprisoned. The release was no doubt in a great measure due to the tact and firmness of Mr. Maclean (who I venture to foretell will prove to be a valuable accession to the ranks of the Consular Service), but it is also evidence of improved relations with the Shereefian Government. A few months ago an official in the position of the Governor of Laraiche would not have dared to have thus yielded to a British demand without authority from the Sultan. I learn that after the release had been effected a Shereefian communication ordering it to be made, in deference to an emphatic demand I had made on the Sultan, was received by the Governor.

In the second case I obtained an order from the Sultan directing the Governor of Laraiche to inquire into and settle the case. Orders of this description are generally evaded and put aside by the local officials, and no doubt if Mr. Maclean and Count Gleichen had not proceeded to the spot the usual result would have followed. As it was, there was much obstruction, as your Lordship will observe. The result, however, is very satisfactory, and the claim is, I hope, finally disposed of.

The Sultan has agreed in a third case at Mazagan, where a British merchant, Mr. Madden, has a claim (a very exaggerated claim, I am inclined to think) against the Moorish Government for robbery, to a joint inquiry and settlement by the British Vice-Consul and a Shereefian Commissioner. The Commissioner arrived when I was at Mazagan, and the inquiry is proceeding.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WEST RIDGEWAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

Consul Maclean to Sir West Ridgeway.

Sir, *Tangier, June* , 1893.

I HAVE the honour to report that Captain Count Gleichen and myself arrived at Habassi on the 6th June, where we expected to meet a Commisssioner from the Sultan to discuss with us the case of Allal Ben Ishu and to arrive at a just settlement.

The case is as follows:—

In February 1891 Mahommed Ben Saada made a savage raid on the dwelling of Allal Ben Ishu, wounding him and some members of his family, destroying crops and robbing a number of cattle and a quantity of grain.

Ben Ishu, who resides in the district of Habassi, was, and is, the agricultural partner of a British subject named Lewis Forde, to whom the aforesaid property belonged. Ben Saada is Sheikh of a division in the district of Habassi.

Representations on the subject were made by the Legation to Hadj Mahommed Torres, the Sultan's official Representative in Tangier, who replied, on the authority of the Governor of Habassi, that the latter had received no notice of Ben Ishu being connected in business with a British subject; that said Ben Ishu bore a bad character and engaged with others in turbulent proceedings; that he was a Government official, and was in debt to Government on account of his office and for taxes due from him personally; it was denied that said Ben Ishu had been the victim of the outrage, had sustained the alleged losses, or that he held property belonging to a British subject; but if Forde proved he had lost property Government would restore it.

In reply, Torres was furnished with proofs drawn up by Adools (Public Notaries) according to Moorish law. He returned the documents as being invalid on account of their not having been attested by a Kadi (Chief Judicial Officer of a district). The documents referred back to Lewis Forde, were strengthened in the manner suggested, and on the 11th March, 1892, were again transmitted to Torres (translations being retained). Subsequently the latter stated he had mislaid them.

These documents show conclusively that Ben Ishu and his family had been victims of alleged outrage and robbery at the hands of Sheikh Ben Saada; and that the property seized did belong to Lewis Forde; and that throughout the district it was notorious that Ben Ishu was the agricultural partner of Lewis Forde.

In August 1892 Forde wrote to Sir Charles Euan-Smith reminding the latter that the case was still unsettled, and calling attention to the brother and son of Ben Ishu being imprisoned on account of the alleged Government claim against the said Ben Ishu, and requesting that steps may be taken for their release and for the security of his (Lewis Forde's) property.

There is no record of anything further being done in the matter until March 1893, more than two years after the perpetration of the outrage. Mr. Forde then brought it before your Excellency in a letter giving a résumé of what had occurred, and stating that the brother of Ben Ishu had died in prison, and that the latter's son was very dangerously ill. A few weeks later your Excellency visited Laraiche and personally inquired into the matter, with the result that you addressed a letter to the Shereefian Government calling attention to the alleged outrage, which included a breach of Treaty, and requesting that a Moorish Commissioner might be dispatched to the scene of the outrage to meet an official from the Legation in order that a thorough investigation might be made and a settlement arrived at. You further urged the immediate release of Ben-Ishu's son.

Accordingly, Count Gleichen and myself were sent to Habassi.

As no Commissioner from the Sultan had arrived, we took what steps we could to procure evidence on the case before his arrival.

Mr. Forde, who was pressing the claim, was not present himself, but only sent his Jewish interpreter, Solomon Asayag, to represent him, together with his Consular soldier, Ben Dris. The latter had been at El Jemil, the scene of the outrage, on behalf of his master, at the time of the second outrage to Ben-Ishu.

We sent at once for Ben-Ishu, who was staying with Abdullah Ben Korshi, one of Mr. Forde's semsars (native agent), several hours from Habassi. He arrived on the evening of the 6th.

We first questioned Asayag on the expediency of going ourselves to El Jemil, which lay twelve hours' journey distant (east-south-east of Habassi, on the Omargha River), to collect more evidence, but Asayag gave it as his strong opinion that it would not be of the slightest use, as none of the people there would give evidence unfavourable to the Sheikh, least of all to us in our official capacity (Mr. Forde subsequently strongly corroborated this). We also asked Asayag whether he thought there would be any chance of settling the matter with the Kaïd (Governor) in the absence of the Moorish Commissioner, but he thought there would be none at all.

Ben Dris confirmed the statement of Mr. Forde (as mentioned in No. 1 of the file) regarding the second outrage on Ben Ishu he saw committed at El Jemil, and stated that both outrages were notorious there.

We examined at various times Ben Ishu, who confirmed the details of the outrages and robbery as sworn to by the villagers in the notarial documents in the file (No. 16). As to the evidence in these documents, Ben Ishu said that the Kadis and Adools who signed them did not belong to his district, but to the neighbouring one (where presumably they could not be intimidated).

Ben Ishu is a straightforward, respectable-looking man, and his statements seemed to bear the impress of truth. In answer to further questions addressed to him, he stated that he was Sheikh of El Jemil during one year, apparently about 1886. In this year his people were 43 dollars short in their taxes, so the Kaïd of Habassi sent a certain Muhamed Ben Saib to see about it. This man, without giving Ben Ishu time to collect the sum, tied him up and brought him to the Kaïd for embezzling the money. Ben Ishu pleaded that he had not received the money, and advised the Kaïd to send and collect it for himself if he wanted it. Whereupon he was acquitted of the charge and let go, but deprived of his Sheikhship. Ben Taib was appointed in his place, and governed for the next two years, 1887 and 1888. During 1887–89, inclusive, the Kaïd did not molest Ben Ishu in any way, nor claim payment, and the two even went on expeditions together. In 1890 Ben Ishu became "mokhalata" (that is an employé of a European subject, not protected, but holding a certificate from a European Consular officer, which states that by Article IX of the Madrid Convention such employé cannot be molested or arrested without reference first being made to the protecting authority. He holds this during his service under a European subject, but it does not exempt him from paying taxes).

In this year Ben Saada, who had now been appointed Sheikh, told Ben Ishu he ought to pay the same taxes as other people, and work with him. Ben Ishu referred the matter

to Mr. Forde, who advised him to work, and to pay the same taxes as the other "mokhalata" (of other nations) did (which was probably nothing). He did work, but did not pay anything.

The real reason of the outrage (in February 1891) was that Sheikh Ben Saada conceived a spite against him for being "mokhalata." The matter of 43 dollars had nothing to do with the outrage. After the outrages Ben Ishu left his country and lived with the semsar Abdullah Ben Korshi (who was the man employed by Mr. Forde to collect the sworn evidence in the notarial documents). He has not been back to his farm since, but has neglected it.

As to the assertion of the Kaïd (*vide* below) that Ben Ishu's son and brother were imprisoned because Ben Ishu owed 43 dollars, the latter says he would have willingly paid this, although he did not owe it, or Mr. Forde would have lent it to him (which this gentleman confirms), but that that was not the real reason at all; that no money could have procured the release of his son or brother.

After a complimentary visit to the Kaïd on the evening of our arrival, he visited us at our request on the morning of the following day (7th), and we then broached the subject of our mission.

After some preliminary talk, I asked the Kaïd as a favour to let the son of Ben Ishu out of prison.

The Kaïd at first pretended not to remember either Ben Ishu or his son, but soon recollected him as the protected subject ("hamir"), and said he was a good man. Then he denied that Ben Ishu's son was in prison, or that his brother had died there, and asked one of his suite if it were so. On being answered in the affirmative, he recovered his memory and said that Ben Ishu owed the Government 43 dollars. That he had been Sheikh six years before, and collected the Sultan's taxes; but that before he had finished settling with the Government he became "mokhalata" (this was not true). That he (the Kaïd) was ready to do any favour, but the 43 dollars belonged to the Sultan, and it was not in his power to let Ben Ishu's son out of prison without the Sultan's order.

I then said that the 2,000 dollars claim would certainly be pressed, and that it was getting larger every day.

The Kaïd denied that any outrage had been committed at all, and said it was all lies from beginning to end. He then said Ben Ishu had killed some people whom the Sultan had sent to make him pay the 43 dollars; but (on seeing a note taken of this) said he was not sure about this—it was only a report. That he had sent to ask Ben Ishu for the 43 dollars when he was about to become "mokhalata," and that he had written to Torres to obtain it from him. That Torres had replied that he might seize Ben Ishu for this sum, as he had been Sheikh before he was "mokhalata." He could not find him, so seized his brother and son instead.

I then showed him the file of letters about the case, and said Torres never mentioned the sum of 43 dollars at all.

Whereupon the Kaïd, after some demur, gave in, and rather ungraciously said he would let the man out of prison, and he would have, he supposed, to pay the 43 dollars himself out of his own pocket, as he had, by releasing the man, pardoned Ben Ishu of the money. We thanked him, and, after some more conversation, said we were going to stay at Habassi for another day to wait for the Moorish Commissioner. On which he repeated he had not heard anything about any Commissioners, Moorish or British, coming to settle anything, and had not heard a word from the Court about the matter.

It was not considered advisable to broach the subject of the money claim yet, as the Moorish Commissioner had not arrived, and the Kaïd was not in the best of tempers. After a friendly cup of coffee, the Kaïd took his departure.

Ben Ishu's son shortly afterwards appeared, looking strong and healthy, and was taken charge of by his father. Examined by himself, he corroborated his father's evidence in every respect.

Solomon Asayag went, later in the day and at my suggestion, to try and sound the Kaïd on the subject of the claim, and come to some arrangement on Mr. Forde's behalf; but the Kaïd would not listen to him.

During the afternoon a letter from Kaïd Maclean at Fez arrived, stating Gharneet, the Vizir, had told him he was sending his Chief Clerk, Kerdudi, to meet us at Habassi, and asking us how long we would wait. We replied we would wait until the 9th, and would then proceed by very slow marches to Laraiche, where we would remain until the 13th to allow of a message reaching us to say whether Kerdudi was really coming. In that event we would be prepared to meet him.

We accordingly struck our camp on the 9th, and moved very slowly on to Laraiche, which we reached on the 11th, having left word of our movements at Habassi.

Our movements were largely influenced by the fact that we had outstayed our welcome at Habassi, and that in obtaining the release of Ben Ishu's son we had accomplished the most important part of our mission.

On the 11th we wrote a letter addressed to Kerdudi and sent it to Habassi, explaining our movements, and asking him to let us know where we could meet him. But the Kaïd refused to receive the letter for him, and sent our messenger back.

Mr. Forde, at Laraiche, corroborated Ben Ishu's testimony in almost every particular. Regarding the question of taxes which Ben Ishu did not pay, Mr. Forde stated that he had told him that the certificate of "mokhalata" would not exempt him from paying taxes, but that if the "mokhalata" of other nations did not pay he would inquire into the matter. Since then neither he nor Mr. Imossi (British Vice-Consul, Laraiche) had heard anything further about these taxes, nor had Mr. Forde heard anything about the 43 dollars till we informed him of it.

On the 14th we were still at Laraiche, and received a letter from Kaïd Maclean, Fez, dated the 8th (viâ Tangier), saying there were no signs yet of Kerdudi leaving Fez.

On the 16th we again dispatched a courier to Habassi for news of Kerdudi.

On the 17th our man returned, saying Kerdudi had not arrived.

On the 17th we left Laraiche for Tangier at 5·30 P.M.

As the result of our investigation into the case, we consider that the claim put forward by Mr. Lewis Forde is a thoroughly sound one, and deserves the support of Her Majesty's Government. With the exception of the statement of the Kaïd of Habassi, who denied flatly the whole outrage, but without producing a single witness to support him, the whole of the evidence so far adduced points most distinctly to the commission of the outrages and the destruction of property as stated by Mr. Forde. We are therefore of opinion:—

1. That during the month of February 1891 a deliberate series of outrages were committed by Sheikh Ben Saada on Ben Ishu, a certified British "mokhalata," and his family, as stated in the notarial documents attached on Mr. Lewis Forde's property.

2. That these outrages were committed by Ben Saada because Ben Ishu was a "mokhalata," and not by reason of any supposed debt that he owed to the Moorish Government.

3. That the losses sustained thereby by Mr. Forde amounted to:—

	Dollars.	File No.
15 head of cattle	370	12
100 head of sheep..	300	12
Wheat, barley, and duri	620	12
Standing crops destroyed	370	12
Expenses for notaries, messengers, &c., up to the 16th November, 1892	47	12
Further like expenses, &c., up to the 5th March, 1893	273	19
Expenses since 5th March, 1893, Interpreter, &c., to meet this Commission, &c.	20	..
Grand total	2,000	

We have examined the above estimate of losses, and after comparing it with market value of beasts and grain in the district, have arrived at the conclusion it is a fair one.

We would also point out that Mr. Forde in this has not claimed any damages either for the loss of crops which would have been raised during the last two seasons had the outrages not been committed, nor for the severe suffering sustained by Ben Ishu and his family.

The reasons for this opinion are as follows:—

In the interview we had with the Kaïd of Habassi, in the presence of numerous witnesses, the Kaïd's single allegation against Ben Ishu was that he owed the Government 43 dollars. Even if this had been so, it would not of itself be sufficient to account for the outrage, nor does it seem likely that the Kaïd would have refrained from pressing the debt until five or six years after it was contracted, and then not until Ben Ishu had been "mokhalata" for a year or more. The Kaïd also stated of his own accord that Ben Ishu was a man of excellent character, and did not persevere in his assertion that he had fired on the Sultan's men when he saw a note taken of it by us.

The sworn notarial documents are most complete, and drawn up to the best of our belief strictly in accordance with the requirements of Moorish law.

In addition to these documents, we personally examined (as above stated) Ben Ishu, his son, Ben Dris, and Mr. Forde. Their evidence as far as possible bore out what is stated in the notarial documents and the other papers in the file.

Having sent several native servants about the district of Habassi, we conclude from their respective reports that the facts are notorious amongst the villagers outside the Karia of the Kaïd.

The only vestige of a reason for the outrage, *i.e.*, that Ben Ishu had not when "mokhalata" paid his taxes, was not even referred to by the Kaïd of Habassi.

We therefore recommend that, when a settlement of the case is arrived at with the Moorish Government, payment of the full claim, amounting to 2,000 dollars, should be insisted on.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ALLAN MACLEAN.

(Countersigned) GLEICHEN, *Captain*,
Grenadier Guards.

Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

Consul Maclean to Sir West Ridgeway.

Sir, *Tangier, June* 26, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to report that on our arrival at Laraiche on the 13th instant Captain Count Gleichen and myself received your Excellency's instructions to inquire into and settle the claim of Mr. John Kirby Green.

This claim was as follows:—

In or about September 1892 a robbery was reported as having been perpetrated on some animals belonging to Mr. Green in the district of Khlot, near a village called El Zeïtun. It was stated that early one morning the Sheikh of Zeïtun, by name Abdelkader Wold Bu Selam, had driven off a horse, two oxen, and a camel, which one Abdselam-ben-Muhamed-ben-Abdelkader had in charge for Mr. Green. This man Abdselam was a "mokhalata" employé of Mr. Green's (term explained in Inclosure 1 herewith), was cultivating some ground for him, and had been in his service for several years.

Mr. Green referred the case to Cid Hadj Mahommed Torres at Tangier, who directed the Basha of Laraiche, in whose province it had occurred, to investigate the matter. The Basha, however, took no notice of Torres' letters, so Mr. Green applied to Her Majesty's Legation. The latter took the matter up, and succeeded in obtaining a letter from the Sultan to the Basha directing him to inquire into and settle the matter.

On the 2nd June Mr. Green took the letter to the Basha of Laraiche, and the latter said he must, of course, have evidence. Mr. Green's witnesses were, however, afraid to come into Laraiche, owing to threats of the Sheikh to have them beaten and imprisoned if they gave evidence against him, and owing to other evidences of hostility on the part of the Basha. Mr. Forde, Her Britannic Majesty's Acting Vice-Consul at Laraiche, was directed by your Excellency to inquire into the case on the receipt of the Sultan's letter, and he reported on it. In consequence, we were directed to inquire into the matter and settle it.

Accordingly, we on the 13th June dispatched Mr. Forde's Consular soldier Ben Dris, a trustworthy man, to El Zeïtun to make private inquiries among the surrounding villages as to the alleged claim, at the same time dispatching a note by him to Mr. Green, who was in the neighbourhood, asking him to send us trustworthy witnesses who would be prepared to swear to the case.

We then proceeded to interview the Basha of Laraiche as follows:—

The Basha stated that Torres had sent him a letter about the claim, but that as Mr. Green's man (Abdselam) was away in Tangier at the time, and did not appear to lodge his complaint, he took no notice of it. That, from what the villagers of the district told him, he thought there was no truth in the claim. At the same time he was quite willing to give every assistance in arriving at the truth. In answer to our telling him that Mr. Green had two men who would swear to the robbery, the Basha said that according to Koranic law their evidence would not be accepted, as they were personally interested. If, however, we would save him from responsibility with his Government on

that point, he was willing to come to a settlement on the basis of our witnesses' evidence.

We accepted the responsibility, as our object was to come to a speedy settlement. The Basha then said if we would bring Mr. Green's witnesses he would do his best, being anxious to settle the matter at once.

We then took our leave, saying we would bring the witnesses as soon as we could.

On the afternoon of the same day Ben Dris returned from El Zeïtun. He stated that all the people whom he had asked, although he had questioned them separately, agreed in saying that there was no truth in the claim, one of his informants even being the cousin of Abdselam. The gist of their statements was that the oxen, horse, and camel had died natural deaths at the farm, and that Abdselam had not borne a good character in the district. One man stated that Abdselam had owed the Sheikh 13 dollars for taxes, and that the latter had taken a bullock as payment whilst Abdselam was away in Tangier, but that beyond this there had been no robbery.

We then examined Si Hamed Hazhazh, a man who knew the district, and was recommended by Mr. Forde as being truthful. He stated that Abdselam, whom he had known for the last three or four years, bore, as far as he knew, a good character. He knew nothing about the alleged robbery.

Next morning an answer arrived from Mr. Green saying his witnesses would not come to Laraiche, as the new Sheikh (Abdelkader being in prison for a money debt to a Jew) had, by order of the Basha, given out that any men who came as witnesses to Laraiche would be beaten and imprisoned; they would, however, go to Tangier.

He also added that, whilst the evidence of some of his witnesses was being taken down by Notaries (Adools), in accordance with a letter from the Kadi of Laraiche obtained by Mr. Forde, a counter-order arrived by the hands of soldiers of the Basha and Kadi, and the evidence was not proceeded with.

We examined the bearer of this letter, Nasr-ben-Ali, nephew of Abdselam, who had been at El Zeïtun at the time of the robbery. He stated that one foggy morning last September he was herding some cattle, when he saw the Sheikh Abdelkader, with two mounted soldiers ("maghzen") and some infantrymen from Alkazar camp come up and drive away two oxen, one horse, and two camels, belonging to Mr. Green, which were being herded at the time by one Muhamed Sibu (at the time of examining in Tangier); that he did not know what had become of the beasts, and that he was afraid to come to Laraiche and give evidence before the Basha.

He then returned to El Zeïtun, promising to send further witnesses on the following morning.

From what had transpired as to the witnesses' fear of coming to Laraiche, we did not place much trust in Nasr-ben-Ali's promise; we therefore immediately sent a courier to Tangier asking for instructions as to how to act at Laraiche without evidence.

Next day, at 11 A.M., no witnesses having arrived from El Zeïtun (which lay only four hours off), we received instructions from Tangier to await for twenty-four hours the arrival of Mr. Green or his witnesses, who had been ordered to go to Laraiche. We might then act as we thought best. As by the stipulated time next day no one had arrived, we visited the Basha again, and told him the witnesses were afraid to come to Laraiche, and no documents could be made out for the same reason.

The Basha denied that there were any grounds for the witnesses' fear, but offered to send the Sheikh Abdelkader to Tangier if we wished it, and if we thought we could settle the matter there. On being told of the stopping of the witnesses' documentary evidence he denied that it had been done by his orders, and said it was the doing of the Kadi of Laraiche, and he was a bad man. He repeated that the principal people of Zeïtun had told him the robbery was not a fact, but qualified this by saying that if anything had been taken he knew nothing of it. He also denied that any infantry soldiers had been engaged in the matter.

After some further discussion we agreed that the Sheikh should come with us and the other witnesses to Tangier to settle the matter before Torres, and the Basha declared that if Torres, as a result of the inquiry, ordered him to pay any sum in settlement, he would see that it was paid, even though he had to sell his own house to pay it. We then, with expressions of good-will, took our leave, and left for Tangier at 5·30 P.M. the same evening.

Next morning we called at El Zeïtun and examined separately several witnesses: Abdselam's son, two nephews, brother, and another, Ben Säali by name, unconnected with the family. These all bore witness to the fact of the robbery, all except one having been eye-witnesses, and all having been at Zeïtun at the time. There were one or two slight discrepancies in their statements, but on the whole they agreed; they also agreed to come to Tangier as witnesses. They said it would be no use examining other villagers, as they

would only tell lies because of the Sheikh's threats, and they (the Abdselam) family were not popular in the district on account of being "mokhalata."

We arrived in Tangier on the 19th, having met Mr. Green on the road, and brought him back, with further witnesses.

Mr. Green corroborated a story we had heard at El Zeïtun from Abdselam's son: that the Basha of Laraiche had imprisoned one of his witnesses, Ahmed Horefa by name, for trying to get his evidence taken down by Adools at Laraiche. He further stated that Horefa's son, who had been on his way to Tangier to give evidence, had been stopped by the Basha's orders and threatened that if he proceeded his father would be beaten to death in prison.

Two days after our arrival at Tangier, Sheikh Abdelkader and most of Mr. Green's witnesses having arrived, we, together with Mr. Green, interviewed Cid Mahommed Torres on the claim.

After considerable wrangling (in our presence) between the Sheikh Abdselam and the other witnesses, Cid Torres said that the Basha of Laraiche should have settled the question at the time it occurred, and that he could not accept the evidence of Mr. Green's witnesses, for, in the first place, they were personally interested in the matter; secondly, they were all of one family; and, thirdly, their evidence was contradictory; they must therefore settle it by Moorish law.

As this meant an indefinite and probably an inconclusive procedure, we objected, and produced two independent witnesses outside the family. These and other witnesses were then separately examined by Cid Torres, but their evidence was still somewhat contradictory, especially as to the time of the occurrence. We would, however, point out that all Mr. Green's witnesses were very nervous and frightened, as they expected to be reported to the Basha of Laraiche, and probably imprisoned. Added to this, the time of the alleged robbery was about the new Moorish year, so that they were not certain whether it occurred this (Moorish) year or last. Eventually, Cid Torres said they would all have to go to Muley Bu Selam, a celebrated saint-house at least 65 miles off, to swear to the case.

Here the Sheikh interposed, and said the witnesses would swear to anything for a dollar. He further denied most solemnly having taken a single sheep or donkey of theirs, but omitted all reference to the other animals in question. He would not, however, agree to swear to anything, though Mr. Green's witnesses expressed their willingness to testify on oath.

As we demurred to the witnesses going to Bu Selam, Cid Torres decided, after a lengthy discussion, that he would give us a strong letter to the Basha of Laraiche, telling him that he must settle the matter or pay up the claim, and that he would report him to the Sultan; and that he had no doubt the Basha was responsible for the whole thing.

We then told him of the Basha's acts of injustice: of his stopping the Adools of Sahel from taking down evidence, of his imprisoning Horefa, and of his stopping the latter's son from coming to give his evidence at Tangier.

Cid Torres was of opinion that these were additional proofs of the Basha's connection with the robbery, and requested us to forward to him an official letter from your Excellency, stating these acts of injustice. He would then make the Basha pay, and severely reprimand him.

We thereupon thanked Cid Torres and took our leave.

The letter requested by Cid Torres was drawn up and sent to him next day.

On the following day Cid Torres sent the strong letter which he had promised to the Basha of Laraiche. It was written in the presence of Mr. Abensûr, who was acting as our interpreter, and, according to this gentleman, was all that could be desired. A duplicate was also sent to us to forward to the British Acting Vice-Consul of that town to present to the Basha.

In forwarding this letter to Mr. Forde at Laraiche, we forwarded also a letter from Mr. Green authorizing Mr. Forde to act for him in the matter of obtaining the compensation, and leaving it to him to settle the exact amount with the Basha.

An answer was received from Mr. Forde, dated the 28th June, stating that after a long discussion with the Basha of Laraiche he had succeeded in settling the claim for 225 dollars, and the Sheikh Abdelkader was to be kept in prison until it was paid.

We consider this to be a fair price for the animals seized.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ALLAN MACLEAN.

(Countersigned) GLEICHEN, *Captain*,
Grenadier Guards.

No. 10.

Sir West Ridgeway to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received July* 15.)

(No. 105.)

Tangier, June 30, 1893.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith translation of a letter I have received from Cid Emfadl Gharneet, informing me that it is the Sultan's intention to make a pilgrimage to the tombs of his ancestors at Tafilelt, and requesting me to direct the British military instructors at the Court to abstain from accompanying His Shereefian Majesty on this Mission, and to proceed to Marakesh instead.

In my reply to this communication, which is identic to others directed to the French, Spanish, and Italian Ministers, I have reminded the Vizir that Her Majesty's Government have no Military Mission at the Shereefian Court, and that, therefore, I can give no orders in the matter; and I added that I had no doubt that the Sultan would issue to Kaïd Maclean such orders as His Majesty might think fit.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WEST RIDGEWAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 10.

Cid Emfadl Gharneet to Sir West Ridgeway.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

1*st Hedja*, 1310 (*June* 15, 1893).

I BEG to inform you that it is the intention of our Master, His Shereefian Majesty, to visit on pilgrimage, on this fortunate expedition, the tomb of his grandfather, Mulai Ali-el-Shereef, as also those of other saints at Tafilelt, so as to examine those sanctuaries; the circumstances and religion forbid that the military instructors who are here accompany His Shereefian Majesty to Tafilelt, for it would be contrary to religious principles and to the custom established amongst the Shereefs and Kabyles of Tafilelt that Christians should go there, and undoubtedly they would be annoyed and grieved at the Government going to their sanctuaries with the military instructors.

His Shereefian Majesty has therefore thought proper that the said military men should precede him to Marakesh, and not accompany His Majesty to Tafilelt.

His Majesty orders me to inform you of this so that you may write to your military instructors to go to Marakesh, and not to accompany His Majesty to Tafilelt for the above-mentioned reasons.

Peace.

(Signed) MOHAMED EMFADL GHARNEET.

Inclosure 2 in No. 10.

Sir West Ridgeway to Cid Emfadl Gharneet.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

Tangier, June 25, 1893 (10 *Hedja*, 1310).

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 1st Hedja, informing me that it is the Sultan's intention to make a pilgrimage to the tomb of his ancestor, Mulai Ali the Shereef, and requesting me to order the British officers at the Shereefian Court to proceed to Marakesh, and not to accompany the Sultan to Tafilelt.

I request your Excellency to inform the Sultan that as Her Majesty's Government has no Military Mission at the Shereefian Court, it is not necessary that I should give any orders in the sense indicated.

With regard to Kaïd Maclean, His Shereefian Majesty will no doubt issue to him such orders as His Majesty may think fit.

No. 11

Sir West Ridgeway to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received July* 17.)

(No. 108.)

Tangier, July 6, 1893.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that the Sultan left Fez on an expedition to Tafilelt on the 29th ultimo. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cid Emfadl Gharneet, has remained at

Fez in order to conclude some business, probably with Mr. Gentile, the Interpreter of the Italian Legation, but will shortly follow His Majesty.

Mulaï Omar, the Sultan's son, has been appointed Viceroy of Fez during the Sultan's absence, and has under his command a considerable body of troops wherewith to maintain order.

The Sultan's expedition to Tafilelt will probably occupy several months, during which business, as far as regards correspondence with the Court, will be practically at a standstill owing to the difficulty of communication. On his return from Tafilelt the Sultan will take up his residence at Morocco City, and will probably not revisit Fez or Mequinez for eighteen months or two years.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WEST RIDGEWAY.

No. 12.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 17, 1893.

I TRANSMIT herewith a copy of a letter from the Conjoint Committee of the Jewish Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association,* renewing their representations concerning the condition of the Mellah at Mogador, and the continued ill-treatment of the Jews of Morocco City by Hadj Mohamed Ouida.

I have to call your attention to the inclosed despatches which relate to the subject,† and I should wish you to confer with Sir W. Ridgeway as to the further steps which it would be advisable for Her Majesty's Legation to take in regard to these renewed complaints.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 13.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(Separate.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 18, 1893.

AS you are upon the point of proceeding to Tangier as Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, I inclose, for your information and guidance, copies of the instructions addressed to Sir West Ridgeway early in this year upon the occasion of his temporary Special Mission to Morocco.‡

The views of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the policy to be followed by Her Majesty's Representative in Morocco having been so recently expressed, it is not necessary that I should now recapitulate them.

It is my wish that you should continue to act upon the general lines laid down in my instructions to your predecessor.

Sir W. Ridgeway's Report upon his visit to the coast towns, and on the claims of British subjects on the Government of Morocco, has not yet been received, but when it reaches this Office, and has been considered, I will lose no time in furnishing you with a copy, accompanied by such directions as its perusal may suggest.

I have noted with satisfaction that Sir W. Ridgeway's Mission has been attended by a marked improvement in the relations of Her Majesty's Legation with the Moorish authorities, and I trust that, by pursuing a firm but conciliatory course, you will be enabled to place them permanently upon a thoroughly satisfactory footing.

It will no doubt be proper that you should have it in contemplation to visit the Sultan's Court for the purpose of presenting your credentials to the Sultan. But this is not a matter which presses, as His Majesty will for some months be absent from his capital. And indeed, before sanctioning your visit, I should wish to be convinced of its opportuneness, and of its being received by the Moorish Court with the cordiality and consideration due to Her Majesty's Representative. I shall be glad, when you have maturely considered this question on the spot, to receive an expression of your views with regard to it. As at present advised, I should not wish your visit to be more than one of ceremony, unaccompanied by any staff beyond the members of your Legation.

* No. 6. † See Part 7, Nos. 137 and 288. ‡ Ibid., Nos. 64, 119, and 120.

With respect to the question of a Moorish Embassy to England, my opinion is that such a Mission would do more good than harm. Any overtures, therefore, that may be made to you on that subject you will receive with politeness, saying that you are aware that such an Embassy would be welcomed by Her Majesty's Government so soon as the relations of the two countries shall permit of it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 14.

Foreign Office to Aborigines Protection Society.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 18, 1893.

I AM directed by the Earl of Rosebery to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th instant, expressing the hope of your Committee that Mr. Satow may be instructed to inquire into, and, if practicable, to negotiate for the removal of, the evils connected with the system of Consular protection in Morocco.

I am to state to you, in reply, that the matter will not be lost sight of.

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 15.

Sir West Ridgeway to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received July* 20.)

(No. 109.)

My Lord, *Tangier, July* 10, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, three Reports:—

I. On the general questions connected with Morocco;
II. On the question of British claims against the Sultan of Morocco; and
III. On a reorganization of the Consular Service in Morocco.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WEST RIDGEWAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 15.

Sir West Ridgeway to the Earl of Rosebery.

I.—REPORT ON GENERAL QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH MOROCCO.

My Lord, *Tangier, July* 10, 1893.

THE period of my Special Mission as Her Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to the Sultan of Morocco will expire on the 20th instant, and consequently it is desirable that I should submit to your Lordship my Report on the manner in which I have performed the duties imposed upon me.

Your Lordship's instructions to me on the eve of my departure stated that "Her Majesty's Government were at the end of last year painfully impressed with the fact that it was impossible to obtain proper attention to the representations of Her Majesty's Legation, or the barest justice to British subjects;" and the main object of my Mission was to "ameliorate this state of affairs, and to restore the more cordial relations which formerly existed between the two countries." I was further instructed as soon as I was sufficiently informed "to report on the general situation, so complicated by intrigue, fanaticism, and misgovernment." Your Lordship anticipated that I should have the benefit of the advice and experience of Sir John Drummond Hay, who had been nearly half-a-century Her Majesty's Minister in Morocco, and who was still resident in that country; but that distinguished officer, I much regret to say, was obliged by severe illness to leave for Europe soon after my arrival, and consequently I have been deprived of the valuable assistance which I found him so ready to give me.

The announcement of your Lordship's intention to dispatch a Special Envoy to Morocco was the subject of much comment in the press. It was at once assumed that a Mission, essentially of persuasion and conciliation, was to be a Mission of menace and

coercion, and that it would, at the least, be my duty to wring from the Emperor by threats, if not by force, the Treaty which His Majesty had refused to grant to my predecessor. The foreign, and especially the Spanish, press were much agitated, and the necessity of counter-demonstrations in defence of the independence of Morocco was freely discussed.

The publication of the reassuring communications which your Lordship made through Her Majesty's Ambassadors and Ministers as to the true nature of my Mission greatly allayed this excitement, except in Spain, where, probably for electoral purposes, the ambitious designs of England continued to be discussed with vigour. Accordingly, by your Lordship's instructions, I made a short stay at Madrid on my way to Tangier, and there, through the kind assistance of Her Majesty's Ambassador, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, I was honoured by an interview with Her Majesty the Queen-Regent, and also with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and other leading statesmen. I thus had the opportunity of repeating in unmistakable language that the object of my Mission was to alleviate the existing state of affairs in Morocco, and to restore the more cordial relations which had existed between the two countries. And I further explained that my instructions were to act in accord with the Representative of Spain and of the other friendly Powers in all questions affecting our common interests.

I arrived in Tangier on the 1st February, in Her Majesty's ship "Phaeton," and was received on landing with the usual honours and ceremonies by the Moorish officials, including Cid Mohammed Torres, the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, the Governor of the town, and other high functionaries. Many of the foreign Legations were also represented. Under ordinary circumstances one of the first visits I made should have been to the Sultan's Representative, Cid Mohammed Torres, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, the astute and venerable gentleman who, resident in Tangier, acts as the channel of communication between the Sultan and the Corps Diplomatique. Unfortunately I was here confronted by a difficulty. The relations of Great Britain and Morocco when I landed were still in a critical state. I may perhaps be allowed to summarize, as rapidly as I can, the main facts of the case.

In December 1892 a British subject named Trinidad was murdered in the streets of Tangier, and careful judicial inquiry proved beyond doubt that he had been shot by one of the Sultan's military guard, on duty in the streets, without any justification. The Moorish Government, through its Representative, Cid Mohammed Torres, refused all redress whatever—refused even to arrest the persons charged or to give an opinion as to their guilt. The arguments of Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires could not shake the determination of this usually reasonable official, and Sir John Hay, rising from a sick bed, visited his old Moorish colleague, and in vain urged upon him the necessity of complying with the demand for the arrest of the accused. But so low had British prestige fallen that Cid Mohammed Torres, though no doubt desirous to do what he knew to be right, feared lest he should bring upon his head the Sultan's displeasure if he were to afford to the Representative of England the redress which he would not have hesitated to give to any other foreign Representative.

The matter was one of paramount importance. The position of the European colony at Tangier is often a position of some danger. The European residents have been more than once at the mercy of the Sultan's unruly troops when quelling revolution in the neighbourhood. There are no police, nor have the local authorities, however good their intention, the means of preserving the peace should there be any formidable outbreak. The safety of the Europeans chiefly lies in the prestige which surrounds the Corps Diplomatique, and the conviction that an outrage to any of its members or of its dependants will inevitably be followed by punishment swift and severe. These circumstances must have been evident to all the foreign Representatives in Tangier. One and all must have seen the necessity of the vigorous action which was taken by Her Majesty's Government. For an ultimatum was at once sent to Fez to be delivered by Mr. de Vismes de Ponthieu, the Interpreter of the Legation, who had been sent there a few days before to obtain an answer to a letter addressed by your Lordship to the Sultan's Minister, Cid Gharneet, so far back as September, but of which no notice had been taken. This ultimatum demanded that within forty-eight hours of its receipt orders should be issued—

1. For the arrest of the offender;
2. For the payment of an indemnity to the family of the murdered man; and
3. That a reprimand should be administered to the Sultan's Representative, Cid Mohammed Torres.

Your Lordship's ultimatum speedily brought the Sultan to his senses. He at once ordered the arrest of the murderer and the payment of the indemnity, but he did so under

protest, and as ungraciously as possible. His Majesty, however, took no notice of the demand for a reprimand of the Minister responsible in the eyes of the public for the miscarriage of justice and the affront to Great Britain. He was accordingly informed that this demand also must be promptly complied with. When I landed at Tangier the Sultan's reply had not been received, and accordingly I postponed until its receipt the visit of ceremony which under ordinary circumstances I should have at once made to the Minister—much to my regret, for I should have preferred to have found the incident closed, and to have been in a position to inaugurate my mission of conciliation by friendly intercourse.

Fortunately the Sultan's reply, submitting to the demand, was not long delayed, and I was then in a position to call upon the Minister. He received me courteously, but spoke with much emotion of the reprimand which his Royal Master had administered to him, for he contended he had merely declined to take upon himself the responsibility of deciding the case, and had referred the whole matter to Fez. Since this somewhat ill-omened opening my relations with this gentleman have been of a friendly nature, and a few days later he and the Governor were present at a ball in the Legation.

Meantime, my inquiries had satisfied me that at the root of the Sultan's insolent attitude towards England lay the conviction that he had nothing either to fear or to hope from her—that the existence of Morocco was essential to the safety of England, and, however much His Majesty flouted and ignored her reasonable demands, no punishment would follow, for she would still be obliged, in her own interests, to uphold the integrity and independence of his Empire. Accordingly, I took the opportunity, when acknowledging His Majesty's submission to the terms of the ultimatum, to express my great satisfaction at the termination of an incident which had threatened to disturb the friendly relations of the two countries. I assured His Majesty that England desired to see Morocco an independent nation, wisely administering its own affairs, free from the control of any foreign Power. But, I reminded His Majesty, friendship must be reciprocal, and if at any time Morocco should show—which God forbid!—that she did not desire or value the friendship of England, then it would be for England to safeguard her own interests. I understand that this letter produced a very good effect.

On all sides I was told that the influence of England, once so predominant, was a thing of the past. There was much anxiety among my colleagues to know what course I proposed to take, but my reply invariably was that my first duty was to collect information as to the true state of things, and then to make my report and suggestions to Her Majesty's Government.

It was generally assumed that I should proceed to Fez, but your Lordship had directed that I should not do so "unless events should take a new and different turn"—a change which would be indicated, as I was afterwards instructed, by a cordial and spontaneous invitation from the Sultan—I had fully concurred in this policy when it had been dictated to me, but my ideas on the subject underwent some change after landing. I had supposed that I should be able to reach the Sultan through his Representative at Tangier, and that if I could inspire the latter with a conviction of the good-will of England and of confidence in her policy towards Morocco, he would be able, in his turn, to influence the Sultan. But I soon found that I was mistaken. Cid Mohammed Torres is not a channel of communication; he is a buffer. He is merely an additional wheel in the machinery, unnecessary except for obstruction. His duty is to obstruct and evade as much as possible, and thus put off the evil day when the Sultan must give a direct reply to a foreign Minister. He has no power of initiative, nor can he act in any matter on his own judgment. He is the first of the many doors at which a foreign Minister must knock before he gains the presence of the Sultan. The helplessness of Cid Mohammed Torres is now so well recognized that foreign Ministers, in matters of importance, dispense with him as a channel of communication, and address themselves direct to the Court. There is little or no social intercourse between the Minister and the European Representatives; indeed, if Cid Mohammed Torres were to throw away the mantle of reserve and isolation in which he wraps himself, he would lose all influence with and perhaps excite the suspicions of the Emperor. His Majesty's policy is to keep the foreign Representatives as far away as possible, and to interpose as many obstacles as he can, in order to break the force of their demands and remonstrances, and this is the reason of their being crowded in a distant corner of his dominions instead of being resident in his capital. Until the foreign Legations are established in Fez, the Sultan will occupy an impregnable position for evasion and obstruction. There is a veil of impenetrable darkness between the ports of the coast, including Tangier, and the rest of Morocco.

Notwithstanding Military Missions at Fez, and travellers continually on the move, the

foreign Representatives at Tangier have very little information as to what is going on at Fez, and still less as to the course of events in the more distant parts of the Empire. They are at the mercy of every wild rumour which flies about Tangier, but I will here incidentally remark that I am making arrangements which will, I trust, place the British Legation in a better position in this matter.

This being the state of things, I found my position for the collection of information and for the amelioration of our relations with Morocco to be much more difficult than I had anticipated, and I was driven to the conclusion that only by visiting Fez could I obtain the opportunities I desired of collecting information, of discovering the true state of things, and, above all, of conciliating, persuading, and giving confidence to the Sultan.

Your Lordship, however, adhered to your original opinion that it was not desirable to send another Mission so soon to Fez unless the Sultan volunteered a cordial and spontaneous invitation. This has not been forthcoming. The Sultan has more than once expressed to Kaïd MacLean his surprise that I did not come, and his desire that I should do so, but when at last Kaïd MacLean suggested that I was not likely to visit Fez unless requested to do so, His Majesty said it was unusual to invite the foreign Ministers. They come as a matter of course, but, he added, he would consider whether he could not send an invitation. Eventually he decided the question in the negative, for, he argued, if he invited me all the other Ministers would demand the same compliment.

On the whole, I think that His Majesty was right. In the Military Missions at Fez he has ample justification for his fears. In 1877 he engaged the services of Kaïd Harry MacLean, a retired officer of the British army, to drill the infantry. France immediately demanded that his artillery should be placed under a French officer, and eventually the appointment of this solitary English officer was made the excuse for the establishment at the cost of the unfortunate Sultan (or rather at the cost of his soldiers, for the cost of the Missions is deducted from their pay) of the existing military Missions at Fez, namely: France, five officers; Italy, three officers; Spain, four officers; Germany, one officer at Rabat. In addition to these there are three Spanish officers at Tetuan, a Spanish military doctor at each port, and five French officers (two commissioned and three non-commissioned) at Rabat,

With the exception of the Chief of the Italian Mission, Colonel Bregoli, who is Head of the Arms Factory, and of Dr. Linares, the medical officer of the French Mission, who is practically the French Diplomatic Agent at Fez, none of these officers has any duty or employment or special means of obtaining information, for they are regarded by the Sultan as spies. Their presence, on the other hand, is a standing reminder to the Sultan of the jealousies and rivalries of the Powers of Europe as regards Morocco, as well as a warning that any concession to one Power must be atoned for by at least as great concessions to the other Powers. Under the circumstances stated I have been dependent during the period of my mission for information on frequent conversations with every class of person, whatever their nationality. I have listened to all with as unprejudiced a mind as possible, and a very useful tour along the coast from Tangier to Mogador has enabled me greatly to multiply my sources of information.

No sooner had I entered on my duties than I painfully realized the truth and absolute accuracy of the passage in my instructions which referred to the impossibility of obtaining "proper attention to the Legation or the barest justice to British subjects." I was everywhere assured by my colleagues, as well as by English residents, that British influence, once so predominant in Morocco, had descended to zero. The explanation generally accepted of this unfortunate change was the circumstances connected with the break-down of the recent commercial negotiations, and the inference which the Sultan had drawn that England was no longer to be feared, and that her representations might be safely ignored.

I assumed, however, and as events proved I assumed correctly I think, that if the Sultan ever did entertain the wild ideas attributed to him he must have been undeceived by the prompt and vigorous action of Her Majesty's Government in the Trinidad affair. He must then have learned that there was a limit to the patience and forbearance of England which he could not transgress with impunity. But it was necessary to analyze the causes which had brought matters to this pass, and the result of my examination has been to convince me that though the feelings of the Sultan towards England were no doubt embittered during the recent negotiations, yet the decay of English influence dates from a much earlier period; that it has synchronized with the attempts of England to wring commercial and other concessions from the present Sultan, and to force upon him the payment of claims of merchants for debts due by his subjects.

During the greater part of the half-century when Sir John Drummond Hay was Representative of England in Morocco English influence was paramount, greatly owing to

the skilful management of that accomplished diplomatist. It is too often said that the policy of Sir John Hay was merely a policy of masterly inactivity, and that he gained his influence by co-operating with the Sultan in excluding European enterprise from Morocco. Nothing could be further from the truth. Sir John Hay no doubt realized the fact that, even if it were justifiable to use force towards Morocco in order to induce her to adopt a more enlightened policy, such a step was not within the scope of practical politics. So intense are the rivalries and jealousies of Europe as regards Morocco, that no Power would believe in the unselfishness of our motives; and, indeed, if we were allowed to embark in such a crusade we should be prepared to undertake, as its inevitable result, the Protectorate of Morocco.

As Sir John Hay could not act, he did not threaten, for in dealing with an uncivilized people there is nothing more dangerous, nothing more fatal to prestige and influence, than to be discovered in recourse to an empty threat. Sir John Hay's policy was therefore one of patience. He obtained a personal influence over the Sultan, at any rate the late Sultan, and he used that influence wisely and well for the benefit of the civilized world in general, and of Morocco in particular.

To Sir John Hay Europe is indebted for the Commercial Treaty of 1856, by which not merely England, but every other Power who had relations with Morocco, gained their present commercial privileges, insufficient no doubt at the present day, but a triumph of diplomacy at the time when they were yielded by the Sultan of the day.

His successor, Sir William Kirby Green, truly wrote, "there is hardly an improvement which has been effected during the past half-century that cannot be directly attributed to the action of Her Majesty's Government carried out by my able predecessor, Sir John Drummond Hay. . . . . He was never able to assume a tone of approval of the system of government followed, yet by patience and judicious counsels he maintained his influence over the Moors."

If circumstances had permitted the continuance of this policy of patience, Morocco might have developed slowly—very slowly—a wiser policy and a less pernicious administration, though it must be doubtful whether in the end Morocco would have proved to be an exception to the rule that a Mahommedan Empire, whenever brought in contact with a civilized nation, inevitably crumbles to pieces. But this was not to be—Europe would not wait—she was not content that this rich country, in sight of her, with its magnificent climate, its abundant agricultural and mineral treasures—a country about the size of France, capable of being made the granary of Europe as it was in old days the granary of Rome—she would not wait till Morocco opened its doors of its own accord. British enterprise was particularly impatient, and Sir John Hay's influence before his withdrawal was seriously impaired by the establishment of an English Company at Cape Juby, a district claimed by the Sultan as his own—a somewhat doubtful but not unreasonable pretension which the British Government were obliged to contest in the interest of the Company. This has ever since rankled in the Sultan's mind, and he has never forgotten or forgiven what he regards as an act of spoliation. English influence has never recovered the ground which it lost when this question arose, and unfortunately the Cape Juby question, as will afterwards be shown, has never since ceased to be a subject of continual discussion between the two Governments.

Another cause of friction was the negotiations of 1885–86 between Sir John Hay and the Shereefian Government, when Sir John, loyally supported by the French and German Representatives, vainly endeavoured to induce the Sultan to accept a Commercial Treaty, the same Treaty which Sir Charles Euan-Smith in 1892 again pressed upon the Sultan, with such unfortunate results.

The claims of British merchants on account of debts due to them and compensation for robberies accumulated between 1872 and 1886 to a large extent, and the last few years of Sir John Hay's tenure of office were embittered by continual and generally unsuccessful attempts to extract a settlement from the Shereefian Government. Thus, when Sir John Hay retired from office the decay of British influence had already begun. Another reason was that the present Sultan, Mulaï Hassan, who had now ascended the throne, proved to be a much less enlightened and more bigoted Ruler than his predecessor. In his address to the London Chamber of Commerce shortly after his retirement, Sir John Hay said: "My successor, Sir W. Kirby Green, is a very able man, of which he has given proofs wherever he has been employed, either as a Diplomatic or Consular officer, especially at his last post, when Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General in Montenegro. He is also a man of energy and decision, but I have no hesitation in saying that I do not expect he will be able to bring about the desired reforms or the removal of existing restrictions on commerce under the present system of government in Morocco, for the same reasons which had prevented me; and I will go so far as to add that even if the late Lord Stratford

de Redcliffe, under whom I served for many years at Constantinople, the ablest diplomatits of his time, could be brought back to life and was sent to Morocco, his great talents and extraordinary energy would be of no avail if he had to treat with a Government constituted like that of Morocco"

The régime of Sir William Kirby Green was able and vigorous, but his tenure of office, unfortunately prematurely closed by death, was, owing to circumstances beyond his control, stormy throughout. First, he had to exact reparation on a large scale on account of an attack on the Cape Juby Settlement; secondly, he continued the suspended commercial negotiations inherited from his predecessor; and lastly, he was forced by the Sultan's unreasonable attitude to insist on the laying of the cable between Europe and Morocco, and afterwards on its repair. On the latter occasion the work had to be done under the guns of our fleet, so intense was the opposition of the Sultan to establishing telegraphic communication with Europe.

In August 1888 I find Sir William Kirby Green writing: "The system of ignoring remonstrances is not one specially adopted by the Moorish Government with me; it is one of long growth, and the whole question of the disregard of diplomatic representations has been coming forward for years standing well back in the time of my predecessor." And again, on the 4th March, 1889, he wrote, with absolute accuracy, that "In justice to myself I think it right to recall to your Lordship's mind that this irritating and unfriendly policy of the Shereefian Court towards Her Majesty's Minister commenced in the time of my predecessor, and cannot be attributed solely to my action. It may, however, no doubt be largely attributed to the Sultan's Oriental susceptibility to a display of strength and energy by attaching himself to the support of Germany and Italy, who have quite dazzled him by their apparent disregard of French susceptibilities, France having hitherto been considered, owing to its possession of Algeria, as the strongest Power in existence."

At the present time the influence of Germany and Italy are not much greater than the influence of England. All are overshadowed by France, the only Power in territorial contact with Morocco, and therefore the only Power which can at a moment's notice make her power felt, not by harmless demonstrations of iron-clads, which by repetition have become innocuous, if not ridiculous, but by the occupancy of some prized territory, additionally prized because not yet tainted (like Tangier and the other ports) by contact with the infidel. France, too, does not offend the Shereefian susceptibilities like England. She does not preach to him or read him lectures regarding the evils of his administration; she does not demand large commercial concessions from him, but courteously accepts whatever he is inclined to give. She does not fritter away her influence, but reserves it for important occasions such as a cession of territory, when she at once takes a bold and decided line. More than this, it was France that came to the Sultan's rescue when the recent difficulties occurred with England, and I am assured on really reliable authority, and, indeed, I am convinced by my own observations, that the Sultan is sincerely grateful to France for the moral support which she gave, and the material support which His Majesty supposes her to have been ready to give at a critical moment.

The undoubted predominance of France at the present time is the result of this mingled fear and gratitude, but it is not the growth of a night—it is not to be wholly or mainly attributed to the recent negotiations, for it has been creeping upward for many years, and, indeed, it is the inevitable result of the French advance in Algeria. Whatever the cause may be, I undoubtedly found on my arrival at Tangier that the influence of England, and indeed of all other Powers except France, had practically disappeared. Under such circumstances the most dignified policy was one of cold but courteous reserve, and this was the policy which your Lordship desired me to adopt.

This policy would have been comparatively easy in any other Court but that of Morocco. But in Morocco, owing to the restrictions on trade, and especially owing to the system of protection, questions daily arise between the Shereefian Government and the Representative of England. A merchant is robbed; one of his employés is murdered in a wild part of the country; a debtor evades payment of his obligations; a protégé is arrested; a British subject desires to repair his house, or—most futile expectation—asks permission to build a home for himself. Or, the Shereefian Government brings unfounded accusations against some British Naboth whose vineyard it covets. Add to this the ancient claims which are continually cropping up and crying for settlement, and your Lordship will observe that it is impossible for the British Representative to refrain from intercourse or even to materially restrict his intercourse with the Shereefian Court. He has continually to be appealing for assistance or demanding redress.

There is invariably evasion and procrastination on the part of the Shereefian officials. Evasion is one of the most cherished institutions of the country, but whether it exceeds (as it had exceeded in the case of England when your Lordship determined on this

Mission) the limits of possible toleration depends on the influence which the country represented commands.

Having thus sketched—at undue length I fear—the general situation when I arrived at Tangier, I proceed to deal with the various items which composed the Morocco question. I shall attempt to be as concise and precise as possible, but in order to justify and explain the conclusions at which I arrive, and the suggestions which I make, it will be necessary for me to tread paths which have been often trodden before, and to summarize facts which have been already the subject of official Reports.

The questions to be dealt with may be divided into two classes: (1) those which concern Europe in general; (2) those which concern England in particular.

The former class may be conveniently subdivided under the following heads:—

(a.) *The policy and administration of the Sultan.*
(b.) *The system of protection.*
(c.) *The commercial question.*
(d.) *The dangers which threaten Morocco from within.*
(e.) *The policy of Europe as regards Morocco, and the dangers which threaten Morocco from without.*

The *administration* of the Sultan has been often described by official and non-official pens. There is practically no administration. There is merely a machinery for raising money. None of the officials, except the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Tangier and the Customs officials, receive salaries. On the contrary, a Governor buys—often by money borrowed from the Jews—his right to administer a province. A Governor will give perhaps 10,000*l.*, a Collector of Land Revenue 500*l.*, the Superintendent of a Custom-house something over 2,000*l.*, and a very subordinate officer will pay his superior a sum in shillings. All ranks rely on the power their office gives them for extorting presents and bribes from the people. They know that any offence, however grave, which comes to the ears of a superior, or even of the Sultan himself, can be wiped out by the payment of a sum proportionate to its gravity. So long as a Governor satisfies the greed of the Sultan he may exact what he chooses from the people, but if he becomes rich the Emperor will hear of it, and he will be summoned to the Court and made to disgorge. Possibly he may be cast into a dungeon to accelerate the process of extraction. But so long as he is in power he can do what he likes; he is under no control.

The character of the administration depends, therefore, not so much on the character and nature of the Sultan as on the character and nature of the Governor or Kaïd. As a rule, the latter is not cruel, and if the people pay well he will leave them alone. If a man is poor and known to be poor, he may live happily even under the Sultan of Morocco.

Morocco is an advanced democracy. All men are equal except those who have inherited sanctity. Every Moor considers himself to be as good as another Moor, and far superior to any European, be he Englishman, Frenchman, or of any other nationality. During the commercial negotiations of 1886 the Sultan had recourse to a *plébiscite* as to whether he should make the concession required. In his Address to his people His Majesty stated that he was merely one of them, and would do nothing important without consulting them. The policy of appealing to the people is a new departure on the part of the present Sultan, and has been resorted to by him on other occasions; for instance, when cessions of territory have been demanded by Spain and France. We occasionally hear of the Council of the "*Ulemas*" as an important institution, as a Court of Appeal or Privy Council, which the Sultan summons on critical occasions. This is a mistake. The *Ulemas* are learned men who act as a Council of Advisers on religious questions. They have nothing to do with, and are not consulted regarding, political or commercial affairs.

The Sultan is religious, hardworking, economical, with ability above the average. He has a dignified presence and a courteous address. He is said to be proud, sensual, and sensitive, crafty, weak, obstinate, and vindictive. He is also superstitious, and relies much on astral combinations. For superstitious reasons he is averse to capital punishment, but he frequently orders tortures to be inflicted which end in death. Avarice is generally the motive. He is very jealous of a powerful Kaïd; for instance, during a recent expedition to the Soos, the Sultan managed to get into his hands a very powerful Shereef, who was known as the Sultan of the South. The Shereef was compelled to drink a cup of poisoned coffee in the Sultan's presence. Occasionally an obnoxious person is requested not to see the sun rise again. He invariably obeys this invitation to poison himself.

The Sultan is not impervious to feminine influence. His favourite wife, a Circassian, is powerful, and many an affair of State is arranged through her and other inmates of the

harem. A Governor or Kaïd often sends a beautiful girl to the harem in the hope that she may become the favourite of the Sultan and his own protectress. Communication is kept up with her through her mother, who can always obtain access to her. In this way the Sultan has often been influenced with startling effect. For instance, a disgraced Governor, summoned for punishment, has been known to return loaded with honours to the scene of his iniquities.

The Sultan takes considerable interest in European politics so far as they affect Morocco directly or indirectly. The information he obtains is more or less distorted according to the prejudices of his informant. After the rupture of the recent negotiations, when he supposed himself to be threatened with hostilities from England, he did not merely look to France for protection, but felt sure that America—who could not desire to see the cultivation of wheat extended to Morocco—would also come to his rescue. The British occupation of Egypt, and the cruelties perpetrated by her there, are also a favourite theme of conversation. The defeat of the German Army Bills, and the embarrassment to the Triple Alliance, and a possible alliance between France, Russia, and Turkey, have given His Majesty much food for reflection, and the distorted glimpses which he obtains of these and other questions no doubt influence his policy.

The Sultan supervises all details. No Minister can send a letter which has not been read and passed by him. He is not accessible, even to his Ministers, and no one dare initiate a topic, even of business. If he does allude to some pressing affair, the Sultan will probably wave him away, particularly if it refers to "those Christians."

The Sultan is supposed to be very rich. His treasure, which is concealed in Fez, Tafilelt, and Morocco, has been estimated at 13,000,000*l.*, but this, no doubt, is a very great exaggeration. It is difficult to estimate the Sultan's revenue. Judging by the exports and imports of 1892, his receipts from customs during that year should have been 425,700*l.*, and altogether his revenue is probably not less than 1,000,000*l.* He has no administrative expenses, for his Governors and their staff pay themselves by what they can screw out of the people. His expenditure is chiefly on his women and soldiers. He has about 1,500 or 2,000 women in his Palaces. The following is a rough estimate of his annual expenditure obtained by me from a trustworthy source:—

	£
Army	70,000
Allowances to 2,000 relatives and pensioners	14,000
Presents to wives and others	15,000
Household expenses	50,000
uildings and extraordinaries	20,000
Total	169,000

The Sultan spends a great deal of money on his arms factory, and on the formidable, but, for all practical purposes, useless, battery armed with Krupp guns which he is erecting at Rabat, under the superintendence of a German engineer; also on the iron-clad which is being constructed for him in an Italian dockyard. These are the sops which His Majesty throws to friendly nations who, probably by abstaining from unpalatable advice, have earned their reward. On one occasion the Sultan pointed out to Sir William Green the folly of England, who, by her ill-timed counsels, deprived herself of similar crumbs of consolation.

Administration of Justice.

Criminal justice is administered by the Minister for Justice, the Governors and their Deputies, on no principle, and according to no law, rule, or procedure. There are no limits to the powers of the Judge. Offenders are never sentenced to fixed terms of imprisonment. They are merely thrown into prison and left there until some one buys their release. The same is the case as regards prisoners under trial. They are thrown into gaol and often forgotten. There is an appeal to the Sultan personally, but nearly always it must be backed by money. The Governors also exercise a summary civil jurisdiction, but the most important cases are tried by the *Kadi*, or Judge (with the assistance of the *Adools*, or Notaries), according to Shraa, which is custom based on the Koran. According to *Shraa*, only the evidence of Mahommedans can be accepted. A curious feature in every town is the sanctuary, where every criminal or debtor can take refuge, and no one, not even the Sultan, can touch him. The sanctuary is part of the town, separated by gates. The sanctuary at Saffi, which I visited, occupied the space of one-third of the town, and exactly resembled it as regards streets, shops, mosques, &c. It has a population of about 5,000 souls. In the Port towns these sanctuaries are very inconvenient for trade.

The Sultan goes on tour, or *Harka*, every year. It is not supposed to be a military

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expedition, but simply a tour in State through different parts of his dominions. Everybody *en route* is supposed to welcome him. The whole Court and Government travel with him, and ordinary business is not supposed to be interrupted. It is attended to between the hours of 4 P.M. and 7·30 P.M. every evening—the tents serving for offices. He takes only a few of his wives—about sixty. No other women are supposed to be allowed into camp. His escort consists generally of about 15,000 infantry, 5,000 mounted men, and 500 artillery, with about 10 mountain guns. Besides these, all the district Governors, who travel with him, bring a rabble of mounted and foot men with them. A market is held every day, and, excepting for the Sultan's immediate household, provisions are paid for. But when tribes do not pay up their taxes the soldiers' pay is stopped, and they are let loose to plunder and kill—unless the tribe is powerful. In that case the Sultan simply camps in the midst of the tribe, and by intrigues sows dissensions between its members and between itself and the neighbouring tribes. When the tribe is sufficiently weakened, he lets loose his army among them. For a *Harka* in the north of Morocco the Sultan invariably starts from Fez; for the centre of the kingdom from Mequinez, and for the south from Morocco city—these three being his chief residential towns.

Succession.

In the natural course of events, the successor to the present Sultan would be selected rom the family of the present dynasty, and thus there might be hundreds of possible competitors. But the throne will probably fall to one of three men, viz.: the Sultan's uncle, Mulaï Ismail (residing at Fez), his eldest son, Malaï Mahomed, governing in Morocco, or his younger and favourite son, Abdul Aziz, aged about 14 years (also at Fez). A good deal would depend on the Sultan's wish. After his death the Ministers will meet and elect the successor. The Viceroys at Morocco and Tafilelt (and at Fez, if the Court is away) will probably declare themselves Sultan, and then the matter will be fought out, as it was on the succession of the present Sultan. The victory will probably be to him who gets the treasure, for the army will follow the competitor who can pay it best. The Sultan's favourite son is rich, and his father continually confers gifts on him. I observe that when in 1887 the Sultan's death was expected, Spain reinforced the Ceuta garrison, with the avowed intention of supporting the Sultan's nominee by force of arms. Such a step would be a great mistake, for the Moors should be allowed to settle the question for themselves. The Europeans who live in the ports would probably be safe, but the handful who live in Morocco and Fez might be in some danger. Protégés, however, might fare badly.

Taxation.

The ordinary taxation is:—

1. The *dime*, or 10 per cent. on all property, real or personal, with the exception of buildings.

2. A tax of 3¾ per cent. on all transactions connected with the buying or selling of all animals and all kinds of goods and produce.

3. Tax for the maintenance of the army. Besides supplying its quota of men, each tribe has to subscribe 1½ dollars (5*s.* to 6*s.*) a-month for each soldier thus recruited from it during the time the man is wanted.

There are also the extraordinary taxes:—

1. When the Sultan proceeds on an expedition—which is generally annual—a heavy tax is levied, part of which is remitted to the Sultan. The greater part, however, is retained by the Kaïd, whose expenses are very heavy when he also has to join the Sultan with a large contingent.

2. All expeditions dispatched to collect taxes or to suppress risings levy "muna" (provisions), by order of the Sultan, on all the countries they pass through. Sometimes this amounts to a heavy tax on the inhabitants, for the latter have, in addition, to make large presents to the various Commanders (*e.g.*, the advanced guard of nearly 3,000 men which was recently sent ahead of the Sultan to Tafilelt).

3. When the Sultan gets married (which is generally once a-year), when any of the Sultan's sons are married, when His Majesty recovers from an illness—on all these occasions a heavy tax is levied.

4. When a foreign Representative passes through a district on his way to Court, the people of the district are heavily taxed, having to furnish him with supplies, and also to make large presents to the Kaïd of the escort and to the Governor the district.

5. When the pecuniary claims of any European Power are paid, a heavy contribution is always levied on the people of the districts concerned.

The amount and incidence of taxation is left to the Kaïd. If he does not remit what is considered as sufficient, or if he or the people of his district become too prosperous, he is soon brought to book. It is soon known in his district if a Kaïd has amassed wealth, and then an offer is made for him. That is to say, some wealthy speculator writes to the Sultan offering to pay so much for the Kaïd. The Sultan may then either tell the Kaïd that the offer has been made, and give him the chance of pre-emption at the same price, or he accepts the offer. In the latter case the speculator becomes Kaïd, and gains bodily possession of the ex-Kaïd, with whom he can do whatever he likes; he generally imprisons him until he disgorges all the money he has.

The Kaïd collects his taxes through his *Oomana*, or Collectors; there are, perhaps, three or four *Oomana* to a district, but the district is not divided among them. No Governor or Kaïd would trust an *Oomana* alone; he always sets spies—generally some of his own slaves—to watch him. The *Oomana* are, moreover, sent out together, so that one may be a check on the other. They annually examine the produce and property of every person in the district. The grain has to be spread out and the animals and property have to be collected before them; they then assess the value, of which one-tenth has to be paid during the year. The amount of grain due is taken at once in kind, whilst the remainder due is paid in four instalments.

All buying and selling transactions, if not reported by the parties, soon come to the knowledge of the *Oomana* through his spies, and a heavy punishment would follow the omission to pay the tax.

As regards the extraordinary taxes, the Kaïd is warned from the Court that a contribution is expected. He immediately assesses the inhabitants of his districts according to their capabilities, and remits to the Court the amount which he thinks fit. If it is not sufficient he is promptly told so.

The Governor, or Kaïd, has complete power over every one in his district. He can summon any one, and demand what he likes. The man has to pay or to go to prison. The theory is that everything that a man possesses—even his wife—belongs, not to himself, but to the Sultan, for whom he holds it in trust.

Prisons.

The condition of the prisons is certainly startling to the European who has not become callous by habit or indifferent through the conviction that he can do no good. The prisons I have seen are on the coast. You pass through a guard-room and look through a window into a large room or courtyard, dark and noisome, more or less crowded with men, most of them chained and fettered in varying degrees. All—rich and poor—debtor and criminal—are thrown into this inclosure, and out of this they never move till death or a bribe, or (more unlikely) the mercy of the men who put them there causes them to be released. Probably none of the prisoners have been tried, and certainly none of them have been sentenced to a fixed period of imprisonment. A man may be released to-morrow, or he may be there for life. He does not know, probably no one knows. This is the dark side of the picture. On the other side may be found certain advantages and privileges. The authorities can nearly always be bribed. The weight of the chains, for instance, depends on the wealth of the prisoner. On entering the gaol he is shown, if condemned to wear chains, a collection of fetters varying in weight, each with its price affixed. The weight of his chains will be in an inverse proportion to the price he is willing to pay. There is no solitary confinement. Every one is free to move about, so far as his fetters permit, and talk and play, and (if a friend supplies him with tobacco) smoke with the other tenants of the prison. Friends may supply food, or even articles of furniture of any description—in this way a Moorish prisoner has all the advantages of a first-class misdemeanant in an English gaol. Those who have not friends to support them may make a living by any handicraft, for they are allowed to use their hands as they like, and to sell the product at the window of the gaol. Those who have no friends, and who cannot work, are supplied with food by their fellow-prisoners, or by some mosque, or by a daily allowance of bread from the prison authorities. There is seldom or ever starvation. Taking into consideration the standard of living to which the generality of the prisoners are accustomed to when at liberty, I should not be surprised if they would regard with dissatisfaction a transfer to an English prison, with its isolation, discipline, and monotony.

The prisons in the interior are much worse, I understand, than those in the towns where Europeans reside. The latter enjoy the light of day (to a limited extent) and the air of Heaven (more or less tainted), but in the interior the prisons are generally underground, and are veritable dungeons. Prisoners, sometimes forty in number, are fastened

together at night by a single chain, in addition to the fetters on their hands, feet, and perhaps necks. They may die of starvation, and it is said, but I can find no evidence of the fact, that their corpses sometimes remain among the living for several days. No attempt is ever made to clean out the dungeon, which is one foul cesspool. Such is reported to be the condition of these dungeons, and the substantial truth of the description was admitted by Sir William Green when called upon for a Report. He added that he was helpless, and that this and other administrative evils in Morocco "were beyond the power of simple diplomatic representation."

The reform of the Morocco prisons is a subject which might surely be taken up by the combined European Powers. They have the right to do so, for many of the unfortunate men who are lingering in these dungeons owe their incarceration to European diplomacy exerted on behalf of their trading protégés. The cleansing of this Augean stable should be the first care and thought of an English Representative.

Jews.

The Jews of Morocco number about 300,000, but many of these are in the mountain districts absorbed in the general population, with whom they fare equally well. The position of the others is much improved for the better by the exertions of the Anglo-Jewish Association and the "Alliance Israélite Universelle de Paris." Indeed, on the whole, the treatment of the Jew is better than that of the Moor. Most rich Jews enjoy protection, and even the poor Jew, who is still a Moorish subject, is exempt from taxation, excepting the "jeziah" or yearly tribute, which is paid solely by the rich, and military service, and in civil matters between Jews he is practically subject to his own laws administered by his Rabbi. On the other hand, the Jew is subject to certain disabilities in the interior; for instance, he is obliged to wear a special costume, such as a black skull cap and black shoes, and he is not allowed to ride through the Medina or Moorish quarter of the town. But these disabilities do not exist in Tangier or in any of the coast towns where Europeans reside. The Jew is always a trader, and generally a money-lender, and in this way he gains much influence. In the interior his position is not so good as in the coast towns, but on the whole he is well treated.

Still, the Jewish Association do well to be vigilant, for doubtless the improvement which has taken place in the status of the Jew, and the comparative security which he enjoys, are greatly due to the energy and watchfulness of his countrymen in London and Paris. On several occasions when some anti-Semitic official has distinguished himself by excesses towards the Jews in his charge, the Associations in question have made the civilized world ring with their denunciation, and the result has been that the Sultan has awoke from his apathy and hastened to allay the storm. The last occasion on which this occurred was in December last, when the Chargé d'Affaires of Great Britain and the Minister of Italy sent identic notes to the Sultan protesting against the flogging and ill-treatment of Jews in Morocco city, where there is a Governor who is exceptionally hostile to them. The Sultan rebuked the tyrannical Governor, and a temporary amelioration followed, but I was informed on my recent visit to Mogador that the Governor had again reverted to his cruel practices. I have sent for further information, and on its receipt I shall submit it to your Lordship for instructions.

The Sultan is believed to be personally well-disposed towards his Jewish subjects, more particularly as the Koran denounces ill-treatment of them. The Jews are obliged to live in the interior in "Ghettos," which in the towns are known as *Mellahs*, but nearly every town is divided into three quarters: the *Kasbah*, or official quarter; the *Medina* for Moors and Europeans (where the rich Jews also generally live); and the *Mellah*, or Jewish quarter. I doubt if this is or should be a grievance. The Jews prefer to live together and practically to rule themselves. Their quarters are securely walled, and the gates are guarded, so they are comparatively safe in the event of one of those savage uprisings against them which occasionally disgrace even Europe.

The principle of the separate Mellah is, I think, generally good, but I have nothing to say in defence of the particular Mellah of Mogador. I carefully examined it on my recent visit to that town. I have seldom, if ever, in the course of my varied experience contemplated anything more revolting. I can vouch for the truth of the following description in a letter from the Anglo-Jewish Association, dated the 20th November, 1890, to the address of Sir William Kirby Green: "In many instances from eighteen to twenty persons work, eat, and drink in a small, dark, and dirty room; that the average number of persons occupying one room is six; that they are huddled together without regard to age or sex; that in some instances as many as three generations are found closely packed together in one noisome and pestilential dwelling." Far from being exaggerated, this

statement does not adequately describe the frightful condition of things. The "small, dark, and dirty room" has often no window, but is pitch dark, and its floor is soaked in filth, while the only door opens into a noisome *pateo*, or covered courtyard, where the cesspool is in close proximity to the drinking water; this in its turn is crowded with miserable fragile huts, and is dependent for light and air on a door opening on a narrow street or alley running with filth. The stench is so terrible that no European stomach could endure it unmoved. And the marvel of it is that there does not appear to be a proportionate amount of death or sickness, and the people, as a rule, look well-fed, contented, and often well-dressed.

The Moorish authorities explain that the state of things I have tried to depict is due to the grasping avarice of the landlords—all rich Jews—who obtain high rents for this miserable accommodation, but do nothing for their clients. There, indeed, appears to be room for additions to the existing houses, and means of improving them. In deference to expostulation, the Sultan has allotted a new quarter for the Jews, but it is feared that this land will fall into the same hands, and that the people will not benefit much. I think the matter is well worth the consideration of the Anglo-Jewish Association. There ought to be some way out of the difficulty, by appointing, for instance, the Rabbi and a few Jews of character to take the supervision of the building of the new quarter. I have directed Mr. Allan Maclean, the new Consul, from whose energy and experience I expect much, to take this matter in hand so soon as he assumes charge of his office.

Agriculture.

Agriculture is extremely primitive. The rudest implements are used, and there is no tendency to take advantage of scientific or mechanical improvements. There are great capabilities in Morocco, for there are vast tracts which could be easily brought under cultivation, but there is no inducement to the people to reclaim. The benefit would not be to them, but to the grasping local officials, who would speedily rob them of the fruits of their labour. Without European enterprise and capital these possible cornfields will remain barren.

The Army.

The strength of the regular army of the Sultan is as follows:—

	Men.
Infantry	15,000
Mounted men	5,000
Engineers	500
Artillerymen	1,000
Total	21,500

There are eighty guns (different patterns, from 4-pounders to 15-pounders) and ten machine-guns for rifle ammunition.

The Chief in Command is the Sultan, and the Generals any one, civilian or soldier, whom he may appoint. Any one is given command of an expedition.

Infantry (15,000 men).—Five thousand of these serve constantly with the colours, and are enlisted voluntarily. The remaining 10,000 are recruited by conscription from the tribes in submission to the Sultan, and are called Government tribes. Regiments are named after the district in which they are raised, or from the name of the Colonel commanding. There are about 1,000 men in each regiment, with the same proportion of officers as a British battalion. Officers purchase their position, and each step, from the Minister for War. No attention is paid to fitness, efficiency, or station in life. Colonels and Captains are mounted, and carry a rifle in active service, but not on parade. About five battalions are armed with the Comblein rifle (Belgian pattern). The rest have the Martini-Henry. Each man carries a bayonet—with or without scabbard—and an ammunition pouch with about ten rounds of ball cartridge. Excepting in two regiments —which have been instructed in French—all words of command are given in English.

The dress is a loose short coat, waistcoat, cotton shirt worn inside, loose baggy cotton knickerbockers, red fez cap, yellow slippers.

The pay is nominal. Every man follows a trade. Every officer lives on bribes for excusing men under him from attending to their duties. Each man rations himself.

The transport is two mules per 100 men served out by Government, but men take their own donkeys, &c., with them on expeditions. Officers supply their own extra transport. Colonels and other officers provide their own tent accommodation. Four small tents, bell pattern, are issued to each 100 men. The bands of regiments consists of company buglers and drummers.

There are practically no trenching tools.

There has been no drill for three years. In the whole infantry 500 men know battalion drill; 5,000 men know company drill; two officers are capable of brigade drill. Excepting under Kaïd Maclean's personal command, in time of fighting, all drill would be quite forgotten.

Physically, the infantry are a fine body of men, with powers of pluck and endurance. They are capable of marching eighteen consecutive hours—say 60 miles—without knocking up. They have plenty of dash. They will go anywhere for *loot* or religion. They are treacherous, and their morality is Oriental. Unofficered by Europeans they are no more use than the same number of untrained natives. But it must always be remembered that a boy in Morocco is born with a gun in his hands, and that to die in bed is considered a disgrace.

The *Mounted Men* (5,000)—they cannot be called *Cavalry*—are mostly voluntarily enlisted, father succeeding son frequently. Otherwise they are detachments from different tribes. There is hardly any organization at all. A Colonel will have a Major, five or six Captains, and from 100 to 500 men under him, sometimes more, sometimes less.

Each man carries a sword (which he cannot draw except with great difficulty, and does not know how to use) and a rifle. These men have about 1,000 Winchester carbines and 500 Martini-Henrys. The rest have long-barrelled flint-locks. The dress are the long robes of the country, with a tall red cap. The cavalry, or rather mounted men, are an absolutely useless body of men, who could be repulsed by shouts and blank cartridge. They are hardly paid at all, but are used as policemen and messengers, and live by extortion.

The *Engineers* (500) consist mostly of men who have been to Europe and have been partially trained in military or scientific schools. They are useless, as they have forgotten everything that they have ever learnt.

The *Artillery* consists of eighty guns of different sizes and patterns; some are carried on pack mules, some slung between camels, and some on wheeled carriages (in extremely bad order). Of ammunition there is very little, and it often gets mixed. There are ten machine-guns of different patterns, but there is no Moor who can work them. The strength is 1,000 artillerymen, not organized in batteries, and recruited from infantry and from coast detachments. They can serve muzzle-loaders very well. Moorish artillery has a good moral effect in tribal wars, but they need not be taken into account by a European enemy.

Those enlisted by conscription are recruited territorially, battalions bearing the name of their respective districts. A theoretical system exists, but is not practised. The method of recruiting is as follows: A Sultan's letter, indorsed by the Minister of War, is sent to the Kaïd of the district, instructing the latter to send a certain number of men to serve with the colours. The Kaïd promptly selects the richest men in his tribe and warns them that they must serve in the Sultan's army. These men lodge objections with the Kaïd. He mulcts them each of a sum of money, and tells them to arrange for substitutes. This they do. Then the Kaïd gathers together the chief men of the tribe and explains that Government pay is so small it is necessary that the whole tribe should subscribe in order that each recruit may be given a sum of money to enable him to live while he is on service. Accordingly a subscription is made. Of this a recruit will receive about 20 dollars. The remainder of the fund, plus a portion of the sum collected from the originally selected recruits (who are excused), is sent to the Minister of War as a perquisite. Each recruit has made his own arrangement with the man he is substitute for, and according to the amount of money he has received he will remain with the colours for three or six months. He is not allowed to leave until he has "squared" the Minister of War, unless he deserts. At ploughing or harvest time these men desert in companies at one time. But they are not generally called out until harvest is over.

Reserves.—Every able-bodied man is bound to serve in case of national danger. This might, in the case of a *Jehad*, or holy war, it has been estimated, mean 800,000 men, of whom 200,000 have been through a good source of drill; 150,000 would be armed with breech-loaders (very little ammunition), 250,000 would be mounted. It must be remembered that all these men regard war as a recreation, and have been brought up in the saddle with guns in their hands.

Not more than 200,000 of these could be brought up to one spot; this, I am informed on good authority, could be managed in three weeks. After a month away from their own district they would quarrel amongst themselves, so there would be no cohesion, and in a short time a great many would return to their own homes.

To sum up, the regular army as a whole, is a rabble, but it is equal to the Sultan's

domestic requirements. It would be absolutely useless as a trained force against a European army. One general action would exhaust the ammunition for artillery and breech-loading small-arms. The men have forgotten what drill they ever knew. At present no drill is allowed. The general population or reserves fighting in their homes might keep up a desperate guerilla war, at least so long as their ammunition lasted.

Slavery.

About one twenty-fifth of the entire population of Morocco are slaves, though many of them are to all intents and purposes free.

The Sultan is by far the greatest slave-owner in the country. He possesses large locations, or farms, where they are allowed to intermarry. After satisfying his own requirements in the way of servants and concubines, he sells the surplus stock.

Other rich men who own a number of slaves follow his example, and this is the principal source of supply for the slave-markets throughout Morocco. Families are sold in one lot, or separately, whichever appears the more profitable course. Slaves as a rule are well treated (the Sultan's being an exception), it being to the interest of their masters that they should be in good condition.

They are generally contented, and if they consider themselves ill-treated they have the right to demand that they should be sold in the market. The beating of slaves is not considered ill-treatment unless it results in their being bed-ridden.

They are never worked in gangs or driven by overseers, as used to be the case when slavery was an institution in America.

There are public markets in which slaves are sold in every town and district excepting in those coast ports where Europeans reside, and the sales are carried on privately.

About 1,000 fresh slaves are introduced every year from the interior of Africa. They are bought at Timbuctoo in exchange for European and Moroccan merchandize. Thence they are conveyed by caravans to Soos. The annual market at M'Gool in Soos is the principal depôt. They arrive thin-looking, but in pretty much the same condition as the people who bring them—the long desert journey being trying to slaves and freemen alike. Occasionally they are badly treated on the road—but it is to the self-interest of sellers that their human wares should be in good saleable condition.

These slaves are generally quite young children. In Soos the average price of a young negress on her first arrival from the interior, who is quite healthy, and about 7 years old, would be 50 dollars. A boy under the same conditions, about 25 dollars. If sold again, almost immediately, in a town, a profit of about 30 per cent. would be realized.

Girls reach their best value—from 90 to 150 dollars—on arriving at a marriageable age.

As a rule a lower-class Moor will purchase a quite young negress as an investment. During her childhood she will work for his wife and learn to perform household duties, and then when she arrives at the desired age he will sell her at a large profit.

Merchants from all corners of Morocco attend the M'Gool market, some to buy on commission, some to invest on their own account.

On his return to his own town or district the trader will warn the local Superintendent of the Slave-market of his approaching arrival, and will give a glowing account of his purchases in order to incite curiosity and expectancy.

On arriving he will hawk his newly-acquired maidens round to the houses of rich people, and try to sell them privately at fancy prices. Failing in this he will place them on the market to be sold by auction.

The principal points in a girl a purchaser looks to are her teeth and soundness in limb and body. They argue that bad teeth denote a feeble digestion and ailing health. In boys they look for health, physical strength, and capability for work of a general or technical kind.

Negroes and negresses (slaves) perform all the offices of servants in Europe.

Another description of slavery applies to those girls who are stolen from country villages, or are taken in war, and afterwards sold as slaves. There are a considerable number of these, and some of them are very beautiful.

They are usually bought to be used as concubines, and they are generally clever enough to make, comparatively speaking, good positions for themselves, often superior to that of legally married women.

Their market value, when still virgins, amounts to sums varying from 200 to 1,000 dollars.

Sometimes pilgrims on their return from the Prophet's tomb in Mecca will purchase white females in Stamboul, Egypt, or Tunis. They smuggle them into Morocco, often

under the noses of European Consuls, as their wives. Once in the country they command a high price—from 300*l.* to 1,000*l.*—according to the extent of their charms and accomplishments.

Sometimes these girls marry their masters—as happened to a Circassian, who is the favourite wife of the present Sultan, and was his slave, acquired by purchase, before she became his wife.

There are not more than 150 eunuchs in Morocco, and they are all owned by the Sultan and his relations. They are immensely prized, and, consequently, spoilt and pampered. They live to great ages, and all of them have wonderful constitutions, probably because it is only the fittest who could have survived the frightful operation they have undergone.

The mortality among slaves does not seem to differ with that of the other communities in Morocco, excepting in regard to boy slaves employed about the Royal Palaces. Numbers of these children die of pulmonary complaints, the result of semi-starvation, cold, general neglect, and cruelty. They are quite at the mercy of the eunuchs, who are the hardest of all taskmasters.

Masters are allowed by Koranic law to cohabit with their female slaves. If a female slave have a child by her master such child is free, and in the same position as his other children born to his wives. The mother cannot be sold, and becomes free on the death of her master.

Were slavery in Morocco abolished, 300,000 people, thoroughly accustomed to being looked after, and provided for without any thought for themselves, would be homeless and resourceless.

Slaves are admitted to the same privileges as free natives, and practise the Mahommedan religion.

Moors contend that to own slaves is permitted by Koranic law, and that therefore those who seek to do away with the institution of slavery are attacking the religion of the country.

Morocco did not sign the Brussels Convention, though Persia and Turkey did.

About ten years ago British protégés were forbidden to hold slaves, and all such were supposed to be manumitted.

Practically this order had no effect, as the slaves, when existent, remained as servants.

There is a considerable resemblance between Afghanistan and Morocco. Both these so-called nations or Empires are merely a collection of unruly independent tribes loosely held together, which readily use their right of revolution when their Ruler displeases them. The situation in each country has been greatly changed by the institution of standing armies equipped with breech-loaders. The Ruler has thus been strengthened, and the tribes have been proportionately weakened. In the matter of the succession, for instance, these armies threaten to be the Prætorian guards who will settle this question, which was formerly decided by the people, perhaps after a succession of sanguinary fights.

Both Afghanistan and Morocco are in contact with one or more Great Powers, and both Empires are shrivelling up before the friction which inevitably follows that contact. Both countries are fanatical, and hate, and would exterminate if they could, all Christians. But so far as I have been able to judge, the fanaticism of the Moor is not nearly so bitter and violent as that of the Afghan. In Morocco I find British travellers freely moving about, and even missionaries (with admirable tact and discretion it is true) preaching Christianity without molestation or, generally speaking, annoyance. Although the danger to Europeans in Afghanistan is greatly exaggerated, the same security does not exist.

The population of Morocco has been variously estimated. One estimate—framed by a careful and experienced officer—reckons the population at 4,500,000, in the following proportions :—

Moors	1,750,000
Berbers	2,000,000
Arabs	250,000
Negroes	200,000
Jews	290,000
Christians	10,000

Another estimate is 8,000,000. Whatever the total is, more than half are practically independent, contributing not a penny or a man to the Sultan's necessities. These practically select their own Governors, and, like the Anghera tribe in the close vicinity of Tangier last year, would quickly get rid of a Governor who did not suit them. The population which live in the ports where the influence of European civilization is felt do not

suffer much, so there only remains the population of the plains in the interior who are at the mercy of the Sultan's agents, and even they, as I have remarked above, are left alone so long as they have not the reputation of having money in their pockets.

In fact, the Sultan's secular power and prestige are limited and restricted to a small portion of his so-called Empire. His chief authority lies in the fact of his being Pope as well as Emperor of Morocco. He is of holy lineage, but unfortunately for him there are others still more holy. There are other Popes in Morocco. For instance, the Shereef of Wazan, who can also trace his descent to Fatma, the beloved daughter of the Prophet, is *facile princeps* among the Popes of Morocco. Indeed, as I write these lines, I hear the reports of guns and fireworks and the ringing acclamations of an excited crowd who are welcoming back after a brief absence from Tangier the sacred progeny by an English Christian wife of a drunken saint—the late Shereef of Wazan—who was wont to deck himself in the uniform of a French General. For no crime or even apostacy in the individual can extinguish the halo which adorns him in consequence of his holy descent. I shall have more to say about this family later when I deal with the dangers which threaten Morocco from within, but I have written enough, I think, to show that the Sultan is by no means an omnipotent tyrant, and that, bad as is the administration of his Empire, the fate of his subjects is not so black as might reasonably be imagined.

There is, of course, much, and I believe increasing, discontent, but though the population should, *sua si bona norint*, long for deliverance, I am confident that if another *plébiscite* were taken there would be an overwhelming verdict against any Christian interference with the present state of things.

There are only two ways of reforming the administration, first, gradually by the influence of European ideas, which will slowly but surely make itself felt as civilization and commerce find their way in the country. The other way is by forcing on the Sultan, by the will of Europe, the reforms which are necessary. The latter is certainly the policy which should be adopted, but is it possible? Who is to be the mandatory of Europe? Certainly not England. Her interference would indeed cause the storm to burst, and if she undertakes this chivalrous rôle she must be ready not merely to quell a rebellion in Morocco, but to face the resistance of more than one Great Power, and then to assume the Protectorate and perhaps administration of this vast and unruly Empire. Some enthusiasts may hope that the European Powers could be induced to act in concert. But the age of crusades is over. Europe might intervene if she had great common material interests to serve, but a mere sentiment, such as the reform of Moorish prisons or the abolition of domestic slavery, which the slaves themselves would probably resist, will never bring about combined European interference in the affairs of Morocco.

Under these circumstances there is no option but to trust to the tact and patience of England's Representative; to choose a man who can be trusted to acquire influence, and by advice (in season but not out of season) gradually to bring about the reforms which are so desirable. The sooner British commerce and philanthropy understand that in the present state of Europe this is the only feasible policy, the better for the prosperity of Morocco and for the peace of the world. England's Representative would not then be forced by the clamour of irresponsible enthusiasts into impossible enterprises and unnecessary humiliation.

I understand that the Sultan, who has great charms of manner, has little sense of humour, notwithstanding that Irish blood flows in his veins. Nevertheless, I feel sure that he and his astute Minister for Foreign Affairs would enjoy a hearty laugh if they were threatened with a combined movement on the part of the European Powers. Their policy is and always has been based on the jealousies and rivalries among these Powers which they so thoroughly understand and utilize. Their policy is one of isolation and obstruction, and they perfectly understand that it is only by playing off one Power against another that they can preserve their equilibrium. They have some fear that France, practically their only neighbour on land, may prove stronger than all the Powers put together; hence their present attitude towards France. But there always have been these ups and downs in their relations with the European Powers, and I do not believe, as some do, that there is any danger of the Sultan accepting a French Protectorate. So long as a superficial submission to France insures him immunity from encroachment, so long perhaps may the present attitude continue, but sooner or later the Sultan will probably again seek the friendship of England and other Powers.

When the Sultan desires to conciliate a Power, his policy is to make some concession to it, the smaller the better, so long as it serves its purpose; indeed, His Majesty was heard to say that the late English Mission was the only case in which a foreign Minister had gone away empty-handed. A foreign Representative seldom if ever gets all he asks for, but he always obtains some advantage for his country, such as a commercial

concession, a settlement of claims, or an important contract. These concessions mount up, and in time make a sum total of advantages by which commerce greatly benefits, and I fear that so long as Europe cannot act in unison this is all that can be done.

Indeed, the great difficulty in the situation is the jealousy which divides the European Representatives at Tangier. The negotiation of a Commercial Treaty is the Blue Ribbon of a diplomatic career in Morocco. The Minister who succeeds is distinguished above his fellows. At present, Count Tattenbach, the German Minister, occupies that proud position. There is no national excuse for this jealousy, for the concessions obtained for one nation are equally enjoyed by all others under the "most-favoured-nation" clauses. This point will, however, be more appropriately dealt with when I come to consider Commercial Treaties, and I merely refer to it here to show the difficulty, indeed hopelessness, of getting the Corps Diplomatique of Tangier to act unselfishly and single-mindedly for the good of Morocco. If such a policy is to be inaugurated, it must be forced on the different Representatives by their respective Governments, who must require them to discard deep-rooted prejudices, suspicions, and rivalries, and work with one accord for the removal of the frightful abuses among which they live.

At present there is no sign of this millennium; certainly it is not to be found in the Council-room of the "Conseil Sanitaire," or, in other words, the Corps Diplomatique, to which the Sultan has delegated the sanitary control, as regards quarantine, &c., of Tangier and the other ports. In order to understand this action of the Sultan, it must be explained that His Majesty's interests in Tangier and other ports open to trade is comparatively slight. They are frequented by Europeans and Christians, and consequently His Majesty attaches much less value to them than to other towns and provinces which remain untainted. The Sultan probably receives Reports of the debates and doings of the "Conseil Sanitaire," and no doubt he often smiles at their divisions and collisions of interests. Recently he seized an opportunity of throwing an apple of discord among them. The sanitary condition of Tangier is, as your Lordship is aware, most unsatisfactory. The Sultan has been repeatedly pressed to improve this state of things, but he is not inclined to spend Shereefian money in making Tangier a more healthy residence for Christians. However, last year Count d'Aubigny, the French Minister, succeeded in extracting from the Sultan a series of concessions by which the municipal administration was practically placed in the hands of the "Conseil Sanitaire," or of a body to be appointed by them.

These concessions gave the Corps Diplomatique power to provide for and levy taxes on account of the construction of abattoirs, the draining and cleaning of the streets, and, above all, for the supply of drinking-water, a want which is grievously felt among the poorer classes, who include several thousands of Spaniards. More than a year has passed, and nothing has been done beyond repeated discussions, which have only proved, what was only too well proved before, that international and personal jealousies will for ever prevent the Representatives of Europe from joining hands even to battle with the dirt, disease, and misery amongst which they live. The Sultan fully appreciates this; indeed, he would never have offered these concessions had he not anticipated the result, and he again consoles himself with the conviction that European diplomatists who cannot act together in the cause of benevolence and personal self-interest, where no political element need enter, are not likely to combine in forcing him to make commercial concessions, which will be to the greater advantage of one than of the other, or to introduce reforms which, by giving a new lease of life to Morocco, will defeat the designs of the more aggressive Powers. *Divide et impera* is the key-note of the Sultan's external and internal policy.

Protection.

I next approach the question of *Protection*, that institution which has been so much and so long abused. The conclusion to which a dispassionate study of its working has led me is that protection is a pernicious system which has fully deserved the abuse heaped upon it, even by the most enthusiastic of philanthropists. No one has a good word to say for protection, though its existence is often (and with reason) justified on the ground of necessity.

By protection is meant the system by which Moorish subjects of the Sultan are removed by the stroke of the pen of some Minister, Consul, Vice-Consul, or even merchant, from the jurisdiction of the Sultan, and subjected solely to the jurisdiction of foreign Consuls. They are thus exempted from liability to pay taxes or from service to the State, and what is perhaps worse than anything else, they are entitled by custom to the support of the country which protects them in the claims which they bring forward against other Moorish subjects.

Originally only foreigners enjoyed these privileges, and no great inconvenience seems to have been experienced. Indeed, according to Sir John Hay, there was no difficulty before the days of protection in obtaining redress when the employés of merchants were arrested or interfered with, but that was in the halcyon days when Sir John Hay's influence was paramount, and when another and wiser King reigned over Morocco. Concerning this point Sir William Kirby Green wrote in January 1888: "The system which I should favour would be the entire abolition of protection of natives engaged in the service of foreigners for the purposes of commerce, agriculture, &c. I would maintain the protection of all natives employed by the Diplomatic Representatives, and fix the number of natives entitled to protection from being in the service of Consular officers." It cannot, however, be doubted that if protection were suddenly abolished without any adequate safeguards a deadly blow would be struck at commerce.

The reason why the fanatical Moor seeks protection from the Christian is because under his own Government there is no security for life or property. Both are at the mercy of any grasping Governor. In Morocco trade is not carried on direct with the interior by the merchant at the port. This is not allowed by the Shereefian Government. Accordingly he must employ Moorish agents, and send them with merchandize to sell to, or with money to buy from, the inhabitants of the country. Even now, when these agents enjoy protection, they are occasionally arrested and robbed by unscrupulous officials. What chance of safety would they have if they were placed beyond the pale of protection, unless some other means of obtaining justice for them can be devised? Again, under the present Sultan Europeans are practically forbidden, in the teeth of Treaties, to hold land. This disability is often evaded (following the analogy of the Roman Catholics in Ireland in the time of the Penal Laws) by entering into partnership with a Moor who, *ipso facto*, becomes entitled to protection.

This is the favourable aspect of protection, but when we look at its reverse side, and realize the disgrace and humiliation which the system brings upon civilization and Christianity, and the grave political dangers bred by it, which are now coming to maturity, I am almost inclined to agree with those who contend that it should be destroyed quickly root and branch.

It is notorious that protection has become an object of traffic, and that merchants, Vice-Consuls, and Consuls have made handsome incomes, if not fortunes, by selling it. Only the rich Moors are, as a rule, protected. Once a Moor amasses wealth his aim is to obtain protection. He has no claim to it, for he has never been out of Morocco, he has no connection with any European firm; perhaps, indeed, he has made his money by the Slave Trade. But there are quarters where men such as he can buy protection, it is merely a question of the price to be paid. There is also the system of selling back a protected Moor. A Governor anxious to seize the wealth of a protected Moor, and baulked in his desire so long as the man is protected, will offer a sum of money to the protecting Consular officer or merchant if he will cause it to be withdrawn. In most cases such a proposal will of course be indignantly repudiated, but in others it will be accepted or made the excuse for securing more money out of the protégé. But if I were to enlarge on the evils of the system, the scope of this Report would be enlarged beyond all reasonable limits. Volumes have been written, and the archives of the Foreign Office contain official Reports which in dry and judicial language fully justify all the abuse which has been heaped on the system by passionate and indignant philanthropists.

When the subject has been discussed by the Cabinets of other Powers not one has denied the evils of the system, though its existence and continuance are defended on the ground that in the present demoralized state of Morocco it is a necessary evil, unless the dream of all Moorish Sultans is to be realized and the doors of Morocco, barely opened, are again to be closed on European enterprise and commerce.

Protection was legalized by the French Agreement of 1863. Until then it had been sanctioned by no Treaty or Convention, nor even by the practice of England. It sprung up out of the decay of Moorish authority and prestige, more especially after the campaign of 1844, when the superiority of Europe was finally established by the bombardment of Tangier and Mogador by the Prince of Joinville and by the crushing defeat of the Moors in the battle of Isly.

Its origin has been thus explained in a foreign official document: "When the prestige of the local authorities was diminishing in consequence of these events, that of the Representatives and Consuls of the European nations was increasing. Encouraged by success, and not having important interests of their own to protect, owing to the small number of their nationals and the limited communication with Europe, the Ministers and Consuls began to use their authority in favour of the subjects of Morocco. Nor were plausible reasons wanting in justification of these proceedings. The lack of European

houses of business suggested extending protection to native firms in order to open and develop commercial relations. In the absence of a native colony of its own, it seemed favourable to the influence of a nation to have a fictitious colony. The abject condition in which the Jews of the Empire were kept made it difficult to resist the appeals of native Interpreters and Secretaries, most of whom were Jews, when they invoked the aid of their chiefs in favour of their relatives. A sense of justice would sometimes prompt the Consul to place under the protection of his flag some rich and influential Moor who had been made the victim of the caprice and rapacity of the Governors. But it cannot be denied that venality now and again played a part in the concession of protection. Some of the foreign Representatives were so mean as to trade in it, and where the Head of a Mission would have been inaccessible to corruption there were subordinate officials who were more easily tempted."

The system gradually developed, especially during and after the Spanish War of 1859, when the authority of the Sultan was still further weakened. Then the evil became so acute that a reaction set in, which led to the French Agreement of 1863, the object of which was to limit protection by restricting it to the employés of Consulates and Legations, and to the commercial agents, of whom two were allowed to each firm or branch of a firm. But this Agreement had not the desired effect. Protection leaped the barriers and flourished more than ever, till at last Señor Cánovas del Castillo, then Spanish Minister of State, declared in the Cortes on the 13th February, 1880, that "if the right of protection continues to develop as it has been doing for the last few years, the Emperor of Morocco will awake some day without a single subject."

This statement owes much of its significance to the fact that it was reluctantly extorted by the force of incontrovertible facts from a Spanish Minister, but it was no new discovery. For many years before this Sir John Hay had protested against the further development of a system which tended "to deprive the Sultan of his rights as an independent Sovereign, and to render all government in this country impossible." In 1865 he expressed his opinion that unless the matter was arranged it would not only prevent the progress of civilization and the increase of trade, but would sooner or later produce a state of anarchy. Even after the Convention of 1863 England refused to adopt the practice, and it was not until after the Convention of Madrid, when the system was formally adopted and sanctioned by united Europe, that Sir John Hay was reluctantly obliged to extend its operations to British trade, which would otherwise have been at a serious disadvantage. More than that, in 1883 he was instructed "that so long as any other Governments insist upon extending foreign protection beyond the limits laid down in the Madrid Convention, and are suffered to do so by the Sultan, Her Majesty's Government are not disposed to debar themselves from claiming similar benefits in all cases where the interests of British subjects may be involved."

The Shereefian Court continued to make energetic remonstrances, and finally a Conference was held in Madrid in 1880 to consider the whole question. At this Conference only the English, Spanish, and Austrians were in favour of restricting the practice, and accordingly the result was that the Convention of 1880 has much aggravated and intensified the evil which it was intended to mitigate and restrict, if not extinguish. The Convention legalized the grant of protection to all employés of a Legation and Consulate, and in a limited degree to those in the personal service of Diplomatic and Consular officers, and also to a limited number of commercial agents of foreign merchants established in Morocco. All employés of foreigners or of protected persons were to be entitled to certificates exempting them from arrest without previous notice to the authority which issued the certificate. Finally (under Article XVI) each Power was entitled to give protection, on account of special services rendered, to natives of Morocco not exceeding twelve in number. Later, when I have to deal with the dangers which threaten Morocco, I shall have to refer in more detail to this mischievous provision which now overshadows the independence and integrity of Morocco.

On the other hand, all foreigners and protected persons possessing or renting cultivated land were made liable to the agrarian tax—which notwithstanding they have never paid—and all foreigners or protected persons owning beasts of burden liable to the gate tax, which, however, has been since abolished by the Sultan. By former Treaties foreigners possessed the right of holding real property in Morocco. This right was affirmed, but the astute Representative of Morocco, dealing with a body of foreign diplomats who were unacquainted in practice with the questions referred to them for decision, succeeded in inserting a proviso that the purchase of real property must be made with the previous consent of the Sultan.

This in practice has deprived Europeans of a valuable and essential privilege, for

never since the Convention of 1880 was signed has the Sultan given his consent to the purchase of real property by Europeans except in the vicinity of Tangier.

This harmful provision and the mischievous Article XVI. have been almost the only Articles of the Convention which have not been a dead letter.

Protection with all its evils continues to develop, the limits imposed to it are habitually ignored, taxes are not paid by foreigners, and, in short, the question of protection is in much the same condition as it was before the Conference of Madrid. No doubt the miscarriage of the Convention is in some measure due to the apathy and indifference of the Moorish Government, who are accustomed to quote the evils of protection as an argument against commercial concessions, for they plausibly urge that the extension of commerce means a great influx of Europeans, and a consequent increase of the system of protection, which by general admission threatens to plunge the country into anarchy.

The negotiations of 1885–86 were broken off on this ground, for the Sultan refused to continue them till the Convention of 1880 should be revised. This led to an interchange of views between the Powers interested, and it was proposed by Spain that another Conference should be held. After much negotiation, when at last the assembly of the Conference seemed to be assured, there was a change of Ministers in Spain. The new Foreign Minister (the Marquis Vega del Armijo) was hostile to the Conference, and he caused it to be postponed for a few months. Meantime, the Sultan, at the instigation, it is believed, of the Spanish Minister in Morocco, wrote a letter withdrawing his demand for the revision of the Convention of 1880, and claimed instead that its provisions should be strictly adhered to.

Thus stands the question of protection. There can be no doubt that it should be abolished, for all attempts at improving the system must fail as they invariably have failed. Of course a substitute must be found, and can be found, in the shape of Mixed Tribunals. Their constitution should be adapted to the peculiar needs and condition of Morocco, a difficult, but by no means impossible, task. It may be objected that a Mixed Tribunal may prove to be the hotbed of intrigue. This is possible, but no pessimist imagination can evoke the nightmare of a Mixed Tribunal which could breed evils so disastrous, morally, economically, and politically, as the present system of protection.

Sir William Kirby Green, who had great experience in such matters, was a strong advocate of the change. He wrote: "Mixed Tribunals would prove the thin edge of the wedge whereby Moorish authorities would learn the meaning of the word 'justice.' They would quickly perceive the hold it would give them over their own people, and the advantage of levying fixed fees instead of depending on the largess of the litigants or having recourse to corruption. It would be the second great success scored by adopting a European form of administration, and would perhaps at last open the door for a general reform in all branches of the Government structure."

There are indications that the present Sultan would be sorry to see protection abolished, as it would deprive him of his favourite and plausible excuse for refusing the extension of commercial concessions. Hitherto the two subjects have been treated together, and we have continued to travel in a vicious circle. The Sultan has refused to grant commercial concessions unless protection is abolished, and Europe has refused to abolish protection unless commercial concessions are simultaneously made.

This, I venture to submit, is a mistaken policy. The abolition of protection and the creation of Mixed Tribunals are called for by morality and policy, and should be treated on their own merits. The Sultan prefers protection to commerce, and the consequent influx of Europeans; the only equivalent which he will accept for commercial concession is a guarantee by Europe of the independence and integrity of Morocco.

In conclusion, I would add that the abolition of protection would not be unacceptable to English merchants, for one result of the system is to throw the trade of the countries into the hands of protected natives, particularly of Jews. There will be opposition from the latter, but, as Sir John Hay has pointed out, of the 300,000 Jews in Morocco, only about 300 are protected, and the safety of these can be adequately insured.

Commercial Concessions.

In 1856 fixity of commercial relations was first secured by Sir John Hay's Convention, which was negotiated with great difficulty, and in spite of much opposition. Before that date a policy of "monopolies, favouritism in trade, and the constant lowering and increasing of duties without notice to merchants," terribly fettered commerce. Duties were sometimes lowered or raised three times a-year, and special terms even were given to special favourites. The effect of this Treaty, and of the Spanish Treaty of 1861, which followed the lines of the English Treaty, was to establish customs duties of 10 per cent.

ad valorem on imports, very heavy export duties, and the power of the Sultan to prohibit the exportation of any produce of Morocco. Consequently, among the articles excluded from exportation remained wheat, barley, flour, argan oil, cork, bones, minerals, horses, and many other articles. With great difficulty Her Majesty's Minister obtained the insertion in the Tariff of Exports of maize, beans, &c., but he failed altogether to induce the Sultan to agree to the export of wheat and barley.

In 1878 Sir John Hay proposed a revision of the Convention. The proposal was his own, and did not originate from, nor was it seconded for some years by, any mercantile bodies or traders. In consequence of America being now the granary of Europe, the export duties in Morocco—from 50 to 70 per cent. of the value of the goods shipped—were prohibitive. It was, moreover, most desirable to open Morocco for the export of wool, oil, cattle, &c. Negotiations dragged on till 1882, when Sir John visited the Court, and had interviews on the subject with the present Sultan, whom he found very averse to any concession. The British Minister quoted the opinion of His Majesty's predecessor, Sultan Cid Mohammed, who, ten years after the Convention of 1857, had warmly thanked the British Minister for the services he had rendered to Morocco in negotiating the Treaty, adding, "the trade had trebled, and the receipts of customs had sufficed to pay the interest of debt to the English loan contractors, and half of the customs (due to Spain on account of the war indemnity), and the surplus from the receipt of customs exceeded the revenue before the Convention was signed."

These arguments had no weight with the Sultan, Mulaï Hassan, who remained obdurate, his principal argument being that all surplus production in grain was already exported, and that, therefore, if the duties were reduced by half, the revenue necessarily would also be reduced in the same proportion.

Another evil which Sir John Hay attempted to have removed was the prohibition of the free shipment of home-grown grain from one Morocco port to another. Grain, when carried from one port to another, must pay export duty (50 to 70 per cent. on its value), and consequently there may be an enormous difference in the price of grain in ports a few hours distant from each other. This is known as the *cabotage* question.

At last, in 1885, after Sir John Hay had used language which, as he reported, "could not have been stronger or more decided unless I had resorted to terms of menace," the Sultan consented to appoint Commissioners to examine the whole question of a Commercial Treaty. France and Germany (the latter had no Treaty of any kind with Morocco) joined in these negotiations by their own desire, but the co-operation of other Powers was declined, on the ground that there would be obvious inconveniences if there were too many concerned in the negotiations. There is every reason to believe that some of the Representatives thus excluded from the negotiations did their best to dissuade the Sultan from bringing them to a successful issue.

A draft Treaty was prepared and laid before the Sultan by this Commission. His Majesty then issued an Edict to his subjects, inviting their opinion. This *plébiscite* produced the impression that the Powers had threatened war, and a "Jehad," or holy war, was said to be proclaimed in consequence in different parts of the Empire. The result was apparently unfavourable to the Treaty, for the Sultan afterwards informed the Ministers of England, France, and Germany that "all the great and distinguished men of the realm," presumably the masses, were opposed to the Treaty. The negotiations, however, continued to linger on until January 1887, when the Moorish Government finally declared that they would not continue them unless the Madrid Convention of 1880 was revised.

I have above referred to the negotiations which ensued for the assembly of a Conference at Madrid to revise the Convention of 1880, and have explained how the Sultan, apparently at the instigation of Spain (where the Marquis Vega del Armijo has succeeded Señor Moret), withdrew his request for a revision of the protection system, and demanded instead that the Convention of 1880 should be strictly enforced. The negotiations were consequently shelved until 1890, when the Spanish Chamber of Commerce reopened the question. Sir William Kirby Green (who had succeeded Sir John Drummond Hay in 1886) consulted his French and Italian colleagues and found them all in favour of joint action in preference to isolated action by Spain. He was accordingly instructed to exchange views with his colleagues as to a joint note to be addressed to the Sultan. All, however, stated that it would be quite impossible for them to take so serious a step without explicit instructions from their respective Governments, for "they could not overlook that an understanding should first be come to between the two Governments as to the manner of enforcing their view of the matter should the Sultan be indisposed to accept it."

Meantime, the German Minister, Count Tattenbach, had proceeded to Fez, and the

following month had returned with a Treaty. When leaving Tangier he had informed Sir William Kirby Green that his mission was merely a complimentary one, and that he intended to avoid the subject of a Treaty altogether, but in deference to the views of the British Minister he agreed to warn the Sultan as to the danger of continuing to ignore the proposal of 1886.

Count Tattenbach now explained that he had "suddenly determined to carry through with Mulaï Hassan a Commercial Convention of simple form and modest scope," but he added that if the British Minister had been with him the Sultan would have been induced to accept the draft Convention of 1886 Sir William Kirby Green added, "I have no doubt that the German Representative availed himself of his knowledge of my proceedings for bringing about the unconditional acceptance by the Sultan of the draft Convention to urge His Majesty into making his present concession." There can be little doubt that the Sultan yielded the minor concession required by Count Tattenbach in order to avoid a complete surrender to the three Powers.

Count Tattenbach's Treaty (dated the 1st June, 1880) is the first Treaty between Germany and Morocco. It provides for the reduction of duty on a few articles of no great importance, and the translation of Article VI runs thus :—

"In order that the High Contracting Parties may have grounds for negotiating regarding further improvements which might be calculated to promote the interests of the subjects of their States, and to facilitate and extend their mutual commercial intercourse, they (the High Contracting Parties) have agreed that five years after the ratification of this Commercial Convention each of them shall have the right to move for a revision to the other. Until such a revision shall take place, and a new Convention be concluded and ratified, the present one shall remain in full force and effect."

The Sultan, however, made the ratification of the Treaty conditional on its acceptance by the other Powers. This was granted, and on the 4th November, 1891, Sir William Kirby Green was informed that Her Majesty's Government did not raise any objection to the ratification of the Convention, but he was directed, when communicating this decision to the Sultan, to add that Her Majesty's Government took the opportunity of reminding His Majesty that Commercial Agreements on a broader basis would conduce to the prosperity and safety of the Sultan's kingdom.

I have stated this point in detail as it affects the contention afterwards raised by the Sultan that England, having accepted the Treaty, was bound by Article VI not to reopen the question for a period of five years.

The really important concession which Count Tattenbach obtained was not contained in the Treaty, but in a Shereefian letter annexed, permitting the exportation of wheat and barley, for a period of three years, at a rate of duty which, in the case of wheat, has proved prohibitive, and which, in the case of barley, has only permitted its profitable exportation when, owing to special causes, the price of barley in Europe (and especially in England) rises above its normal price. Thus, in 1892 the local price of wheat and barley was 20*s.* and 7*s.* per quarter respectively. The duty under the Tattenbach Treaty was 16*s.* on wheat and 6*s.* on barley per quarter. Nevertheless, the concession has proved to be very valuable, for the Sultan has admitted by it that he could do what he had always said he could not do—permit the exportation without being false to his subjects and breaking his Coronation oath, or whatever its Moorish equivalent may be.

The chapter of commercial negotiations was accordingly closed, but only to be reopened when Sir Charles Euan-Smith proceeded to Fez in 1892. I need not enlarge on the negotiations which followed, for they are fresh in your Lordship's mind. It is sufficient here to remark that it was entirely left to the discretion of the British Minister "to content himself with minor amendments to existing arrangements, with a view to remedy the most pressing complaints and grievances, or to negotiate a new Treaty on the basis of Sir John Hay's draft, with his own modifications to it;" and he was informed that if, without raising the suspicion of the Powers or the Sultan, you can succeed in obtaining useful stipulations, you will have done good work." Finally, he was told, "with regard to the language which you should hold to the Sultan in the event of his refusing to accept your proposals, I should wish you to abstain from anything in the nature of a menace, which would be doubly dangerous, because, if resisted, it might bring on a serious crisis, and, if successful, would place Her Majesty's Government in the position of having to undertake the protection of Morocco. You should therefore confine yourself to urging your recommendations in moderate and friendly terms, supporting them by such arguments as may best show to the Sultan that his own interests would be promoted by their adoption."

The principal reforms proposed in the draft Treaty were—permanent permission to export wheat and barley, and the reduction of the duty on the former from 3*s.*, and on the latter from 1*s.* 2*d.*, the strike fanega—a measure varying from 104 to 108 lbs.—to 9¾*d.* in

each case; the exportation of, and reduction of, export duty on grain, wool, oil, gums, almonds, horns, cattle, eggs, and many other articles; *cabotage*, or free transit of produce from port to port in Morocco; unrestricted right of British subjects (Article XIII) to purchase and hire land, houses, stores, and other immovable property, also to repair, rebuild, and enlarge existing houses and stores. The co-operation of all Powers interested was sought and obtained in recommending the Treaty to the Sultan, with the exception of France, to whom the Treaty was only communicated after the Mission had left Tangier for Fez. The Spanish Minister, however, expressed his fear that the Sultan should throw himself in the arms of France if the Treaty were pressed on him.

It is significant, bearing in mind one of the causes of the collapse of the negotiations of 1885-86—namely, the intrigues of other Powers—that Sir Charles Euan-Smith attributes the breakdown of his negotiations to the machinations of France, and perhaps of some other Power or Powers, by whom he was supposed to be supported.

When the British Minister opened the subject, the Sultan at once refused to negotiate, basing his refusal on Article VI of the German Treaty above referred to, and on an alleged personal promise by the German Minister. The matter was referred to Her Majesty's Government, but I do not think that the Sultan's arguments and objections, which at least were plausible, and which were repeatedly urged with much persistence and emphasis, were ever adequately communicated to them. In reply to his telegram Sir C. Euan-Smith was told that the Sultan's objection, "founded on an alleged promise of German Minister," had caused much surprise to Her Majesty's Government, and could not be accepted by them. Count Tattenbach afterwards denied having made such a promise, but there seems to me to have been considerable force in the Sultan's objection, in so far as it was founded, not on this alleged promise, but on Article VI of the Treaty. A similar clause in the Treaty of 1856 had been held to bar further negotiations during the period of limitation. It seems to me that though there might be no objection to our recommending the Sultan to make further modifications of the Convention in his own interests as much as in ours, yet we were prevented by Article VI in the German Treaty from putting pressure on him, and certainly from using threats. I cannot find that the question was ever discussed with the Sultan from this point of view. It appears that he was merely told that Her Majesty's Government could not accept his objection as valid, and that he yielded under protest, no doubt nursing a feeling of rancour at the supposed breach of faith.

Finally, as your Lordship is aware, the negotiations broke down, for the only Treaty which the Sultan would accept was quite inadequate, and was rightly rejected by the British Minister. It contained no concessions as regards the permanent exportation of, or reduction of duties on the temporary exportation of wheat and barley, or regarding *cabotage*, and it materially whittled away the proposed provision securing the right of British subjects to build or repair their houses. Moreover, it contained an Article which barred the reopening of negotiations for a period of five years, a limitation which, in the present unsettled state of Morocco, it is very inexpedient that England should accept.

Sir Charles Euan-Smith returned to Tangier in July, and a French Mission proceeded to Fez in September 1892. Count d'Aubigny succeeded in obtaining the reduction of duty on a few comparatively unimportant articles, but he explains that he did not press for more, and that the object he had in view was to obtain a few concessions which would justify the French Chamber in applying the Minimum Tariff to imports from Morocco. This has been done.

Thus stands the question of commercial relations with Morocco. The inference to be drawn from the failure of the negotiations of 1886 and 1892 is that no attempt to force adequate commercial concessions on Morocco will be successful until all the Powers interested act in unison and demand them with a firm and united voice. I doubt whether by Article VI of the German Treaty the Powers which accepted that Treaty are not morally disqualified from putting pressure on the Sultan. But whether this be so or not, it is certain that England has no intention of throwing the Morocco question in the crucible by using or threatening to use force. Under these circumstances, it is a mistake, I venture to say, to irritate the Sultan, and to diminish our influence by attempts at negotiations doomed to failure. It is better, until Europe is prepared to act together and to insist on the opening out of this rich country, to content ourselves with gradually extracting from the Sultan such concessions as he may be induced by persuasion to give.

Trade.

In 1892 the value of the export trade was 1,526,000*l.*, and of the import trade

1,866,000*l.*; total, 3,392,000*l.* Of the export trade 52 per cent., and of the import trade 56 per cent., were British.

The principal articles of import, and the countries whence principally exported, were:—

Articles.	Value.	Where from.
	£	
Cottons	691,000	England.
Loaf sugar	361,200	France.
Tea	95,500	England.
Raw silk	63,600	Italy.
Cloth	53,400	Germany. Austria. England.
Candles	46,600	England.
Hardware	28,200	Germany. Austria. England.

The principal articles of export, and the countries to which they were exported, were, in 1892:—

Articles.	Value.	Where to.
	£	
Beans	329,832	England.
Peas	160,938	Spain.
Wool	154,067	France.
Barley	138,332	Spain. England. Gibraltar.
Skins	123,770	France. England. United States of America.
Maize	64,044	England. France.
Oxen	64,040	Gibraltar. Spain.
Almonds	58,364	England. Germany.
Beeswax	40,307	France. Italy.
Eggs	38,549	Gibraltar. Spain.
Canary seed	33,346	England. Portugal.
Guns	27,975	England. Germany.

England, it will be seen, is the chief customer of Morocco; France, Spain, and Germany come next. Trade has almost continuously increased during the last six or seven years, and England, in spite of the efforts of other nations, preserves her predominance.

The ports stand as regards the value of their trade as follows:—

	£
Tangier	770,980
Dar-al-Baida	744,075
Mogador	491,060
Mazagan	480,612
Laraiche	319,125
Saffi	291,825
Rabat	235,400
Tetuan	72,544

The order in which the concessions stand as regards importance seem to me to be:—

1. Removal of restrictions on the building and repairing of houses, and acquisition of immovable property by British subjects.
2. Exportation of barley and wheat, and reduction of duty on the same.
3. Reduction of duty on certain other articles of export.
4. *Cabotage*, or free transit of produce from port to port in Morocco.
5. Improvement of ports.

I have not included the improvement of the administration in the above list, for it would be useless for England to make any such demand. It is, however, of the first importance, for everything hinges on it. Until Europe can unite in cleansing this Augean stable, nothing can be done except by persuasion. It should therefore be the constant and earnest endeavour of every British Minister to induce the Sultan to introduce the reforms which are so essential to the prosperity of the country, the happiness of his subjects, and the stability of his rule.

1. I consider that the *removal of restrictions on the holding of real property* by Europeans is the next most important requirement. The wheat and barley produced in the country are little more than sufficient for the wants of the people, and the surplus only exists in years of plenty. There are, however, large tracts of land which can be cultivated, but no subject of the Sultan will cultivate more than is necessary for his wants so long as his property is liable to confiscation and his person to imprisonment by some greedy and tyrannical Governor. Protection would do something towards meeting this, but if the commerce of Morocco can only be improved by the extension of that evil with its attendant dangers it would be better to leave it stagnant.

We have a right to insist on the concession of the right of Europeans to hold property, for under the Treaty of 1824 British subjects are entitled to build warehouses, and Article IV of the Treaty of 1856 admits the right of British subjects to hire on lease, or otherwise, dwellings and warehouses, and if a British subject cannot find a suitable building the Moorish authorities are under that Article bound to assist him in finding a site.

The Convention of 1880 recognized the right of foreigners to hold property, but unfortunately a clause was inserted to the effect that the purchase of real property must be made with the previous consent of the Moorish Government. As the Government invariably refuses to give its consent—there is no instance of its having been given since 1880 outside of Tangier—the right of British subjects under Treaty has been abolished. This was not intended by the Convention of 1880, and I doubt if such an effect can be held even technically to flow from it. But, whether it be so or not, the Moorish Government should be forced to abandon the position it has taken up, for the position of British subjects in this matter, and, indeed, of all Europeans, is intolerable. They cannot acquire land or build on land already in their possession. There is, indeed, an arrangement in force, introduced in 1863, by which the Moorish Government undertake themselves to build houses when required, charging the occupier 6 per cent. on the outlay. But, as may be imagined, this arrangement does not work, and it requires the intervention (not always successful) of the Minister before the Shereefian authorities will give it effect.

The same difficulty exists as regards repairs, on account of which 5 per cent. is added to the rent; Europeans are not even allowed to repair their own houses, for masons and labourers are imprisoned if they work for them. This difficulty might in some places be overcome by employing Spanish labour—there are 6,000 Spaniards in Tangier—and if the Moorish Government were to continue obdurate it would be worth considering whether the necessary labour should not be sent periodically to each port to do all necessary repairs, of course at the expense of the house-owners. If once that were done, the Government would give in, in order to prevent its repetition. The grievance is real and substantial, and should engage the early attention of the new British Minister, who may be able by personal persuasion to induce the Sultan to redress it.

2. It was anticipated that the provision of the Tattenbach Treaty for the *export of wheat and barley* would be a dead letter. The anticipation has been realized as regards wheat, for the duty is prohibitive, but not so as regards barley. As shown above, during the two years the Convention has been in force the value of barley exported has been 363,000*l.*, or one-tenth of the total exports. Of this, 65 per cent. are exported to Great Britain, and the balance principally to Spain. The trade promises to increase in years of good harvest. Much of the barley exported is, however, the produce of tithes, and is shipped, of course without paying duty, by the Sultan himself. The concession will expire in October or November next, and it will be a lamentable retrogression if it be not continued. The great value of the concession was its admission of the principle, for the first time, that wheat and barley might be exported from Morocco. Unfortunately, the Sultan's interests in this matter are at variance with those of his subjects, for, as above

stated, he is accustomed to export barley on his own account through private agents. As he pays no duty, his profits are large.

I learn from M. Gentile, of the Italian Legation, now at Fez, that the Sultan is disinclined to continue the concession, and I have suggested to Her Majesty's Government a combined representation by the Powers interested to the Sultan.

3. *Cabotage.*—I have already referred to this subject. Lately there was a scarcity of flour at Tangier, and sickness and distress were threatened. At the same time there was abundance of wheat at Laraiche and Rabat, a few hours distant, but the export rate of duty, 50 per cent. on its value, prevented its being utilized even for the relief of the Sultan's own subjects in Tangier. The whole Corps Diplomatique made an appeal to His Majesty to allow *cabotage*—as he had done in previous years in time of scarcity—but His Majesty refused, and contented himself with some very insufficient measures for the relief of the population. There is therefore every reason to believe that the Sultan is more opposed than ever to the concession.

4. *The articles on which a reduction of duty is particularly desirable* are (besides wheat and barley) cork, eggs, fowls, grain, gums, bones, horns, oil, wool, and salt in all its forms. It should, however, be borne in mind that the present duties are nominal. The Custom-house officers are nearly all corrupt, and I believe that an examination of their books would show that merchants rarely pay more than 50 per cent. of the duty, plus a *douceur*—about another 20 per cent.—to the Custom-house official.

5. *Improvement of Ports.*—There are no ports in Morocco. There are merely open roadsteads, more or less unsafe when certain winds prevail. At some places, such as Rabat and Saffi, landing is generally dangerous in consequence of the surf, and there is frequent loss of life. Landing-piers and breakwaters are much required, for it would be easy to make a good harbour at places such as Tangier and Mogador. At one or two ports steam-tugs are provided fully equipped, but they never leave their anchorage, as their commanders are afraid of wrecking them. I addressed the Sultan on the subject on after my recent tour on the coast. I have suggested minor improvements, and my recommendations have been supported by my French colleague. I am happy to say that they have been accepted by His Majesty.

Dangers which threaten Morocco from within.

Next comes the question, What are the dangers which threaten Morocco from within? Revolution is the first danger which suggests itself to the mind, but I do not think that there is much risk of the present Sultan being dethroned by any such movement. The powerful tribes are practically independent, but, like the European Powers, their jealousies and rivalries will prevent their combining against the Sultan, even if they had sufficient provocation to do so. For the Sultan's policy is *Divide et impera*. He plays off one tribe against another; he has treasure, and can always manage this, and as a consequence he contrives to preserve his equilibrium.

So long as the Sultan retains his health and life there is no fear of the break-up of Morocco through dissolution, disturbed as its condition may be. The danger is lest in the course of these disturbances there should be loss of European life and property on a large scale. If, for instance, there were a massacre of Europeans, Europe would certainly interfere, and the Morocco question would reach an acute stage. So far as can be seen, there is little risk of this; but with a fanatical Mahommedan population the unexpected often happens.

The great danger to Morocco will arise when the Sultan dies, and the question of the succession has to be settled. I have described in an early passage of this Report how this question stands. There are always war and tumult when a Sultan of Morocco dies, and if the Moors were left alone they would settle the question for themselves.

This might still be the policy of Europe in general, but will France adopt it? Will she be content to see fighting and tumult along the whole length of her frontier, and look on with clasped hands? She will have plenty of excuse for interfering if she desires to do so, both on the frontier and in other directions where she has subjects and protégés whom she is entitled to protect. For the phantom of protection here rises in another shape to threaten the independence of Morocco. I have pointed out how it may produce anarchy. But it also may be the cause of invasion. Morocco is now covered with French subjects, or, in other words, protégés. Colonies of Algerians have settled down near Fez and elsewhere; they will, doubtless, be held to be entitled to French protection. A member of this Legation travelling, a few days ago, in the vicinity of Laraiche, came across a French-protected village of 250 souls, of whose existence we had not had the slightest information. There may be many more similar cases, and each one of them gives an excuse for interference, and is a danger to the independence of Morocco.

As an instance of the length to which protection may be carried, there was at one

time, if there is not now, a village of several hundred souls under American protection because they assisted in boar-hunting.

It is rumoured, and generally believed, that on the death of the present Sultan the French will encourage the Shereef of Wazan to claim the succession. He would have little chance of success if he stood by himself, but how far will he be assisted by the French, and how far will they allow him (a French protégé) to be roughly used by the contending parties? And no doubt it is held that not only the Shereef and his family, but all his religious followers, are entitled to French protection.

Thus it appears that, first, protection and its attendant evils, and, secondly, the internal disorders, especially the disorders on the French frontier which will follow the demise of the Sultan, are the chief dangers which threaten the independence of Morocco from within.

Policy of Europe as regards Morocco, and the Dangers which threaten Morocco from without.

I next have the honour to submit to your Lordship certain reflections on the policy of the interested European Powers towards Morocco, and the dangers which threaten the independence of that country from without. I trust that in doing so I am not overstepping the legitimate limits of the Report which your Lordship's instructions require me to make, but it seems to me that a Report on the situation in Morocco would be very incomplete without a review of this vital question.

I need not dwell on the importance of Morocco, or rather of its northern and western coasts, commanding in the one case the entrance to the Mediterranean, and in the other—although much more remotely—the alternative route to India by the Cape of Good Hope. The Power which obtains possession of Tangier and the north coast of Morocco can close the Straits to commerce and altogether neutralize the advantage attaching to the possession of Gibraltar. It is a prevalent idea, and I think a fallacy, that the possession of Gibraltar will enable England to anticipate any other Power which has designs on Tangier. In the first place, England is seldom prepared for a *coup de main*. There is rarely a man-of-war in Gibraltar Bay, and never a field-gun in that fortress. A force could not be landed in Tangier except under the protection of the guns of an English squadron, able, if necessary, to silence the shore batteries of Armstrong guns. If we were rash enough to send over transports unescorted there would be foreign Representatives who would not allow such an opportunity to slip of inflicting a humiliation on England.

When the death of the Sultan was anticipated in 1887 Spain sent over an additional force of 6,000 men to Ceuta, but I cannot discover that any precautions were taken by England.

Again, when Tangier is taken it will probably be taken under cover of a temporary occupation, in order to recover reparation for some insult or injury, real or imaginary, from the Moorish Government. Once troops have been landed it may require a declaration and active operations of war to oust them. For this reason, I submit that, whatever the provocation may be, we should hesitate long before we seek redress in this manner, and thus set a very dangerous example and precedent. The question how to exact reparation from this decaying Government, which threatens to crumble away when touched, becomes more difficult every day, for naval demonstrations, once so effective, have now through excessive repetition become ridiculous. The apparent intention of the Sultan to have one or more iron-clad men-of-war may provide a way out of the difficulty, for they will be something to seize.

Another fallacy is the idea that the town of Tangier can be held by itself. In order to occupy Tangier it will be necessary to hold the heights which command it. This would require a force of at least 5,000 men. In order to hold Tangier it will be necessary to have within our influence—but influence depends on the power to enforce obedience—a belt of country sufficient to furnish the required supplies, not merely for Tangier but for Gibraltar, which, in case of war with Spain and France, would be dependent on Tangier. Moreover, tribes must not be split up. The whole of a tribe or none of it must be included in the zone of our influence, and so the circle keeps widening, and in the end it will be found that the occupation of Tangier will involve the employment of a considerable force. Therefore, it is a matter of grave importance that the integrity of Morocco should be respected, and that Tangier should continue to be in the inoffensive hands of a Ruler whom no one fears.

The chief enemy of the *status quo* in Morocco is undoubtedly France. England, Italy, and Germany are the only sincere friends of this policy, for they fully appreciate the fact that if France were possessed of Morocco, Algiers, and Tunis—Egypt being evacuated by England—the Mediterranean would indeed be a French lake. It is therefore a fact of

much significance to find France pressing for the evacuation of Egypt, and at the same time showing her determination not to bind herself in any way to respect the integrity of Morocco.

The relations of Morocco with France, England, Spain, Italy, Germany, and some other Powers are governed by Treaties which all contain the favoured-nation clause. According to these Treaties the Powers in question have the right to be represented by Consular officers in any town of Morocco, their subjects are free to trade, travel, and reside (subject to the precautions of police which are practised towards the subjects or citizens of the best-favoured nations) throughout Morocco. They are entitled to build, hire, or lease houses. Missionaries are free to exercise their calling, the rights of property are guaranteed, and Europeans are declared to be liable to the jurisdiction of their own Courts only.

The frontier of Morocco, as regards the north and west, is the sea. On the south the point where it terminates is still a matter of dispute between England and the Sultan, as I have pointed out in my remarks on Cape Juby, but it is very desirable that the question should be settled by our recognition of the Sultan's sovereignty as far as Cape Bojador, else other Powers may step in. The southern frontier, bordering on the Sahara, is quite undefined.

The eastern frontier is imperfectly defined by the Treaty of 1845, negotiated after the battle of Isly, between France and Morocco. Article I states that the frontier is to be the same as it was when Turkey held Algeria. Article III lays down the frontier for about 80 miles, leaving Figuig to Morocco. Article VI says that the country south of the point where definition ceases in Article III is desert, and that its delimitation is consequently unnecessary. Apparently the negotiators of that Treaty, or at least the Moorish negotiators, were not aware that the Oasis of Tuat, peopled by 200,000 Arabs, Berbers, and negroes, lay 420 miles to the south of that point. This oasis—or rather these oases—is now a question of dispute between France and Morocco. The Sultan, whose ideas of geography are very wild—he has claimed to the east the Nile and Kordofan, and to the south Guinea, as the boundaries of his Empire—asserts his right to Tuat on the ground that it belonged to Morocco when Turkey was her neighbour in Algeria, and that, consequently, under Article I of the Treaty of 1845, it should remain hers. The Sultan also appeals to a map published by the French War Office in 1848, which showed Tuat to be on the Morocco side of the new frontier. The French, however, decline to discuss the question. They contend that Morocco has no right whatever to the oasis, that the question is one of police for the Administration of Algeria to settle, and that, in short, when France is ready to annex Tuat she intends to do so.

The reason why France is particularly desirous to occupy Tuat is that the projected railway which is to join her Algerian with her Niger Settlements must pass though Tuat, or sufficiently near to Tuat to make its possession by France most desirable.

As to the rights of the case there is little to be said. Tuat might have belonged once to Morocco, but so far no proof has been produced. No importance can be attached to the fact that in 1886, after they had incurred by their aggression and misconduct the anger of France, the inhabitants of the oasis made overtures to the Sultan which were greedily accepted by him. But their allegiance is (as in many districts indisputably within Morocco) purely nominal, and the Sultan has no control over the inhabitants, otherwise France would hold him responsible for the plotting of the massacre of the Flatters Mission in 1881, of the murder of Palat in 1886, and for the wholesale massacre of the followers of a French adherent in September 1891, and for harbouring the offenders.

There is also evidence of French encroachments on Figuig, a locality which has been aptly termed by Consul-General Playfair "the Herat of Morocco." This oasis is inhabited by about 15,000 Berbers, mostly agriculturists and merchants. It is a trade centre between the Sahara and the north. It is easy of access (30 miles) from the French fortified post at Jenan Borzig, to which place the railway is being continued from Ain Sefra. Refugees from Algiers are continually flying into Figuig, and are harboured by the inhabitants, and fanatics stir up religious rebellion in Algeria, where the French appear to have acquired little or no hold on the affection of the people. Hence there are continually disputes with the French authorities, who do not now hesitate to cross the frontier in pursuit. The Sultan's authority in this oasis is merely nominal, he cannot give redress. In 1886 the French annexed the district of Genan Abu Reg or Borzig referred to above, though it indisputably belongs to Morocco by the Treaty of 1845. The cession was made secretly by the Sultan, though the district commands the most important passes in Morocco, without any communication to England, notwithstanding the promise which he had made in 1882 to Sir John Drummond Hay, that if France, or any other Power, put forward a demand for cession of territory, the British Minister would be informed and

consulted before any reply was given. As the Spanish Minister, Señor Diosdado, remarked, the step thus gained by France was disastrous, "for it marked, first, the determination of France to advance; secondly, the inability of the Sultan to resist that determination; and thirdly, the platonic nature of the opposition of other Powers to French encroachment on Morocco."

This cession was negotiated at Fez by the French Minister, M. Ferrand, and it is noteworthy that when leaving Tangier for Fez he assured Sir John Hay (no doubt with perfect truth) that he had no important question to discuss there. Besides Genan Borzig, the Sultan was reported to have ceded a large district between Magaura and Ain Shair, on the significant condition that there should be no formal cession, and that he should not be held responsible for the opposition of the inhabitants. About this time there was an outbreak in Morocco territory at Ouj-da, which is quite close (about 5 miles) to the French frontier, and the French complained loudly of the disturbances in their neighbourhood, and claimed a rectification of the frontier.

North of the Atlas also the French had meanwhile been busy. In 1883 the French Minister had, in the most arbitrary way, taken the Shereef of Wazan and his family under French protection, or, in other words, had made this holy man a French subject. The Shereef is a descendant of the Idrissite dynasty, which reigned some 200 years ago, and which is more popular than the present dynasty. His strength is chiefly in Wazan, where he could muster some 3,000 fighting men. His temporal authority is limited to Wazan, and even there he is merely entitled to the dues from the sanctuary. The wild tribes in the vicinity have little respect for him. His revenue, which is very large, is made up by offerings from the religious and superstitious throughout Morocco. For the Shereef's followers or disciples ("Taum") are dotted over the country, and number perhaps 50,000 souls. They extend also into Algeria and Tripoli. Without foreign assistance he would have no chance in a contest for the throne.

In 1884 the Shereef was induced to send an emissary to the Soos country to stir up a rebellion, and of late years he has repeatedly been made use of in order to extend French influence. For instance, in March 1892 he went, accompanied by eight French officials and a French escort, to Tuat, in order to win over to the French the inhabitants of that oasis, but he was not successful. The Shereef died in September 1892, and his eldest son has succeeded him, though his younger brothers claim equal rights. He is a man of better character, and, in appearance at least, more true to his saintly reputation. But he also is practically a French subject. The English widow of the Shereef, after having in vain sought English has accepted French protection, and is to receive an allowance from the French Government on condition that she resides and has her two sons educated in France.

The other European Powers have not contemplated the encroachment of France with complete indifference. A collective note, signed by the Ministers of England, Spain, and Italy, was addressed to the Sultan on the 12th March, 1887, which expressed the solicitude of those Governments for the independence and integrity of Morocco, and requested the Sultan formally to engage not to consent to any future cession of territory without previously consulting the three friendly Governments. His Majesty hesitated before answering, for he considered the proposed arrangement one-sided, and at last, on the 16th August, 1887, he replied, but instead of giving a direct answer, he demanded the neutralization of Morocco. The proposal did not commend itself to Her Majesty's Government. They were of opinion that it would be imprudent to guarantee the neutrality of a country which did not furnish some security that it was unlikely to take any course which would justify action on the part of other Powers. Morocco was not in this position. Her Majesty's Government were, however, of opinion that a Self-denying Agreement would not have been open to a similar objection had the Sultan, on his part, been willing to undertake to make no further cession of territory without the consent of the Powers concerned.

It was afterwards proposed to make an attempt to negotiate a Self-denying Agreement at the Conference of Madrid, but the idea of course fell through when the proposed Conference collapsed.

About this time rumours were rife regarding a proposed partition of Morocco between France and Spain, and it is certain that some such scheme was proposed to the Queen and to Señor Moret, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in 1887, by M. Cambon, the French Ambassador. Although these proposals were not seriously treated by Señor Moret, a strong supporter of the *status quo*, it is by no means certain that they were not favourably regarded by his successor (the Marquis Vega del Armijo) who is responsible for the abandonment of the proposed Conference. It is certain that about this time rumours of Spanish designs on Tetuan and other places grew rife, and in 1887, before the

ink on the collective note of England, Spain, and Italy was dry, Spain was detected in clandestine negotiation with the Sultan for the cession of the Island of Peregir. Again, in 1890, it transpired, and it was admitted by the Spanish Minister, that Spain, with the knowledge of France and the Sultan, had exchanged, unknown to her co-signatories of the note of March 1877—which about this time was accepted by the Sultan—proposals for acquisition of territory (which Spain called an exchange) on the left bank of the Muloya. The negotiations fell through, for they were discovered by Sir William Green, who strongly advised the Sultan against yielding.

In compliance with the note of 1887 the Sultan more than once appealed to the three Signatory Powers to assist him in resisting the French claim to Tuat. He was told, in reply, that he should call upon France to give in writing her reasons for supposing Tuat to be within the Algerian frontier. Accordingly, His Majesty caused a note to be addressed in this sense to the French Minister on the 9th January, 1892. He received a curt reply to the effect that Morocco had no right to Tuat, and that France would not even discuss the subject with her. This reply was not communicated to the three Governments until Sir Charles-Euan Smith, when at Fez in May 1892, extracted it from the Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs. There can be little doubt that the Sultan, despairing of any material assistance—an uncivilized Ruler does not attach much value to "moral" support—from the other European Powers, has made up his mind to give up Tuat when France demands the cession. He is now merely putting off the evil day; when it comes he will bend his head, but the blow will be very severe, for the Sultan values his territories to the south far more than he values those to the north. He anticipates the day when the pressure of Europe, which he is so stubbornly and astutely resisting, will drive him southwards, and consequently he regards with special disfavour any loss of territory in that direction. He complains bitterly of the arrangement of August 1887 between France and England regarding the French zone of influence in North Africa, which, in his opinion, has cut off his retreat and hemmed him in between two advancing forces. There is, however, no foundation for the construction which he has placed on the Agreement in question.

From the above sketch is appears clear that England, Italy, and (in a less interested degree) Germany are the only sincere friends of the *status quo*. Spain is nominally one of its supporters, but only so far as it is binding on other nations and not on herself. Because she expelled the Moors from Spain she thinks that she has an hereditary claim to Morocco. Absurd as the pretension undoubtedly is, it is deeply rooted in the mind of every Spaniard, and when the time comes for realizing it no Minister will be strong enough to stem the current and keep his feet. A distinguished Spaniard speaking a few days ago expressed the national sentiment when he said, "Morocco rightfully belongs to us. We are at present not in a position to claim our heritage, but at some future day, perhaps in fifty years, we may be in a position to do so." Meantime, her policy has been aptly described as "la politique du chien du jardinier."

In pursuance of this policy, Spain is averse to the extension of her commercial relations by Morocco, and to the reform of her administration, for by the former policy Morocco would encourage an influx of merchants, probably English, certainly not Spanish, and by the latter she would strengthen herself against foreign invasion. Neither of these results would assist the Spanish conquest of the future. Spain fears England and France, especially France, and with reason, for her position would be awkward if she were hemmed in by France in the Pyrenees and France in Morocco. But it is possible that she might be bribed by France, who would be willing to let her have her way for the present north of the Atlas, while she (France) was engaged south of that great mountain range, where at present her interests are chiefly concentrated. No reliance can therefore be placed on Spain, for she may yield to temptation.

France, however, is the only Power which can apply the match to the powder magazine. She is the only Power in contact by land—unless Ceuta and other Spanish Settlements are taken into consideration—with Morocco, and her advance is as certain there as the advance of England and Russia has been in Asia. Frontier troubles will arise, and the Sultan will be unable to give redress. France, whatever the intention of her rulers, will be pushed on in spite of herself, and gradually she will creep on with practical impunity. Each encroachment will no doubt be made the subject of unavailing protest by the other European Powers, and soothing promises will be made by the Central Government, and promptly broken by the local officers.

In Central Asia the similar silent and piecemeal encroachment of Russia in time of peace was stopped by the delimitation of the Russo-Afghan frontier. The best hope for Morocco would lie in a demarcation of the eastern frontier. France might be induced to accept this on the understanding that Tuat and other doubtful provinces would be included

in her frontier; and if delimitation were made, it might be possible to obtain the Self-denying Ordinance contemplated by Lord Salisbury, especially if its adoption were a condition antecedent to our evacuation of Egypt. In return for this the Sultan would certainly be ready to make commercial concessions, and perhaps proper arrangements under foreign officers for the reform of his administration and for the control of his frontier.

To sum up, a possible policy is as follows:—

1. The abolition of protection, and constitution of Mixed Tribunals.
2. The delimitation of the frontier of Morocco.
3. The guarantee by Europe of the integrity and independence of Morocco, or a Self-denying Ordinance, accompanied with a demand for the reform of the administration and for the grant of commercial concessions.

The programme may be ambitious, but the situation is dangerous. At any moment it may become critical. France must be allowed to encroach, or she must be resisted. The alternative policy is to temporize until the long-expected European war takes place, and the map of Europe is remade. This may be the only practicable policy, but when war breaks out England must take Tangier under her guardianship, and therefore it will still be necessary to fix a limit to French encroachment in time of peace, and to prevent her occupation of the zone which is necessary for a British occupation of Tangier, and for the provisioning of Gibraltar. The extent of that zone must be decided by military and local experts. If France and French influence could be kept out of that zone in time of peace, we should not have much to fear from the side of Algeria in time of war, for the army of Algeria, instead of being reinforced, will be then probably reduced, and internal troubles are almost certain to occur. But in this case England must make up her mind to acquiesce in the eventual annexation by France of all Morocco with the exception of its northern coast.

The questions which concern England and Morocco in particular may be stated under three heads:—

1. The Cape Juby question.
2. The pecuniary claims of British subjects.
3. The difficulty of obtaining the transaction of ordinary routine business.

1. *The Cape Juby Question.*—Cape Juby is situated on the West Coast of Africa, between Wad Draa and Bojador, a district which is inhabited by nomad Arab tribes. The Settlement was founded in 1879 by Mr. Donald Mackenzie, who obtained a grant of the strip of land on the coast (8 by 2 miles) in which Cape Juby is situated from the Sheikh of Wad Noon, a disaffected subject of the Sultan of Morocco. The Company have since claimed the whole strip from Wad Draa to Cape Bojador, but there is no evidence whatever to support this pretension. Indeed, I observe that the Sheikh of Wad Noon, whose territory is asserted by them to extend to Cape Bojador, himself admits in his letter of the 15th November, 1879, to Lord Salisbury that it only reaches as far as Cape Juby.

The Sultan was greatly incensed at the proceedings of the Company, and demanded the removal of the buildings which it erected, for he claimed the tract south of Wad Draa as Moorish territory. Her Majesty's Government, however, disputed this claim on the ground that the Map of North Africa showed Wad Draa to be the southern extremity of the Empire, and the Sultan was warned against any act of aggression on the property of the Company.

In 1880 the stores of the Company were burnt by a hostile tribe in the neighbourhood, who were supposed to have been instigated by the Sultan. Indeed, the history of Cape Juby till 1886 is a series of complaints by the Company, and of warnings addressed by Her Majesty's Government to the Sultan. In 1886 the Company adopted the advice which had been given to them in 1880 by Sir John Hay, and sent an agent (Mr. Fergusson) to Fez to negotiate the sale of their Settlement to the Sultan. They were then ready to accept 50,000*l.* The Sultan, however, would not discuss the subject, and the same state of things continued.

At last, in 1888, the Manager of the Company was murdered by some men who were proved to be soldiers in the service of the Sultan. A long and vexatious discussion followed. The Company claimed from the Sultan compensation for the supposed loss to their trade, as well as compensation for the widow of the Manager. The Sultan eventually paid over 4,000*l.* on the latter account. In 1891 Sir William Green tried to negotiate a settlement on the basis of the recognition of the Sultan's sovereignty, on condition of his engaging not to allow any other Power to establish itself between Wad Draa and Cape Bojador; but His Majesty, rather than admit the implied flaw in his sovereignty over the territory in question, agreed to pay the Company 50,000*l.* in five annual instalments, a

settlement very advantageous to the Company, which had been ready in 1886 to sell their Settlement outright for that sum.

In 1892 Sir Charles Euan-Smith, on his Mission to Fez, tried to negotiate a settlement, but the negotiations were not successful. The Sultan then admitted that he had used his influence with the neighbouring tribes to prevent their trading with the Company. The fact is that the Sultan believes that he has been very badly treated in the matter, and, as I have stated above, I believe that the loss of British influence is greatly due to this grievance. My instructions were not to reopen the question, and to content myself with seeing that the instalments due were paid. That has been done, the third annual instalment having been remitted to the Company in May last.

As regards the future, I am of opinion that if Cape Juby is worth keeping it should be retained; but if, as I understand, it has been pronounced by experts to be useless as a port, and if, as is the general impression, the prospects of trade are poor, and are likely to remain so under even more favourable conditions, I am of opinion that it would be better to give up a Settlement which serves no useful purpose, and which embitters our friendly relations with the Sultan of Morocco.

A careful examination of the locality and of the Company's books by experts would alone supply the information which is required. But whatever the fate of the Settlement, the Sultan's sovereignty over the rest of the district should, I think, be recognized as quickly as possible, else other nations will follow, not necessarily for commercial reasons, the example of the Cape Juby Company. Your Lordship will remember that in 1885 Spain annexed the tract between Cape Bojador and Cape Blanco.

2. *The British Pecuniary Claims.*—I have made the difficult and intricate question of pecuniary claims against the Morocco Government the subject of a separate Report. These claims, aggregating over 24,000*l.*, vary in amount from five shillings to thousands of pounds. Some of them are thirty or forty years old. I have made careful inquiry into them, both at Tangier and at the ports, when I made a tour along the coast in May last, for all the claims originate in the ports where alone the European residents reside. The manner in which business is transacted in Morocco is as follows: a merchant cannot visit the interior, nor can he send his European assistants there to sell his goods. He accordingly employs a Moorish agent or broker, and commits to his charge the goods which he desires to sell. A document is generally first recorded before the public notaries and countersigned by the Kadi or Judge, in which the agent acknowledges the trust and its value. Or the merchant desires to buy wool or grain or other produce. He intrusts money to the Moorish agent for this purpose, and receipt of the money is also acknowledged in a notarial document.

Very often it is remunerative to buy a crop or other produce in advance of the harvest, for the cultivator is willing to sell it cheap in order to obtain money for the payment of his taxes or other pressing liabilities. This transaction is also carried into effect by a Moorish agent. It is not difficult to imagine how, under these circumstances, claims arise. An agent is robbed, and a claim is made on the Morocco Government. An agent absconds or dies a defaulter, a claim is made on the Moorish Government.

A cultivator fails to carry out his contract, perhaps owing to no fault of his own; for instance, the great bulk of claims under this head date from the famine of 1878-79, and the inevitable claim follows.

These claims are forwarded by the Legation to the Shereefian Government with a request for inquiry, for if, on inquiry, the robbery is proved, the Sultan would be held responsible on the ground that his police arrangements are defective or (to speak more correctly) non-existent. Or if the claim is on account of debts due by a Moorish subject in the interior, where the European trader cannot follow him, the Shereefian authorities are expected to proceed against his property or person, or, if he cannot be found, against the property or person of his relations, who, in Morocco, are held responsible for the debts of a defaulter.

The Moorish Government almost invariably neglect to reply, and fail to inquire, partly owing to habits of natural apathy and deep-rooted obstruction, and partly owing to the reluctance in any way to assist commerce, which is their great enemy, as it tends to defeat the policy of isolation. Time passes on. Evidence disappears in the natural course of events, or, if documentary, it is lost probably by the Moorish Government, to whom it has been sent for inspection in support of a claim, and so claims accumulate. Then they are taken up by a Minister when a good opportunity (such as a Mission to Fez) presents itself, and perhaps the claims are compromised for a 50 per cent. payment, which the creditors as a rule gladly welcome. It is easy to suspect, but difficult to prove, the fraud which taints many of these claims. If the Moorish Government exercised due diligence when the cases originated or were first brought to their notice, they would be in

a position to reject the claims which are worthless, and, by fulfilling their obligations and bringing the debtor before the proper authorities, they would relieve themselves of all further responsibility.

Not having done so, the Government itself becomes liable, and this result has so invariably followed that the creditor has become accustomed to regard the Sultan as bound to pay all his bad debts. The system has encouraged fraud. A trader falsely alleges that his agent has been robbed, or he makes a claim for a debt which has been paid or which has never existed. The notarial document referred to above may be of little value, for it often records the transfer of money and goods which has never taken place. The consideration very often is the "protection" which the native obtains as the partner—for so he is regarded—of a European merchant, and whereby he evades the payment of taxes and military service. Again, the certainty that claims will be compromised and not paid in full induces many to exaggerate the amount due to them. For example, the agent of a merchant of Gibraltar is robbed of 550 dollars—I quote a case which actually occurred—the merchant writes accordingly, claiming 550 dollars, but at the same time, without his knowledge, his branch firm at the port near which the robbery occurred institutes a claim on the same account for 1,100 dollars, thereby anticipating a reduction of 50 per cent.

Another evil is this. The Moorish Government hold the relatives of a debtor (dead or absconded) responsible for his debts. When the Moorish Government is pressed on account of claims for debts by the British Legation, if it takes any notice at all of the reference, it will probably issue orders for the arrest and imprisonment of the debtor, or, if he is not forthcoming, of his father, brother, or even son, and the unfortunate man, whoever he is, remains in the filthy dungeon, treated exactly the same as a murderer, until the money is paid. I find a case on record in this Legation where a boy of 14 years of age was found to have been in prison for two years on account of a debt due by his dead father to the British Vice-Consul—trading Vice-Consul.

I have in my separate Report dealt fully with the subject, and made suggestions which I trust will mitigate, if they do not stamp out, the evils of the present system. Much will depend on the Moorish Government, whether they can be galvanized into some kind of comparative promptitude when cases in question arise; much will depend on the British Legation, whether it will cease to record and support claims which have not been carefully examined; and much, perhaps more than anything, will depend on the willingness of Her Majesty's Government to provide the necessary machinery for inquiry. I refer to the travelling expenses of officers who may be sent to examine locally into claims preferred, for I have tried this in two or three cases with most excellent results, but, above all, I refer to the reversion to the old system of paid instead of trading Consuls. The trading Consuls are often, indeed generally, claimants themselves. In one locality, of the total amount of 7,300*l.* claimed, 5,300*l.* were on account of the claims of the Vice-Consul and his staff. How, I submit, can trading Vice-Consuls be expected to act fairly and fearlessly, or to apply rules vigorously, and create precedents impartially, with the certainty that the same rules and precedents will rise up in judgment against them when they themselves appear as claimants? Moreover, they have their own affairs to look after, and they cannot act with promptitude or give up their time to local inquiries without serious loss to themselves.

These claims are a shadow which is ever creeping up between the British Minister and the Sultan. Nothing can do influence of the Minister more harm than having continually to dun the Sultan for money—money which the Sultan and the Minister too well know to be often unjustly claimed. I do not know any reform which would more tend to the comfort (indeed, the self-respect) of the British Minister at Tangier, or to the rehabilitation of British credit and influence, than his removal from the false position which he now occupies. And I believe that if my proposals are accepted, this can be done without any danger to trade and commerce. It should be noted that the few British firms of standing and reputation seldom or never appear as claimants for debts.

The third question which particularly concerns England in its relations with Morocco is *the difficulty of obtaining replies or attention from the Shereefian Government.* Not that this is a grievance peculiar to England; other nations suffer as much or more from the apathy and obstruction of the Moorish officials, partly the result of constitutional apathy, and partly the offspring of deliberate policy.

When a foreign Representative first arrives, even when he comes from a European Court least remarkable for promptitude, he is much exercised by the silence and evasive, tortuous replies and ways of this cynical Court. His impatience finds vent in repeated protests, and perhaps threats, but these are all received with a compassionate smile by the hardened Minister for Foreign Affairs. He understands the case thoroughly, and its familiar symptoms do not alarm him. It is a process of acclimatization which every new

Minister must undergo, for acclimatized he becomes sooner or later. Thus claims and unredressed grievances accumulate, until, perhaps, by a visit to Fez, the now more philosophical Representative manages to obtain a modicum of relief.

These tactics of the Sultan are not new. Even Sir John Hay, with all his influence, could not induce the Court to move at a less sluggish pace, and consequently his successors have inherited the mass of British claims which are such a heavy drag upon them. Of course, there are times when things are worse or better than at other times. For instance, when this Mission was sent to Morocco things were at their worst. No justice could be obtained for British subjects, no replies, however evasive or frivolous, were vouchsafed to letters from this Legation. I was assured by one of the most sagacious and impartial of my colleagues that the Shereefian Government, finding that they could thus treat England with impunity, were extending the policy of absolute silence to other European Powers. The murdered Trinidad proved to be a *Deus ex machina*, for the vigorous action then taken, followed by the dispatch of a Special Mission, startled the Sultan, and since then things have much improved as regards England, but other Powers, I understand, still endure the same treatment of indifference.

Even as regards us, the Sultan will very probably relapse into his old ways. If so, patience is the only policy. An affair like that of Trinidad is comparatively easy to treat, for it is so outrageous as to justify the strongest measures. But a Government cannot issue an ultimatum on every trifling occasion, and the only alternative is by tact and patience to break down the passive resistance which cannot otherwise be overcome. Things would be different if the Corps Diplomatique resided at Fez instead of Tangier, but this a change which at present is impossible. The next best arrangement is a responsible officer resident at Fez, a trained and capable man of standing who can represent the Minister.

The fruit of Sir Charles Euan-Smith's Mission was the appointment of a Vice-Consul to reside at Fez. The present temporary incumbent of the post is a Scotch trader in Fez, a shrewd and honest man, well qualified to look after the trading interests, if there were any, of British subjects, but quite unfitted by training and instinct for the discharge of delicate political duties. Necessarily he carries little weight with the Shereefian Ministers. He should, I submit, be replaced by a qualified officer. If this were done the hands of the British Minister at Tangier would be greatly strengthened. Indeed, if it had not been for the assistance kindly given to me by Kaïd Harry Maclean the difficulties of my situation would have been greatly increased. Kaïd Maclean has often served as a channel of informal communications with the Shereefian officials, with whom he is popular. He is a loyal and straightforward gentleman, eager to be of use to his countrymen, but he is entirely in the service of the Sultan, and therefore it follows that he cannot fill the place of a responsible and independent officer of Her Majesty's Government.

I submit, too, that the visits of the English Minister to the Court should be more frequent. Only by personal intercourse can he gain influence over the Sultan and his Ministers. However popular he may become with them, the Court will always be glad to wish him good-bye, and in order to hasten the leave-taking they will settle questions which would otherwise occupy years of abortive and irritating correspondence. These visits, however, should not be on the same scale as visits of ceremony. Excepting on the latter occasions the Minister should proceed to the Court with one, or perhaps two, officers, and little or no retinue. His visit would not be then regarded by the people in the same light as a flight of locusts, and he would be much more likely to attain his ends. This was the procedure of M. Ferrand, the most successful Minister who has ever represented France in Morocco.

I have heard several complaints regarding the manner in which the Sultan receives a foreign Minister when he makes a visit of ceremony. The Sultan is mounted, and the Minister stands bareheaded, in an open court-yard filled with troops. My inquiries have not induced me to sympathize with the complainants. In Morocco, the Sultan's war-charger is his throne. All great ceremonies take place before the army, consequently they must be held in the open air. The Minister need only uncover when he first addresses the Sultan, and His Majesty promptly begs him to replace his hat or helmet. I do not see how this is more undignified than backing out of a throne-room. Certainly I am of opinion that it should be left to the Representative of some less practical nation to raise an irritating question such as this.

In conclusion, it is my duty to review the results which have been attained by my Mission.

By those who expected that during the six months of my stay in Morocco I should be able to wring from the Sultan valuable commercial concessions and important administrative reforms, including the abolition of slavery, the regeneration of the prison system—

and this is but a fraction of the programme which well-meaning, but over-sanguine, critics sketched for me—by those who expected so much my Mission will doubtless be condemned as a failure. But your Lordship is aware that heroic diplomacy was outside the range of possibility, and was not, therefore, within the scope of my instructions. The duty which was imposed upon me, which I trust I have discharged to the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government, was of a humbler nature. I may perhaps be permitted again to quote from the instructions which were issued to me on the eve of my departure, in so far as they define the object to be attained by the Mission. The reason for dispatching my Mission was because "it was impossible to obtain proper attention to the representations of Her Majesty's Legation, or the barest justice to British subjects." It was with the object "of ameliorating this state of things and of restoring the more cordial relations which formerly existed between the two countries" that Her Majesty's Government deputed me as Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to the Court of Morocco. I was further instructed, when I felt myself sufficiently informed, to report on the general situation in Morocco, "so complicated by intrigue, fanaticism, and misgovernment."

Whether I have adequately discharged this latter duty must be decided by those who read this Report; but whatever its shortcomings, I hope that its length—approaching, I fear, to tediousness—will be accepted as a proof of my conscientious desire to omit no subject of interest or importance when reviewing the situation in Morocco.

As regards the amelioration of the state of affairs which I found existing on my arrival, and the restoration of friendly relations with the Shereefian Government, I think I can report that my Mission has been as successful as any reasonable critic could expect.

When I arrived in Morocco I found the Sultan sulky and suspicious, while my colleagues were naturally anxious and disquieted. I think I may truly say that I leave the Sultan in a much more friendly mood, and with his confidence in the unaggressive intention of England revived. His Majesty has, indeed, admitted to a foreign diplomat that the conduct of the Mission has to a great extent restored the confidence in the good-will and good faith of England which, he stated, he had recently lost. There is no doubt that at the time of my arrival His Majesty, like the foreign press, believed that my Mission was to threaten and intimidate, with the view of extorting commercial and other concessions, and relying on the assistance promised by irresponsible Agents of certain foreign Powers, he was prepared to maintain an attitude of stubborn resistance. The Sultan considers Morocco to be the pivot on which the whole world turns. Courted as he has been by foreign Powers, he believes his friendship to be essential to the peace of mind, if not to the prosperity, of the Powers represented at Tangier. Accordingly, the attitude of cold but courteous reserve which, under your Lordship's instructions, was assumed towards His Majesty seemed to puzzle him, for it was entirely at variance with his preconceived ideas. All the prophecies of the foreign prophets hostile to England, who so readily gain his ear, were falsified, in itself a happy result, and the harbinger, I trust, of the decay of their mischievous influence. It seems to me that at an early period, when his first fears were passing away, the Sultan determined to adopt the wise policy of abstaining from anything which could give England reasonable cause for offence. Certainly, during the time I have been in Morocco I have had no reason to find serious fault with the Sultan or his officials. My communications on various subjects have been attended to promptly, and in a reasonable spirit, if allowance is made for the apathy and obstruction natural to his Court. Indeed, I do not think that any communication I have made to the Sultan—and I have made many—has been ignored, or that any demand has been refused, or even questioned, without some plausible reason. On a recent occasion, when all the Representatives of Europe in Tangier addressed identic notes to the Sultan on the subject of *cabotage*, His Majesty only vouchsafed replies to the Minister of France and to myself, and, as I have stated, my suggestions for the improvement of the ports have been accepted.

This is a state of things which is decidedly satisfactory, but I doubt whether it will last. It is, I fear, merely a phase which will soon pass away. But I hope that if the proposals are accepted, which I have made in separate despatches, regarding the settlement of claims—the most vexatious of questions—and the improvement of the Consular Service, permanent and valuable results will follow my Mission, and will make the path of my successor less rough and difficult than it has been for my predecessors.

As to my colleagues, I can speak with more certainty, for my relations with one and all of the courteous gentlemen who compose the Corps Diplomatique at Tangier are, and have been throughout, of a very friendly nature. Any forebodings of evil, or any feelings of jealousy, with which some of them may have regarded this Mission on its inception, have disappeared; and though one or two may be disappointed that a more high-handed policy has not been adopted—or, in other words, that England has not pulled the chesnuts out of

the fire for them—still, all acknowledge that the Mission has been successful (to quote an important member of the Corps Diplomatique) "in removing all asperities." Indeed, I think I am justified in repeating the opinion of a colleague, the Representative of a Power unquestionably friendly to England, who a few days since emphatically stated to me that the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government in the dispatch and conduct of this Mission had undoubtedly been highly successful, that the situation had greatly improved for the better, and that Her Majesty's Government could not do better than continue to prosecute the same policy.

Such, my Lord, are the humble results of my Mission, and I trust that Her Majesty's Government will consider them to be as much as could be reasonably expected, considering my limited means and opportunities, and also, I fear, my limited capabilities for the delicate duty confided to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WEST RIDGEWAY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 15.

Sir West Ridgeway to the Earl of Rosebery.

II.—REPORT ON CLAIMS OF BRITISH SUBJECTS IN MOROCCO.

My Lord, *Tangier, July* 10, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to submit, as required by my instructions, a Report upon the subject of the long-standing claims of British subjects in Morocco.

These claims may be divided under two heads:—

1. Claims for robberies.
2. Claims for debts.

The first question which suggests itself is, Why should the Moorish Government have any responsibility in the matter? If a Moor were robbed in England he would not be entitled to compensation from the State, and certainly he would not recover from the Government unpaid debts due to him by the Englishmen with whom he had traded in England. Why, then, should the liability in both cases attach to the Sultan of Morocco?

As regards claims for robberies, the reply is that there is no security for life or property in Morocco, for the Sultan has no system of police administration. He expends the revenues he collects on himself, with the exception of a comparatively small amount on his army, and entirely neglects his administrative duties. Consequently, he must be held responsible for the robberies which are the inevitable result of his indifference, unless he can catch and punish the robbers. This rule is, I think, fair and expedient. It is in force in some of the native States in India, but if the Ruler can show that he has discharged his administrative duties by providing an adequate system fort he detection and punishment of crime and for the protection of life and property, the responsibility referred to would be removed from his shoulders.

As regards debts, the responsibility of the Moorish Government is far more vague and doubtful. Owing to the unsettled state of many parts of the country and to the obstructive commercial policy of the Shereefian Government, a merchant established in one of the ports cannot deal directly with the inhabitants of the country outside the ports. If he wishes to sell to them his goods, or to buy from them their produce, he must employ a broker or agent who is a native of Morocco, and a subject of the Sultan. To this man he intrusts his money or goods, but generally before the broker starts documents called *resoom* are recorded by the Public Notaries, or *Adools*, and countersigned by the *Kadi*, or Judge, which are, practically, an acknowledgment of the trust. No inquiry, however, is made by either *Adools* or *Kadi* into the *bona fides* of the transaction, and thus the door is open to fraud and deception.

By virtue of this transaction the broker acquires protection in a less or greater degree—in a greater degree if he is a semsar, that is to say, one of the two brokers whom, according to the Convention of Madrid, each firm is entitled to have at each of its places of business; and in a less degree if he acquires merely a certificate of temporary and partial protection so long as he is associated with the European merchant. This is a valuable privilege, often paid for at a high price, for, though nominally the certificate merely entitles the European merchant to notice before the native employé or partner is arrested, in practice it exempts the holder of the certificate from the jurisdiction of the Sultan. There is no limit to the number of these certificates, which have, however, to be

signed by the Minister of the nation to which the merchant belongs, and, consequently, a merchant can cause as many as he likes to be issued unless care and supervision are exercised at his Legation. It is notorious that many merchants make a larger income by traffic in these certificates than they do by legitimate trade.

These remarks, however, apply in a limited degree to British merchants, for more care is exercised in issuing a certificate by the British Legation than by the majority of foreign Legations. There have been this year only 333 certificates issued by the British Minister throughout the whole of Morocco. But it is notorious that more than one Legation indulges in a reckless and barefaced traffic in these certificates, while by other Legations they are issued without inquiry or scrutiny on the application of any Consular Agent—perhaps himself a trader.

The Convention of 1880—the Magna Charta of protection—legalizes the issue of these certificates, and, scandalous as the abuses of the system are, I do not see how, in the absence of Mixed Tribunals or some similar substitute, trade can exist without their assistance. Not only are the buying and selling carried on by their means, but under cover of them do Europeans succeed in defeating, in a limited degree, the Sultan's policy, in defiance of his Treaty obligations, of preventing their holding real property, for, though the European cannot hold land himself, he can enter into a partnership with a native landholder, who *ipso facto* becomes entitled to a certificate. But, as I have remarked above, the Moor who thus associates himself with a European often pays highly for the privilege. Perhaps he contributes all the capital. The European finds the protection, and the Moor the land, money, or cattle.

The holder of a certificate must not be confounded with the semsars or censaux. By the French Agreement of 1863 (which, under the best-favoured-nation clause, applies to all nations having Treaty relations with Morocco) two semsars, or agents, are allowed to each European firm engaged in wholesale import and export trade. Firms having several houses at different ports are allowed two protected semsars for each house. The protection given to the semsar is absolute so long as it lasts. He practically ceases to be a subject of the Sultan, and the protection extends to all his family, and generally, in transgression of the agreement, to his employés. The privilege was originally restricted to European firms established in Morocco. Now, however, firms in Europe who have no establishment in Morocco are allowed to have semsars. Protected Moors also claim, and often obtain, the privilege. This, too, is in defiance of the Convention, but I may point out that whenever a European nation, say France, transgresses the limits of a Treaty or Convention, and the Sultan, either through helplessness or indifference, does not successfully protest, other nations, say England, follow the example and claim similar rights, on the ground that, under the best-favoured-nation clause, concessions to one nation must be made to all. Otherwise, their trade would be be handicapped to the great advantage of their rivals. The following instructions, which Sir John Hay received in 1883, refer to this point: "So long as other Governments insist upon extending foreign protection beyond the limits laid down in the Madrid Convention, and are suffered to do so by the Sultan, Her Majesty's Government are not disposed to debar themselves from claiming similar benefits in all cases where the interests of British subjects may be involved."

Certainly it is only by an extravagant fiction that the Sultan can be assumed to consent to the extension of protection beyond the limits assigned to it by international engagement, for he has never ceased to protest. Protection is the Nemesis which overtakes him in consequence of his maladministration and bad faith, but, nevertheless, the position of the European Powers, forced as it may have been on them, is not altogether dignified or creditable.

The manner in which trade in Morocco is carried on is accordingly as follows:—

A European firm establishes itself in one of the ports. It engages two semsars, who generally act as inspectors of brokers. The firm imports tea, cotton, and other commodities, and exports wool, grain, &c. It employs native agents to carry on its transactions in the country. Often little is known regarding the trustworthiness of the agent, for the Moorish Government will give no advice or opinion, and it is out of the power of the merchant to make local inquiries. Accordingly, he must rely on the reputation which the man has for honesty in the port where the transaction occurs. The goods and money are then intrusted to the agent, and both parties go before the *Adools* and then the *Kadi*, and have recorded the necessary *resoom* or acknowledgment. The few large British firms, however, dispense with *resoom*. They exercise more care as regards their agents, and when bad debts occur they write them off instead of appealing to the Legation. Of all the claims for debt, I doubt if there is one by the five or six large English firms on the coast.

The remarks in this despatch accordingly refer to the class of merchants, nearly always Gibraltarians and protégés, from whose ranks only the claimants are recruited.

The agent departs, his instructions being to sell the cotton and tea, and to buy the wool and grain for export. Often it is desirable to buy cheaply from some farmer, in want of ready money, the produce of the coming harvest, or to advance him money to buy sheep, in order that he may take up a contract for wool.

Soon the agent returns; he has been, he says, robbed of everything. Depositions, or *bina*, are recorded before the *Adools*, but they must not be the depositions of the man robbed, or of his companions, for, being interested persons, their evidence, according to Mahommedan law, is not admissible. The only evidence which can be produced is consequently very meagre and imperfect, and is generally hearsay. The merchant then makes his claim to compensation to the Vice-Consul, who forwards it to the Governor, who ignores it, or, driven to make some reply, quibbles and evades inquiry. Time is thus lost, and the case is then submitted to the Legation, which represents it to the Sultan. His Majesty pursues the same tactics as the Governor, and the case is added to the long list of unsatisfied British claims, which increases in size like a snowball. If the claimant is a man of energy and persistence, he may visit the Court and buy the intervention of a powerful Shereefian Minister, and perhaps get a settlement, or, more likely, an order to the Governor to inquire and settle. This order the Governor generally puts aside; he knows that it means nothing. But if he is obliged to hold an inquiry he often threatens the witnesses for the claimant with imprisonment if they dare to come forward. He may be convinced that the case is fraudulent and trumped up, but his procedure is the same. Rather than expose the fraud by an open and searching inquiry, he prefers to fight the claimant with his own weapons. Or perhaps he himself may have the stolen horse (if it is a horse that has been stolen) in his own stable, and he may be in the habit of riding it. Every one knows the fact, but who dare come forward and depose to it? In the eyes of the Governor it is not a theft. He saw the horse, liked it, and therefore seized it, as he had a right to do, the owner being a Moor. It is a mere accident his being a protected Moor, and the Governor feels that he himself is the aggrieved person whom it is desired to rob of his rights.

Supposing the agent is not robbed, and does not pretend to be robbed. He sells his goods and buys other goods, and returns. He is sent forth again and again, and a running account is kept up with the merchant. At last he dies or absconds, or becomes bankrupt. The merchant has a balance due to him. He cannot proceed to the locality where the man lives and has, perhaps, property. He must appeal to the Moorish authorities to arrest the debtor or sell his property. This he does through his Vice-Consul, but the Moorish authorities do nothing, and consequently the Sultan becomes responsible for the debt. Or a farmer, to whom an advance of money has been made, does not fulfil his contract, possibly through no fault of his own, but owing to a drought or some visitation of God. His debt is entered in the list which will be sent to the Sultan for realization or payment.

When the debtor lives in a town the claimant is not so helpless. He can proceed against the debtor before the Governor, but if the case is important it must be dealt with by the *Kadi* or Judge. But the *Kadi* only dispenses justice according to *Shraa*, which is Mahommedan custom founded on the Koran. A leading principle of *Shraa* is that no evidence of Christian or Jew, not even documentary evidence, such as mercantile books, notes of hand, &c., can be looked at. The only documents admissible as evidence are those drawn up by the *Adools* and countersigned by the *Kadi*. In 1868 Sir John Hay attempted to turn this obstacle to justice by proposing arbitration in cases where the evidence was not admissible according to *Shraa*, but this well-meant attempt failed, as other attempts have failed, and will probably continue to fail, before the apathy and passive resistance of the Moorish Court.

It will thus be seen that it is not possible to leave the merchant to seek his own redress. The influence of the Legation must be exercised in his behalf, otherwise trade would cease, or would fall entirely into the hands of the nations whose Representatives assist and support their merchants.

Originally the responsibility of the Shereefian authorities consisted in, and was limited to, the obligation of helping the merchant to recover his money, either by imprisoning the debtor or by selling his property, but as this responsibility was never adequately or promptly discharged, and the evidence of the claim, and the means of enforcing it, were lost by lapse of time and its accidents, the entire responsibility for paying the debts grew in time to be thrown on the Sultan, as a consequence of his *lâches* and maladministration, and, consequently, the idea has gradually developed that the Sultan should pay all the bad debts owing by his subjects. Consequently, it has become

the custom for a certain class of merchant to send periodically to his Legation a list of debts, some genuine, some fraudulent, and nearly all exaggerated. So long as the *resoom* are in order, the list is forwarded without any further scrutiny to the Sultan with a demand for payment. The communication is ignored, the claims accumulate, the crowd of claimants at the doors of the Legation become noisy and impatient, and at last the Minister, when he proceeds on a visit to the Crurt, tries to arrive at a compromise, perhaps a 50 per cent. payment. The claims are thus wiped out, only to accumulate again in the same fashion.

In short, one of the principal duties of a foreign Representative is the constant "dunning" (I can find no other word which adequately describes the duty) the Sultan for debts varying in amount from a few shillings to thousands of pounds. There can be nothing more destructive to the influence of a European Minister than the undignified rôle which he is thus obliged to fill at the Court of Morocco. Sometimes, when the Sultan is particularly obstinate, and the claims have accumulated to a large amount, force, or the threat of force, has to be employed. Thus, in 1883, Italy sent men-of-war to Tangier, where they remained for some months, until the Italian claims were paid.

There are two considerations which make the duty of the foreign Representative as regards claims particularly odious. The first is the conviction that all the claims are exaggerated, and many of them fraudulent. I dare say that my predecessors had suspicions of this, but careful inquiry has convinced me that it is the case. The principal merchants, certainly the principal British merchants, will not be found among the claimants, and if their names do appear at rare intervals, their claims will be found to be modest and well supported. The mass of British claimants are protected Jews, Gibraltarians, and protected Moors, especially the Consular Staff and their dependants. For instance, the total amount of the British claims is about 27,000*l.*; of this sum, 12,000*l.* are claimed by Consular employés. The question naturally suggests itself, How comes it that a Consular employé, an interpreter for instance, is engaged in trade? It will be found that, generally, the interpreter of a Consulate is a Jew trader, who can speak no language except Arabic and Hebrew. There is no salary attached to the post, but the trader by accepting it earns protection, and consequently gains the assistance of the protecting Government in collecting whatever he chooses to describe as debts due to him. It is evident why the trader accepts the honorary office, but the object in giving it to him is not equally clear. In most cases the present British Consul or Vice-Consul is not responsible for these appointments, which were made before his time.

The second consideration which distresses, or ought to distress, the foreign Representative when he presses claims on the Moorish Government is the conviction that if action be taken in consequence of his representations it will be in the shape of harshness, oppression, and perhaps robbery.

For when the Sultan is roused into action he sends to the Governor of the district a list of the debtors or their relations. Accordingly, an unfortunate cultivator, whose default is the inevitable result of a bad season, is in consequence of the action of the foreign Minister thrown into prison—I have elsewhere described the horrors of a Moorish prison—and there left to rot in chains till the debt is paid for him by some friends. If the debtor is dead, the father, brother, or son (perhaps a mere child) takes his place in the dungeon. On this point I quote from a Circular addressed by Sir John Hay on the 16th February, 1886, to Consular officers: "The claims of British creditors upon Moorish subjects dwelling in districts of the interior have been a constant source of vexatious correspondence for several years with this Government.

"The greater number of these claims originated, as you are aware, from the distress suffered by the peasantry engaged in agricultural pursuits during successive years of drought and famine, and many of the unfortunate Arabs who had obtained loans, or had bound themselves to deliver grain or other produce to foreign subjects at a fixed period, were unable to fulfil their engagements, and when threatened with prosecution they had given their assent to the preparation of documents, drawn up by Moorish notaries, in which the sums they owed were doubled, or otherwise raised to an usurious amount.

"When the claims of British and other foreign subjects were pressed upon the notice of this Government, the latter appointed Commissioners to investigate them, and directions were given to the Governors of districts where the debtors resided to arrest and send the debtors prisoners to the dungeons at the Moorish capitals or other places, and to confiscate their property. Many of these prisoners, after suffering most cruel hardships, have died from disease or starvation, for their families, having lost all their property through confiscation, have not had the means of providing for the subsistence of the imprisoned relatives. Cases of most distressing character have frequently been brought under my notice."

I think I have written enough to show your Lordship the gravity of the question at issue; it is to my mind more than sufficient to account for the loss of influence and the slow progress of commerce and civilization in this unhappy, distracted country, which are the subject of so much regret and surprise in Europe.

I now propose to deal with British claims in particular. These claims number 1,048, and are of the aggregate value, as stated, of 27,300*l.* They range in value from 5*s.* to 4,000*l.* Of the 1,048 claims, 567 do not exceed 5*l.* in value. Owing to the long period of time over which they are spread, and to the consequent loss of documents—some mislaid, others lost by the Shereefian Government, to whom they were referred—it has been very difficult, indeed in the case of the majority of claims impossible, to arrive at a satisfactory opinion regarding them. With the view of obtaining better information than the archives of this Legation could afford, I made a tour in May last, and visited all the ports on the west coast. I then personally examined all the claimants who could be found, and, with the able assistance of Mr. Consul White, I elicited all the information obtainable. This is embodied in Mr. White's notes attached to this Report; but before summarizing their contents it may be convenient if I review the history of the British claims.

One of these claims dates as far back as 1858, but as a rule nearly all have originated since 1881, when the great famine of the preceding year had impoverished the population and deprived them of the means of discharging their liabilities.

Previous to 1872 there does not appear to have been any great difficulty in the settlement of claims, save in a few exceptional cases which have descended to us. Whether the unfortunate change which then occurred is due to the substitution, about that time, of unpaid for paid Vice-Consuls I am not in a position to say. At any rate the two events coincide, and the inference that one is the result of the other need not be considered strained. There is little doubt, I think, that if this retrograde step had not been taken the question of claims would not have reached its present acute stage.

In 1873 Sir John Hay arranged with the Sultan that Commissioners should be sent to all the ports to examine claims in the presence of the Vice-Consul, and to give a written decision on each claim. An appeal was to lie to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Tangier as provided in the Treaty. Cases where the evidence was not admissible by *Shraa* were to be decided by arbitration. This admirable scheme fell through, probably owing to the apathy of the Moorish Government. A Commissioner was sent in 1874 to to conduct the inquiry as proposed, but he did nothing.

In 1875 the Moorish Government warned the foreign Representatives that credit should not be given to Governors and Sheikhs, and that the Government would not be responsible for their debts. This ruling was accepted by Sir John Hay, and communicated to merchants. In later years Sir John wrote that he had reason to believe that the rule had been relaxed in the case of some other nation, and that therefore he would claim the same treatment of British claims against Governors and Sheikhs. The ruling of the Moorish Government, which appears to be a fair one, must, however, I think, be considered to be binding on us.

In 1875 Sir John Hay visited Fez and obtained a Royal Order to the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Tangier for the settlement of claims, but nothing was done.

In 1880 Sir John Hay again visited Fez and settled a few claims, but no arrangement was made for the settlement of claims in general.

In 1882 Sir John Hay, during his visit to Fez, went through the claims with a Commissioner appointed by the Sultan, and a settlement was promised within six months. About this time British merchants were warned, by the desire of the Vizir, against giving reckless credit, and they were told that claims on account of such transactions would not be supported.

In 1880–81 there had been a great famine, and from this date and for this cause the claims multiplied and accumulated at a great rate. Commissioners were sent to Mogador and elsewhere, and Consular officers were instructed to collect the *resoom* from claimants and to send them to the Governors with a request that the debtors should be made to pay or be sent into the ports. Nothing, however, was done. Many of the *resoom* were lost by the Moorish officials, and on the 17th July, 1882, Sir John Hay warned the Vizir that unless his claims were settled within six months the Sultan would be held responsible.

In the same year the Sultan stated that he would accept no claim of an earlier date than 1875, and this limitation appears to have been accepted by Sir John Hay; but two years later he called it in question, and stated that the limitation would be unfair in case of claims the settlement of which had been delayed, not by any want of due diligence on the part of the claimants, but by the *lâches* of the Sultan's officials.

In 1883 Cid Boobeker, a wealthy English protegé, was sent, with the concurrence of

the Sultan, to locally examine and report on the claims. He proposed the dismissal of the bad claims, and a compromise—the payment of 50 per cent.—of the good claims. All the merchants agreed to accept 50 per cent.

The Sultan, however, refused, and proposed instead that all robbery claims, if supported by valid documents, should be paid after the claimant had taken oath, and that, as regards commercial claims, the debtors should be imprisoned and their property sold. Sir John Hay accepted the proposal, and having collected all the *resoom*, sent them to the Sultan's Representative at Tangier, as arranged, to be examined. Commissioners were also sent to different ports.

In 1884 Her Majesty's Government ordered that all claims of British subjects should be searchingly scrutinized before payment.

About this time arose the question of debtors' debts. The Morocco Government raised objection to enforcing payment based on documents in which the name of the claimant did not appear, but which had been surrendered to him by a third party. Sir John Hay asked whether Italian and French subjects had not been allowed to realize similar debts. The Moorish Minister replied in the negative, and there the matter appears to have dropped.

Sir John Hay then pressed for the payment of all debts, on the ground that this course had been taken in the case of Italian claims—gun-boats had been sent to Tangier by the Italian Government—but the Moorish Minister denied this, contending that the terms given to the Italians were as follows:—

1. That old debts should be abandoned and cancelled.
2. That just claims of recent date against solvent debtors be paid within a year.
3. That claims not fully proved by documents be treated in a similar way if the claimant will publicly take the oath regarding them.
4. All robbery claims of doubtful character to be abandoned.

Sir John, however, replied that he had heard that the agreement with the Italians had been that all claims should be settled and paid within a year, with the exception of those against people who had become bankrupt or died insolvent. Sir John expressed, however, his opinion that this exception had merely been inserted to mislead the Americans, who were at that moment pressing for a settlement. He demanded the immediate payment by the Government of the entire amounts, intimating that the Sultan could afterwards refund itself from the debtors.

About this time the Vizir addressed a Circular to the Corps Diplomatique warning foreign subjects against engaging in commercial relations with bankrupt persons or persons belonging to certain tribes not fully under the control of the Sultan. Sir John Hay accepted this ruling, provided that all other Legations did the same.

In November 1884 Sir John Hay returned from England, and wrote to the Moorish Minister expressing the grave dissatisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at the dilatory course which had been adopted in the matter of the claims. He complained particularly of some Governors who had deprived the debtors of all they possessed, and had retained the money for themselves instead of paying the creditors.

Then followed a correspondence as to the validity of certain claims.

Meantime, the Shereefian authorities were actively collecting the debts, and, consequently, many debtors and their relatives were cast into prison. The facts were brought to light in the London press, and a considerable agitation followed. Her Majesty's Government gave orders that all claims of British subjects should be subjected to a searching scrutiny before payment was required, and an inquiry was ordered into the conduct of Mr. Lapeen, British Vice-Consul at Dar-al-Baida, who was accused of having caused the imprisonment of several persons for debt which they had paid, and for various other misdeeds. The result of the inquiry was the dismissal of Mr. Lapeen from the post of Vice-Consul. It should be noted that two interpreters in the same Vice-Consulate were dismissed about this time, one for usury, and the other for selling protection. In 1885 and 1886, 14,363 dollars were paid into the British Legation on account of claims, and the documents connected with several others were returned to the Legation in an imperfect state. These were sent to the ports with orders that all claims should be examined at the ports in accordance with arrangements between Sir John Hay and the Minister.

In 1886 Sir John Hay wrote to the Shereefian Court proposing the following procedure:—

1. Debtors to appear before Governor and Consul of port where creditors reside.
2. Documents to be examined as to their validity before *Shraa*, and to see if they are of a usurious or unjust character.
3. If the debtor be solvent but not possessed of sufficient ready money to pay the

claim, his Government to sell an adequate amount of his property and remit the proceeds to the Governor of the port, he being meanwhile detained in prison.

4. If he plead bankruptcy, he is to be sworn before *Shraa* and thereupon liberated.

5. If persons be proved to have inherited property of a deceased debtor they are to be charged with his debts.

6. Fraudulent bankrupt to be imprisoned, and his property sold for benefit of creditor.

7. Governor assisting debtor to evade payment to be made personally liable, and to be punished by the Sultan.

8. Persons imprisoned in the interior on account of claims to be sent to the ports for legal proceedings.

9. Claims not based on notarial documents, but on letters, note of hand, &c., to be adjudicated on by arbitration of merchants selected by Governor and Consul.

These rules were accepted, and a Circular despatch was addressed to the Consular officers ordering their adoption. But they have been a dead letter. A Commissioner was about this time appointed to examine into the Mogador claims in concert with the Consul, but no practical result followed.

In 1886 Sir John Hay was succeeded as Minister by Sir William Kirby Green, who, when he visited the Court in April 1887, reopened the question, and demanded that the local Governors should be required to submit lists of the sums received by them on account of claims, and that the amount should be delivered to the Legation. The Moorish Minister declared that fresh orders for the settlement of claims had been issued, as arranged with Sir John Hay.

In 1888 there was further correspondence, the Moorish Minister repeating his former statements. About this time Her Majesty's Government, having learnt that British subjects often caused the imprisonment and ill-treatment of debtors by gaining the ear of the Moorish officials, directed that the Sultan be requested not to imprison debtors on the private application of British subjects.

In 1889 the Sultan visited Tangier, and promised Sir William Green a prompt settlement of claims. Further correspondence ensued, Sir William Green complaining that the promise had not been kept.

In November 1890 Sir William proceeded to Morocco. He was engaged in settling the question of claims when he died. Mr. de Vismes de Ponthieu remained, and tried to settle the question. He obtained the dispatch of a Commissioner to Dar-al-Baida, who did nothing, and orders were sent to the Governor of Mogador to examine claims there, but nothing was done.

In May 1892 Sir C. Euan-Smith visited Fez, and tried to induce the Sultan to send a Commissioner to examine the claims, but he quite failed, and at his last audience with the Sultan His Majesty took a new line, and absolutely refused to admit the existence of any claims, and said he would not settle them. It should be, however, remembered that the relations of the British Minister and the Sultan were at this time much embittered owing to the rupture of the negotiations.

Sir Charles Euan-Smith then asked for authority from Her Majesty's Government to demand and enforce payment of the claims.

In the following year I was dispatched as Special Envoy to Morocco. My instructions were, *inter alia*, not to take any immediate steps in the matter, but to bear it in mind, and eventually to report my opinion as to the best means of effecting a satisfactory settlement. I was also to give my attention to the history and reliability of these claims. In May I visited the different ports, and examined the claimants. The following is a summary of the results of my inquiries :—

Laraiche.

The first port I visited was Laraiche, which is the nearest port for Fez. The Vice-Consul, Mr. Imossi, had been appointed in 1872, but had been absent for the last twelve months from his post. He had just tendered his resignation. He is, it will be observed, one of the claimants. It will be seen that the total claims amount to about 36,570 dollars, and of this amount over 26,000 dollars are debts due to the Vice-Consular Staff. The late Vice-Consul, Mr. Imossi (Gibraltarian), claims 8,490 dollars, of which the earliest is dated 1868, and the latest 1881. There are 170 items in his claim, of which the smallest is for 5*s.* (dated 1872), and the largest item is for 450 dollars, dated 1873. Of the 170 items, 100 are for sums of 5*l.* and under.

All the claims are for debts due by agriculturists from whom he had bought grain, and who had failed to deliver it. Many of these debtors must be dead, and most of these debts were incurred before the famine years of 1879-81. The claims are supported by *resoom*, but the *resoom* are not for the most part in the name of Mr. Imossi or of his agent. They are in the name of a third party, and were transferred to Mr. Imossi by his agent on his death in discharge of his liabilities to Mr. Imossi, but how the agent acquired them does not appear. It will be observed in my summary above that in 1884 the Moorish Government protested against this system, which is known as that of "debtors' debts," and declared that they would not accept them. This ruling, however, is generally subsequent to the time when these debts originated. The system, however, is a very bad one, and should be discontinued. All *resoom* should be in the name of the claimant. Otherwise *resoom* between Moorish subjects may be bought up by British subjects and protégés as a speculation, and presented to the British Legation for enforcement of payment. Indeed, I have strong suspicions that this is often done. It will further be seen that Mr. Imossi obtained from his agent *resoom* for larger sums than those due to him. Another difficulty is that the *resoom* are for kind, and it is difficult to say whether they have been converted into the equivalent pecuniary value at the time of the transaction. Altogether I consider Mr. Imossi's claims are far from satisfactory, but there is, on the other hand, the fact that he has to make good to his principals in Gibraltar the amount of his agent's default, and also that his claim has been accepted by this Legation, and repeatedly pressed upon the Sultan with other claims.

The next claims worth noticing are those of the Matitia family. Mr. White's notes show that this family have been hereditary interpreters for many years. The present occupant of the office has no particular qualifications, and draws no salary. But in virtue of his appointment he has become a British protégé, and therefore is entitled to the assistance of the Legation in collecting his debts.

The total amount claimed by his family is 15,080 dollars, or about 2,600*l.* The earliest claim is dated 1866, and the latest 1891. There are 284 items, of which 169 are under 5*l.* in value. The smallest item is for 5 dollars, and the largest for 790 dollars. Matitia's claims are open to the same objection as Mr. Imossi's. There is nothing to show that he has not purchased as a speculation the *resoom* which he produces, none of which are in his own name. There is nothing to show that his agent was indebted to him, and one or two of the items are particularly open to objection. For instance, it will be seen that he advanced to his agent in 1872 about 1,000*l.* on condition that he was to receive half profits. After nine years the bad debts alone on this capital amounted to almost double the original capital, and this amount is claimed from the Sultan. Besides the claims on account of his agent, Matitia has claims on account of his own business. In this case the *resoom* are in his own name; but there are no account books or ledger to show that the amount entered in the *resoom* were really due to him and not entered by collusion. Moreover, he took no step to recover any of his debts till he sent in a list to the Legation in 1883.

All the other claims in this Vice-Consulate are open to very similar objections. I would, however, specially draw attention to the claims of Levy and Co., Gibraltar. In the list of his local agents his claims are said to amount to about 3,080 dollars, while in Messrs. Levy's list, submitted from Gibraltar, the same claims are given at about 1,280 dollars, half that amount. The explanation given is that the agent must have taken the opportunity of including his own private debts, which he, a Moorish subject, was not entitled to do, and that he also doubled the amount of Mr. Levy's claims, as stated in the *resoom*, apparently in anticipation of a 50 per cent. reduction.

The only sound claim in the Laraiche Vice-Consulate is Mr. Forde's robbery claim for 1,707 dollars. This originated so late as 1891, and I was therefore able to hold a local inquiry into its merits, as reported in my despatch No. 104 of the 30th June last.

Rabat.

At Rabat there were no claims. The reason is not that there are few British merchants at this port, for it will be seen that British merchants are seldom claimants, and there are no British merchants except Mr. Forde at Laraiche, where the claims are so heavy. The claimants are Gibraltarians or protégés. I attribute this satisfactory state of things in a great measure to the fact that Mr. Frost, the Vice-Consul, gives up his entire time to his Consular duties and is not himself a trader, nor does he employ any trader on the Consular Staff.

Dar-al-Baida.

The total claims amount to 30,516 dollars, of which 24,723 dollars are due to present or former members of the Consular Staff. The history of this Vice-Consulate is not satisfactory. In 1872, when the paid Vice-Consulate was abolished, Mr. Lapeen (Gibraltarian) was appointed trading Vice-Consul. His unpaid claims amount to 20,416 dollars, but other claims have been paid through the Sultan. In 1884 your Lordship will remember there was a considerable scandal regarding this Vice-Consul's trading proceedings, and an inquiry was held, the result of which was his dismissal from his post for what may be described as extortion and wrongful imprisonment of Moorish debtors. In 1885 the Interpreter Benchimol (a claimant for 980 dollars) was dismissed for usury, and his predecessor had been dismissed for flogging a Jewess, and his brother, the Interpreter of the Danish Vice-Consulate—the English Vice-Consul is also Danish Vice-Consul—was also dismissed about the same time as his brother for selling protection in the name of the Vice-Consul.

Mr. White's notes will show that of the total 20,416 dollars only 3,122 dollars are supported by *resoom* Mr. Lapeen's own name. As regards the item 4,586 dollars for robbery claims, it will be observed that they were not robberies of his own goods, but alleged robberies from his agents, Moorish subjects, who transferred these claims, together with certain *resoom* in their names, to him in payment of a balance of account, viz., 3,699 dollars, alleged to be due by them to him. It will thus be seen that to pay 3,699 dollars they have transferred to him certain dubious claims aggregating 11,475 dollars. I think that the whole of the amount should be struck out.

I also notice that debts of Jews, aggregating 7,428 dollars, and similar claims of other residents of towns, are included in Mr. Lapeen's list. These should be excluded, as this Legation is only supposed to concern itself, save in very exceptional cases, with debts due in the interior where the British creditor cannot obtain redress. In a town, particularly a port where there is a residential Governor and a Consular officer, there need seldom be difficulty in proceeding against the debtor. It is generally acknowledged that claims of this description should not be admitted. I should add that after a personal examination of Mr. Lapeen I came to much the same conclusion as that arrived at by Mr. Consul Payton when he conducted the inquiry of 1884, namely, that his apparent dishonesty is more the result of dulness and carelessness than of fraudulent intention.

Mr. Cansino (Gibraltarian) claims 1,662 dollars for civil debts, and 2,403 dollars for robberies. I formed a very unfavourable opinion of these claims after a personal examination of the claimant. Mr. White's notes state the particulars, and I would merely remark that the robberies appear to have been greatly exaggerated as regards value of property stolen, and that one or two of the claims have been rejected in whole or in part after inquiry by a British Consular officer and a Moorish Commissioner in 1887.

Your Lordship will observe that the claimaint in one instance not merely demands the value of the animals stolen, but also the value of the possible offspring that might have been produced if the parents had remained in his possession. Mr. Cansino is not singular in making this claim; others, too, have claimed the annual wool crop and possible offspring of sheep that have been stolen during the period that the claim has remained unsettled.

As regards Mr. Cansino's claim on account of camels stolen, I should observe that the local officials recovered the animals, but Mr. Cansino refused to accept them unless all possible hire that the animals might have earned during the period of their detention were also refunded to him. The only claims which seemed to me unexaggerated and unquestionably genuine were those of Mr. Pons (Gibraltarian), 235 dollars; Mr. Fernau (Vice-Consul), 2,852 dollars; Messrs. Murdoch, Butler, and Co., 376 dollars; and Messrs. Lamb Brothers, 300 dollars.

The last two are on account of robberies, but Mr. Lamb, who has been lately entertained by the Governor, against whom he preferred the claim, has good-naturedly withdrawn it.

Messrs. Alvarez and Carraro did not appear in support of their claims.

Mazagan.

As at Rabat, the Vice-Consul, Mr. Redman, practically gives up all his time to his Consular duties, and none of his Consular Staff is a trader. I am not aware that there are any unsettled claims in the Vice-Consulate except that of the widow of the semsar of a

British subject who was murdered in 1890. I examined the woman, and was favourably impressed, though the documents produced in support of her claims were by no means conclusive. I think that moderate compensation should be obtained for her.

Saffi.

The total claims amount to 9,399 dollars; of this sum, 7,562 dollars are due to the Vice-Consul, Mr. Hunot. There is a claim by Messrs. Lamb and Co. for the value (839 dollars) of the property stolen when their semsar was murdered, referred to in previous paragraph. This is apparently a sound and unexaggerated claim.

I had no opportunity of examining the remaining claimants, Messrs. Andrews and Co., but I understand that their claims are recent. They should be carefully examined, and any items which they should be able to collect for themselves or which are of ancient date should be struck out.

Mr. Hunot, when I visited Saffi, was at Fez trying to arrive at a settlement directly with the Vizir, to whom I had given him a letter of introduction. His claims are explained in Mr. White's notes, and no doubt he would readily accept a 50 per cent. settlement, especially as one of his claims, for recovery of duty paid on beans, is of doubtful validity. Mr. Hunot remained about two months at Fez, and was almost daily in attendance on the Vizir, who continually told him that there would be a settlement in "four or five days." Finally, Mr. Hunot was informed that the principal claim (for robbery) would be settled at Tarudant, where it occurred. He has been instructed to meet the Sultan at that place, and has been given a safe-conduct. It is to be hoped, in the interests of exploration, that Mr. Hunot, who is an unrivalled Arabic linguist and a naturally clever man, will avail himself of this rare opportunity of visiting Soos. I have not, however, encouraged him to do so.

Mogador.

The claims amount to 52,575 dollars; of this sum, 7,812 dollars are due to the Consular Interpreter, a Jew of high position, who cannot speak any language but Arabic and Hebrew.

The principal claims are those of Mr. Damonte, aggregating 25,666 dollars, and dating back to 1858. Mr. Damonte has been recently appointed Consular Clerk. The principal claim is for losses sustained when Mr. Damonte's grandfather had to leave the country in 1858 in consequence of the war with Spain. It amounts to 24,988 dollars, and has been the subject of correspondence with the Foreign Office.

I examined Mr. Damonte (a very respectable young man), and the conclusion I arrived at was that his claims are well founded, and considering that the family have never ceased, since the cause of action arose, to agitate for a settlement, and that the question has been kept open solely by the apathy and obstruction of the Moorish Government, the claims should not be prejudiced by the fact that they are of ancient date. I have reason to believe that Mr. Damonte would accept 10,000 dollars in satisfaction of all his claims.

The other claims have been more than once the subject of inquiry by the British Consul and a Moorish Commissioner, but no practical result has followed, though I believe that the validity of most of them was admitted. Nevertheless, the examination which we made of the claimants showed that many of the claims were not free from the defects and flaws discovered in the claims of the Laraiche and Dar-al-Baida Vice-Consulates. The same features present themselves, namely, a multitude of small items, ancient date, absence of all corroborative evidence, flaws in the *resoom*, absence of due diligence on the part of claimant, &c.

It should be noted that all these claimants accepted the 50 per cent. compromise negotiated by Cid Boobekir in 1883.

Such are the British claims against the Moorish Government. There are a few considerations, however, which should be borne in mind:—

1. That the exaggerated or fraudulent claims are not the claims of British merchants, but of Gibraltarians—that is to say, persons of foreign origin, born on the Rock—and of protected Moors and Jews.

2. That if the Moorish Government had acted with ordinary care, expedition, and good faith, and had given effect to the repeated proposals of Sir John Hay, proper inquiry would have been made, if not at the time, at least at an early stage, when it would have been comparatively easy to ascertain the truth.

3. That these claims have been accepted as sound, and pressed as such on the Moorish

Government, and that the claimants, or the descendants of claimants, even to the second and third generation, are living in hope, for they have been led to expect that the British Government would aid them to recover the money.

4. That there is a foundation for nearly all claims, though the superstructure raised on that foundation is often huge, and even grotesque.

5. That other Legations recover similar claims for their countrymen and protégés, and that it has always been held that a British subject or protégé is entitled to every privilege—even, it appears, the privilege of fraud—which is enjoyed by a foreigner.

6. By a decision of Her Majesty's Government in 1888, claimants were forbidden to approach the local officials direct in order to imprison their debtors.

Under all these circumstances, and especially considering the loss of documents and evidence, I am of opinion that it would not be just or expedient to summarily sweep away the claims, but after going through each list roughly, I am of opinion, though further inquiry will probably be necessary, that a sum of 11,000*l.* (excluding the claim of Mr. Madden, which will be probably settled direct with him, and the claim of Mr. Forshaw, which I have not yet examined) would suffice to dispose of British claims according to the principles laid down in the rules which I am about to propose for your Lordship's approval. In arriving at this result I have struck out claims undoubtedly fraudulent or untenable, that is to say, claims unsupported by any evidence or on the face of them fraudulent; claims based on insufficient documents; claims for town debts; claims for debts due by Governors since 1875. I have further allowed full payment in some cases, and 50 per cent. or 25 per cent. payments in other cases, when the claims are ancient or evidently the consequence of bad harvests.

The benefits which would follow the settlement of this mischievous question are incalculable. A millstone would be removed from the neck of the British Minister. Instead of filling the rôle of an importunate tradesman dunning for debts of doubtful morality, he would be free to act as the friendly, disinterested adviser of the Sultan, with the untarnished dignity which becomes the Representative of Great Britain. When he approaches the Sultan, it will not be to beg for and haggle about money, but to urge the improvement of his prisons, the abolition of slave-markets, and other administrative reforms. His voice might then be heard, and, if the system of protection were also swept away, he would not be liable on those occasions to be told to remove first the beam out of his own eyes. To gain these great advantages, and to remove for ever this stumbling-block from the path of the British Representative, some might be inclined to suggest that Her Majesty's Government should pay the money themselves, in order to get rid of a question which has clouded for so many years their relations with Morocco, on the understanding that in future every claim should be promptly inquired into and settled as soon as it is brought to the notice of the local authorities. But, apart from the obvious difficulties in the way of such a policy, I am of opinion that its adoption would not be advantageous to our future relations with the Sultan. An uncivilized Ruler is apt to regard as weakness justice which is not stern, and he might in future be still more difficult to deal with when rightful claims arise. A premium, moreover, would be given on the evasion and obstruction in which the Sultan and his *entourage* love to revel. If this view be accepted by your Lordship, there is no alternative but to press vigorously on the Sultan the payment of the sum necessary in order to extirpate this poisonous question. One sharp operation is all that is necessary, and I think that it should be promptly performed by the new Minister when he visits the Court, but unfortunately, owing to the Sultan's departure for Tafilelt, this cannot be for some time. The visit will probably be made to Morocco, as the Sultan is not likely to return to Fez for another two years. I do not believe that the Minister would encounter much difficulty. The Sultan would be glad to settle the question cheaply, and his advisers would probably not object, for money does not pass through the fingers of a Shereefian Minister without leaving a valuable residuum.

There may be in addition some recent claims not yet presented. These should be carefully, indeed mercilessly, examined, and I doubt if they will amount to more than a very small amount.

Finally, as regards the future. It is of little use to cut down the weeds if they are to be allowed to spring up again. This may be avoided by the enforcement of the following rules, which, if they meet with your Lordship's approval, should be communicated through the Consular Staff to all merchants and traders:—

1. No protected person is entitled to more than protection of person and property. The British Government shall have nothing to say to his trading debts. This rule, of course, applies to Consular employés.

2. Save in exceptional cases to be decided as they arise, no debt shall be accepted as

sound by the British Minister unless based on valid documents, which must be in the name of the claimant, and not of a third person. If there are documents not admissible by *Shraa* the case should be referred to arbitration, but if they are *resoom* or notarial documents they must have been properly attested by the *Adools* and *Kadi*.

3. Save in very exceptional cases, no town debts shall be taken up by the British Legation. If the local authorities refuse ordinary justice, the matter should be reported at once by the Vice-Consul or Consul.

4. *Resoom* exceeding 100 dollars in value must be registered on payment of a small sum at the British Vice-Consulate. The British Vice-Consul shall examine the parties, and if he be satisfied as to the *bona fides* of the transaction, and especially as to the character and antecedents of the native agent, he shall register the document.

5. No claim of less than 20 dollars in value shall be taken up by the British Legation, although there is no objection to the Consular officer exercising his personal influence to obtain a settlement for creditors in case of smaller debts which, after inquiry, he is satisfied are justly due.

6. *Resoom* between the value of 20 and 100 dollars, and any other valid documentary evidence of debts, may be registered on the payment of a small fee at the British Consulate, and *resoom* thus registered shall be held to have priority in every way over *resoom* not registered.

7. No claim shall be taken up by the British Government which is not presented at the Vice-Consulate within one year from the date of cause of action.

(This will necessitate an annual settlement of accounts, which is very desirable.)

8. The claims when presented shall be carefully examined, if possible in the presence of the debtor, and the claimant shall be required to show that the default is not due to a visitation of God, that every reasonable attempt has been made to obtain payment, that the failure to do so is owing to the non-co-operation or obstruction of the Moorish officials. He must also show that there is good ground for believing that the debtor has means of paying the debt, and his residence and the locality where his property are situated should be indicated.

9. The Vice-Consul or Consul, if satisfied on these points, should register the claim in a book of prescribed form, called the "Register of Claims," and should then seek the co-operation of the Moorish responsible authority.

10. Once a-quarter he shall furnish Her Majesty's Minister with a list of the claims thus registered, and the latter shall order him to strike out the claim of any claimant who, in his opinion, after inquiry, is not entitled to have his claim registered.

11. Every six months the Minister will send to the Shereefian Court a list of claims which are not discharged by reason of the obstructiveness or want of diligence of the Local Governments. But he should first satisfy himself so far as possible that the debtor has the means of discharging his liability.

12. Once the Moorish officials have produced the debtor at the port to be confronted with the claimant, and when the Moorish official has proceeded against any property of the debtor which is indicated to him, and has paid into the Vice-Consulate the money thus realized, the responsibility of the Moorish Government for this particular claim shall cease.

13. The Vice-Consul should not demand, or, so far as it lies in his power, permit the imprisonment of any debtor unless he is satisfied that the man is acting fraudulently. All cases of imprisonment which come to the knowledge of the claimant should be immediately reported by him to the Consular officer, and by the latter to the Legation. Every effort should be made that the debtor when imprisoned be imprisoned in the port or town where the Vice-Consul resides. The subsistence of the prisoner shall be paid for by the creditor at a rate fixed, with the approval of the Minister, by the Consul or Vice-Consul.

14. In cases of robbery, information is to be immediately given to the Consul or Vice-Consul, who shall make full and prompt inquiry, if possible on the spot, either personally or by a trustworthy agent, into all the circumstances of the case, including the value of the property stolen.

15. Rules 2, 4, and 5 apply to all cases of robbery where pecuniary compensation is required.

16. If the offenders are arrested and adequately punished by the Moorish authorities, the responsibility of the latter will cease, and no pecuniary claim shall be made against them, provided that compensation for any actual loss sustained be paid if the offenders have property available for the purpose. This rule is not intended to relieve the district which harbours the offenders from any responsibility attaching to them by equity and the custom of the country.

17. As soon as the inquiry has been concluded, a full Report shall be submitted to

the British Minister, who will decide as to the redress, if any, which should be demanded by the Legation from the Shereefian Government.

18. Whenever in the above rules an inquiry is prescribed, every effort should be made to obtain the co-operation in the inquiry of a Moorish Representative, but in default of such co-operation the inquiry should not be abandoned or even unduly postponed.

19. In future, compensation to British subjects or protégés for insults or injuries shall not necessarily take a pecuniary form. Pecuniary compensation shall only be paid to the claimant to the extent that he has sustained bodily or pecuniary loss, and in all cases any sum which it may be considered desirable to levy in excess of that amount from the Moorish Government shall, after the claim has been satisfied to the extent prescribed above, be paid into a Legation fund to be called the "Legation Claims Fund." From this fund may be advanced money to pay approved claims for robbery or assault in anticipation of their payment by the Shereefian Government.

The object and expediency of each of these rules are explained by what has been written above. Rule 19 alone perhaps needs further explanation and justification. It is the fashion in Morocco to demand pecuniary compensation for every trifling assault and insult—compensation generally quite disproportionate to the moral or physical injury which the claimant has sustained—even supposing him to be the most haughty and sensitive of men. This system is a direct encouragement to travellers and others to rove about Morocco inviting assault and seeking insults. I need not enlarge on the evils of th system, and the rule which I propose will, I think, prevent their recurrence.

I see no reason why the above rules should not be put into force at once, should your Lordship approve them. The particular merit which differentiates them from former schemes is that the co-operation of the local Moorish officials is not essential, for this is the rock on which all other proposals have been wrecked.

But the whole scheme is contingent on prompt local inquiry and careful treatment by Consular authorities. This will involve some expense for travelling, &c., and this small difficulty—the expenses should not be large—has prevented my predecessors from constantly visiting or deputing an experienced officer to visit and inspect the Vice-Consulates. In another Report, in which I recommend a reorganization of the Consular Service in Morocco, I shall describe how necessary such periodical inspections are. I am convinced that if, for instance, that experienced and able officer Mr. Consul White, to whose assistance I am so much indebted for the unravelling of this entangled web, had been authorized to visit the Vice-Consulate of Laraiche the existing condition of that Vice-Consulate would never have reached its present acute stage.

Most important is the local inquiry into robbery. It is the only way of arriving at the truth. I have tried it in three cases since I have been in Morocco. In one case the inquiry is still proceeding; in the second case a settlement has been arrived at; and in the third case the Moorish Representative did not appear, and the inquiry (in a very unsettled part of the country) was conducted by the British officers (Mr. Allan Maclean and Captain Count Gleichen) without Moorish co-operation, but with the tacit consent of the Governor. The result was the release of an unfortunate boy who had been in prison for two years, and the verification of a pecuniary claim which I can now—a case almost unprecedented—press upon the Moorish Government with a conviction that it is genuine. For one result of the fraud and exaggeration through which a British Minister wades when dealing with the question of claims is that he becomes sceptical and suspicious even in cases which are true and reasonable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WEST RIDGEWAY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 15.

Memorandum of the Steps that have been taken for the Settlement of Claims of British Subjects.

IN 1869 the Sultan appointed a Commissioner, who examined all the claims and effected a settlement of nearly all.

In 1873, fresh claims having arisen, Sir J. D. Hay obtained appointment of another Commissioner, but with no result.

In 1874 claims against Governors and Sheikhs were compromised, and an agreement come to that such claims be debarred in the future.

In 1882, during his Mission to the Court, Sir J. D. Hay went through the list of

claims and discussed them with the Moorish authorities, and it was again agreed that Commissioners be sent to the port. They settled but few claims, however.

In 1883, by arrangement between the Sultan and Sir J. D. Hay, Cid Boobekir visited the ports and examined the claims. He reported that the claimants of the southern ports, which he had then visited, all had agreed to accept 50 per cent. in full settlement. The Sultan, however, refused to accept this arrangement, and proposed, instead, that all documents be examined at the Court. All resoom and other documents were accordingly sent to Tangier, and handed over to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who examined them with a Commissioner, and presumably sent them to the Court. They were detained till 1886, when they were returned to Sir J. D. Hay, and by him sent back to the various ports, but a number of them had been apparently lost, and were not returned by the Moorish Minister.

In the meantime, a certain number of claims had been paid, and the debtors had been imprisoned and cruelly treated. Many cases of usury and unjust claims were brought to light, and, consequently, Sir J. D. Hay made an agreement that on the *resoom* being returned to the ports each claim should be examined jointly by the Vice-Consul and Moorish Governor in the presence of the debtor and claimant, and settled once for all by a payment if the claim were valid and the debtor solvent, or by release of debtor if insolvent, and by dismissal of claim if invalid. Unfortunately, it was found impossible to carry out these regulations owing to the wilful obstruction of country Governors, who would not send the debtors to the ports.

Since that time there has been much correspondence and negotiation during the various Missions, and occasionally Commissioners have been sent to the various ports, but with very little results, owing to the above-mentioned cause, that country Governors persistently refuse to co-operate, and will neither make the debtors pay nor send them in.

In some cases there is no doubt that debtors have paid their debts to the Commissioners, but that the money has remained somewhere on its way to the Legation, either in hands of Commissioners or of some other officials through whom it had to pass. The above-referred-to loss of *resoom* is another obstacle to the proper examination of some of the claims.

General Summary of Claims.

	Amount.	
	Dol. r. vn.	Dol. r. vn.
Commercial.		
Laraiche	34,862 19	
Dar-al-Baida	22,851 2	
Mazagan	1,020 0	
Saffi	6,975 0	
Mogador	10,307 0	
Various	13,192 12	
		89,208 13
Robberies, &c.		
Laraiche	1,707 0	
Dar-al-Baida	7,665 0	
Mazagan	23,052 0	
Saffi	2,424 0	
Mogador	42,268 0	
Various	4,215 0	
		81,331 0
		170,539 13

Of the above total, 75,492 dollars are claimed by past or present Consular officers and employés.

Memorandum.

The following notes embody the results of an examination of the claims at Tangier, at Gibraltar, and at each of the Moorish ports. The examination in many cases could not be very thorough, as the time at our disposal did not admit of a searching inquiry into each claim; these notes cannot, therefore, be regarded as exhaustive. In some cases, notably the Dar-al-Baida claims of Mr. Lapeen, the Laraiche claims of Messrs. Imossi,

and of Messrs. Levy and Co., of Gibraltar, and in many of the Mogador claims, *each resm*, or notarial document, has been perused and compared with the list; in other cases certain documents were chosen at hazard from the bundle, and the claims inquired into. The claimant, wherever possible, was personally questioned as to the circumstances under which the claim arose, the position of the debtor, steps taken by the claimant to recover payment, &c., and the commercial books, ledgers, &c., were in some cases also examined. Unfortunately, however, it appeared to be the custom of many of the claimants (so-called merchants) to conduct their business in a very loose manner, keeping no books of any kind whatever, but merely memoranda on loose slips of paper, which they stated that they had destroyed or lost, although the transactions to which they referred were the subject of claim.

SUMMARY of Laraiche Claims.

	Amount.	
	Dol. r. vn.	Dol. r. vn.
Commercial.		
Vice-Consul Imossi, per agent, Lislami, List I ..	2,927 10*	
" " " " List II ..	1,751 12†	
" " " Soliman El Kharrat ..	3,811 3	
		8,490 5
Meir Matitia, Consular Interpreter	2,714 0	
" " per agent, Moses El Kharrat ..	9,713 0	
Heirs of Mesod Matitia, late Consular Interpreter ..	2,653 6	
		15,080 6
Lewis Forde .. .. (about)	..	1,100 0
Heirs of late J. and J. Coute	..	3,930 10
J. Fereres	..	2,456 8
J. Fava	..	726 0
Levy and Co., of Gibraltar, per agent, Benzaquen ..	..	3,079 10‡
		34,862 19
Robbery Claims.		
Lewis Forde, per agent, Benishu		1,707 0
		36,569 19

Laraiche Claims.

Examination of Mr. Imossi at Gibraltar.

Mr. Imossi's claims 8,490 : 5 dollars.

Abdullah Lislami, List I, 2,927 : 10 dollars. Ditto, List II, 1,751 : 12 dollars.

The claims on List I are against debtors residing in the Gharb districts under the jurisdiction of the Governors Habassi and Remoosh.

All Mr. Imossi's transactions through Lislami were on behalf of Messrs. Smith and Imossi, of Gibraltar, whose agent at Laraiche he was. His own private business he did entirely through El Kharrat.

Mr. Imossi wound up his account with Messrs. Smith and Imossi a few years since, and then had himself to make good the deficit arising from the amounts owing through Lislami. Messrs. Smith and Imossi used to purchase large quantities of grain through him —as much as 97,000 dollars in one year.

His system of business with Lislami was as follows:—

He would give money to Lislami from time to time as required, taking as security either a *resm* (notarial document) or a note of hand. Lislami would visit the various

* In the Arabic translation of the list sent by claimant for delivery to the Moorish authorities the total is stated at 3,404 : 10 dollars.

† In the Arabic list the total is stated at 1,822 : 10 dollars, whereas the addition of the items in the English list brings the total to 1,655 dollars only, and not as therein stated.

‡ In a list received direct from Gibraltar from Messrs. Levy and Co. the total is given at 1,280 dollars only.

A large proportion of all the claims are for grain, the *resoom* merely stating the amount of *grain* due, and not the value, which in the lists has been calculated by the claimants at a very high rate. In other claims the *resoom* state the value in *okeat*, a coin which has varied greatly in value by change in the rate of exchange.

markets and purchase grain and send it in to him at Laraiche, taking note of all thus sent. Lislami compared notes with him from time to time, and when it was found that any grain had not been sent in Lislami would visit the seller or carrier (as the case may be) who had engaged to deliver it, and if unable to fulfil the contract would take from him a *resm* acknowledging the debt. The *resoom* thus collected remained in Lislami's possession, as he was the person responsible to him (Imossi). At the end of every year Imossi would balance accounts with Lislami, and a fresh paper would be drawn up showing the total amount then owing, all the former notes of hand, &c., being destroyed. No books were kept, but merely memoranda on slips of paper, which were destroyed. Lislami did no business on his own account except in cattle, all his transactions in grain were for account of Mr. Imossi, as agent for Messrs. Smith and Imossi.

In 1874, hearing that Lislami was dying, Mr. Imossi, then British Vice-Consul, called on the Basha and asked his advice as to the sum owing to him. By the Basha's recommendation he saw Lislami, and with his consent, *Adool* (Notaries Public) were called to his bedside, and took his declaration as to the amount owing by him to Imossi.* A few days later Lislami died, and the *Kadi* took possession of all his property and assumed the administration of his estate. He took note of Mr. Imossi's claim, but declined to hand him over any documents. When, however, in 1883, Sir J. D. Hay called for a list of claims, Vice-Consul Imossi wrote to the *Kadi*, saying he would hold him responsible for the amount of the debt if he did not deliver the *resoom*; the *Kadi* handed them over to him, taking a receipt for them.

The total amount represented by these documents is in excess of the sum owing to him by Lislami, but he intended to pay over to the heirs any balance that might be recovered. He made some endeavours to recover payment on these *resoom*, but did not succeed in getting anything, although he went to considerable expense in sending messengers, &c. He believes the debtors had means, but they used to evade payment by making presents to their Governors. Lislami left no property except a small amount of realty, so that Imossi could only recover the amount owing to him by accepting transfer of the debts due to Lislami.

Examination of "Resoom."

List I. Of the sixty *resoom*, only six, representing 115 dollars, are in Lislami's name; of the others, thirty-six are in the name of Buselham, described in one of the documents as agent of Mr. Imossi. He was an employé of Lislami; seven *resoom* are in name of Fereres, a partner of Lislami, and the others are in the names of various Moors. They are all dated in the years 1869-74, and vary in amount from 2 to 500 dollars, the total being 2,927 : 10 dollars. With few exceptions the *resoom* only give the amount of grain, and not the value; the prices quoted in the list are evidently exaggerated, probably by not less than 60 per cent., though it is difficult to say exactly, as prices in this country vary greatly both from month to month, and in different places. The quantities of grain are given correctly, except in item No. 15, where 60 mood beans are given instead of 50 mood canary seed. Item No. 15 is stated as for 23 dollars, whereas it is only for 11 "ducats," which at the rate of exchange at that time would have been about 2 dollars.

List II. There are fifty-six items in this list, for a total sum of 1,655 dollars, wrongly stated as 1,751 : 12 dollars.

Five *resoom* are in Lislami's name, thirty-four in Buselham's name, one in Imossi's name, seven in Fereres' name, and eight in names of various Moors. They date in the years 1868-74, and vary in amount from 1½ to 140 dollars.

The prices of the grain and rates of exchange are again grossly exaggerated. At a rough estimate on the basis of the prices stated in some of the documents, I should think that the money actually out of pocket by these bad debts was about 900 dollars. The list is very confused, the various debts being frequently put down to the wrong names, the list having evidently been copied by column instead of by line.

Lists I and II. Probably a sum of 1,700 or 1,800 dollars would cover the true amount of the claims included in both lists.

Examination of Mr. Imossi.

El Kharrat's list, 3,811 : 3 dollars. These claims are similar to those on Lislami's lists, except that they are for amounts due to Mr. Imossi personally, and not as agent for Messrs. Smith and Imossi. The

* 3,382 dollars.

business was carried on on the same principle, El Kharrat, however, being a Jew resident at Laraiche, and no memoranda or papers existing in support of Imossi's claim on him.

El Kharrat died about the year 1882, and on his death his widow and his cousin, Moses El Kharrat called on Mr. Imossi and informed him that the deceased had told them he owed him 2,490 dollars. Deceased did no business on his own account except to retail wheat and barley, and he left no property except a half share of a house. Mr. Imossi wished to take that as security for his debt, but he yielded to the entreaties of the widow and accepted transfer of these documents instead, representing a sum of 3,811 dollars, the balance, if collected, to be returned to the widow. A son of the deceased went into the country to try and collect on them for account of Mr. Imossi, but got nothing, and Mr. Imossi has never recovered anything. All the grain transactions mentioned in these documents, except the wheat and barley, were made by El Kharrat on Imossi's account.

Examination of the "Resoom."

There are fifty-six items in the list, each of which is supported by a *resm*. All these *resoom* are in the name of El Kharrat, or of a relative of his, except one which is indorsed to him, and three which are in the names of Buselham or Fereres.

The *resoom* date of the years 1865-81, and vary in amount from 6 to 600 dollars. The majority of the documents are for cash, and the figures given in the list are therefore more correct than in the lists of Lislami; thirteen items, however, are for grain, and two are for ducats, in those the values are exaggerated. The true amounts of the list would probably total up to about 2,500 dollars. Some of the *resoom*, however, included herein are not quite in order.

Summary of Mr. Imossi's claims.

The true value of all the documents presented by Mr. Imossi in support of his claim for 8,490 : 5 dollars, as per his three lists, does probably not exceed 4,300 dollars, even admitting all the documents as valid, and that he is entitled to claim on them all.

Matitia claims, 15,080 : 6 dollars.

Examination of Meir Matitia, Interpreter to Vice-Consulate at Laraiche.

The Matitia family.

Samuel Matitia was appointed Interpreter to the Vice-Consulate about the year 1848. He died in 1873, and was succeeded as Interpreter by his son, Mesod Matitia, who died in 1879, when his brother, Meir Matitia, the present Interpreter, was appointed to the post.

The Vice-Consulate house was built by the Sultan's orders with money advanced by Samuel Matitia, the family receiving as rent 8 dollars per month, representing the interest on their money.

Personal claims of Meir Matitia in his own name, 2,714 dollars.

This amount is made up of ninety-seven items, varying from 1½ to 216 dollars, the *resoom* being dated 1866-91.

He has other claims of more recent date, but has not yet sent them in to the Legation, or brought them under the notice of the Vice-Consul. He has made private attempts at settlement, both by direct application to the debtors and by private application to their Governors, but with no effect, the Governors being either unwilling or unable to enforce payment. He has no day-book, account-book, ledgers, or other commercial books to produce in support of these claims, but only has a list of documents similar to that sent in to the Legation.

The following items on his list were then selected at hazard and inquired into :—

"No. 11, for 40 dollars, date 1877."

He sold half share in some goats for 40 dollars, to be paid in yearly instalments of 10 dollars. Debtor escaped to a different district, and Matitia had been unable to recover payment. He had taken no steps, however, until list was sent in eight years later, nor has he done anything since that time.

"No. 90, for 90 dollars, dated 1889."

He advanced this sum to a Moor of Hel Scrif district. He had applied to the Basha, who sent soldiers to the debtor, but without result. The district has been in revolt for two years, and Basha advised him to wait till it was quiet again. At the time he advanced the money the district was in a settled condition.

"No. 74, for 158 dollars, dated 1866."

This is for a balance of accounts; the debtor has, however, been paying instalments since that time, the last instalment being 11 dollars, paid three months ago.

"No. 86, for 140 dollars, dated 1869."

This amount was advanced by Samuel Matitia to a Laraiche man for purchase of woollen coverings. No steps were taken against him at the time, although he was living

at Laraiche, as he was expected to pay. He died about 1886 or 1867, and a settlement was attempted with the heirs, but fell through owing to obstruction of the Kadi, who had presumably been bribed. Matitia complained to the Vice-Consul, but there was no record of his having done so, all that passed having probably been verbal.

Mr. Matitia considers that it is fair to require the Sultan to pay claims of foreigners, as, had the Moorish officials done their duty, debtors would probably have had to pay, and the claims would not have arisen. He admitted, however, that in many cases it would have been impossible for the debtors to pay owing to failure of crops, &c.

Meir Matitia per El Kharrat, 9,713 dollars.

The origin of these claims was as follows :—

Samuel Matitia in 1872 advanced 5,000 dollars to Moses El Kharrat to trade with; by the contract, Samuel Matitia was to receive credit for 10,000 dollars (though he only actually paid the 5,000 dollars as above), and was to receive half profits. The Hebrew notarial document of contract was produced in proof of the above. El Kharrat was at this time a merchant doing an independent business on his own account, and also carrying on business as agent for some Tangier firms, as well as the partnership with Matitia.

In 1881 El Kharrat became insolvent and his business with Matitia was wound up. He then handed over to Meir Matitia (Samuel Matitia having died previously) the documents of his debts in payment of what he owed. Matitia endeavoured to obtain possession of El Kharrat's house, but it was shown to belong to his son. El Kharrat died about 1890.

There was no formal settlement of accounts on the dissolution of partnership in 1881, nor does Mr. Matitia hold any document to prove that El Kharrat was indebted to him at that time, nor are there any account-books showing the state of accounts between them, in fact, nothing whatever in writing, but merely the fact that the *resoom* are in Matitia's possession, although his name is not mentioned in one of them. He knows nothing whatever about the transactions to which the *resoom* refer, nor whether the debtors are alive or dead, rich or poor, who they are, or where they live. He has taken no steps to recover payment further than to send in the list to the Legation.

The total of 9,713 dollars given in the list is made up of 113 items, varying from 2 to 710 dollars, the *resoom* being dated 1866–84, two of them being at a period when the partnership of Matitia with El Kharrat did not exist, and there is nothing in any of them to show that Matitia was directly or indirectly interested in the transactions they record.

The following items were selected at hazard and examined :—

"No. 60, for 23 mood beans, 23 dollars, date 1877."

The *resm* states the value of the beans as 16 dollars. The claim is thus exaggerated by 7 dollars, *i.e.*, nearly 44 per cent.

"No 65, for 100 mood beans, 52 dollars, date 1875."

The amount of 52 dollars is correct, and the number of mood of beans is also correct, but their value is not stated in the *resm*. The value of 100 dollars given in the list is evidently much exaggerated, the real value would probably have been about 70 dollars.

It is worthy of notice, in connection with the claims on this list, that with an original capital of 5,000 dollars on which Matitia was only entitled to half the profits, the *bad* debts alone—or rather Matitia's share of them—amounted at the end of nine years to 9,713 dollars, or nearly half the original capital.

Even were it to be supposed that Matitia's share of these bad debts really was those specified in the list, it is a question whether his claim based on them should be supported, for it would be difficult to account for their amount except on the supposition that there has been the grossest usury, which unfortunately was, and in some cases still is, so common in this country. The fact that the majority of these items are for cash would rather appear to favour this theory. Of the total sum claimed, 1,944 dollars is claimed for 1,944 mood of beans, of which the value would probably at the the time of purchase not have exceeded 1,000 dollars, take one season with another.

Mesod Matitia, 2,653 : 6 dollars.

These claims are brought by the heirs of the late Interpreter, brother of Meir Matitia, who, however, was not able to throw any light upon them.

Our time was not sufficient to enable us to examine the documents, which were not immediately forthcoming, and there apparently was no one who could give us any particulars concerning the claims and their origin.

Examination of Mr. Forde.

Forde (commercial), 1,100 dollars.

The claim is composed of twenty-three items, of which eight are not in the name of Mr. Forde, but of a man who he states was his agent, employed on the same system as Mr. Imossi employed Lislami.

The amounts of the separate items vary from about 5 to 210 dollars, and date 1873–78.

Many of the items are for grain, no money value being stated; the amount given in the summary is therefore only roughly approximate, and having been calculated on the basis of the calculations in the other Laraiche list, is probably considerably too high.

Mr. Forde explained that he had been continuously endeavouring to collect his outstanding debts, but though he had succeeded in recovering certain amounts, thus reducing his list to its present proportions, he had failed to obtain a settlement of those in his present list. One, however, which figured at 350 dollars, had been reduced by instalments to 210 dollars, and he hoped to receive payment in full in time, so he thought the item could be withdrawn from the list. Some of the debtors are under protection of a powerful Shereef, and the Governor is therefore powerless to help him, as such men are to all intents and purposes independent of all authority.

With regard to the debts transferred to him by his agent, he knows nothing of the individual transactions, nor has he been able to discover the debtors, though he has tried to trace them. He took no steps with regard to them till 1891, when he included them in his list for the first time. His agent was killed in the country some six or eight years previously.

Forde (Benishu claim), 1,707 dollars.

This claim forms the subject of a Special Report by Mr. Maclean and Captain Count Gleichen, forwarded to the Foreign Office in despatch No. 104 of the 30th June. It arose out of the attack by a Sheikh in the district of Kaïd Habassi upon Alal Benishu (Mr. Forde's agent, duly certified as such) and his family, when property to the value indicated was said to have been seized or destroyed, and Benishu himself and some members of his family were wounded. Repeated representations have been made to the Moorish Court by this Legation on the subject, but hitherto without any result whatsoever. The inquiry by Mr. Maclean and Captain Count Gleichen tended to show that the claim was well founded, and the amount claimed not exaggerated.

Examination of Mr. Guillen, who is related by Marriage to one of the Claimants.

Heirs of J. and J. Coute, 3930 : 10 dollars.

Joseph and John Coute (father and son) died within a few months of each other about the year 1879. The claims first passed to the widow, and on her death to her daughters, who, however, are unacquainted with business, and have been unable to attend to them. Accordingly, he, Mr. Guillen, has assisted them, but has been unable to do much for them, as he has his own business to attend to. He knows nothing of the transactions out of which the claims arose, but he formerly succeeded in collecting some amounts. He ceased, however, to take any further action in the matter once the claims had been sent in to the Legation, and he does not consider it would have been right for him to have done so. He only holds the documents, and has no account-books or ledgers connected with the claims, not does he know whether any exist.

[The total amount of 3,930 : 10 dollars is made up of fifty-eight items, varying from 8 to 202 dollars, and dating in the years 1866-80, one, however, of 1888. In the Arabic copy of the list the total value is given at 3,930 : 10 dollars, but in the English copy the amount is not given in dollars, each item being specified in kind, or *okeat* (*i.e.*, $\frac{1}{16}$ ducat), and a few only in dollars. According to my rough estimation the value should be only about 2,500 dollars.—H. E. W.]

The following items were selected at hazard and examined:—

"No. 1, for 260 okeat, date 1867."

The document is not in the name of Coute, but in that of a Jew. Mr. Guillen said this Jew was indebted to Coute, and must have transferred the debt, but he could produce nothing in proof of this.

"No. 31, for certain quantities of various grains, date 1878."

The *resm* states that the quantities of grains indicated "belonging to Juan the Englishman" were in the hands of the debtor.

"No. 38, for three bullocks, date 1867."

Resm states that the debtor held two bullocks and a cow belonging to Coute.

J. Fereres, 2,456 : 8 dollars.

This list contains 138 items, which vary from 16 reals vellon to 280 dollars, dating in years 1869-91. Thirty-eight of these items are for grain, which is valued at the same exaggerated rates as in the other lists.

Mr. Fereres was absent from Laraiche on the occasion of our first visit there, and on our return our stay was too short to permit of our entering into any details. He stated that the claims were for money advanced for the purchase of grain, &c., on the same system as has been explained above, and that he had failed to obtain any settlement.

J. Fava, 726 dollars.

Mr. Fava was absent, and though asked to come to Tangier to explain his claims, has not appeared. There are thirteen items of from 8 to 200 dollars, and dating 1876-89.

Examination of Mr. Levy at Gibraltar.

Levy and Co., 3,079 : 10 dollars.

Mr. Levy explained that he personally knew nothing of the items, but that Mr. Benzaquen was their agent at Laraiche, and did their business for them. Mr. Levy, who was most frank, exhibited his books, correspondence with Benzaquen, and contract with him. Under this contract Benzaquen was to receive a commission of one-third of the profits, and was precluded from doing any business except as their agent.

I drew Mr. Levy's attention to the fact that Mr. Benzaquen's list totalled to 3,079 : 10 dollars, whilst the list received from them was only for 1,280 dollars. Mr. Levy at once stated that Benzaquen's list was not correct, as he quoted present prices of the grain instead of price at time of purchase. He read to me a letter from Benzaquen forwarding the list of claims and document, and saying that only 514 dollars of the total amount was due to Messrs. Levy (the remainder being presumably on Benzaquen's own account). Mr. Levy knew nothing of the extra items included in Benzaquen's list and not appearing in his own, and told me he would instruct Benzaquen to deliver all *resoom* for examination, and to call himself to give explanations. The documents were since delivered, but Benzaquen, who came to Tangier when we were at Laraiche, returned to Laraiche when we were at Tangier without appearing to afford explanations.

Messrs. Levy's books show that they wrote off as bad debts in 1882 a sum of 825 dollars owing at Laraiche, and again in 1891 they wrote off a further sum of 280 dollars.

The conclusion to be drawn would appear to be that though Messrs. Levy and Co. are themselves honourable merchants, and do not wish to claim more than is due, they are in the hands of their agent, an unprotected Moorish subject, who thought the occasion for obtaining payment, with interest, of some of his private claims was too good to let slip.

The examination of the *resoom* showed that out of a list of ten items, varying from 10 to 1,310 dollars, and dated 1876-89, two items for 210 dollars are unsupported by *resoom*, and the others have *resoom* in name of Benzaquen, but only four of them appear in Messrs. Levy and Co's. list, where they are correctly stated as making a total of 1,244 dollars, whilst in Mr. Benzaquen's list they amount to 2,440 dollars. One of the five items on Messrs. Levy and Co's. list, being for 36 dollars, is unsupported by *resoom*. Thus it would appear that the claim should only be for 1,244 dollars, of which amount only 514 dollars is due to Messrs. Levy and Co., and therefore entitled to the support of the Legation.

SUMMARY of Dar-al-Baida Claims.

	Amount.	
	Dol. r. vn.	Dol. r. vn.
Commercial.		
Ex-Vice-Consul Lapeen, claims on Moors	8,400 15	
" " " Jews	7,428 12	
		15,829 7
A. Benchimol (dismissed Consular Interpreter) ..	..	979 10
Ex-Vice-Consul Fernau	..	2,852 0
H. Cansino	..	1,622 0
W. Pons	..	235 5
J. Alvarez	..	106 0
A. N. Carara	..	1,227 0
		22,851 2
Robbery Claims.		
Ex-Vice-Consul Lapeen, per various agents ..	4,586 0	
Ex-Vice-Consul Hunter's firm (Murdoch, Butler, and Co.)	376 0	
H. Cansino	2,403 0	
Lamb Brothers	300 0	
		7,665 0
		30,516 2

Examination of Mr. Lapeen, and of his Books, at Dar-al-Baida; of his "Resoom" at Tangier.

Lapeen's claims, 20,415 : 7 dollars.

Claims on Moors, 8,400 : 15 dollars.

His claims on Moors, as per list presented in 1883, consisted of 187 items, varying from 2 to 1,150 dollars, and dated 1867-83, aggregating to a total sum of 19,849 : 5 dollars. Since that time Mr. Lapeen states that he has collected on these *resoom* 11,448 : 10 dollars, leaving a balance due of 8,400 : 15 dollars on 138 documents, of which only thirty-three are in his own name, the remainder having been transferred to him by his agents in payment of the amounts they owed him. Forty items are for grain, &c., of which the value stated in the list is evidently much exaggerated.

An examination of all the *resoom* showed several serious errors in Mr. Lapeen's figures, *e.g.*, No. 6, for 100 sheep. Mr. Lapeen states the value as 250 dollars, whereas the *resm* states explicitly that he is only entitled to 57 dollars on them.

"No. 19, for 120 mood beans, 450 dollars," whereas the *resm* is for 1 mood beans, value 2 dollars.

"No. 136, for three cows, value 72 dollars," the *resm* being for 6 dollars cash only.

"No. 176, for one camel, value 60 dollars," the *resm* being "for 16½ dollars for half a camel."

In other cases Mr. Lapeen, in his lists, takes no notice of sums paid on account, as in "No. 60, for 282 dollars," where the *resm* is indorsed with a payment of 51½ dollars on account, reducing the amount due to 230 : 10 dollars.

Mr. Lapeen's books apparently show no entry of this payment on account either, the balance there stated as due being 282 dollars, so I fear the books are not very reliable either.

"No. 73, for 484 dollars," the *resm* being indorsed with a payment of 92 dollars on account, reducing the debt to 392 dollars. In this case also Mr. Lapeen's books show the full amount of 484 dollars as being the balance due.

In the case of items Nos. 30, 31, and 31 A against the same person for an aggregate of 548 dollars, Mr. Lapeen's books show a balance due of only 181 dollars.

The list also contains some items which have been settled. Some of these, Lapeen admits, have been wrongly inserted in the list by an oversight; the others he states have been inserted, as, although the money has been recovered from the debtors, it has never been paid to him. He explains that he signed a receipt and gave up the documents at the time of the inquiry into his claims in 1884 when he was dismissed from the Vice-Consulate, as at that time, when so many charges were brought against him, he was anxious that his debtors be released from prison, and consequently signed receipts for amounts he never himself received, though he alleges that in many cases they were received by the Moorish authorities.

A careful examination of all Mr. Lapeen's *resoom* show that the amounts due are:—

	Dollars.
With *resoom*—	
Direct	3,122
Indirect	2,084
Without *resoom*—	
Direct	805
Indirect	751

I will remark on the indirect claims in a general summary of all Mr. Lapeen's claims at the end.

Claims on Jews, 7,428 : 10 dollars.

The original list contained thirty-nine items varying from 12½ to 2,247 dollars, and aggregating 9,877 : 15 dollars, of which 2,439 : 10 dollars has been recovered.

Only seven documents have been shown representing 1,812 dollars. These *resoom* reveal two errors in Lapeen's list. Nos. 29, 30, and 31 show a sum of 1,072 dollars to be due, whereas, according to the document, only 352 dollars are due. Mr. Lapeen's books in this case also show the larger amount as the balance due. In the original list first presented no account was taken of payments on account, but this has been in most cases corrected in the list now before me.

All these claims are against Jews resident in the towns of Rabat, Sallu, and Dar-al-Baida, many of whom were sent in chains to Fez and Mequinez, and there imprisoned till they were released by Sir J. D. Hay's orders in 1884. Mr. Lapeen's action in connection with these claims was severely commented on at that time, and it is probable that he gave up the *resoom* then.

Robbery claims, 4,586 dollars.

This list is composed of five items, each of which are for robberies from separate agents of Mr. Lapeen.

No. 1 is for robbery from Jacob Alitbol at Demnat in 1879, the amount claimed being 1,500 dollars.

Some correspondence passed at the time between the Legation and the Court on the subject, and it was shown to be probable that the agent's story was false, and that there had been no robbery. He was therefore required to make oath, but instead of doing so he escaped from the country and went to the East. Mr. Lapeen himself admits that he did not at first believe in the robbery, and had Alitbol put in prison on account of the money he owed him, which by Lapeen's books was only 352 dollars, and which is included in his list of claims against Jews; but he says that he subsequently (? when he found the man had no means of paying his debt himself) thought his story must be true, and accordingly released him and claimed from the Moorish Government. Alitbol has since died in Tunis.

No. 2, for 336 dollars, on account of an alleged robbery from an agent named Escalants in 1877.

Escalants owed Lapeen 273 dollars, and was cast into prison on that account, but was released and given a receipt at the time of the inquiry in 1884. Lapeen claims 336 dollars on account of the robbery, the difference between that sum and 273 dollars representing prospective profits. He has no documents to prove either sum due or robbery.

No. 3, 1,600 dollars, on account of an alleged robbery from his agent, Ruimi, in 1878.

Lapeen has no papers in proof. His books show a balance of 594 dollars against Ruimi, whereas he is claiming on these lists 1,600 dollars for robbery, and 299 dollars on commercial debts list, *i.e.*, a total of 1,899 dollars.

No. 4, for 800 dollars on account of an alleged robbery from his agent, Serguini, in 1877.

This claim is exactly similar to those preceding. Lapeen's books show a balance against Serguini of 428 dollars, which is claimed in the list of commercial debts against Moors (item No. 62). The claim was examined by Mr. Vice-Consul Hunter in 1885, when Serguini was released from prison and a receipt given to him, together with the *resm*, yet the amount of 428 dollars still appears in Mr. Lapeen's list, as well as this robbery claim.

No. 5, for 350 dollars, on account of an alleged seizure of goods of his agent, Benshitrit, by a Governor in 1882.

Mr. Lapeen's books do not contain the name of this man, but show an account with his wife and a balance against her of 459 dollars, which was compromised for 350 dollars. It appears that she was merely a customer, and not an agent. Mr. Lapeen has no documents in proof of this claim.

Mr. Lapeen states that all the preceding amounts have been levied by the Moorish Government from the districts where the robberies are said to have occurred, but he has no proof of this.

General summary.

Thus, of the total amount of 20,415 : 7 dollars claimed by Mr. Lapeen on his three lists, only 4,934 dollars are shown by *resoom* to be due to him directly, and he has also transferred *resoom* for a further sum of 2,084 dollars.

It also appears that for a sum of 3,699 dollars owed by six alleged agents, Mr. Lapeen puts in claims as follows:—

	Dollars.
Transferred claims on Moors	3,542
Claims on the Jews	3,697
Transferred robbery claims	4,236
Making a total of	11,575
Or an excess of	7,776

After a very careful and detailed examination of all Mr. Lapeen's documents, *resoom*, and books, and giving due weight to all he stated when under examination, and taking into consideration all the circumstances that have been brought to light in this inquiry, and that have been reported to the Legation by Mr. Payton after his inquiry, and by the succeeding Vice-Consuls at Dar-al-Baida, I am of opinion that Mr. Lapeen is entitled to claim a sum of about 5,800 dollars, or, at the most, 6,000 dollars, in full settlement of all his claims, the claims for robberies and the claims on Jews being dropped by the Legation.

Benchimol. 979 : 10 dollars.

Abraham Benchimol, formerly Interpreter of the Vice-Consulate, was dismissed from that post in 1885 for gross usury in connection with the claims sent to Legation. A bond for 25 dollars having risen in nine months to 330 dollars, the debtor was imprisoned in

chains for two months, and only released on his brother giving a bond for 180 dollar. Subsequently the brother was imprisoned for four years on his bond for 180 dollars, whilst the original debtor was again for a further period of seven months on account of the bond for 330 dollars.

We did not, when at Dar-al-Baida, summon Abraham Benchimol or inquire into his claims, as it was not considered desirable to give him any grounds for believing that the Legation would lend him any assistance in recovering them.

Examination of Mr. Fernau.

Ex-Vice-Consul Fernau, 2,852 dollars.

This claim is only composed of two items, the principal of which is for 2,752 dollars, cash advanced to a Moor for purchase of cattle, grain, &c. He applied the money, however, to buying landed property for himself, and although steps were taken by Mr. Fernau at the time he could not recover anything. The Moor died in 1881, leaving some property, but still Mr. Fernau could not obtain payment. The money was advanced by Mr. Fernau when he first arrived as a young man in the country, and had had no experience.

The other item is for 100 dollars owed by a Moor, who commenced doing a ready money purchase business with him. He then obtained small sums from Mr. Fernau for the purchase of wool, and eventually absconded with 100 dollars.

Mr. Fernau has documents to prove both these items.

Examination of Mr. Cansino.

Mr. Cansino, 4,025 dollars. Commercial, 1,622 dollars.

This list is composed of six items of from 4 to 700 dollars each:—

No. 1, for 850 dollars. Debtor was Cansino's semsar, and was imprisoned by his Governor, and his property seized. Mr. Cansino states that his own property in hands of semsar was also seized at the same time. Cansino claims from Sultan on grounds that his semsar was prevented from paying what he owed him by the action of the Governor, but he admits that the semsar was released and an indemnity of 200 dollars paid to him, which, however, he states was personal to the semsar, who is now dead.

This claim was examined in 1887 by Mr. Vice-Consul Hunter and a Moorish Commissioner, and they were both of opinion that Cansino has no claim on the Sultan.

No. 2, for 14 dollars. A balance of a larger debt due to Cansino's semsar and transferred to him. The debt is of old standing, and the debtor is dead, though the semsar is alive.

No. 3, for 30 dollars. The debtor is alive, and his residence was pointed out to Sultan's Commissioner in 1887, but he was not sent in to settle.

No. 4, for 4 dollars. The debt arose about 1885. The debtor fled to the disturbed district of Zair.

No. 5, for 24 dollars. Debtor was put in prison, but subsequently released on payment, the money was, however, retained by Commissioner, and not delivered to Cansino.

No. 6, for 700 dollars. The *resm* is for 300 dollars only, but Cansino claims 700 dollars, as that is the present price of the grain which the 300 dollars should have purchased at that time; 300 dollars was collected by the Commissioner from the debtor, but was not delivered to Cansino.

Thus, Mr. Cansino is not entitled to claim more than 354 dollars on the list of 1,622 dollars; of that amount, 324 dollars has apparently been recovered from the debtors by the Moorish authorities, and can therefore be claimed from the Government.

Robberies, &c., 2,403 dollars.

No. 1, for 700 dollars, for robbery of 133 sheep, 1 mare, 1 cow, and 2 donkeys from an agent.

The sum claimed includes not only "the full value of said animals," but also "all they might have produced in young, wool, &c." Mr. Cansino has a document proving that the agent held 100 sheep of his.

No. 2, for 863 dollars, said to have been robbed from his agent, *i.e.*, 613 dollars in cash, and the agent's animal and clothes.

Mr. Cansino states that Sultan admitted the justice of this claim, and ordered its payment in a letter of Cid Hadj Mohammed Torres of the 30th September, 1885. [As a matter of fact, the letter referred to runs as follows: "The Governor states there is no truth in it, and that the said Jew had begged him to give him 10 dollars in settlement, which the Governor declined to do, knowing that the claim was unfounded. After this the Jew did

not again refer to the question, and it is now more than five years since anything has been said about the matter. Now he (Cansino) demands that the Governor be put upon his oath. . . . . The Sultan orders the Governor to make some settlement instead of taking an oath in order to finish the affair, to which the Governor agrees"—the Governor in whose time the alleged robbery was said to have taken place, and it was not to be expected that his successor should take an oath regarding it. No settlement appears to have been come to, presumably as the parties could not come to terms.]

No. 3, for 250 dollars, for the robbery of a mule. This amount is arrived at by estimating the value of the mule, then adding the expenses said to have been incurred in endeavouring to recover it, and also ¼ dollar a-day for hire of the mule up to date of sending in the claim.

Mr. Vice-Consul Hunter, in his Report of 1887, says that the Governor against whom the claim was brought had produced a letter from Vice-Consul Lapeen, dated 1882, to the effect that "in consequence of oath in accordance with *Shraa* taken by Sheikh in whose district robbery was alleged to have been committed, the matter was at an end, and no further claim would be made respecting it;" and Mr. Hunter adds that it should not have been brought forward.

No. 4, for 440 dollars, for an alleged robbery in 1890, which, however, was never reported to the Vice-Consulate at Dar-al-Baida or to the Legation, except that it was included in a list of claims sent in 1890, no particulars whatever being given except that it was "value of goods and money stolen." No documents whatever have been produced in support of this claim, and there is at present no evidence that there was any robbery, or that the man said to have been robbed had any property belonging to Mr. Cansino.

No. 5, for 150 dollars, for robbery of a camel and her young one. This amount includes value of camels, expenses said to have been incurred, and 1 dollar per diem for hire from time of robbery till claim was sent in. Mr. Cansino, on examination, denied that there had been any offer to return the camels seized, but in a Memorandum by him dated 1885, he states: "Cansino presented to the Governor a letter from the Sultan, ... but as the Governor only offered to return the animals without allowing expenses, &c., no settlement could be come to."

From the foregoing notes it will appear that though there may be perhaps some slight foundation for some of these robbery claims, they are at any rate grossly exaggerated. It will be necessary to examine all *resoom* and documents that Cansino can produce in support of them before recognizing them at all, but presuming that such are forthcoming, and that it is shown that the goods, &c., seized or robbed were really Mr. Cansino's, a sum of 1,000 dollars would probably be more than sufficient to cover them all.

Mr. Pons having left Dar-al-Baida to reside at Mazagan, was examined at that place.

W. Pons, 235: 5 dollars.

These claims are for money advanced for the purchase of grain. We had not the documents or list with us, so were unable to look into them, but Mr. Pons stated that all the claims were based on *resoom* in his own name, and that the value was the price actually paid. He took all possible steps to recover payment, and in many cases succeeded, but the items in his list are still due. All the debtors reside in country districts, and he has been unable to effect a settlement, as their Governors neglect to send them into the ports. Since he left Dar-al-Baida he has been unable to take any further steps to obtain a settlement of his claims.

J. Alvarez, 106 dollars.

Mr. Alvarez did not appear to explain his claims when we were at Dar-al-Baida.

Mr. Vice-Consul Fernau stated that his claims are composed of three items, each of which had been collected by the Sultan's Commissioner, who stated that he had remitted it to the Moorish Government, but it has never been paid over to Mr. Alvarez.

A. N. Carara, 1,227 dollars.

Mr. Carara has left Dar-al-Baida, and now resides at Port Saïd. There was apparently no one acting as his agent who could explain his claims; but Mr. Fernau stated that the land belonging to the debtors (two brothers, who owed the whole amount) had been sold by their Governor, who states that he remitted the amount to the Moorish Government for Mr. Carara, who, however, never received it.

Lamb Brothers' robbery, 300 dollars.

Mr. Lamb has withdrawn this claim, as he has lately received hospitality from the Governor in whose district the robbery took place, and he is consequently unwilling to put forward a claim against him.

Murdoch, Butler, and Co., 376 dollars.

This claim arises out of the robbery of some camels and their loads by some troops of the Sultan near Rabat, when His Majesty was at that place in 1891. The matter was reported at the time to the Legation, and correspondence has passed with the Court, but so far without result except the recovery of a camel.

The case is well authenticated, and it seems reasonable that the Government should pay for the depredations of its troops.

General summary.

It would thus appear that the total amount of 30,516 dollars claimed by merchants at Dar-al-Baida could fairly be compounded for a sum of 12,150 dollars, to be apportioned as follows:—

	Dollars.
Mr. Lapeen	6,000
Mr. Benchimol	—
Mr. Fernau	2,852
Mr. Cansino	1,354
Mr. Pons	235
Mr. Alvarez	106
Mr. Carara	1,227
Messrs. Murdoch and Butler	376
	12,150

Of the above, it is possible that Mr. Cansino has been too liberally treated, as his robbery claims, for which 1,000 dollars has been allowed, have not yet been sufficiently investigated, and Mr. Lapeen has been allowed the higher of the two figures given above.

SUMMARY of Mazagan Claims.

	Amount.
	Dollars.
Commercial.	
L. de Maria, heirs of * (?)	1,020
Robbery Claims, &c.	
Ali Abdi (semsar of Dassoy), seizure of cattle and grain † (?) ..	1,500
Lamb Brothers, per murdered semsar Ruimi	1,564
Mr. Ruimi's heirs (Lamb Brothers' semsar)	13,500
Carara, Rahamna robbery * (?)	1,100
Madden, burglary	5,388
	24,072

L. de Maria heirs, 1,020 dollars.

This is a claim of Dar-al-Baida origin, M. de Maria having subsequently left that place for Mazagan, where he died. There was no one who could give any explanations regarding the claims.

The claim had not been settled in July 1891, as Sir W. K. Green then addressed a letter to the Court asking that the Commissioner then at Dar-al-Baida should settle it. Since that time nothing more has been heard of the matter, but probably it is still unsettled. The claims are of old date, and the Moorish Government stated that they had been settled some years previously, and suggested that the papers had been falsified. Sir J. D. Hay directed the Vice-Consul to examine the claims carefully in presence of the debtors. The country Governors, however, as usual, neglected to send the debtors in, notwithstanding repeated requests that they should do so.

Ali Abdi, 1,500 dollars.

The claim is against two Moors for seizing, in 1889, "a large quantity of cattle, sheep, goats, donkeys, camels, and 'matamors' of wheat and barley," belonging to a semsar of a British subject, who himself is a small trader. The Vice-Consul made repeated representations to the Governor of the district (who is known for his hostility to Europeans and all Moors connected with them), but with no effect, the Governor neither taking any steps himself nor sending the two Moors into Mazagan. This claim is illustrative of two points: (1) the evils of the extension of protection. Here is a small trader who engages a wealthy Moor as semsar. The Moor thus obtains protection both for himself personally and for his property; in fact, is to all intents and purposes in the same position as a true British subject, and the British Minister is expected to use all his influence for the protection of the personal interests of this Moorish subject; (2) the Moorish officials,

* These claims are not mentioned in the last list received from the Vice-Consul, and may therefore perhaps be settled, but there is no record of their settlement in the Legation archives.

† The value of the property seized has never been stated, the Vice-Consul's despatch merely stating "a number of" cattle, sheep, goats, animals, and stores of grain. The figures I have inserted are therefore a mere guess.

by their obstinate and persistent obstruction, and custom of saying "*No*" to whatever a British—or, indeed, a foreign, for it applies to all nations equally—official requests, defeat the ends of justice, and prevent any investigation of claims, even when the British officials desire it in the interests of the Moorish debtors or accused, and in order to guard against fraud or gross usury on the part of British subjects. Were it possible to induce the Moorish Government to co-operate in a prompt investigation of every case as it arose, there would be an end to the perennial vexatious question of claims.

Lamb Brothers, 1,564 dollars.

This claim is put forward by the Saffi branch of the firm of Lamb Brothers. It arose out of the murder in 1890 of their semsar, Mesod Ruimi, through which Messrs. Lamb had been prevented from recovering certain camel-loads of beans purchased by them under Ruimi's guarantee to the value above indicated. An official named Kaïd-el-Ganti is accused of the murder. He was a debtor of the deceased, and is supposed to have murdered him in order to gain possession of the document proving his debt, which, however, it appears was not on him at the time, he having left it at his house. The evidence against Kaïd-el-Ganti is principally circumstantial. The Government put him in prison, not as a murderer, but avowedly on account of his debt. On his release he is said to have sold various documents which had been in the possession of Ruimi at the time of his murder, and he is also said to have been seen with Ruimi's gold watch and ring.

Widow's claim.

In addition to the claim of Messrs. Lamb Brothers, Ruimi's widow claims (1) "blood-money," *i.e.*, an indemnity for the loss of her husband; (2) the amount of cash he had on his person when robbed; and (3) the value of the *resoom* he had with him, and which Kaïd-el-Ganti is said subsequently to have sold to the debtors; the widow through their loss being prevented to recover the sums due to her late husband.

The documents presented in support of this accusation and claim are not very conclusive, but it must be borne in mind that in Morocco it would be impossible to obtain written and valid testimony against a Moorish official that could be regarded as conclusive.

The amount claimed by the widow is 15,000 dollars (about), *i.e.*:—

	Dollars.
Kaïd-el-Ganti's debt	6,000
Resoom lost	7,500
Blood-money (say)	1,500 (?)
Total	15,000

Carara robbery, 1,100 dollars.

This is a claim for robbery of specie from their agent in the country in 1879.

Documentary evidence was produced in support of this claim, and some of the robbers who were caught were imprisoned. Messrs. Carara held documents of land belonging to their agent as guarantee for his debt to them, and it was suggested that they recover the debt of their agent to them by sale of the land, leaving him to recover from the Moorish Government for the robbery.

The Court subsequently declined to admit the claim for the robbery, on the grounds that there was some flaw in the documents presented by the claimants. Much correspondence passed between the Court and Sir J. D. Hay and Sir W. K. Green, who both supported the claim; but since 1887 there appears to have been no correspondence on the subject.

D. Madden, 5,388 dollars.

This is a claim for a burglary said to have been committed on the house of Mr. Madden during his absence from Mazagan, when it is alleged a quantity of jewellery and other goods were carried away. The Sultan has sent a Special Commissioner to Mazagan to examine the affair in conjunction with the British Vice-Consul and the Governor of the town, and it is to be hoped that a settlement will thus be arrived at.

Summary of Saffi Claims.

	Amount.
	Dollars.
Commercial.	
Vice-Consul Hunot's firm (Hunot and Co.) .. .. (about)	5,138
Andrews and Co. .. .. "	837
Lamb Brothers .. .. "	1,000
	6,975
Claim on Moorish Government.	
Vice-Consul Hunot's firm, for duty paid on beans	2,424
	9,399

The lists furnished of the above commercial claims gives, in many cases, the goods purchased, and not their value. The value quoted above is calculated on an average, and can therefore be regarded only as approximate.

Hunot and Co., 5,138 dollars.

Our stay at Saffi was so short that there was not time to examine the claims.

Messrs. Hunot's list shows twenty items, varying from 5 to 320 dollars, some being for cash to the amount of 1,008 : 10 dollars, and the remainder for beans, wool, oil, &c., the value of which I have roughly estimated, as it is not indicated in the list presented by Messrs. Hunot and Co.

The claimants observe that they have made repeated efforts to obtain a settlement, but have failed principally through neglect of country Governors to send in debtors, or through the debtors living in sanctuary, and the authorities consequently refusing to touch them. As half the town of Saffi nearly is sanctuary, and it is in that half that the stores and business premises of Messrs. Hunot and other merchants are situated, business is seriously affected by the system of regarding all persons there as beyond the reach of the law. In other cases the debtors have been imprisoned, but their landed property not sold to pay their debts, as demanded.

Andrews and Co., 837 dollars.

This list is composed of ten items, varying from 11 to 370 dollars, two items being for beans and wool, value unindicated, and the others for cash.

The Vice-Consul states that in eight cases the Governors have neglected to send in the debtors, and in the other two cases, including the claim for 370 dollars, the debtors are in sanctuary, where they are carrying on their business unmolested.

Lamb Brothers, 1,000 dollars.

There are six items in this list, of which one is for thirty loads of beans, and the others for sums of money varying from 13 to 380 dollars.

None of the debtors have been sent in by the country Governors, though frequent applications have been made.

In addition to the above three claims, there are other debts due to British subjects which it is hoped may be settled without the intervention of the Legation.

Hunot's bean duty case, 2,424 dollars.

This claim arose in 1878, when, on account of the probability of a famine, the Sultan gave notice that after a certain date the exportation of grain would be prohibited. Just before the date fixed Messrs. Hunot, who had some beans in store for export, but no vessel in port at the time, requested the Customs officers to duty them at once in their stores, so that they might be subsequently shipped; this was done, but only half the duty was then paid, the remainder being only paid some time later, when the claim was sent in.

Finding that there was a great rise in price of beans in Morocco, and that a greater profit could be obtained by selling them locally instead of sending them to England, Mr. Hunot withdrew them from his store and sold them at Saffi, claiming that the Customs officials should hand him back the duty he had paid them, on the grounds that they had not been exported after all.

The Moorish Government have hitherto declined to entertain this claim, stating that it was Messrs. Hunot's concern, and a mere matter of business, that the beans had not been exported.

Messrs. Hunot allege, in reply, that there is a precedent for the return of duty, as duty was returned to an Italian firm once at another port.

Summary of Mogador Claims.

	Amount.
	Dol. r. vn.
Commercial.	
J. S. Levy (Consular Interpreter)	2,262 10
Hunot and Co. (Vice-Consul at Saffi)	180 0
A. Bitton	1,126 0
A. Coleman	2,878 15
S. Bensaude (Moorish subject, naturalized English, but living in Oran)	2,943 15
H. N. Damonte (Clerk of Vice-Consulate)	677 0
A. Farache	76 10
M. and Y. Macnin	50 0
J. S. Serfaty	112 10
	10,307 0
Robberies, &c.	
J. S. Levy (Consular Interpreter)	5,550 0
Hunot and Co. (Vice-Consul at Saffi), Tarudant claim	8,000 0
Damonte heirs, Shiadma claim	24,988 0
H. Yuly heirs	620 0
S. Assor, of Demnat	2,060 0
A. Bitton, murdered agents	1,050 0
	52,575 0

Examination of Mr. Levy and his Papers.

J. S. Levy, 7,812 : 10 dollars.

Mr. J. S. Levy ("Akkan Ben Hammu") has been Interpreter since about 1865. He is a wealthy man doing a large business. He speaks no language except Arabic and Hebrew, and is consequently useless as an Interpreter, but Mr. Johnston states that he is of service in giving advice in cases between Jews, where his knowledge of Rabbinical law is of use. The trade of Mogador being largely in the hands of Jews, many cases of importance arise between them, and Levy can then render good service to the Consul and to British claimants.

He receives no pay whatever, but is amply compensated for the time and trouble he bestows by the indirect advantages conferred on him by his position as Interpreter and by British protection, which he acquires thereby with the consequent assistance in the recovery of his numerous claims.

Commercial Claims, 2,262 : 10 *dollars.*

Levy's commercial claims.

Mr. Levy states that all these claims are on Moors residing in country districts, and that the documents are in his own name, and have been examined by the Sultan's Commissioner, who decided that all the claims should be paid if he declared on oath they were good, but that he declined to make oath till the money was produced.

The list consists of fifteen items of from 15 to 330 dollars each.

No. 15 is for 330 dollars money advanced to the Sheikhs at the request of their Governor by his brother and partner at Marakesh, who was ignorant of the rule prohibiting the giving of credit to Governors and Sheikhs.

Levy produced a letter from the Governor to his brother asking that the money be advanced, and also a *resm* proving the advance of 330 dollars to twenty-two Sheikhs. Both documents are in the brother's name, date 1874. There is also a Jewish notarial document proving partnership since 1863 of the two brothers.

Mr. Levy produced valid *resoom* for all the other items on this list, except No. 8, for 100 dollars, which he said he had mislaid. All these documents were in his own name, and for the amounts stated in his list, for goods supplied to the debtors, both goods and value being indicated in the *resoom*.

Levy stated that he had taken all possible steps to recover payment of these amounts, but without success. He had complained on several occasions to the local authorities through the Consul, and had obtained letters from the Governor of Mogador to the

various Governors in the interior, but no satisfactory replies were received, nor were the debtors sent in. Some of the debtors had since died, but he believes that their heirs are in a position to pay off the debts, and would do if some pressure were brought to bear on them.

This list is composed of six items as follows:—

No. 1, for 2,000 dollars, for goods sent to Tarudant, in Soos, and robbed on the road.

Robberies, &c., 5,550 dollars.

Documents produced as follows:—

(A.) A *resm*, dated 1878, proving delivery of certain goods (value not stated) to two camel-drivers to be delivered to Levy's agent at Tarudant.

(B.) Declaration of five Moors that they met the camel-drivers at a certain spot, some of the party being wounded, and they said they had been robbed of sixteen loads goods, of which thirteen belonged to Levy. This document is dated 1878.

(C.) Declaration of twelve merchants of Tarudant as to the ruling prices at that time there of goods stolen. [On this Levy estimates the value of the goods at 2,000 dollars, which is thus the price he expected to realize by their sale at Tarudant, and not the price he had paid.]

(D.) Shereefian letter to Governor of district where robbery took place, ordering immediate settlement.

(E.) Shereefian letter reprimanding said Governor for not having settled British claims, and warning him that he will be held personally responsible if he does not promptly settle them.

There is no evidence of the camel-drivers themselves.

No. 2, for 150 dollars, on account of a robbery of goods at a halting-place on road to Soos.

Mr. Levy says the documents were sent to Tangier, and not returned.

No. 3, for 300 dollars, for robbery on road.

Levy states he delivered goods to two muleteers, Jews, but he could produce no evidence that he had done so, the only document he had being merely the evidence of twelve Moors that these two Jews, "agents for some Mogador merchants," were attacked and robbed of a donkey-load and mule-load of goods—what the goods were, or what their value, not appearing—the document being dated 1877.

Mr. Levy referred to the *resoom* mentioned in the next case as proving that the above goods were his, but as these *resoom* were of a date posterior to the occurrence of the alleged robbery they do not bear on the present case at all.

No. 4, for 1,300 dollars, on account of a similar robbery from the same two agents as in the preceding case. This robbery was said to have taken place the following year, *i.e.*, 1878. In this case, however, the goods were said to have been robbed from the men's house, and not on the road. The alleged robbery took place six months after the delivery of the goods to the two agents, and thirteen months after the former robbery (300 dollars).

Mr. Levy produced the following documents in support of this claim:—

(A.) A *resm* showing that Levy delivered certain specified goods, value 2,239 dollars, to the two agents, date 1878.

(B.) Declaration of twelve Moors that robbery was committed in house where the two agents were robbed, and that they had lost goods to the value of 1,300 dollars.

Levy admits that these Moors could not have known what the goods were that were robbed, or their value, and can only have repeated what the two agents themselves must have told them.

Mr. Levy has no evidence showing clearly that the goods robbed were his, and admits that it was strange that these two men should have been robbed twice in succession; he adds that he did not employ them again after the second alleged robbery.

No. 5, for 1,000 dollars, on account of robbery on the road of a bag of specie in the year 1878.

Mr. Levy held two documents in support of this claim, and transmitted them to Tangier, whence they have never been returned. He complained to the Sultan's Commissioner regarding this claim, and received letters to the Governor of the district, but nothing was done.

No. 6, for 800 dollars, for goods delivered to a camel-driver in 1891 for conveyance to his agent in Merakish. The camel-driver, however, appropriated the goods for himself, depositing one load (tartaric acid) with a friend in one district, and took the other three loads (calicoes) to his own district, where he sold a portion in different markets.

In consequence of the action of the Consul at Mogador the camel-driver was arrested, and the property, or what remained of it, taken possession of by the Governor.

The sum of 140 dollars was subsequently paid to Levy on account of value of one of these loads, but nothing further has yet been obtained.

Mr. Levy produced a *resm* showing what the loads consisted of, though no value is

stated therein; he estimates the total value at 960 dollars, of which he has recovered 140 dollars; the balance he claims, however, is only 800 dollars.

This is a claim on a Governor of Ait Zilten for goods sold to him before he was appointed Governor, and therefore, as Mr. Hunot argues, not barred by the arrangement excluding debts on Governors.

Hunot and Co., 8,180 dollars. Commercial, 180 dollars.

The Moorish authorities, on the other hand, have persistently maintained that it is so barred, and a long correspondence between the Legation and the Court has led to no result.

This is a claim of old standing, and has led to much correspondence. It arose out of the murder in 1879 at Tarudant of Messrs. Hunot's agent, Hadj M. Suggur, and the consequent loss, as Messrs. Hunot allege, of goods to the value of 7,870 dollars in his possession at the time. Complaint being made to the Sultan, an inquiry was instituted which, as the Moorish authorities assert, elicited nothing in proof of the claim. Messrs. Hunot, however, state that the Kadi of Tarudant was implicated in the affair, and prevented proof being brought, and that the slave-girl of the deceased was kept in the house of the Kadi, who said she was dead, and that he also prevented the evidence being taken of the witnesses brought forward by the son of the deceased, and further that he imprisoned another person for assisting the son of the deceased in obtaining evidence.

Robbery, 8,000 dollars.

The slave-girl was subsequently produced, but she either could not or would not remember what had happened many years previously when she was still a young girl.

No thorough and impartial inquiry ever seems to have been held into this case, and Mr. Hunot, who has on more than one occasion himself personally pressed it at the Court, has obtained nothing but repeated promises of a settlement, and last month a permit to visit Tarudant himself for the purpose of inquiry.

This list consists of twenty-five items, varying from 18 to 126 dollars, and dated 1877 to 1889.

A. Bitton, 2,176 dollars. Commercial, 1,126 dollars.

Each item is supported by a *resm* in his own name, and stating the goods sold and their value.

He stated that he had done what he could to recover payment of these amounts, but had failed.

He explained that it is difficult when selling goods on credit to satisfy oneself as to the credit of the purchaser, as inquiry cannot be made of the Moorish authorities. The Notaries Public, however, refuse to draw up the *resoom* unless they believe the man to be trustworthy.

He does not know whether some of the debtors are alive or dead, but if dead, he presumes they must have left property.

This claim is composed of two items exactly similar to one another. The first is for the murder of his agent, Benzekri, in April 1891, and the second for the murder of two other agents, the brothers Alihaseera, in September of the same year. In each case there is no doubt that the murder was committed, though both having occurred on the borders of two tribes, each cast the responsibility on the other.

Robberies, 1,050 dollars.

Correspondence has passed with the Court, and the Sultan ordered an inquiry, but there the matter has remained.

Mr. Bitton failed to produce any satisfactory proof in support of his personal claims as above stated. He only showed two Jewish notarial documents, one dated 1888, to the effect that Benzekri was in business relations with him, and owed him 500 dollars, and and the other, dated 1891, to the effect that ene of the brothers Alihaseera was in business relations with him, and owed him 500 dollars. Each document provides that Bitton can advance up to 1,000 dollars.

There are fifteen other items of from 2 to 1,538·15 dollars. Of these, twelve are for smaller amounts, and mostly, as Mr. Coleman stated, for balance of accounts, each item being proved by a *resm* in his own name.

A. Coleman, 2,878 : 15 dollars.

Two of the other items are connected together, being each for goods, value 500 dollars, delivered respectively to a Governor of Ait Zilten and to certain Sheikhs of the same district, at the request and on the guarantee of the said Governor. The goods were sold in 1879, subsequent to the arrangement barring claims against Governors and Sheikhs. Moorish Government rejects claim on that ground, but Mr. Coleman states that other similar claims have been paid.

Mr. Coleman produced in evidence—

(A.) A *resm*, dated 1879, against the five men, Sheikhs, for 500 dollars, value of goods sold, which they engage to pay in four months.

(B.) A letter from the Governor guaranteeing the said amount.

(C.) A note of hand of the said Governor engaging to pay 500 dollars to Mr. Coleman in four months for goods sold to him.

The remaining item is a claim of 1,538 : 15 dollars against the estate of a deceased merchant named Guenoon, being for a balance of account. This claim has been the subject of correspondence since it was first presented in 1887, but it is hoped that it is now in course of settlement, as a letter lately received from the Court states that orders have been given for the Governor's heir to pay the claim, and, in the event of his not doing so, for the sale of his house at Rabat, and the payment of the amount due out of the proceeds of the sale.

S. Bensaude, 2,943 : 15 dollars.

Mr. Bensaude is a Moorish subject who has been naturalized in England, but resides at Oran, in Algeria.

His list consists of twenty-one items, varying in amount from 8 to 450 dollars, and dating from the year 1879.

No one appeared to represent Mr. Bensaude and give any information regarding these claims, and there is some doubt as to the district where some of the debtors reside.

As a British naturalized subject of Morocco residing out of England, it is doubtful whether the Legation would be justified in taking up the claims of his agency in Mogador.

Damonte claims, 25,665 dollars. Commercial, 677 dollars. Shiadma claim, 24,988 dollars.

There are only six items in this list, varying from 8 to 323 dollars, and dating from 1862 to 1885.

They are each supported by a notarial document.

This claim has been fully reported to the Foreign Office in despatches No. 113 of the 5th August, 1888, and No. 76 of the 19th September, 1890. It arose in 1859, when the late Mr. Damonte left Mogador on account of the Spanish war, and intrusted for safe custody to his friend a country Governor various goods and property to the value, it is said, of 21,203 dollars. The said Governor was deposed, and his successor took possession of all his property and that of Damonte as well. Representations were made to the Sultan, but all that was recovered was 2,215 dollars worth of oil. The new Governor also seized a "fondak," or caravanserai, which had been mortgaged to Damonte for 6,000 dollars.

After much correspondence the claim was referred to the Kadi of Tangier in 1870, but the proceedings appear to have led to no definite conclusion, and the claim has never been thoroughly investigated or adjudicated on; and at this distance of time it would be difficult to hold any satisfactory investigation. The best way of settling the question would be to effect a compromise of the claim, and Mr. Johnston stated that he is of opinion that Mr. Damonte would be disposed to accept a sum of 9,000 or 10,000 dollars in settlement of all the claims of the family, including the Shiadma claim, the "fondak" claim, and the commercial claims. The Moorish Government, on the other hand, ought to be willing to compromise the matter, as there can be no doubt that there is a valid claim, though the amount may be difficult to ascertain.

A. Farache, 76 : 10 dollars.

In this list there are four items of 7, 8, 19½, and 42 dollars respectively; they are of recent date, and would soon be settled if only general orders of a satisfactory character for settlement of claims at Mogador could be obtained.

M. and Y. Macuin, 50 dollars.

A claim of about thirteen years' standing against the heirs of the debtor. The claimants hold title-deeds as security.

J. S. Serfaty, 112 : 10 dollars.

This is a debt of recent date supported by a notarial document.

Both these last two items could be recovered were satisfactory orders given in the sense above indicated.

Heirs of H. Yuly, 620 dollars.

This is a claim arising out of an alleged robbery before 1869. The claimants say that the case was brought before the Sultan's Commissioner in 1869, and they produced a *resm* stating that the Commissioner had compounded the claim against some Sheikhs for 621 dollars, of which 460 dollars to be paid in six months, and the balance when Yuly's agent swore that the claim was valid. Moorish authorities allege that claim is of too old a date, that it was settled, and that the *resm* is fraudulent.

The only ground for the interference of the British Legation appears to be that Mr. H. Yuly, who succeeded to a share of the estate of the original claimant, is a British subject, the original claimant having been a Moorish subject.

S. Assor, 2,060 dollars.

This claim is put forward by a British subject residing at Demnat on account of two robberies said to have been committed at his shop.

No especial information is obtainable at Mogador, as Demnat is far distant, being at some distance on the farther side of Morocco city.

Mr. Assor is said to be a respectable man, and is now residing in England, but the evidence at hand is very far from conclusive, and it is desirable that a proper investigation be held into these two alleged robberies, of which the first was in 1889, when 500 dollars were said to have been taken, and the second in the same year, when 1,560 dollars' worth of goods are said to have been abstracted. There was also said to have been an attempted robbery during the intervening months.

SUMMARY of Claims at Tangier, &c.

	Amount.
	Dol. r. vn.
Commercial.	
M. Delmar on Salawi of Fez	158 0
Widow of H. Labos	532 0
Carr and Co. on El Kasry of Fez	48 0
Cornwell, Brooks, and Co.	400 0
M. de J. Levy	1,000 0
T. Forshaw on Lazrak	11,054 12
	13,192 12
Robbery, &c., Claims.	
M. Levy	1,386 0
Laredo and Bengio	565 0
H. Amar (advanced by Sir J. D. Hay)	1,155 0
Rabbi Maman (advanced by Sir J. D. Hay)	634 0
Lady Kirby Green	150 0
Mr. J. Kirby Green .. .. (about)	110 0
W. B. Harris	215 0
	17,407 12

Delmar, 158 dollars.

This claim arose in 1883, when the debtor, a Moor of Fez, became bankrupt, and his property was seized and sold, the proceeds being applied to pay other creditors, but not Mr. Delmar, who is a native of Gibraltar. The claim was made against the Governor of Fez for wrongful application of the proceeds of sale of debtor's property, and much correspondence passed. Now, the Governor of Fez, and the claimant also [?], leaving as heir a brother who is not a British subject.

Widow Labos, 532 dollars.

These are claims against Moors for debts, and were a portion of a set of claims sent in in 1883, some of which were paid. The Moorish authorities rejected these as being transferred debts, and in returning the *resoom* failed to return some of the principal documents, which apparently had been lost by the Commissioner.

Carr and Co., 48 dollars.

Amount due to an English firm on a bill of exchange. The debtor resides at Fez, and during Sir C. Euan-Smith's recent Mission he promised to pay the amount due, but there is no record to show that he has done so.

Cornwell, Brooks, and Co., 400 dollars.

This is a claim of a London firm against a son of Cid Mahommed Bargash, late Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is for value of some cloves which Bargash claimed to return as not being equal to the sample. The matter was referred to arbitration, but difficulties have been raised, and it still remains unsettled. The debtor is a Government official of some position, which renders it the more difficult to obtain a settlement. He resides generally at Rabat.

Messrs. Levy and Sons, 1,000 dollars.

The claimants are a London firm, and the debtors reside at Fez and Mequinez, the claims being for value of goods sold through claimants' agents. Most of the claims are for balance of accounts.

F. Forshaw, 11,054 : 12 dollars.

This is a claim of old standing of a Manchester firm against a Moor named Lazrack, who formerly resided at Manchester, where the debt was principally contracted. Forshaw brought an action against Lazrack in 1876, and obtained a default judgment in the Manchester Court for 807*l.* 19*s.* 6*d.*, and 4*l.* 6*s.* for costs, but Lazrack returned to Rabat, where he has resided ever since. He became interpreter to the Spanish Vice-Consul, and thus obtained Spanish protection, so that the claimant was unable to do anything with him. Now, however, he is no longer under Spanish protection, and the claimants wish to bring the claim against him before the Moorish authorities, as he is said to be a wealthy man. The claim has not yet been put forward, however.

M. Levy, 1,386 dollars.

This is a robbery claim of old date (1879), which was rejected by Sir J. D. Hay as invalid. Claimant, however, now asserts that Sir W. K. Green promised to support it. This is very doubtful, and it would appear that the claim is one that should be struck off the list.

Laredo and Bengio, 565 dollars.

This claim arose in the autumn of 1891, and is for the robbery of their store. They paid the chief Government guard a special fee for a watchman for their shop, and after an attempted robbery gave notice that good watch be kept. The burglary was evidently effected with false keys, and they claim that, according to precedent, when a special guard

is hired the Government make good their loss. The Governor argues that as entry was effected with false keys, and not by breaking open door, the responsibility of the watchman ceases.

The claim appears to me to be one which, in accordance with custom and precedent, the Government can properly be called upon to pay.

H. Amar, 1,155 dollars.

This was an old-standing robbery claim for 5,550 dollars, which Sir J. D. Hay compromised in 1886, shortly before retiring, for 1,155 dollars, paying that amount out of a sum of money which had been paid in for claims, though Sir J. D. Hay had been unable to elicit for what particular claims. As this Amar claim had not been admitted by the Moorish Government at that time, the money could not have been intended to be delivered to the claimant. The Moorish Government has repeatedly since been pressed to repay this sum in order that it may be paid to the claimants on whose account it had been delivered, but though promises have been given, the money has not yet been paid.

Rabbi Maman, 634 dollars.

This case is exactly similar to the preceding one—a robbery claim for 860 dollars, compromised by Sir J. D. Hay for 634 dollars, and paid out of the claims fund. The above remarks apply to this case also.

Lady Kirby Green, 150 dollars.

This claim arose out of the last Mission of Sir W. K. Green to Morocco city. Sir W. K. Green's horses were sent ahead by land to the port at which the Mission was to disembark in charge of a Government soldier provided by the Basha of Tangier. When near to Rabat an altercation arose between the soldier and a village from which he had demanded supplies, and a fight ensued, during which one of Sir W. K. Green's horses was shot and some property damaged. Sir W. K. Green mentioned the matter to the Sultan when at the Court, but, being a personal matter, did not care to press any claim.

Mr. J. Green, 110 dollars.

This is a claim of the son of the late Sir W. K. Green for some cattle, &c., seized by a country Sheikh. It has just been investigated by Mr. MacLean and Captain Count Gleichen, as reported to the Foreign Office in despatch No. 104 of the 30th June, and there is every reason to believe that it will be promptly settled.

Mr. Harris, 215 dollars.

Mr. Harris, when travelling in an unsettled part of the country in the interior, was attacked, and had to fly for his life; his tents and luggage were brought on by his men and taken to the house of a Government official, where it is alleged certain articles to the value above mentioned were abstracted. The Moorish Government argue that Mr. Harris was travelling in a part of the country known to be unsafe, and also that he did not conform with the regulations, which require that travellers take a soldier supplied by the Government as guard. Mr. Harris replies that he makes no claim or complaint for what occurred in the unsafe district, but that he claims merely for what was robbed from his luggage after it had been brought to a safe district, and was actually in the custody of a Government official.

(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Tangier, July 10, 1893.

Inclosure 4 in No. 15.

Sir West Ridgeway to the Earl of Rosebery.

III.—PROPOSALS FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF THE BRITISH CONSULAR SERVICE IN MOROCCO.

Tangier, July 10, 1893.

My Lord,

IN the preceding despatches of this date I have dealt with the general situation in Morocco and with the question of claims. I have now the honour to submit my proposals for the reorganization of the Consular Service.

The present Consular Service in Morocco is constituted as follows:—

Consul-General, Consul, Vice-Consul, all residing in Tangier, Consul at Daralbaida, Vice-Consuls at Fez, Laraiche, Rabat, Mazagan, Saffi, and Mogador, and Consular Agent at Tetuan.

The Vice-Consul at Tangier is merely titular. He is interpreter to the Legation, and does no Consular work. With this exception all the Vice-Consuls are unpaid.

This was not always the case. The Consular Service was originally a paid Service, but in 1872 it was transformed into its present shape on the ground that trade was not sufficient to justify the outlay.

The correspondence of that time is not forthcoming, but I find from later papers that Sir John Drummond Hay earnestly protested against the change. He pointed out that in a semi-barbarous country like Morocco, where British subjects are placed under the jurisdiction of Consular officers, trade was not the only criterion. He wrote, "In civilized countries the law suffices to protect British subjects and commerce, and paid Consuls may not be necessary. In barbarous countries the appointment of unpaid Consular officers, selected frequently from traders of a class who have neither the education or the feelings of justice and honour requisite to render them qualified to conduct Magisterial duties, produces evils."

In 1884, after twelve years' experience of the new system, Sir John Hay repeated his protest. His successor, Sir William Kirby Green, lost no opportunity of urging the same views on Her Majesty's Government, and I find that in 1890 the Chief Justice of Gibraltar placed on record his opinion in the following words: "I venture to draw attention to the inexpediency of continuing in places where it is possible to make other arrangements the representation of British interests by trading Vice-Consuls. Without touching upon the manifest objections to gentlemen of this class being intrusted with ordinary Consular duties among a people of the peculiar idiosyncracies of the inhabitants of Morocco, I would remonstrate against the impropriety of a trader being constituted a Judge in civil matters in which his own firm or his own rivals in trade may be concerned."

These weighty protests have been repeatedly and emphatically supported by commercial firms and bodies, both in this country and in England.

But strong as are the arguments which my predecessors have advanced against the judicial anomaly thus created in this country, where it is, of all countries, most desirable to establish model Courts of Justice, there are other reasons, based on political grounds, which are even still more cogent.

In the Reports quoted in the opening paragraph of this despatch I have attempted to describe the evils and dangers which have followed the change made in 1872. I have shown that if there had been a trained Consular staff *de carrière* the question of claims would, in all probability, never have reached its present scandalous proportions. This question is one of the principal causes of the decline of British influence and prestige, and its growth, if not its birth, has synchronized with the system of unpaid trading Consuls. As I have ventured to represent to your Lordship in the second of these despatches, how "can trading Vice-Consuls be expected to act fairly and without prejudice, or to apply rules vigorously and create precedents impartially with the certainty that the same rules and precedents will rise up in judgment against them when they themselves appear as claimants?"

Again, the question of protection has arisen since the change. It was not till after the Convention of 1880 that this system was adopted by Great Britain. Consequently, another grave responsibility is cast upon trading Vice-Consuls which keenly concerns the honour of our country. If protection had existed in 1872 Sir John Hay would have been armed with another and unanswerable argument against the change.

In a country such as Morocco the duties of Vice-Consuls are political as well as commercial. I have lately impressed on these gentlemen, in obedience to your Lordship's instructions, the necessity of urging, when opportunity occurs, the reform of the prison system, the abolition of slavery, and the fair treatment of Jews.

But how, I venture to submit, can a trading Vice-Consul, to whom the good-will of the local authorities is essential, be expected to incur their displeasure by unpalatable advice such as this? Necessarily these gentlemen have not the independence which is indispensable.

Nor have they the political tact and foresight which (save in some rare cases) can only be acquired by training and experience. They are isolated far beyond the reach of telegraphic and, sometimes, of postal communications, and, consequently, in international, as well as in commercial and other matters, they are often obliged to act on their own judgment, according to their own lights. They are generally in favour of "strong measures," and, being with little sense of responsibility and liable to no penalty, they have often acted in a manner which has seriously compromised their Government. Your Lordship will recollect that two or three cases of this description have occurred during even my short tenure of office. Where there is no pay there is, generally, no discipline.

Again, it is most desirable that our Vice-Consuls should act as intelligence officers, and should feel the pulse of their districts. For this purpose trading Vice-Consuls are useless, and consequently Egyptian darkness reigns over the land.

It is far from my wish or intention to cast any slur or reflection on the integrity of those gentlemen who since 1872 have filled the office of Vice-Consuls. Many of them—most of them—have honestly tried to do their duty, but it is too much to expect that

they will sacrifice their personal commercial interests when they are in collision with those of Government. Nor would it be reasonable to expect to find in them the qualifications which are only to be acquired by education, training, and experience.

These are the grounds on which I earnestly submit to your Lordship the necessity of reverting to the system of a paid Consular Service in Morocco, and of following the example of France and Spain, which are both represented at the ports and elsewhere by Consular officers *de carrière*.

The position of Morocco from all points of view is unique. It cannot be treated on a procrustean system. The question of Morocco is one which affects the interests and excites the rivalries of nearly all Europe. At any moment it may blaze up into a burning question. The barbarism of the country, of its gaols and other institutions—if so they can be called—should be a reproach to the civilization of Europe. Unfortunately, the standard of honour and honesty which Europe has established in this country is not much better than that which it found there.

There seems to be sufficient reasons and justification for departing from hard and fast financial rules, and for treating Morocco more generously than would be necessary or justifiable in the case of a civilized and independent country in Europe.

The reform will not be costly. A few hundreds of pounds annually, perhaps saved in some other quarter, would suffice, as the following proposals will show.

The appointment of a paid Vice-Consul or Consul at the Court of the Sultan is the first and the most important requirement. This officer would move with the Court, and should act as the medium of communication between the Sultan and Her Majesty's Representative. I have shown in my despatch on the general situation how essential it is that there should be this link between the Sultan and the Minister, so long as the latter is compelled to reside at a distance from the capital. Thus, and thus only, is there any reasonable hope of prompt correspondence and of a lasting revival of British influence. The Sultan would probably make no objection if the matter were arranged with tact and without ostentation. This could best be done personally, but if it must be managed by correspondence I would merely tell the Sultan that Her Majesty's Government think it desirable that the person who represents them at the Court should be unconnected with trade, and of suitable social and official standing.

The pay of the Consul or Vice-Consul should be 500*l.* a-year with office allowance, and the officer appointed should be a man able to converse without the assistance of an interpreter with the Sultan and his Ministers, and his social position and his training should be such as to command respect. His staff should be paid out of his office allowance.

Iwould prefer to propose the restoration of Vice-Consuls *de carrière* at all the ports, but so long as Messrs. Frost and Rednan (who have practically ceased to trade) remain at Rabat and Mazagan, the step may be postponed as regards those two places.

There should certainly be paid Vice-Consuls at Mogador, Saffi, and Laraiche, and a paid Consular Agent at Morocco: 300*l.* a-year, with office allowance of 130*l.* per annum, out of which the Consular staff, including the interpreter, should be paid, would be sufficient remuneration for the Vice-Consuls. I have elsewhere pointed out how pernicious the present system is, according to which the interpreter gives his services without pay, and receives in return the protection which enables him to require Her Majesty's Minister to act as his debt collector.

The Consular Agent at Morocco should receive 100*l.* per annum. The entire annual cost of the measure would, therefore, be 1,500*l.* exclusive of office allowances. If the results should be such as I hope and expect, namely, the disappearance of the scandal connected with claims and protection, the cultivation of friendly personal relations with the Sultan and his officials, the creation of means for obtaining information as to events in the interior, and, above all, the rehabilitation of the good name and the revival of the influence of Great Britain, the price I submit would not be high.

I have no hesitation in saying that if the evils which run riot in Morocco to the disgrace of civilization and Christianity are to be touched, the restoration of the paid Consular Service is essential. It is the peg on which all reforms must hang. Formerly Morocco was merely a remote and barbarous country, which rarely obtruded itself upon European diplomacy. Of late years it has threatened to become one of the most burning questions of Europe. It is certainly the object of interest and rivalry and jealousy to France, Spain, Germany, Italy, and Great Britain. All other nations have recognized the change, and have increased their diplomatic machinery to enable them to deal with the new order of things. England alone is the exception, and, in truth, her Minister is less adequately equipped than he was some twenty years ago.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WEST RIDGEWAY.

No. 16.

Sir West Ridgeway to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received July* 20.)

(No. 110.)
My Lord, *Tangier, July* 10, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Lordship some information obtained by Captain Count Gleichen on the 8th instant, in the course of a private conversation with M. Souhart (First Secretary of the French Legation here), on the subject of French troops and proceedings along the Mauro-Algerian frontier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WEST RIDGEWAY.

Inclosure in No. 16.

Notes on French Troops on the Algerian-Moroccan Frontier.

(Derived from a conversation held with an official of the French Legation at Tangier.)

Number of troops.

THE French force along the frontier from the Mediterranean downwards numbers altogether:—

5 battalions of Regulars, including 1 battalion Zouaves, 1 battalion Light African Infantry (Zéphyrs), and 2 battalions Légion Étrangère, though of the exact composition my informant was not quite certain.

2 battalions native Tirailleurs Algériens, chiefly quartered in the southernmost districts, in detachments.

1 battery Artillery, divided up into 3 sections of 2 guns each.

1 regiment Spahis, 1 regiment Chasseurs d'Afrique, split up into detachments.

Total: 7 battalions Infantry, 2 regiments Cavalry, 1 battalion Artillery (besides, doubtless, a few Engineers and Transport).

Force at Aïn Sefra.

The force at Aïn Sefra, included in the above, numbers between 1,500 and 1,800 men, including 2 battalions, 2 guns, and half a regiment of cavalry.

Force at Jenan Bu Rezg.

The force at Jenan Bu Rezg amounts to only a "section" (half-company ?) of Infantry, and half a squadron of Spahis.

Scarcity of supplies in the country, &c.

Great difficulty is experienced in moving troops from place to place, owing to the want of vegetation and water. Transport is carried out by camels, of which an average of two to each bayonet is usually found necessary. My informant dwelt at some length on the inhospitable nature of the country along the frontier and towards Tuat, between Aïn Sefra and Jenan Bu Rezg amongst others, on the want of supplies and water, and on the objections that French officers had towards serving in those regions.

Frontier disturbances.

As can be easily understood, the disturbances which arise on the frontier are almost entirely pastoral, *i.e.*, caused by tribes wandering with their flocks from place to place in search of water at the few and scattered wells.

How dealt with.

When any disturbance occurs along the frontier, the mode of procedure adopted is that the Kaïd of the district is called upon to repress it with his "goum." This "goum" consists of an armed contingent of 40 to 400 tribesmen, and it is backed up in rear by a detachment of French regular troops, usually Spahis. So that action may be taken either way: if the "goum" represses the disturbance, and hunts the Moors back into their own country, and official Moorish notice is taken of it, it is of course only a "tribal disturbance," and the French are in no way responsible for the acts of their unruly protégés, though of course they may follow them up to protect them. If, however, the "goum" gets driven back with loss, then the Spahis come to the rescue, and the act constitutes on the part of the Moors an "invasion of Algerian territory," to be probably followed by reprisals, and giving the French an additional handle against Morocco.

As an instance of this, a number of Moors lately strayed with their herds of goats on to French territory near Magûra (near the southern point of the 1845 demarcated boundary), and were driven back with great success by the "goums" in the neighbourhood. "Goum" is the same as the Moorish "Geesh," or tribal contingent.

The Aïn Sefra-Jenan Bu Rezg Railway.

The railway from Aïn Sefra to Jenan Bu Rezg is now being surveyed—a matter of difficulty owing to the hilly country and the necessity for making numerous detours. The line will be completed some time next year.

Tuat question. As regards Tuat, my informant declares he himself wrote a letter "de deux lignes" to the Sultan, saying that the French intended to take it when it was time to do so, and that the Sultan made no reply. That as for the railway to Senegambia, "c'est de la blague," and is quite out of the question. A road, however, would not be by any means impossible.

Figuig question. He also said that "Figuig is, and always has been, Moorish territory, and we have no intention whatever of interfering with it."

I may state that the above information was given quite frankly, and required but little exertion on my part to elicit. My informant would have volunteered further remarks, I am sure, had we not been unfortunately interrupted.

(Signed) GLEICHEN, *Captain, Grenadier Guards.*

Tangier, 10th July, 1893.

No. 17.

Sir West Ridgeway to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received July* 20.)

(No. 111.)

Tangier, July 10, 1893.

My Lord,

I RECEIVED on 6th instant a telegram from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid, inquiring as to the truth of a report which had appeared in a Madrid newspaper regarding a collision which had occurred between the Moors and Spaniards at Melilla, on account of a fort which the latter were building there.

I took an early opportunity of speaking to the Spanish Minister on the subject. He informed me that there had been a collision, and shots had been fired; but he had no further information except that the fort was not the cause. The Marquis Potestad —who is inclined to regard all Moorish questions in a somewhat light and airy way— did not attach much importance to the incident. He said that these collisions were constantly occurring, and referred to some similar trouble at Ceuta.

I also inquired from the Moorish Commissioner for Foreign Affairs; but he knew absolutely nothing regarding the matter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WEST RIDGEWAY.

No. 18.

Sir West Ridgeway to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received July* 20.)

(No. 113.)

Tangier, July 13, 1893.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt yesterday of your Lordship's despatch No. 81 of the 30th ultimo, in which you request me to furnish you with an explanation of the allusion made by Kaïd Maclean in his letter of the 22nd May to "a big man coming up from our Legation." Fortunately, Kaïd Maclean happens to be in Tangier, and therefore I am in a position to give your Lordship the required explanation by return of post. Cid Emfadl Gharnit did not mention the name of the supposed visitor to Kaïd Maclean; but Kaïd Maclean thinks he may have referred to myself. As I intimated to the Foreign Office before starting on this tour, it was possible, in the event of the steamer not touching at Laraiche and Rabat, as is often the case, I might have had to march back from Rabat overland. I informed the Shereefian Court of this possibility, and asked them to arrange for baggage animals at Rabat. This they did; but as the steamer did touch at Laraiche and Rabat, I did not avail myself of the animals—some of which were used by Mr. Allan Maclean and Captain Count Gleichen when they made the investigation referred to in my despatch No. 104 of the 30th ultimo.

I have no doubt that M. Gentile, like other suspicious foreigners, assumed that I was not speaking the truth, and that my real intention was to visit Fez from Rabat. It is satisfactory, however, to find that the Shereefian Court did not share these unworthy doubts as to my good faith.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WEST RIDGEWAY.

No. 19.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received July* 20.)

(No. 195.) P.

My Lord,

Madrid, July 20, 1893.

I HAVE been informed by Señor Moret that the Spanish war-ship whose visit to Melilla and Ceuta is announced in to-day's papers was sent to convey the new Spanish Minister in Morocco to these towns, and with no other object.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

No. 20.

The North-West African Company to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received July* 22.)

My Lord,

132, *Cheapside, London, July* 20, 1893.

ON the 5th April last we had the honour to bring to your notice a condition of affairs at the Company's Settlement at Cape Juby similar to that which has, unhappily, too frequently formed the subject of correspondence between the Representatives of Her Majesty's Government and ourselves.

We have since that date had an opportunity of making inquiry into the matters with reference to which our complaints have arisen, and communications having also been received by us from our Manager at Cape Juby, we think it desirable to place before your Lordship, in a more particular form, the substance of the information which we possess. Your Lordship will then be in a position to gauge the justicé of our complaints, and to estimate the expediency of acquiescing in certain proposals which I shall now have to advance on behalf of the Company, and which will, if acceded to, in our opinion, tend to produce harmonious relations between ourselves and those hitherto opposed to us, such as have been unknown in the Company's previous history.

On the 18th February last a numerous company of armed men encamped in the vicinity of our station. A small contingent of the soldiers of the Sultan of Morocco, some twenty-five in all, formed the nucleus of this body, whose numbers were besides swelled by the accession of various wandering, lawless marauders, gathered from the various tribes, and easily induced to continue with the soldiers as long as they could be sure of present maintenance, with a prospect of possible pillage in the future.

The Sheikh-el-Bashire learnt from the soldiers soon after their arrival that they had been sent by his uncle, Dakhman, the Sultan's Governor at Wadnoon, with the purpose of preventing trade being done at the station. Indeed, my Lord, the soldiers were at no pains to conceal their object, and it was so well known that on the 24th February a document evidentiary of the character of these men and of the object of their visit was drawn up and signed by numerous friendly Chiefs in the neighbourhood who were acquainted with the facts. This document, which I conceived might be of interest to your Lordship, has been translated, and a copy of the translation has been appended to this letter, p. 5, and is marked (A).

El-Bashire's information was not unfounded. On the 5th March this nondescript force, led by the Sultan's soldiers, descended upon the station, defiled and filled up the Company's well, and they fired with some determination upon the Company's warehouse on the shore, although the British flag, which flew upon it, should have secured it, at least, immunity from attack by the soldiers of a friendly Power. Our Manager on shore, Mr. Macleod, at the head of our Tangerine guards, at once advanced to repel the attack under cover of the guns of the Castle, and by the combined influence of the superior weapons with which he and his men were provided, and of the exploding shells from the Castle, he succeeded in driving the enemy away. This effort to obtain possession of our shore-house which I have related to your Lordship was repeated several times during the next four weeks. In the result, our guards were always able to drive back their assailants, who, at length, having abandoned their design, took their departure on the 25th April to the north.

In addition to the foregoing episodes of violence to which I have drawn your Lordship's attention, events have recently been taking place in connection with the revival of Spanish enterprise in North-west Africa which may have an important bearing upon the future interests of the Company. With the permission of your Lordship, I will proceed to give some account of these events here. The conduct of one Spiridon Ayoub, a Syrian, formerly in the Company's employment as an interpreter, has been already described in former

letters to your Lordship, dated the 21st and 30th September last. The capture of Spanish subjects and the negotiations to which it gave rise has engaged the attention of the Spanish Government, and we are also informed that the captives were subsequently taken under the escort of the Sheikh Ma-el-Anain to Rio de Oro by the orders of the Sultan, and, finally, delivered to the Spanish authorities.

The circumstance that the Sultan interfered to influence the conduct of a religious emissary favourably to the Spaniards leads us to suppose that His Highness is likely to promote the recent revival in Spanish enterprise. The "Compañia Trans-Atlantica" are bent upon establishing a town upon the Rio de Oro as well as a trading station at Cape Bojador, and should the Sultan favour this active policy, he might easily, and without his agency being discovered, move the Sheikh Ma-el-Anain, who is known to be his friend, to assist the Spaniards. He would be able thus to indulge his animosity against the Company by causing the infliction of a heavy blow against their interests, for, in league with Ma-el-Anain, the Spaniards would be able seriously to interfere with the Company's commerce in the interior, and thus fulfil the object of the Sultan, and at the same time increase their own trade.

To induce the opinion in your Lordship's mind that our apprehensions are not unfounded, I venture to point to the fact that Señor Lopez has made an application to his Government for permission to make a journey to Morocco from Cape Bojador, and to visit on his way this very Sheikh. There is very little doubt that his object is to make a Treaty with him to extend the Spanish claims over the whole of Tekna, especially the country at the back of Cape Juby, and so cut off English trade. Probably this scheme has been suggested by Spiridon Ayoub, who is now with this Sheikh, as the best means of checking the advance of the English in the country. I would also mention that there is raised at present in the Spanish press in the Canaries, which takes care to remind its readers of the former occupation by Spain of the Puerto Cansado, a constant demand for annexation by Spain of the whole coast from the Wad Draa, including Tekna and our station, to Cape Bojador, the present northern limit of the Spanish claim. This newspaper outcry is likely to continue as long as matters stand as they do to-day. The gradual development in the very face of Las Palmas of a port which might become some day an important naval station and a serious rival to her, when that development is due to the exertions of a private Company not officially recognized by any Government, cannot fail not only to awaken jealousy, but also to suggest to an envious foreign Power the possibility of driving their unprotected competitors from the field. At the port of Las Palmas we find ourselves subjected to treatment which is most unusual and oppressive, and which, if persisted in, must have a disastrous effect upon our trading operations. The authorities at that port are claiming from us customs duties for goods consigned to Las Palmas for transhipment to Cape Juby. The demand, we are advised, is wholly unjustifiable, and means are now being taken to test its legality in the best manner that may be available to us. Regulations in connection with quarantine have besides been imposed upon our schooner which plies between the islands and Cape Juby of a vexatious and unnecessary character, and it is threatened that, in case of an outbreak of cholera in Europe, none of our wool or skins will be allowed into the islands, even for transhipment, and that the "Sahara," our vessel, will herself, in such an event, be entirely excluded unless she can produce a document certifying that no trade has been done with the Arabs. We have reason to believe, my Lord, that all these provisions, whether in operation or threatened to be imposed, are not and will not be *bonâ fide* promulgated, but rather they are and will be directed by a desire to cripple our trading operations, and thus to promote the policy of Spanish enterprise of which I have already spoken.

Before bringing this portion of my letter to a conclusion, I should perhaps mention that we have information that the Germans pnrpose to establish a trading and coaling station at Shbeyke, between Puerto Cansado and the Morocco frontier. If this information is accurate, and if it indicates an intention on the part of Germany to enter into competition with Spain in this part of Africa, and if the recent presence of a French ship of war at Cape Juby has any such similar import with regard to French designs, such matters would be likely, I would respectfully submit, to form powerful incentives to action, both energetic and prompt, on the part of Spain. But on these points your Lordship will have a much ampler knowledge than that to which the Company can lay claim.

I have, my Lord, placed before you such facts as I considered it my duty to submit to your Lordship. I now desire upon behalf of my Company to make certain observations upon them, to consider the present position of the Company with reference to these facts and with reference to the former history of the Company, and, finally, to make a request to your Lordship, to which I trust your Lordship will think right to advise that an affirmative answer should be returned. I may say, my Lord, that what follows is the

result of the most careful and anxious deliberation, under legal advice, between my co-Directors and myself. As your Lordship is aware, since the first settlement of our Company at Cape Juby in 1879, we have been the object of the unremitting hostility of the Sultan of Morocco. To satisfy the Sultan's animosity, our property was invaded and abused by his agents, our trade was sacrificed, and at length the life of our Manager at Cape Juby was destroyed. Unhappily, we are to-day unable to declare that the Sultan is reconciled and our friend. We do think, however, that a material change in the situation recently has been brought about. Her Majesty's Government has exacted a sum of money to be paid by the Sultan as compensation for the wrongs which he has done us, and payment of a considerable portion of that sum has already been secured. Such action on the part of Great Britain has made it extremely improbable in our view, either that the Sultan will ever venture upon any direct and overt opposition to us, or that he will ever sanction the prosecution of any designs against us on the part of his Agents, on any greater scale than that of Dakhman's predatory expeditions. We are, however, and we must remain, unless we are to be assisted by your Lordship, liable at any time to be crippled by any attack which may be made upon us by the handful of soldiers that Dakhman can command, recruited by such idle vagabonds as he may find in the neighbourhood. This is a humiliating admission, and whether this state of things is to be allowed to continue will depend entirely upon the policy which is to be adopted in the future towards the Company by Her Majesty's Government. If our objects could be carried out, if other traders could be induced to join us, if houses and stores could be built, if the land could be cultivated, a peaceable and industrious population would soon cluster round our Settlement. We should become an important civilizing agency upon the surrounding tribes, employment would be afforded to the natives, and our strength would be such that no one would dare to attack us. Such a development in the Company's concerns would, I submit, my Lord, have the effect of giving such definition and weight to the Company's position at Cape Juby, that neither Spain nor any other foreign Power would venture to encroach upon the rights which we have acquired. Without this extension of our business, to which we have always hopefully looked forward, we can see nothing before us but a continuance of Dakhman's injurious actions, and the probable initiation of a course of intrigue and oppression on the part of Spain, directed to drive us from our station. My Lord, as Englishmen we have rights of which we cannot divest ourselves. We have a right to the protection of Her Majesty's Government; this we have constantly asserted, and having invoked that protection, we received, when our demand was complied with, a signal recognition of the validity of our claim. We therefore apprehend, my Lord, that the dangers which threaten ourselves, if the present condition of things be allowed to continue, will also sooner or later become the occasion of embroiling Her Majesty's Government in controversies and disagreements with the Shereefian Court, and with Spain or other foreign Powers.

I have already assured your Lordship that the Company is powerless to alter the situation in which it is placed by its own unaided resources. On the other hand, with the assistance of Her Majesty's Government, it will approach the future with every confidence of ultimate success, and in the full expectation that it will be able to manage its affairs and hold its own against its competitors and opponents without further appeal to the Government of Great Britain for direct support.

I will, in a word, my Lord, proceed to explain what it is that the Company desire should be accorded to them. But I will first remind your Lordship that, at the invitation of Her Majesty's Government, the Company recently agreed to intrust the settlement of its relations with the Sultan, and incidentally of its domestic administration also, to Sir C. Euan-Smith, at that time Her Majesty's Minister at Tangier. Unfortunately, no result, so far as the Company are concerned, attended his negotiations. It is now material to observe that during the period when a settlement might have been expected, no step was taken by the Company to advance their present request, because, in the opinion of the Directors, such a demand at such a juncture might have proved embarrassing to the Government. Such a reason for silence exists no longer.

They desire now that the power of dealing with offenders against the law, within such limits as may be thought expedient, should be intrusted or delegated to fit and proper persons at Cape Juby; that rules respecting markets or bazaars should be established; and that regulations for the government of the harbour should be laid down, and in all cases be enforceable by some member of the Company, or by some one in the Company's employ resident within the Settlement. If such powers of government and administration as I have suggested could be bestowed, the development which I have alluded to, with all its attendant advantages, would, in all human probability, at once begin to result.

The Company is constantly being requested by merchants and others for distinct information on the following questions:—

Is the station to be a free port?

Is it English territory?

Have the Company permission to fly the British flag?

Will English traders and others receive justice by the administration of British law?

Will the Company give facilities for sea-borne trade?

Will shippers and traders have their lives and property protected?

These applications for information are from merchants in the tobacco trade, coal trade, general merchandize, shipping stores and bazaars, who could use the port as a place for transhipment of British goods suitable for all British possessions south of Senegal.

The native merchants south of the Sakiet-el-Hamra, and other places in the interior, are constantly declaring their intention of visiting Cape Juby, and of trading with us, if the station is placed under British protection. The document marked (B), which is also appended to this letter (p. 6), will indicate to your Lordship the character of these appeals. They ask, besides, that a proper "funduk" be built, that a bazaar should be instituted, and that law and order should be maintained under British direction. My Lord, at present the Company can neither answer these questions satisfactorily, nor can they, for the reasons which I have given, comply with the merchants' requirements. The Company are, however, convinced that were the powers which they ask conceded, many of those who are making these inquiries, and others who are interested in opening up new outlets for British trade, especially at the present moment of severe depression, would come to the station and aid in that development in the Company's operations which is so greatly to be wished.

My Lord, the Company is at present an anomaly. It trades under the British flag, which it hoists on the fort and at the Castle, but no express recognition of its British character has ever been given to it officially by the British Government. As Englishmen, the members of the Company and their British staff carry with them to Tekna the laws of Great Britain, but if they attempt to administer those laws themselves, they become exposed to the risk of interminable litigation in the Courts of this country at the suit of those whom they may have been obliged to imprison or punish in their Settlement. I need hardly remind your Lordship that the inconvenience of such a condition of affairs has been previously experienced by pioneer Companies, and for their relief laws have been from time to time provided. The Statutes to which I refer were made to apply to Settlements which should, subsequent to their several dates, be made on the coast of Africa, as well as to Settlements existing when those Acts were severally passed. In the preambles of those Statutes, the necessity of providing for civil government and for the administration of justice is expressly and repeatedly set forth. I am saved from the charge of citing obsolete law by the fact, of which I venture to remind your Lordship, that these Statutes were repealed and re-enacted, only so recently as 1887, by the British Settlements Act of that year. My Lord, I have to submit that the case of the North-West African Company is such a case as is contemplated by the Act of 1887 and by the Statutes which preceded it. I submit further that the possession of such powers as I have indicated is a matter of urgent and paramount necessity, for without them, if a population were allowed to centre at Cape Juby, in the absence of any authority capable of enforcing order, the port might become a gathering place for outlaws from Europe.

If I may venture to allude to the political and strategical importance of our Settlement, I may remind your Lordship that Cape Juby would make an admirable coaling-station for our ships of war, where coal would be available at a time when, if it should be declared contraband of war, it could not be procured from Las Palmas, if Las Palmas happened to be a neutral port when Great Britain might be belligerent, or from any port between Sierra Leone and Gibraltar. It is by no means improbable that Cape Juby would become as well a formidable rival to Las Palmas, where at present 100 ships of British nationality every month put in. There is another consideration as to the political value of Cape Juby which I will finally advance. It has always been the policy of Great Britain to maintain intact and inviolable the integrity of the Moorish Empire of Morocco. If I may presume to speak of the anticipations of Her Majesty's Government, it is not expected that that policy can long be maintained. A revolt or revolution in Morocco, the death of the ruling Prince followed by the devolution of power into the hands of a feeble successor, may give the signal to those European Powers which are anxiously awaiting such an event to precipitate themselves upon the country, in order to effect a partition of the Moorish territories. My Lord, if England, when that time comes, possesses a Settlement like Cape Juby on the frontier of the Sultan's dominions, if she is mistress of a port such as Cape

Juby might easily be made, she would, I venture to think, find herself greatly strengthened by the possession of such inestimable advantages.

My Lord, the matter upon which I have had the honour of addressing you—I trust at not too great a length—is vital and peremptory. The position of the Company is such that we must now either advance or succumb at length to those adverse influences of which we have so long been the victims. We are being carefully watched by the Spanish and by the French, and if by misadventure we have to retire and abandon the long struggle our place will be at once filled by another nation, and the result of our labours, which has cost so much energy and capital, will become the possession of others, who will reap the harvest which we have sown.

My Lord, in conclusion, permit me to remind your Lordship of the Company's record in the past. The encouragement which we received from the Governments of both Great Britain and Morocco led us fourteen years ago to embark our capital, and to devote our labour to the promotion of this enterprise. During our occupation of Tekna we have given cause of offence to none; we have always and everywhere been welcomed by the natives of the country, yet the inveterate malignancy with which we have been pursued by the Sultan of Morocco has blighted all our hopes.

We have from time to time been unofficially recognized by your Lordship's predecessors to such an extent that our Settlement is marked on all foreign State maps as a British Colony, and it is difficult to see how an official recognition such as would be rendered us by conferring upon us the powers we ask for would increase the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government for the safety of the Englishmen resident at Cape Juby. I repeat we have stood our ground during all these years at the request of Her Majesty's Government, and now, in return for the constancy which we have shown, and in pursuance of the terms of the Statute to which I have alluded, we most earnestly beseech your Lordship to grant our request for administrative powers, and thus enable us to see some hope as a recompense for our long and arduous efforts, and to enable us to further the interests of British trade.

I am, &c.

(Signed) JOSEPH C. LEE, *Chairman.*

Appendix (A).

Let it be known to every one who sees or reads this document that we of the following names (of the different tribes of Ait-el-Jamel), who are present at this date in the port of Tarfaya:—

Of the Azzurgeens—

Mohamed Ahmed Salik, his cousin,
Mohamed-el-Ameen Ben Orosi,
Allul Ben J'daya,
Abdullah Ben Sidi Yuseph, the writer,
El Mami Ben Sidi Yahia,
Rami Ben Ali,
Abdsalam Ben Boubakr,
El Kouri Ben Bushra,
Swaydi Ben Ahmad Salim,
El Imman Bilkhair,
Mohamed Ben Sidi Said,
Buhya Emsaid,
Saddan Ben Orosi,
Mohamed Ben Delil,
Mohamed Azziz,
all of the part of Shtuka; and also

Mahfood Ben Boojamah,
Mohamed Ben Ayash,
Bashir Ben-el-Ridda,
Mohamed Ben Abdulla Said,
Mohamed Ben Ahmed Bushra,
all of the part of Ghurrah; also
Mohamed Shirkowri,
Mohamed Ben Abdulkhadir, and his brother, El Hussein,
El Mamon Ben-el-Bashir Ben Yahia,
El Emin Ben Sidi Mahmoud,
El Bashir Ben Abbukr,
El Bashir Ben H'mad,
all of the part of Ait Said.

Of Ait-el-Hassan—

Mohamed Boodeboos,
Boojamah Woold Omara,
Said Ben M'Said,
El Arbi Ben Zayo, and his son, Abdulla,
El Orosi Ben Imhat,
Bushra Ben Belal,
Mohamed Ben Belal,
Mohamed Salim Ben Najim,
Maiood Ben Mohamed Ben Ali,
Ali Ben H'mad,

Said Ben Yhisya,
Khadir Ben Husein,
Ibrahim Ben Hussein,
Afreed Ben Mohamed Finnish,
H'mida Ben Bryka Finnish,
Mohamed Ben Bara,
Ibrahim-el-Khalil Ben Bara,
Ali Salim Ben Shia,
Matulla Ben Habeeb, and his brother, Said,
Mahjoub Ben Habidda.

Of the Mayjats—

El Husein Ben Ferizhish,
Hanndnah Ben Khaysin,
Mohamed Ben M'barak,
El Khadir Ben Bahyiss,
Abd-el-Hai Ben Belal.

We, as above-mentioned (one by one), testify to and acknowledge the truth of the arrival of some soldiers, who are sent by the order of Dahman of Wadnoon, to reside awhile in the place of Tasofrim, and then to advance and live in a nearer place called Afreed, with the object of cutting the road between the tribes and Tarfaya, and of stopping the traders who wish to go there. We have seen the soldiers, and are assured of their intention as before mentioned, and also of their being agents of Dahman.

Written the 3rd day of Shaaban, in the year 1310.

Also of the tribe of Ait-el-Hassan—

Mohammed Ben Hillab, and his brother, M'barak,
Salim Ben Ahmad Ben Najim,
Abdulla Ben Ali M'barak,
Mohamed Ben Bashir,
Salim Ben Hamo Shiab,
Abd-el-Khareem, Ben M'barak;

And of the tribe of Ait Moosa Woold Ali—

El Marrakshi Ben-el-Bashir,
Ali Sirrak,
Abdulla Ben Ali Wimbarak,
Ben Balwul, and others;

testify and agree to the same, as above.

I agree and testify to the above written.

(Signed) BASHIR BEN MOHAMED BEYROOK.

Praise be to God alone, &c. All that is written above is true.

(Signed) TAIB BEN MULAY AHMAD.

(May God preserve him, Amen.)

This is also witnessed to by Haj Ali Boutalib.

Appendix (B).

Praise be to God, &c

Hereby let it be known to the reader that this is from the writer, El Sheriffe, and from all that are here of the men of Shtuka:—

El Bikai Ben Sidi Yusuph,
El Hassan Ben El-Bushra,
Ahmad Salim, and his brother, Allul Ben J'daya,
Mohamed Ben Sidi Bilkhair and his cousin, El Mahjoub,
Mohamed Ben Ahmad Salik,
Abbas Ben Ahd-el-Malik, and his cousin, Ahmad Ali,
and many others.

To the Company at Tarfaya:—

Salaams on those that follow righteousness.

This is to inform you that we, the above named and others, ask your help in regard to the Doura, in all that is wanted as to buildings, digging wells, supplies, powder, and guns, as there remains nothing for us but to dwell there, because, until now, we have lost most of our possessions for your sake. We have been already robbed in the past, and we informed you of it without any beneficial result, and we have been also attacked and robbed to-day, and we still inform you of it and ask (?) from you if you are just. The things which are stolen are these: 500 camels, 1,500 sheep, and many things besides, of cloth, books, jewellery, &c. We also request you to begin buying from us all that we may bring for sale of camels, horses, or any trade produce, as we have no market to go to now except this port. Thus, if you want its reformation (trade ?), please stand earnestly for the thing, and give up the slow old lines on which you have proceeded with us. Provided these conditions are fulfilled, we prefer you to all other people. Otherwise, do not blame us if we make other confederacies with some one else, as we shall be obliged to do.

This also by permission of Mohamed Belal.

(Signed) MOHAMED BEN SIDI BILKHAIR.
MOHAMED AHMAD SALIK.
EL HASSAN BEN-EL-BUSHRA.
ALLUL J'DAYA.
ABBAS BEN ALD-EL-MALIK.
EL BIKAI BEN SIDI YSUPH.

Dhulkadi 15th, 1310.

Note.—"The writer, El Sheriffe," is Mulay Tyeeb.

No. 20*.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir West Ridgeway.

(No. 85 A.)

Foreign Office, July 24, 1893.

Sir,

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatch No. 109 of the 10th instant, forwarding three Reports which you have drawn up upon the general questions connected with the state of affairs in Morocco at the expiration of the period of your special mission to the Sultan.

In conveying to you my thanks for these very able and interesting documents, I have to express to you the high sense which Her Majesty's Government entertain of the valuable services which you have rendered to the political and commercial interests of this country in Morocco.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 21.

Acting Consul Johnston to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 10. Commercial.)

Mogador, June 23, 1893.

My Lord,

WITH reference to Sir E. Grey's despatch, Commercial, of the 1st February, introducing Sir A. Kirby and his son, who were at that time expected to visit this port, I have the honour to state that the objects of Sir Alfred Kirby's interest in Morocco—as nearly as I have been able to learn them—appear to render desirable a special report on the subject.

The Foreign Office letter of recommendation granted to Sir A. Kirby was presented by a Mr. George J. Cross and his son Mr. William Cross, friends or agents of Sir A. Kirby, who has not himself yet carried out his intention of visiting Southern Morocco.

Mr. Cross and his son arrived here about the middle of March, after a somewhat adventurous voyage in a Spanish schooner chartered by them in the Canary Islands. They had touched, it seems, at a point on the coast within a score of miles south of Cape Juby, the fortified Settlement of the North-west African Trading Company. On attempting a landing they lost an English employé, who was drowned in trying to swim ashore through the surf. They then sailed to Cape Juby, and obtaining assistance there succeeded in recovering the body of their unfortunate companion, which was ultimately buried at sea.

The Crosses, father and son, stayed in Mogador until the 11th instant, when they left for England.

Though I am wholly ignorant of the details of any plan which Mr. Cross, with his friend Sir A. Kirby and others, may entertain, I have every reason to believe that they are desirous of opening up direct trade with the tribes inhabiting the territory between Cape Juby and Cape Bojador, and I am given to understand that the promoters of this enterprise—which is in no sense connected with the Cape Juby Company, but if anything a rival one—are prepared to invest in it a large amount of capital.

They have certainly held communication, if not verbally, by correspondence, with the Chiefs of the tribes in question, and there is little doubt in my mind that they have been encouraged by the tribes to form a settlement there.

Had their object been to land anywhere north of Cape Juby, on territory over which the Sultan may perhaps have grounds for claiming suzerainty, I should have felt it my duty to advise them strongly against such a step, highly dangerous for themselves, and calculated to provoke troublesome questions with the Moorish Government. But in the case of the country to the south of Cape Juby these objections may not perhaps be deemed applicable.

In the event of the return to Mogador of Mr. Cross, or the visit here of other members of the Syndicate, I should be very grateful for instructions from your Lordship as to the amount of encouragement and support it would be desirable for me to give them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. L. N. JOHNSTON.

No. 22.

Sir West Ridgeway to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 114.)

My Lord, *Tangier, July* 13, 1893.

WITH reference to my despatches No. 105 of the 30th ultimo and No. 106 of the 6th instant, reporting the Sultan's departure for Tafilelt, and His Majesty's request that the officers of the foreign Military Missions should not be permitted to accompany him, I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that, though the foreign officers had declared their determination to accompany His Majesty, I learn from Mr. Vice-Consul Macleod that they only did so for a short distance, and were then ordered to proceed to Marakesh viâ Rabat, on the ground that their lives would be in danger if they went to the districts the Sultan was about to visit. All the officers consequently left, with the exception of Dr. Linares, of the French Mission, who, it appears, will accompany the expedition. Kaïd Maclean also, who is at present at Tangier, having been sent by the Sultan at my request to meet me, will also shortly join the Sultan, having received special authority to do so.

Mr. Macleod reports further that the advance guard of the expedition, under the command of Mulaï-el-Amin, uncle of the Sultan, has already been engaged in hostilities with a fraction of the Aït Youssi tribe, and, after much resistance and some loss on both sides, succeeded in taking prisoner the Shereef Mulaï Mohammed Tsagarushni, and fourteen of his followers. The capture is regarded as one of some importance, as the Shereef is a man of great influence in those districts.

Mulaï-el-Amin is now said to be about to attack the Aït Shohkman tribe.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WEST RIDGEWAY.

No. 23.

Sir West Ridgeway to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 115.)

My Lord, *Tangier, July* 13, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to transmit a despatch to your Lordship's address which has been sent to me under flying seal by the Vice-Consul at Mogador relating to the enterprise of Sir Alfred Kirby.

I first heard of this gentleman's proceedings from one of my colleagues, and I immediately wrote to the Consul at Mogador for a report.

I then learnt that the gentleman in question had started on this tour with the cognizance of the Foreign Office.

I would suggest, for your Lordship's consideration, whether in future it would not be expedient to acquaint Her Majesty's Minister at Tangier whenever letters of recommendation are addressed to his subordinates in favour of visitors to Morocco. In other countries such a precaution would be unnecessary, but considering the delicacy of the situation in Morocco, it seems desirable to adopt the exceptional procedure proposed by me.

As regards the proceedings of Sir Alfred Kirby and his friends Messrs. Cross, it seems that they contemplate the establishment of a Settlement similar to that of the Cape Juby Company in the same district of which the sovereignty is disputed. I would refer your Lordship to my remarks regarding the Cape Juby Company in the Report (Inclosure 1) submitted in my despatch No. 109 of the 10th instant, and add that this new proposal fills me with dismay.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WEST RIDGEWAY.

No. 24.

Sir West Ridgeway to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 116.)

My Lord, *Tangier, July* 13, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to submit copy of a letter which I have addressed to the Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the arrest and imprisonment of two Moors holding certificates of employment from the British Legation. One, the employé

of Mr. Cansino, a merchant of Dar-al-Baida, was arrested on the 17th February on the road to Rabat. I wrote to Cid Gharneet on the 30th March and 16th May, requiring the man's release, but though no direct reply has been received, I have from time to time learnt from Kaïd Maclean, and indeed from Cid Gharneet himself, that the matter was under consideration, and Kaïd Maclean informs me that the Governor who had imprisoned the man has been personally examined by the Minister.

In the second case, an employé of Messrs. Lamb and Co., of Dar-al-Baida, was also arrested by the same Governor in May last. The matter came to my notice as I was passing through Dar-al-Baida at the end of the month, and I called for a report. Meantime, I mentioned the matter in a letter which I addressed to Cid Gharneet on the 19th June. The report which has been since received from the Vice-Consul places on record the fact that the man held a certificate from this Legation. Under Article IX of the Madrid Convention, Moors who hold these certificates should not be arrested without notice to the employer, but practically their privileges extend much further, and they are exempt, so long as the certificates hold good, from the Sultan's jurisdiction. I have reported fully on the system in Inclosure 2 to my despatch No. 109 of the 10th instant, and I would here merely remark that Moors holding certificates often try to evade the payment of the taxes due by them under cover of their certificates. The reason given by the Governors for the arrest of the men is unpaid taxes, the reason as given by these men and their employers is extortion. In Morocco the terms are convertible. The arrest of such persons is very common, and as it is a violation of Treaty, it should, I think, be checked with a strong hand. I have hitherto succeeded in obtaining the release of all persons thus arrested, with the exception of these two men. Up to the present I have been sanguine of obtaining their release also, and I understood that letters yielding the point had been written and merely awaited the Sultan's approval. Kaïd Maclean, however, who has just arrived, informs me that exception is likely to be made to the release of Mr. Cansino's employé, on the ground that he is a soldier, and was therefore not entitled to a certificate. If by this definition is meant a Moor who has passed through the ranks, it might be held to apply to all the adult male population of Morocco under the Sultan's control. But if it means a soldier actually on the effective list, it is sufficient reason for requiring that the certificate of protection should be withdrawn. But he should first be released. Kaïd Maclean does not know what the intentions of the Court are regarding Mr. Lamb's agent, but he believes that they are ready to give way in both cases.

It is, however, possible that they may not do so, and I think that it is only fair to my successor that the question should be referred by me for your Lordship's decision as to the course which should be taken in that case.

There is a slight flaw in the case of Mr. Cansino's agent. His certificate had been signed and issued to his employer, but it had not been communicated to the Governor, nor had the certificate been handed to the man by his employer when the arrest occurred. The Governor might accordingly plead ignorance of the fact that the man held a certificate, but apparently he has not done so. There is no such defect in the second case.

I am therefore of opinion that the demand for the release of both men should be pressed. I have no doubt that the Moorish Government will give way if persistence is shown, though it may take time.

I shall be sorry if the question is not satisfactorily disposed of, as I expected it would be, before I hand over charge to my successor. It is, I think, the only comparatively new case of importance which I leave undisposed of.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WEST RIDGEWAY.

Inclosure in No. 24.

Sir West Ridgeway to Cid Emfadl Gharneet.

British Legation, Tangier,

(After compliments.) 27 *Hedja*, 1310 (*July* 12, 1893).

I HAVE received your Excellency's letter of the 18th Hedja, 1310 (3rd July, 1893), informing me that Kaïd Maclean has been directed to wait on me at Tangier. Please communicate to His Majesty my thanks for this act of courtesy.

I much regret that I have not also received replies to my letters of the 4th Hedja, 1310 (19th June, 1893), and 29th Shawal, 1310 (16th May, 1893), relating to the arrest and imprisonment of the agents of Mr. Cansino and Mr. Lamb, both of Dar-al-Baida. I pointed out to your Excellency that these questions were of importance, as they

affected the provisions of our Treaties with Morocco, which must be scrupulously observed.

I heard from Kaïd Maclean more than once that your Excellency was about to send me satisfactory replies regarding both matters, and consequently I waited daily expecting to receive them. None has arrived. Kaïd Maclean indeed tells me that the reason given for the arrest of Mr. Cansino [*sic*] is that he is a soldier. But this reason does not justify the Shereefian Government in arresting an employé of a British subject without notice. How is a British subject to know that a man who takes his service is a soldier? The reason for requiring notice to be given is that the British subject may have time to make other arrangements. Doubtless, if Kaïd Bershid had satisfied the Vice-Consul that the man in question was actually a soldier, Mr. Cansino would have been told to find another employé. I must therefore again ask for the release of this man on the ground that Mr. Cansino had no reason to believe him to be a soldier, and the notice required by the Treaty was not given to him.

As regards the arrest of Mr. Lamb's employé, there is not even the excuse which has been pleaded in the case of Mr. Cansino's employé. The man holds a certificate, and therefore his arrest is in violation of Treaty obligations. I must therefore again require his early release. I have again postponed my departure till the 26th instant, and I have ordered the bearer of this to wait for your Excellency's replies. It will be a matter of deep regret to me if my last act in Morocco should be to report to my Government that I have not succeeded, by courteous and considerate language, to obtain from the Shereefian Government attention to just and reasonable demands or the observance of Treaty obligations.

Peace.

(Signed) WEST RIDGEWAY.

No. 25.

Sir West Ridgeway to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 117.)

My Lord, *Tangier, July 17, 1893.*

IN Inclosure 3 of my despatch No. 109 of the 10th instant I had the honour to make certain proposals for the reorganization of the Consular Service in Morocco.

I have now the honour to submit, for your Lordship's information, a Memorandum on the subject of trading Vice-Consuls which has been written by one of the leading British merchants on the coast. Its value consists not so much in originality of views as in the fact that it expresses what I believe to be the unanimous opinion of the British merchants in Morocco.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WEST RIDGEWAY

Inclosure in No. 25.

Memorandum.

1. A PAID Government official without permission to trade would possess the full confidence of merchants and traders, as the trading Consular officer by always having his own interests in hand also, either rightly or wrongly, is viewed with distrust as to the extent he may be able to make use of his official position or information for his own personal benefit. This in Morocco, owing to the powers invested in Consular officers—both general and judicial—is a decided point in favour of independent paid Consular officers, who would not have any personal interests which could clash in any way with those of the mercantile community.

2. Both in the exercise of his duties and means of obtaining useful information of all kinds which would be to the benefit of British interests in general, the paid official would meet with much greater support and assistance, as well as with greater respect in all matters that would bring the Consul and British subjects into communication one with another.

3. The paid official would also meet with much more consideration and respect from the local authorities and his colleagues at port of residence, thus reducing in many cases prolonged questions which often are aggravated by some incidental matter of personal feeling getting involved in the affair in dispute.

4. It would also be assumed that paid Government officials would know their duties, both judicial and otherwise, in a more competent way, and thus many matters could be settled without the necessity of reference to Her Majesty's Legation; and also that should such reference be necessary, some more practical solutions to settle or bring to an end the events at issue would be arrived at than has been the case during late years.

5. Another point in favour of paid officials would be that they, having no duties to occupy them other than their Consular work, could give all attention required in investigating claims that might be brought forward at the time of producing them, and thus in almost every case a reliable report as to the circumstances of the case would be sent forward with those that it might be found necessary to refer to Tangier—while matters not worthy of official support could be summarily dealt with—thus the "old pending claims" would with proper organization become things of the past.

6. Independent paid officers would be in a much better position to judge all judicial affairs, as well as the vexed matters of protection both as regards "semsars" and "employés" at the respective ports, and be able to give their assistance without suspicion of favouritism in matters in which genuine British interests were really at stake.

7. So long as the British Consular officers on the coast are "traders" the feeling will exist, whether with or without reason, that some individual interests obtain precedence over others—which feeling cannot be beneficial to the general extension of British influence in the country. The dual position in a country like Morocco is, in my experience, a most difficult one, as well as unpleasant for its holder, who endeavours conscientiously to carry out his duties, and it is an economy which ought to be abolished by the appointment of paid officials who would take an interest in their work for the general good of the community and the advancement of all honourable British commerce and enterprise.

(Signed) ROBERT S. HUNTER.

Tangier, July 11, 1893.

No. 26.

Sir West Ridgeway to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 118.)

My Lord, *Tangier, July 18, 1893.*

I HAVE the honour to submit, for your Lordship's information, copy of correspondence regarding the alleged robbery of cattle belonging to a British subject.

I submit it as being typical of a class of case on which I have commented in Inclosure 2 of my despatch No. 109 of the 10th instant, and because it also typifies the procedure which I should like to see adopted in all similar cases.

According to the procedure hitherto in force, the claim would be accepted without inquiry and forwarded to the Sultan, who would probably ignore it. It would then be added to the already swollen list of unsettled claims. The inquiry which I have directed should either prove that the claim is sound, or that it is wholly or partly manufactured.

Fortunately the scene of the robbery is near Rabat, where Mr. Frost, the Vice-Consul, practically devotes himself to his Vice-Consular duties. In the other Vice-Consulates (excepting, perhaps, Mazagan) I could not expect a trading Vice-Consul to give up his time to an inquiry such as this, essential although I consider it to be in the interests of truth and policy.

Your Lordship will observe that, although this robbery is alleged to have occurred on the 7th May, it is not officially reported till the 3rd July. The interval has been spent by the Vice-Consul in trying to arrange the matter with the local authorities. I submit copy of a Circular which I have addressed to the Consular officers on this point.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WEST RIDGEWAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 26.

Vice-Consul Fernau to Sir West Ridgeway.

Sir, *Dar-el-Baida, July 3, 1893.*

WITH reference to the robbery of cattle belonging to Mr. Ramon Alvarez, which took place on the public highway between Sallee and Mehedia on the 7th May, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that none have been recovered since your last visit to Dar-al-Baida. The case is as follows:—

Mr. Ramon Alvarez was sending to Tangier for sale twenty oxen, in charge of Abbubel Miludi and El Hassen-ben-Tanny; while on the road between Sallee and Mehedia in company with other drivers and their cattle, these men were attacked by mounted thieves belonging presumably to the Zemour tribe; all the cattle, one pack-horse, one haik, one selham, two djellabs, and a leather bag with 24 dollars in it, were taken from them, but some Amer horsemen appearing on the scene, four of Mr. Alvarez' cattle were got back. The men returned to Sallee and laid their complaint before the Kaïd of that town, who promised them such assistance as he could give. They then came back to Dar-al-Baida, and I furnished them with a letter to the Kaïd of Sallee, in reply to which he acknowledged the fact of the robbery, and stated he had obtained the return of one of Mr. Alvarez' cattle, which was delivered to the drivers on payment of 5 dollars to the Kaïd's soldiers.

	Dollars.
Mr. Alvarez's claim is now for the value of fifteen oxen, having originally cost 16½ dollars each	247·50
One pack-horse	40·00
One haik	3·00
One selham	2·00
Two djellabs	3·00
One leather bag and 24 dollars	25·00
Expenses incurred	15·00
10 dollars per head estimated profits	150·00
Making a total of	485·50

I do not consider this claim in any way exaggerated, as I have ascertained that the cattle were purchased seven months before the robbery, and had been specially fattened for the Tangier market, and that 5 dollars profit per head was offered in the Rabat market the day before the robbery.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. FERNAU.

Inclosure 2 in No. 26.

Sir West Ridgeway to Vice-Consul Fernau.

Sir, *Tangier, July* 17, 1893.

I HAVE to acknowledge your despatch of the 3rd July, and to inform you that I have directed the Vice-Consul at Rabat to conduct a full inquiry into the alleged robbery near Rabat, on the 7th May, of Mr. Alvarez' cattle.

Please direct Mr. Alvarez to proceed at once in person, or by efficient and fully informed agent, to Rabat, immediately on receipt of this letter.

He, or his agent, should be prepared to produce all necessary proof required to establish the fact of the robbery, the value of the property, &c.

I have to request that, in future, any similar cases of robbery may be at once reported to this Legation in all possible detail.

I am, &c.
(Signed) WEST RIDGEWAY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 26.

Sir West Ridgeway to Vice-Consul Frost.

Sir, *Tangier, July* 17, 1893.

I HAVE to forward, for your information, a letter which I have received from the Vice-Consul at Dar-al-Baida regarding a robbery of cattle which is alleged to have occurred on the 7th May last in the vicinity of Rabat. I should be much obliged if you would institute a searching inquiry into the facts of this robbery, in co-operation with the local authorities if they will promptly co-operate, or without their co-operation if they refuse or delay. I should be glad to have full information as to the details of the robbery—how,

when, and where it occurred—and I would invite your special attention to the necessity of elucidating the following points:—

1. What proof is there that the cattle really belonged to Mr. Alvarez? Any documents produced, *resoom*, &c., should be carefully examined and reported on.
2. What evidence is there as to the real value of the animals, and what compensation can be fairly claimed? From the latter should be excluded all indirect damages, *e.g.*, the possible profits which might have accrued.
3. What proof is there that the robbery really occurred, and did it occur in a disturbed part of the district, and were all proper precautions taken?
4. When the robbery occurred, was information immediately given at Rabat and Dar-al-Baida, and if there was delay, what was the reason?

I have instructed Mr. Alvarez, through the Vice-Consul at Dar-al-Baida, to wait on you without delay in person, or by agent, and to produce all evidence forthcoming. If he appears by agent who is insufficiently instructed or informed, he must take the consequences of his own negligence or indifference.

I think you will be able to conduct the inquiry in person, but, if not, please depute an efficient agent to do so. In either case, all reasonable expenses will be paid.

I am, &c.
(Signed) WEST RIDGEWAY.

Inclosure 4 in No. 26.

Sir West Ridgeway to Consular Officials in Morocco.

(Circular.)
Sir, *Tangier, July* 18, 1893.

I HAVE to request that, in future, all cases of robbery in which British subjects are complainants shall be immediately reported to this Legation, with the following particulars:—

1. Date, place, time, and full details of robbery.
2. Names of persons robbed, and their connection—with evidence thereof—with the British subject who is complainant.
3. Description and value of goods robbed, and evidence of their value, and of their being the property of the British subject, and of his having intrusted them to the persons robbed.
4. Amount of compensation claimed, and how the amount is arrived at. From the amount should be excluded all indirect damages, such as possible profits, unless exceptional reasons can be given for including them.
5. Date when the robbery was reported to you, and the explanation of delay, if any, which has occurred in reporting it.
6. Steps taken, or proposed to be taken, by you.

I am, &c.
(Signed) WEST RIDGEWAY.

No. 27.

Sir West Ridgeway to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 119.)
My Lord, *Tangier, July* 18, 1893.

IN my despatch No. 81 of the 9th May last I reported the substance of a long correspondence in which I had been engaged with a British subject, Mr. Meakin, who had brought certain charges against Cid Bubekir. These charges were the subject of an action for libel brought by Cid Bubekir against Mr. Meakin in the Supreme Court of Gibraltar, which resulted in a verdict for Cid Bubekir, with 500 dollars' damages.

At this trial the alleged slave Rabba was the principal witness for the defendant, and it may be fairly assumed that her evidence was not believed by the Jury. After the trial Mr. Meakin caused Rabba to lay information in support of charges of murder and attempted murder against Bubekir, but both the Supreme Court and the Police Magistrate at Gibraltar refused to receive them, as they had not jurisdiction. Mr. Meakin then disappeared, no doubt with the view of evading the execution of the Decree. He had previously parted with his property in Tangier. His son, however, brought Rabba to the British Consulate at Tangier to swear information against Bubekir, but as the offences

disclosed were alleged to have been committed in Morocco city, Mr. Consul White whose jurisdiction does not extend to that place, has taken no further action in the matter.

The charges appear to me to be trumped up in a vindictive spirit by Meakin and Rabba. The latter has had several opportunities, of which she has not availed herself, for making the charges at an earlier date. The offences are alleged to have occurred prior to 1887. There have been since then two British Missions to Morocco city, where the woman says that she resided, but no complaint was preferred by her before the British Minister. Again in June 1892 she was brought by Meakin before the Vice-Consul at Mazogan, when he (Meakin) first obtained possession of the woman, with the view doubtless of producing her as a witness in the pending proceedings for libel. Rabba does not appear to have then made her present charges against Bubekir. She has been for some months in Tangier, and has been offered ample opportunity of bringing any charges she had to make to this Legation, but she has not done so. Even now Meakin and Rabba have waited till Bubekir has left Tangier and returned to his home at Morocco before lodging the information before the Consul.

For these reasons, I am inclined to think that no magistrate would take action on evidence such as this, but, nevertheless, there must be some Court before which the woman and others can seek redress, and it is on this point of jurisdiction that I seek instructions.

Is the Court having jurisdiction in Morocco city the Court of the new Consul at Daralbaida, or the Court of the Vice-Consul at Mogador, or both? Your Lordship will observe that Rabba also proposes to institute a civil action against Cid Bubekir.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WEST RIDGEWAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 27.

Consul White to Sir West Ridgeway.

Tangier, June 28, 1893.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of two Declarations made before me this day by Rabba, the negress whom Mr. Meakin lately took with him to Gibraltar to give evidence for him against Cid Bubekir in the action then pending in the Supreme Court.

The offences charged against Cid Bubekir having taken place at Morocco city, and Cid Bubekir himself being at present at Morocco city, I have no jurisdiction over him. I propose, therefore, subject to your Excellency's approval, to take no further action in the matter. I am the more inclined to take this course, as the charges might as easily have been brought at any time during Cid Bubekir's recent visit to Tangier, when he was within my jurisdiction, and also because I feel persuaded that Rabba has been put forward to make these charges by Mr. Meakin, in the hopes that he may thereby obtain a weapon to use against Cid Bubekir in his proposed attempt to upset the Judgment recently obtained by Bubekir against him in the Supreme Court. He attempted at the time to cause Rabba to lay the information first at the Supreme Court and then at the Police Court at Gibraltar, but both the Chief Justice and the Police Magistrate refused to receive them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure 2 in No 27.

Declaration of Rabba, made before Her Majesty's Consul on the 28*th June,* 1893.

I AM the slave of Ben Zahra, of Oolad Boaziz. I was sold to him by Hadj Elarby Belfar, Ameen of the Sultan, who bought me from Omar Maracshy, who bought me from Bubekir-el-Ghanjawi, in the market of Ilata Sidi Benor. He had bought me from Hadja Mooena-bentz-Sheikh Boomehdi, at Daralbaida, through Cid Mohammed Shaafi. Hadja Mooena bought me as a small child in the market of Daralbaida from a person who brought me from Mogador. I don't know who he was. I was still not grown up when Bubekir bought me. I was in his house in Morocco city when his doors were sealed up. I was his concubine, and became *enceinte*. He called in Adool in my presence, and said he bought me to marry me. Afterwards he made a feast and married me. He was

married with all his slaves. When I was three months with child he caused me to miscarry. It was my turn to go to him, and he sent a slave for me. I delayed in going, and when I arrived he boxed my ears and ordered me to sit down, and then when I was sitting kicked me in the abdomen. I was very ill after this for half-a-month, and then miscarried. He never had any connection with me before he married me. This happened before the doors of Cid Bubekir were sealed. It was long before the deceased Minister's first mission to Morocco city that I had the miscarriage. I know of no English Bashador being at Morocco except the one mentioned above. There was no one present when Cid Bubekir kicked me. When I was ill afterwards another slave of his, named Tacot Sfinia, used to bring medicines which she bought for me with my money. Sfinia is still with Cid Bubekir, and all the household, including Cid Bubekir's wife, knew that I had aborted. The mother of the "Booab" took away the child and buried him.

Before me:
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE,
Her Majesty's Consul.

Inclosure 3 in No. 27.

Declaration of Rabba, made before Her Majesty's Consul on the 28*th June,* 1893.

CID BUBEKIR-EL-GHANJAWI had a slave named Ambar, with whom he was also married. He had been quarrelling with her for two months, but had never beaten her or done anything to her. One day, about 1 o'clock, he sent Tacot Fasia (another slave) for her. When she came to him in his sitting room, he said to her, "Go in front of me," and as she was walking away he shot her with a pistol. The ball entered at the bottom of the throat, and she fell; after giving a few convulsive kicks she died. I was present, and also Tacot Fasia, Fatas Zohra, and Hadija. We buried Ambar by throwing her into a dry well in the middle of the house, and filling the well with stones and earth. I assisted in burying her. I could point out the well where she is buried. It is near the "Hamam" in the house where we lived, adjoining and forming part of the house that the English Minister visited. This happened before the English Minister first visited Morocco city in 1887.

Before me:
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE,
Her Majesty's Consul.

Inclosure 4 in No. 27.

Consul White to Sir West Ridgeway.

Tangier, July 6, 1893.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch of the 28th ultimo, transmitting copies of Declarations made by Rabba bringing certain charges against Cid Bubekir-el-Ghanjawi, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of a letter I have received from Mr. J. E. Budgett Meakin and of my reply, from which it appears that Mr. Meakin is anxious to bring Cid Bubekir into Court by any means in his power. It was Mr. Meakin who brought Rabba to me in the first instance, and I then drew his attention to section 18 of the Morocco Order in Council, and pointed out to him that the alleged offences were committed out of my jurisdiction, and that the person charged is also out of my jurisdiction. In reply to his question, I stated that I was not aware whether Morocco city was within the jurisdiction of the newly-created Vice-Consulate of Mogador.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 27.

Mr. Meakin to Consul White.

Camp, on Marshan, June 28, 1893.

Dear Sir,

YOU promised to ascertain from Sir West Ridgeway when Rabba must make her complaint against Bubekir-el-Ghanjawi, but I have not yet heard from you. I presume she may bring a civil action for damages in your Court. Am I rightly advised?

You understand that she sues *in formâ pauperis*, and that if no other way lies before her then let her go to Casablanca or to Mogador; she will be practically denied justice, to the shame of our laws.

If Kaïd Maclean is the official to apply to, can the application be made to him here?

Yours faithfully,
(Signed) J. E. B. MEAKIN.

Inclosure 6 in No. 27.

Consul White to Mr. Meakin.

Tangier, July 3, 1893.

Sir,

IN reply to your letter of the 28th ultimo, received the day before yesterday, I have to inform you that the question of jurisdiction in regard to the city of Morocco has been referred to the Foreign Office for instructions.

Any application which Rabba may make to the British Consular Court regarding any action she may wish to institute will be duly considered by the Court, but I must decline to enter into any correspondence with you on the subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

No. 28.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir West Ridgeway.

(No. 88.)

Foreign Office, July 26, 1893.

Sir,

I HAVE received and considered your despatch No. 104 of the 30th ultimo, reporting the steps you have taken to effect a settlement of the claims of certain British subjects on the Moorish Government.

Your proceedings in this matter are approved, and I note with satisfaction the satisfactory manner in which Count Gleichen and Mr. A. Maclean carried out your instructions.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 29.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir West Ridgeway.

(No. 89.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1893.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 116 of the 13th instant, reporting the steps that you have taken to obtain the release of two Moors, holding certificates of employment from the British Legation, who have been arrested and imprisoned by the Moorish authorities.

I have to inform you that your action is approved, and that Mr. Satow will be instructed to press this matter upon the Shereefian Government in the manner recommended in your despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 30.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir West Ridgeway.

(No. 90.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1893.

Sir,

I HAVE received and considered your despatch No. 118 of the 18th instant reporting your action in a case of robbery of cattle belonging to a British subject, named Ramon Alvarez, which is alleged to have occurred near Rabat, and forwarding copy of a Circular despatch which you have addressed to the British Vice-Consuls in Morocco for their

guidance in analogous cases. I have to convey to you my approval of your proceedings in this matter and of the rules which you have laid down for the investigation of future complaints of a character similar to that of Mr. Alvarez.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 31.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

Foreign Office, July 31, 1893.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT herewith, for your perusal, a despatch, with its inclosure, from Sir West Ridgeway,* reporting the steps that he has taken to obtain the release of two Moors, holding certificates of employment from the British Legation, who have been arrested and imprisoned by the Moorish authorities in violation of Treaty stipulations.

You will perceive that the Minister's representations upon this subject have hitherto proved unsuccessful, and I have accordingly to request that you will take an early opportunity, after your arrival at Tangier, of pressing the matter upon the serious attention of the Moorish Government, with a view to the immediate release of both prisoners.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 32.

Sir West Ridgeway to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received August* 1.)

(No. 123. Secret.)

Tangier, July 24, 1893.

My Lord,

M. GENTILE, the Dragoman of the Italian Legation, called on me to-day on his return from Fez.

He stated that, on the whole, he was satisfied with the results of his Mission, but he added that he never experienced greater difficulty in transacting business with the Court. He accounts for this by the fact that the Sultan has of late deprived his Ministers of all initiative and authority. Every letter, however trifling its subject, has to be approved by His Majesty, and as his habits in the transaction of public business are not methodical, arrears accumulate to an alarming extent. In this way important letters remain unanswered, for no Minister dare remind the Sultan that there has been delay on his part. M. Gentile considers it to be a certainty that the Sultan will refuse to continue the Tattenbach Concession for the exportation of wheat and barley. Indeed, he believes that orders have already been issued to this effect. The Sultan states that the price of barley has risen in consequence of the export, and that the Governors represent that the people are consequently less able to pay taxes.

As regards French influence, M. Gentile represents that it is great. But he does not believe that the Sultan has any intention of ceding Tuat, or, indeed, making any important concession to France, though he will yield in minor points in order to keep her in a good humour. Indeed, in M. Gentile's opinion, one of the Sultan's principal reasons for visiting Tafilelt is to cement and strengthen his sovereignty over Tuat and in the south of his dominions generally. I greatly doubt, however, whether he will really pursue his journey so far as Tafilelt. There are already rumours that he will shortly change his direction to Rabat on his way to Morocco.

The Sultan's feelings towards England are, M. Gentile states, much improved, and he fully appreciates the spirit of justice and conciliation which characterizes her attitude. His Majesty had been quite determined on the arrival of this Mission to resist any demand accompanied by threats, and he had been assured that he would have material assistance from France in doing so. There is, however, still a good deal of bitterness in connection with the recent negotiations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WEST RIDGEWAY.

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* No. 24.

No. 33.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 2, 1893.

I INCLOSE, for your perusal, despatches from Sir West Ridgeway and the Acting Consul at Mogador respecting an enterprise contemplated by Sir Alfred Kirby on territory south of the Wady Draa between Cape Juby and Cape Bogador.*

I should at the same time explain that the letter of introduction, to which Sir W. Ridgeway calls attention, was given to Sir A. Kirby through inadvertence, and that when he called at this Office in the month of December last and explained his designs and intentions, he was informed that he must not expect any support or countenance from Her Majesty's Government, who could not encourage any enterprises on that part of the coast, as they might have a tendency to disturb the *status quo*.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 34.

Mr. White to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received August* 3.)

(No. 125.)
My Lord, *Tangier, July* 28, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to report that Sir West Ridgeway left Tangier yesterday afternoon in Her Majesty's ship "Bramble" for Gibraltar and England, and that I have taken charge of the Legation.

The Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Cid Hadj Mohammed Torres, the Captain of the Port, and other Moorish officials, as well as all the foreign Representatives, accompanied by the members of their respective Legations, and a number of the private residents at Tangier, were at the pier to take leave of Sir West and Lady Ridgeway, and great regret was universally expressed at their departure, as during their short stay at Tangier they had socially, as well as officially, made themselves most popular and respected amongst all classes, Moorish and European, official and private.

On my return from Her Majesty's ship "Bramble" on its departure I was met by the principal soldier of the Basha, who had been sent to express the great regret of that official at having arrived at the pier just too late to take leave of Her Majesty's Minister, owing to a misunderstanding as to the hour of embarkation; the Basha, he added, was the more sorry to have missed taking leave of Sir West Ridgeway, as he had been especially anxious to state to him personally how much he regretted his departure, and to testify the great esteem in which he held him; he further stated that, if I desired it, the Basha would call upon me officially at the Legation to express his regrets personally. I replied that it was unnecessary that he should do so, as I was convinced that his absence had been involuntary, and caused by a misapprehension as explained.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

No. 35.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received August* 3.)

My Lord, *London, August* 3, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 31st ultimo, transmitting, for my perusal, a despatch, with its inclosure, from Sir West Ridgeway with regard to the arrest and imprisonment of two Moors holding certificates of employment from the British Legation.

If on my arrival at Tangier I find that these men have not been released, I shall take

* Nos. 21 and 23.

an early opportunity of pressing the matter upon the attention of the Moorish Government, in accordance with your Lordship's instructions.

I beg to return the original documents inclosed in your Lordship's despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 36.

Memorandum by Mr. Oakes respecting the North-West African Company.

THE following short history of the proceedings of the North-West African Company in connection with their Settlement at Cape Juby, so far as this Office is concerned, has been extracted principally from the various Memoranda which have been written on the subject.

The original scheme of the Company embraced the idea of flooding a portion of the desert of Sahara with a view to promoting navigation in the direction of Timbuctoo, and Mr. Donald Mackenzie, who was one of the chief movers in the matter, requested, in 1878, that Mr. Dundas, Her Majesty's Consul at Teneriffe, might be allowed to accompany him to Cape Juby, where he was about to proceed for the purpose of obtaining a cession of territory, and that they might be conveyed there in a British ship of war. — Confidential No. 4670, p. 11.

To this application Lord Salisbury replied, on the 2nd October, 1878, that, inasmuch as Her Majesty's Government were not prepared to give any support to Mr. Mackenzie's undertaking, he could not authorize Mr. Dundas to accompany him officially, or in a ship of war; but his Lordship would not object to Mr. Dundas going in a purely private capacity, on the understanding that he was not to identify himself with the proceedings, or to take any step, such as the attesting of documents, which could countenance the idea that the enterprise had the official support of Her Majesty's Government.

Consul Dundas was at the same time informed that the scheme, embracing the flooding of the Sahara, was not considered to be likely to prove successful, and was not one which Her Majesty's Government should support.

On the 25th January, 1879, Mr. Mackenzie announced his approaching visit to Cape Juby, and suggested that a British ship of war should call there at the same time, in order to make a Treaty with the native Chiefs for regulating commercial intercourse. — Ibid., p. 16.

He was informed, in reply, that Her Majesty's Government were not then ("at present") able to send a ship of war to Cape Juby for the purpose indicated by him. — Ibid., p. 19. February 17, 1879.

It appears from the correspondence that the Spanish Government were jealous of Mr. Mackenzie's undertaking; and that the Sultan of Morocco opposed it, stating that the territory of Cape Juby was within his dominions. This, however, Her Majesty's Government did not admit. — Confidential No. 4670, p. 23.

In reply to an inquiry from the Spanish Government, the Marquis of Salisbury informed Mr. West on the 5th July, 1879, that no official countenance was afforded to Mr. Mackenzie's expedition, but that the place where he was trading was more than 100 miles beyond the limits of Moorish territory, on an independent part of the coast, where he was free to trade without molestation from any foreign Power. — Ibid., p. 33.

In reply to a remonstrance from the Moorish Government, Lord Granville (who was then Secretary of State) instructed Sir J. D. Hay to inform them that Her Majesty's Government would not be justified in requiring, and had not the power to require, a British subject to withdraw from a place where he had established himself for purposes of trade; and that it was the policy of Her Majesty's Government to encourage legitimate trade in all parts of the world, and that they would never interfere with it in one place in order to increase the profits at another. — Ibid., pp. 59, 63. October 2, 1880.

On the 2nd September, 1880, Mr. H. Lee, M.P., asked (in a private letter to Sir C. Dilke) whether the Company might depend on the protection of Her Majesty's Government; whether, if they became firmly established on the coast, there was any prospect of a Royal Charter being granted to them; and other similar questions. — Confidential No. 4670, p. 51.

He was officially informed, in reply to these inquiries, that Lord Granville felt convinced that the proceedings of the Company at Cape Juby were calculated to arouse feelings of animosity in the Sultan of Morocco and the Chiefs under his influence, and that its prosecution would be fraught with peril to British life and property, and for this reason the undertaking had never received any encouragement or support from Her Majesty's Government. The claim of Morocco to sovereignty over Cape Juby had not been recognized by Great Britain, and the Sultan had been warned that he would be held responsible for any injury to the life and property of British subjects occasioned by attacks — Ibid., p. 69. February 4, 1881. — Memorandum, September 22, 1890.

instigated by him; but that under present circumstances, Lord Granville would not feel justified in entertaining an application for a Royal Charter to the Company.

Lord Granville added that Her Majesty's Government could not claim the right to prevent Spanish ships and merchants from resorting to Cape Juby for purposes of trade, and that as regarded the amount of protection which would be extended to the Company, much depended on the nature of the protection required, and the circumstances under which it was invoked. Her Majesty's Government could not, therefore, pledge themselves to any course of action, but would make all reasonable efforts to protect British subjects in the territories in question from the dangers to which they might be exposed at the hands of the native Chiefs.

August 9, 1882. Sir C. Dilke subsequently wrote privately to Mr. Lee as follows:—

"I need not remind you that Her Majesty's Government have assumed no responsibility with regard to your Settlement, and have often warned British subjects that if they go to uncivilized and savage countries it must be at their own risk and peril."

February 22, 1883. In 1883, Mr. Lee wrote on the subject of the supposed intention of Spain to occupy the territory of Cape Juby, expressing a hope that Lord Granville would render to the Company the protection which, as British subjects lawfully engaged in trade, they might fairly claim.

February 28, 1883. Sir J. Pauncefote minuted this: "I think we need only acknowledge; they can't expect protection until their interests are attacked."

And this Minute was acted upon.

In consequence of the hostility of the Sultan of Morocco to the Company's establishment at Cape Juby, a suggestion was thrown out by Sir J. Hay, in 1882, that the Company should negotiate with His Majesty for the sale of their rights and establishments, and should hand them over for a consideration and retire from Cape Juby.

This suggestion was communicated to the Company, who replied that they would give attention to Lord Granville's advice, and that if it were desirable to enter into the proposed negotiations they were prepared to do so.

After full consideration, as appears from Minutes written at the time, it was decided to maintain a passive attitude, and nothing was done.

May 31, 1883. Mr. Lee subsequently asked whether the Foreign Office recommended the Company to enter on these negotiations, to which Lord Granville replied that Sir J. Hay would, no

June 26, 1883. doubt, assist them in opening such negotiations should they desire it, but his Lordship could express no opinion as to the expediency of such a course.

July 18, 1884. On the 18th July, 1884, the Company wrote to say that without some recognition and protection from Her Majesty's Government, it was useless to attempt to establish a free port on the West Coast of Africa, and that under the circumstances there were four courses open to them, namely—

1. To sell the Cape Juby property to Spain.
2. To sell it to France.
3. To sell it to Germany, who had promised to protect their own people wherever they might form trading-stations.
4. To sell it to Morocco, which country was, however, evidently in no position to come to terms with them.

July 28, 1884. The Company were informed, in reply, that as the Sultan did not recognize the concessions under which they acted, Her Majesty's Government could not give their countenance and support (as requested) to their transfer to any other Power.

November 13, 1884. The Company then asked that the Conference, which was then sitting at Berlin, should declare the coast-line between Wad Draa and Senegal (about 800 miles) to be neutral, stating that Spain was about to raise the question of Cape Juby in the Conference.

November 14, 1884. They were, however, informed that the question was outside the scope of the Conference, but that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin would be informed of their fears with regard to Spain.

No. 350, November 15, 1884. Sir E. Malet was consequently instructed to oppose any attempt by Spain to obtain a decision adverse to the Company.

Spanish Minister in London, January 9, 1885. On the 9th January, 1885, Spain announced the assumption of a Spanish Protectorate over the West Coast of Africa from Cape Blanco on the south to Cape Bojador on the north, the latter point being some distance to the south of Cape Juby.

January 28, 1885. The receipt of this communication was acknowledged on the 28th January, 1885.

July 23, 1885. In July 1885 the Company asked whether this Protectorate was an accomplished fact, and what would be the position of British trade in the district, expressing a hope that Lord Salisbury (who was again Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) would take up the question, as it was with his knowledge that the Company first established themselves at Cape Juby.

The Company were informed that the Spanish Protectorate was an actual fact, and that inquiries were being made as to British trade. August 12, 1885.

Sir J. Lee then wrote to Mr. Kennedy respecting the territory between Wad Draa and Cape Bojador and between Cape Blanco and the French possessions at Portendic. He said what he wanted was an *official recognition* for the Company, as he was afraid of Bismarck, who was on the look-out for unclaimed territory. September 1, 1885.

He wrote strongly on the future commercial value of the territories in question, admitting, at the same time, that the Company's land comprised only 5 miles of coast.

Various Minutes were written as to the advisability of establishing a British Protectorate or of placing the North-West African Company on a footing similar to the North Borneo Company, and eventually the Colonial Office were asked as to taking over the Company's territory in connection with the Gambia Colony, or otherwise. September 21, 1885.

They replied that it was not feasible or desirable to take over the territory as suggested, which would be separated from the Gambia by the whole extent of the French Colony of Senegal; but with regard to the country between Wad Draa and Bojador, if Lord Salisbury was satisfied that Morocco had no title to it, the proposal to establish British jurisdiction of some sort over it deserved serious consideration, suggesting, in the first instance, a Chartered Company under British protection. January 6, 1886.

But the Admiralty, who were consulted, at the suggestion of the Colonial Office, stated that the territory in question had no value either as a coaling-station or for other naval purposes; and the Company were accordingly informed (through Sir J. Lee) that after careful consideration Her Majesty's Government had decided that insuperable difficulties existed as regarded the establishment of an effective British Protectorate over the coast in question, the isolated position of which made it impossible to connect it with any British Colony, and would make direct Imperial control an experiment attended with no ordinary risk and expenditure. February 2, 1886. March 5, 1886.

The Colonial Office were also informed that the Sultan of Morocco, who had pretensions to part of that coast (though not recognized by Great Britain), would probably view a British Protectorate with jealousy, and the grant of a Charter to the Company might entail responsibilities disproportionate to any advantage to be derived from the prospects of opening up trade. February 17, 1886.

In 1886 the Company reported that an attack had been made on their Settlement at Cape Juby and their stores pillaged, when they were informed that a gun-boat had been ordered to the spot. July 12, 1886.

In the course of the same year numerous letters were received from the Company applying for protection or annexation, and asking what course they should adopt, and on the 6th November a comprehensive reply was returned to them in the following sense:— November 6, 1886.

They were informed that they had received British protection to the extent that a gun-boat had been sent to Cape Juby on the occasion of the pillage of their stores, and that the Sultan of Morocco had been told that he would be held responsible for acts of aggression against them. They, however, required protection against molestation on the part of all Powers, either by Royal Charter or otherwise. Such protection would involve an annexation or Protectorate by Great Britain, and Her Majesty's Government were not prepared to incur the responsibilities of such a step. They could only require, in the case of annexation by a foreign Power, that the property of British subjects should be respected. Although Her Majesty's Government had hitherto recognized the Wad Draa as the southern boundary of Morocco, they could not contest the right of the Sultan of Morocco to extend his frontier. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, while willing to grant, as in the past, the protection ordinarily accorded to British traders, could not extend British dominion or protection over the territories in which the Company might seek to establish its trade, nor grant any powers of government over those territories by Charter or otherwise.

The Company then reverted to the compromise suggested by Sir J. Hay in 1882, and Mr. Kirby Green was instructed to promote the negotiations. No. 7, Africa, November 30, 1886.

The Sultan, however, refused to discuss the question, and the agent of the Company, who had gone to Morocco, returned to England. Mr. Kirby Green, No. 3, Africa, May 7, 1887.

A further appeal from the Company for assistance was based on the contention that Her Majesty's Government, by giving them information as to the recognized boundaries of Morocco, had contracted an obligation to defend British enterprises established outside those limits. July 12, 1887. See Minute by Sir V. Lister

Lord Salisbury minuted this letter thus: "I should at once deny the absurd liability which they attempt to fasten on us," and this was done.

Further correspondence ensued, and early in 1888 a further attack was made upon the

Company's premises, resulting in the murder of Mr. Morris, a member of the Settlement at Cape Juby.

Confidential No. 5706, p. 87.

Compensation was demanded for this outrage, as well as the punishment of the perpetrators of it, and ultimately a sum of 4,803*l.* was paid by the Moorish Government in compensation.

Law Officers, May 29, 1888.

The Law Officers reported in May 1888 that Her Majesty's Government could not support a claim put forward by the Company to exemption from the jurisdiction and authority of the Sultan. They were, however, entitled to the protection of Her Majesty's Government against violent aggression against persons and property.

Confidential No. 5747, p. 63.

Sir W. K. Green then, under instructions from this Office, demanded from the Moorish Government 50,000*l.* in consideration of the permanent loss of the trade of the Company.

Negotiations were then entered upon between the Company and the Moorish Government, this Office acting as transmitter of the various proposals and counter-proposals.

Confidential No. 5958, pp. 59, 80.

The Sultan offered 30,000*l.* provided that the Company retired from Cape Juby; the latter undertook to do this if 70,000*l.* were paid to them. In addition to the 30,000*l.*, the Sultan offered to give Her Majesty's Government the right of pre-emption over the territory occupied by the Company. No notice seems to have been taken of this offer.

To Sir W. Kirby Green, January 14, 1889. Confidential No. 5847, p. 7.

In connection with the claim for injuries inflicted on the Company, Lord Salisbury stated that even if the Sultan had succeeded in acquiring control over the Cape Juby territory, he could not ignore the pre-existing rights of foreigners established there. Her Majesty's Government therefore protested against any attempt to compel the British Company to retire without giving them proper compensation.

Memorandum [?] by Sir G. Dallas.

The Moorish Government at length agreed to pay the Company 50,000*l.* in five yearly instalments of 10,000*l.* each.

No. 60, March 28, 1892.

On Sir C. Euan-Smith being appointed Her Majesty's Minister in Morocco, he was instructed to endeavour to bring about a better understanding between the Sultan and the Company, and he submitted to Her Majesty's Government the following proposals:—

1. The recognition of the Sultan's sovereignty over the district between Wad Draa and Cape Bojador, with the exception of Cape Juby and the country immediately behind it.

2. His Highness' right to levy duties on trade between the Company's territory and his own, as well as at his ports on the coast.

3. A reduction in the amount still owing to the Company for the compensation granted.

As advantages on behalf of the Company, he proposed:—

1. The recognition by the Sultan of their Settlement at Cape Juby.

2. The issue of Firmans to the tribes encouraging them to trade with the Company.

3. An undertaking by the Sultan not to part with his new territory without the consent of Her Majesty's Government, and a grant to the Company of a priority of right to purchase mining and other privileges within that territory.

May 14, 1892.

Sir C. Euan-Smith was informed that Her Majesty's Government would not go beyond the above proposals, but he might, if he could, obtain better terms for the Company, though it was essential not to give umbrage to the Powers co-operating with Her Majesty's Government on commercial and other questions.

No. 97, May 24, 1892.

To Sir C. Euan-Smith, Telegraphic, June 9, 1892.

On Sir C. Euan-Smith submitting a draft Agreement for consideration, he was informed that Her Majesty's Government were prepared to press for a full recognition of the private rights of the Company as a private Company; they would also press the Sultan not to cede the sovereignty of the Company's land to any other Power, but they would not maintain that any portion of this territory was under the sovereignty of the Queen. Such a claim would be dangerous, as it would certainly provoke similar claims from the other Powers on other frontiers.

It was subsequently decided to hold this question back until the conclusion of the Commercial Convention.

Sir C. Euan-Smith, No. 126, July 19, 1892.

This Convention fell through, and therefore nothing came of the Cape Juby proposals. But the Sultan openly boasted to Sir C. Euan-Smith that the ruin of the Company's trade was chiefly due to his orders to the tribes to cease from trading with them.

Sir. G. Dallas' Memorandum, from which the latter part of this Memorandum has been compiled, ends thus:—

"The Company have hinted more than once that they are not in a good financial position, and to do what they now ask us to do would most certainly embroil us before long with Morocco.

"But probably we had better refer their letter (20th July, 1893) to Sir W. Ridgeway when he arrives, and, in the meantime, we might inform them that we will do so."

(Signed) A. H. OAKES.

Foreign Office, August 4, 1893.

No. 37.

Foreign Office to Acting Consul Johnston.

(No. 1.)

Foreign Office, August 4, 1893.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 10, Commercial, of the 23rd ultimo, requesting instructions respecting the degree of support that you should afford to Sir Alfred Kirby and his Syndicate, I am directed by the Earl of Rosebery to state that the letter of introduction in favour of that gentleman was issued by the Commercial Department owing to a misunderstanding, for when in December last Sir A. Kirby called at this Office and explained his designs and intentions, he was informed that he must not expect any support or countenance from Her Majesty's Government, who could not encourage any enterprises on the strip of coast between Cape Juby and Cape Bojador which might have a tendency to disturb the *status quo*.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 38.

Question asked in the House of Commons, August 7, 1893; *and Answer.*

Mr. A. O'Connor asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether a person named Boubker-el-Ganjour was or had at any time been an Agent of the British Government or of the British Minister at the Shereefian Court of Morocco.

Sir E. Grey.—The person mentioned in the question has been employed by Her Majesty's Legation, and has received British protection in consequence.

Mr. A. O'Connor.—Is the Foreign Office acquainted with the antecedents of this man?

Sir E. Grey.—To this extent—that certain grave charges were brought against him, and he brought an action for libel, which was decided publicly in his favour, and a fine of 100*l.* was imposed on the man who originally made the statements.

Mr. A. O'Connor.—Is it a fact that certain houses belonging to this man were closed by the order of the Sultan?

Sir E. Grey.—I cannot say whether it is a fact, but about this time last year the Sultan expressly stated that there was no complaint to make of this man.

No. 39.

Mr. White to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received August* 8.)

(No. 126.)

Tangier, July 29, 1893.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from the Vice-Consul at Mogador, reporting the assembling of considerable bodies of troops under the Viceroy of Marakesh, the Sultan's son, Mulai Mohammed, and under certain Governors of southern provinces. Mr. Johnston states that the forces collected are considerably larger than usual, and that the general belief is that Mulai Mohammed is under orders to join the Sultan at Tafilelt.

The most contradictory rumours are rife as to the present position of the Sultan's expedition and as to His Majesty's plans, and it is currently believed that the visit to Tafilelt has been abandoned.

There can, I think, be little doubt that the Sultan's original intention on leaving Fez was to proceed to Tafilelt, and thence to Tarudant, where Mulai Mohammed was to join him with his contingent in order to accompany His Majesty to Marakesh. The Sultan would thus, in a single expedition, accomplish visits to Tafilelt and Soos, some of the tribes of which have lately been giving trouble, and be then free to return to Fez next year,

the unsatisfactory state of the tribes neighbouring Fez and Mequinez rendering a long absence of the Court undesirable.

On the other hand, it is said that difficulties have arisen, desertions have been numerous, the commissariat has failed, and all at the Court, including the ladies of the Harem, are opposed to the expedition, and use every endeavour to dissuade the Sultan from persevering in it, whilst His Majesty, though very obstinate, is also superstitious, and apt to be influenced by his astrologers. It is thence argued that there is probably truth in the persistent rumours that His Majesty has changed his plans, and, after passing through and chastising the Beni M'guild Zemoor and neighbouring tribes, will march to Rabat, and after spending a short time there proceed to Marakesh.

Without more definite news I am, however, disinclined to believe that the Sultan has so soon renounced his long-cherished idea of visiting Tafilelt, and has abandoned the expedition. His Majesty must feel that his prestige would suffer were he to turn aside now after having started with the publicly announced intention of visiting Tafilelt, and I do not think His Majesty will allow himself to be diverted from his purpose except by some absolutely insurmountable obstacle, such as a total failure of supplies.

The Sultan successfully carried through his first Soos expedition in 1882, marching to the farthest extremity of that province, when it was universally said His Majesty would not go, or, if he did, the expedition was doomed to destruction. The present expedition is a more difficult one, but I should not be surprised at His Majesty accomplishing it successfully.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 39.

Vice-Consul Johnston to Sir West Ridgeway.

Mogador, July 11, 1893.

Sir,

REFERRING to my semi-official letter of the 5th instant, reporting the formation near Morocco City of a military force considerably larger than has been hitherto usual in the absence of His Majesty the Sultan, I am still unable to state with any amount of certainty the object this expedition is intended to serve.

The general belief is, however, embodied in the following extract from a letter, dated the 6th instant, received from a native correspondent:—

"On Saturday next (July 8th) this army is starting by the Amskrod road to Tarudant, and will thence proceed to Fatta and on to El Dads, where it will stop a short time, thence to Tafilelt. Of this you may be quite sure. Orders have come from the Sultan to this effect. Fifty-four Soos kaïds are going to accompany the Viceroy Mulai Mohammed as far as Tafilelt, and to meet the Sultan at Ain Shaer on the French frontier, where His Majesty will *help the French to make their railway to the Soudan*."

I imagine this last statement, which I have italicised, to be written ironically.

Though I am not in possession of detailed information as to the composition of this force, it is said on good authority to consist of the pick of nearly all the loyal tribes of Abda, Rahamna. Seragna, Mtooga, the eastern part of Haha, and others from the Plain of Morocco, officered by their kaïds or lieutenant-kaïds (Khalaef), and, as nearly as I can estimate, should amount to a total of about 12,000 fighting men, including a large proportion of cavalry.

Within the past week Kaïd Saïd Belayeshy, Governor of the large province of Shiadma, has, I am informed, ordered the immediate levy of 2,400 infantry (200 from each of his twelve tribes) and of *all* the horsemen in Shiadma. It is stated that this force is to be directed against certain tribes in and bordering the Atlas (Enfeefa Damseiera and Hassayn), which were recently placed under his jurisdiction by the Sultan, and which have refused to pay taxes. The Kaïd of Oolad Bon Sfäa, whose territory lies between Shiadma and the Atlas, has been ordered by the Sultan to support Kaïd Belayeshy.

Kaïd El Giulooly, who holds the western and southern part of Haha, is still employed in endeavouring to reduce the Eda O'Tanan mountaineers; and the existence of the large royal force under Mulai Mohammed seems to have had its moral effect upon the highlanders, two of the five divisions in which the Eda O'Tanan are split having within the past few days offered their submission.

In spite of the regrettable absence of details of the reports furnished to me by correspondents, it is evident that the greater part of Southern Morocco is now being drained of its more loyal inhabitants to supply levies for the supposed Tafilelt expedition, and that

the Atlas tribes from the neighbourhood of Agadir to Emintanoot are in a state of open or veiled revolt. The very depressing effect upon trade of the withdrawal of so many of the farmers and peasantry for military service is already being felt, while in Morocco City—so I am informed by an English agent there—a great deal of anxiety exists among the commercial classes lest, during the absence at Tafilelt of the Sultan and of his more loyal tribes, the disaffected both in town and country should seize an opportunity to raise a serious rebellion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. L. N. JOHNSTON.

No. 40.

Mr Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received August* 8.)

London, August 7, 1893.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to return herewith Sir West Ridgeway's despatch No. 115 of the 13th July, together with that of Mr. R. L. N. Johnston, British Vice-Consul at Mogador, relative to an enterprise of Sir Alfred Kirby on the coast south of Cape Juby, which were transmitted for my perusal in Sir T. V. Lister's letter of the 2nd instant.

On my arrival at Tangier I shall acquaint Mr. Johnston with the views of Her Majesty's Government with reference to this matter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 41.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

Foreign Office, August 11, 1893.

Sir,

WITH reference to Sir West Ridgeway's despatch No. 119 of the 18th ultimo, which was forwarded to you for your perusal in Sir T. Villiers Lister's note of the 1st instant, I have to inform you that Morocco city is within the jurisdiction of Mr. Maclean, Her Majesty's Consul at Daralbaida.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 42.

Foreign Office to North-West African Company.

Foreign Office, August 14, 1893.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Earl of Rosebery to acknowledge the receipt of your letter o the 20th ultimo, requesting that administrative powers may be granted to the North-West African Company, under the British Settlements Act of 1887.

In reply, I am to state that your application has been carefully considered by his Lordship, but that he regrets that he does not see his way to complying with it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 43.

Mr. White to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received August* 15.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Tangier, August 15, 1893.

AS prognosticated in your Lordship's despatch No. 87 of the 26th ultimo, the Marquis de Potestad-Fornari, Spanish Minister in Morocco, left Tangier this afternoon on his visit to the Spanish "presidios" on the Moorish Mediterranean coast in a Spanish despatch-vessel.

No. 44.

Mr. White to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received August* 16.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August* 16, 1893.

AN attack was perpetrated at Daralbaida on an Englishman of the name of Irwin by a Moor. The aggressor, a madman, knocked down Mr. Irwin, and, seizing a large stone, commenced battering him with it on the head. Happily, the Englishman was saved by the servant of a German who was present. It is said that the Lieutenant-Governor of the town, with an escort of a few soldiers, was at the time close to the scene of the attack, but did not attempt to rescue Mr. Irwin. The Basha subsequently ordered the arrest of the madman, who was flogged and imprisoned. A very short time previously the same man had tried to kill his own mother, but the Basha and Cadi had turned a deaf ear to her applications to have him placed under restraint.

No. 45.

Mr. White to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received August* 21.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August* 21, 1893.

THE Representatives of foreign Powers at Tangier are each and all of them willing to affix their signatures to a collective note proposed to be addressed to the Sultan, petitioning His Majesty to grant an extension of the term fixed for the exportation of wheat and barley.

Have I your Lordship's authority to sign with them?

No. 46.

Mr. White to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received August* 22.)

(No. 128.)
My Lord, *Tangier, August* 15, 1893.

WITH reference to Sir West Ridgeway's despatch No. 73, Very Confidential, of the 24th ultimo, on the subject of the extension of the Concession obtained by Count von Tattenbach in 1880 for the export of wheat and barley, I have the honour to report that notice having been given at the ports that the further export of these grains would be prohibited after the 12th October next, the merchants at Daralbaida transmitted to the foreign Representatives at Tangier a Petition, copy of which is inclosed herewith, praying that the Sultan be urged to prolong the term beyond the three years stipulated in the original Concession.

This Petition has been circulated by the Portuguese Minister, Doyen of the foreign Representatives, among his colleagues, with a covering letter proposing that a note in the sense desired be addressed to the Sultan by all the Representatives.

I fear, if the views expressed by M. Gentile on his return from the Court, and reported in Sir West Ridgeway's despatch No. 123, Secret, of the 24th ultimo, are correct, there is little chance of the Sultan's extending the Concession even at the unanimous request of the foreign Representatives; but there can be no doubt that it will be a serious blow to commerce if the prohibition takes effect at the time stated, for, as pointed out in the Petition, wheat and barley are nearly the only crops that have not been much affected by the locusts.

As soon as I have learnt the views of the foreign Representatives regarding the proposal of the Portuguese Minister, I shall report on the subject by telegraph, and request your Lordship's instructions on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

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Inclosure in No. 46.

Petition from Merchants at Daralbaida to the Foreign Representatives at Tangier.

NOUS avons l'honneur de soumettre respectueusement à vos Excellences la Pétition ci-dessous et de solliciter l'appui de votre bienveillance pour lui faire obtenir une suite favorable.

Nous Soussignés, négociants et commerçants de Casablanca, avons l'honneur de prier leurs Excellences Messieurs les Représentants des Puissances étrangères à Tanger, de vouloir bien, dans l'intérêt général du Maroc, user de leur haute influence auprès de Sa Majesté Chérifienne afin d'obtenir une nouvelle période pour l'exportation de l'orge et du blé dont le terme des trois années accordées vient de nous être annoncé pour le 12 Octobre prochain.

Les raisons sur lesquelles nous basons la présente Pétition sont les suivantes :—

1. Les grands avantages résultant de l'exportation tant pour Sa Majesté Chérifienne par l'augmentation de ses recettes douanières que pour les fermiers Marocains qui continueraient à trouver un débouché pour ces grains au lieu de les laisser forcément gâter en silos; enfin pour le commerce en général par l'augmentation des affaires.

2. Grevés, comme le sont ces grains par des droits de sortie élevés, aucune cherté ne résulte de leur exportation, les prix, quoique suivant la fluctuation du cours Européen, restant à peu près les mêmes que si l'exportation en était prohibée.

3. Enfin, les autres récoltes ayant beaucoup souffert cette année se trouvent bien en dessous de la moyenne, tandis que les récoltes de blé et d'orge étant bonnes, si l'exportation en était arrêtée il résulterait une véritable stagnation dans les affaires qui causerait au commerce des torts immenses.

Fait a Casablanca le 25 Juillet, 1893.

(Suivent 35 signatures.)

No. 47.

Mr. White to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received August* 24.)

(No. 129.)
My Lord, *Tangier, August* 16, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to report that Mr. Alfred Irwin, an English gentleman residing at Dar-al-Baida, was attacked and nearly killed by an insane Moor at that town on the evening of the 11th instant.

The facts of the case, as related to me by Mr. Fernau in a private letter, and confirmed by another private letter communicated to me by a friend here, appear to be as follows:—

Mr. Irwin was standing on the beach at Dar-al-Baida on the evening in question talking to a lady, when a Moor from the Province of Wad Draa came up to him from behind, and without any warning caught him by the throat, threw him to the ground, and, after hitting him with his fists, seized a large stone and commenced striking him on the head with it, causing a severe wound. Happily, two servants of the lady to whom Mr. Irwin had been talking ran to the rescue, and pulled the Moor off, otherwise he would undoubtedly have succeeded in killing his victim.

The brother of the Governor of the town, himself Lieutenant-Governor, accompanied by some mounted soldiers, was, it is stated, only some fifteen or twenty yards distant when this assault occurred, but made no attempt whatever to interfere or to protect Mr. Irwin, although he must have witnessed the whole occurrence.

The Moor was eventually seized, and, after being flogged, was cast into prison. There can be little doubt that the man was mad, as there could have been no motive for his attack on Mr. Irwin, and it is said that his relations had shortly before applied—unfortunately in vain—to both the Governor and the Cadi to have him placed under restraint as a lunatic, as he had killed a cow, and attempted to murder his own mother or brother.

I am glad to be able to report that Mr. Irwin is said to be doing better than was to have been expected, and that it is not considered that he will suffer any permanent injury from the murderous attack that was made on him.

After the occurrence, the authorities appear to have taken the necessary steps and arrested the Moor, and their conduct in this respect would call for no comment on the part of the Legation; but the serious feature of the case is the alleged action, or rather

inaction, of the Lieutenant-Governor and his soldiers in having allowed a European to be attacked under their very eyes without making the slightest attempt to save him. Should conduct of this nature be allowed to pass unnoticed, a very bad effect would be produced; I therefore venture to suggest that Mr. Maclean, who, I understand, is shortly to take up his post as Consul at Dar-al-Baida, be directed to inquire into the matter, and, should the facts prove to be as stated, that Her Majesty's Government demand of the Sultan such reparation as they may deem proper. At the same time, it is my duty to record my opinion that every endeavour will probably be made at the Shereefian Court to shelter the Lieutenant-Governor, who is a brother of the Governor, and grandson of Cid Mohammed Bargash, formerly Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Tangier, and that it may require some insistance to obtain a compliance with any demand that may be made.

As prompt action in such matters produces a greater effect, I would further suggest that, should your Lordship decide to adopt the course I have ventured to propose, a letter be addressed to Cid Emfadl Gharneet, acquainting him with the facts of the case as reported, and with the steps Her Majesty's Government intend to take.

I beg to submit herewith, for your Lordship's consideration, draft of a letter in the sense indicated, in order that, should your Lordship be of opinion that prompt action is desirable, telegraphic instructions may be sent to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 47.

Draft of proposed Letter to Cid Emfadl Gharneet.

(Compliments.)

I HAVE the honour, by direction of Her Majesty's Government, to inform your Excellency that it has been reported to them that a murderous attack has recently been made upon Mr. Irwin, a British subject at Dar-al-Baida, under the following circumstances:—

The British subject was standing on the beach talking to a friend, when a Wad Draa Moor suddenly, and without any provocation, attacked him from behind, knocked him down, and, after hitting him with his fists, seized a large stone and commenced striking him on the head with it. Fortunately, the servants of the Englishman's friend were able to prevent the Wad Draa Moor from killing the Englishman, as was evidently his intention. The said Moor was eventually arrested and cast into prison, and no doubt all proper steps will be taken in the matter.

It has, however, been further reported that Kaïd Abdesselam Bargash, Lieutenant-Governor of Dar-al-Baida, accompanied by several soldiers, was close to the spot where the attack took place, and witnessed the whole occurrence, and that neither he nor any one of his soldiers made any attempt to rescue the Englishman from what appeared to be certain death. Her Majesty's Government are unwilling to suppose it possible that any Moorish official can have acted in the manner alleged; but the matter is of so grave a nature, that they think it necessary to cause an inquiry to be made as to the facts of the case. They have therefore directed Her Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida to institute a searching investigation into the matter, and report thereon.

Her Majesty's Government will communicate to your Excellency, for the information of the Sultan, the substance of the Consul's report, which they trust will show that Kaïd A. Bargash is free from blame; but should it unfortunately be proved that the facts are as they have been stated, Her Majesty's Government are convinced that His Shereefian Majesty will mark his disapprobation of that officer's neglect of duty in such a manner as will serve for a warning to other officials, and cause them to exercise due vigilance over the safety of Europeans. Peace.

No. 48.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. White.

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August* 25, 1893.

EXPORT of wheat and barley.

In reply to your telegram No. 46, I authorize you to join in the proposed collective note to the Sultan of Morocco, provided that it is signed by all the other foreign Representatives at Tangier.

No. 49.

Mr. White to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 130.)
My Lord, *Tangier, August* 17, 1893.

WITH reference to Sir West Ridgeway's despatch No. 118 of the 18th ultimo, and to your Lordship's despatch No. 90 of the 31st ultimo, regarding the claim of Mr. Alvarez arising out of a robbery of cattle near Sallee, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the final Report of Mr. Vice-Consul Frost on the subject.

After careful inquiry Mr. Frost has come to the conclusion that there is no doubt that sixteen head of cattle, for which 224 dollars had been paid, and one horse, value 20 dollars, were stolen, as stated, but that no satisfactory evidence had been produced to show to whom the cattle belonged; he is, however, inclined to the opinion that they belonged to the Moorish drover, and not to Mr. Alvarez as alleged.

Of the sixteen oxen robbed, one was subsequently recovered by the Governor of Sallee and restored; the value of the lost cattle was thus reduced to 230 dollars, including the horse.

In conclusion, Mr. Frost draws attention to the frequency with which cattle robberies have recently occurred on the same road, and expresses the opinion that, unless the Sultan speedily displays a firm hand in dealing with this lawlessness, the evil will rapidly assume larger proportions.

I have not communicated Mr. Frost's Report to the Acting Consul at Dar-al-Baida, as it would, I think, be preferable to allow the matter to stand over until the arrival at that port of Mr. Consul Maclean, who, I would suggest, should be instructed to inform Mr. Alvarez that, unless proof can be produced to show that the stolen cattle were his property, the Legation can take no steps in regard to the claim he has put forward.

With reference to the concluding paragraph of Mr. Frost's despatch, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of a letter I have addressed Cid Emfadl Gharneet. A large number of cattle are exported weekly from Tangier, principally to Gibraltar, the majority of which are bought up from the southern districts, and have to pass by the road where these robberies have recently been of such frequent occurrence that they have threatened to paralyze the trade. I therefore deemed it my duty to bring the matter to the notice of the Sultan in order that His Majesty might give orders for the better security of the road in question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 49.

Vice-Consul Frost to Mr. White.

Sir, *Rabat, August* 7, 1893.

REFERRING to my despatch of the 24th ultimo, I have now the honour to forward my final Report on the matter of the claim made by Mr. Ramon Alvarez, through the Vice-Consulate at Dar-al-Baida, for cattle alleged to have been robbed by the Zimmour tribe on the 7th May last near the town of Sallee.

The history of the robbery and the claim to which it has given rise will be gathered from the documents copies of which are inclosed, and which consist of:—

1. Copy of a letter addressed by Vice-Consul Fernau to the Governor of Dar-al-Baida, dated the 11th May, 1893, giving details of the robbery, and requesting the

latter to write to the Governor of Sallee to use every effort to recover the stolen property. Also copy of the indorsement on said letter by the Governor of Dar-al-Baida in forwarding it to the Governor of Sallee on same date for his report.

2. Copy of the reply of the Governor of Sallee to the Governor of Dar-al-Baida, dated close of Showal, 1310 (16th May, 1893), stating that the Zimmour admitted having a certain number of stolen cattle.

3. Copy of the declaration made to the Governor of Sallee by Mr. Alvarez' drovers, Abdallah-bin-Meludi and Hassan-bin-Thamy, on the 20th Showal (8th May), the day after the robbery.

For the first and third of these documents I am indebted to the Acting Governor of Sallee. The second was handed to me by Mr. Alvarez' agent, El Hashmy Ziani.

Directing my attention specially to the points mentioned in Sir West Ridgeway's despatch of the 17th ultimo, I found Mr. Alvarez' agent could give me little or no assistance in their elucidation. He could produce no proof of ownership of the cattle, or of their cost, or of their delivery to the drovers, and these last-named not appearing, I sent him back to Dar-al-Baida, telling him that if the drovers failed to appear at the end of a week I should proceed to make my report on such data as I possessed.

The drovers, Abdallah-bin-Meludi and Hassan-bin-Thamy, eventually presented themselves on the 1st instant, and were examined by me on the following day. They declared the cattle to be the property of Mr. Lamb, of Dar-al-Baida, and not of Mr. Ramon Alvarez. That they received them in Ziayda from Mr. Lamb's agent there, named Khashan, and that they were addressed to Mr. Ramon Alvarez' brother in Tangier. Their account of the robbery and of the cattle subsequently agreed with that given in Vice-Consul Fernau's despatch of the 3rd July addressed to Her Majesty's Minister. On their statement to the Governor of Sallee being read to them they did not deny its accuracy, and on being questioned as to the discrepancies between the values of the cattle and the horse therein given and those claimed by Mr. Alvarez, they were unable to furnish any explanation. They said the horse was lent them by Mr. Lamb, who also gave them 10 dollars for expenses on the road, the remaining 14 dollars making up the amount of 24 dollars in the claim, being money intrusted to them for delivery in Tangier by other persons.

Hassan admitted that his statement of having lost nine oxen was false.

Amongst other questions I asked them what pay they were to receive for taking the cattle to Tangier. Hassan replied he was to receive 4 dollars, but Meludi hesitated, and said nothing was arranged as to his pay, and this answer, coupled with the fact of his knowledge of the price paid for the cattle, as stated to the Governor of Sallee, led me to suspect that he himself was either wholly or partly owner of them. I told him my suspicion, but he said it was not so.

These men further stated that when they left Sallee with the cattle they were joined by two other drovers from Dar-al-Baida who were conducting fourteen and eight oxen respectively to Tangier. These were also stolen, but six were recovered, leaving sixteen missing. These sixteen oxen have formed the subject of a claim through the French Consular Agency here, forwarded to the Governor of Sallee; and this fact explains the reply of the Zimmour to the last-named functionary that they had only twenty-seven head, the total number of the British and French claim being thirty-one head.

My conclusions, after a very careful examination of the written and oral evidence in this case, are as follows:—

1. That there is no doubt the robbery actually occurred.

2. That no satisfactory evidence of the ownership of the cattle claimed for has been furnished. I did not consider it my duty to discover who the real owner or owners of them may be. It is for the plaintiff to prove his ownership, and this he has certainly so far failed to do.

3. That the purchase price of the twenty head of cattle was no doubt 280 dollars, or 14 dollars per head, as stated by the drovers in their declaration to the Governor of Sallee. And I think it very probable that Abdallah-bin-Meludi, having made himself responsible for this amount, was taking the cattle to Tangier as a speculation of his own.

4. That the value of the horse was 20 dollars, as stated in the same declaration.

The Acting Governor of Sallee has shown every disposition to aid in the inquiry, in which, however, he was debarred from taking an active part in the absence of instructions from his Government, and from a reluctance, not unnatural perhaps, to do anything which might be construed into admitting a claim against his Government.

I ought perhaps to mention that no notice of the robbery was given at this Vice-Consulate. Otherwise there appears to have been no delay in apprising the authorities at Sallee and Dar-al-Baida.

In conclusion, I may state that this robbery is but one of many others which have recently taken place and are now of almost daily occurrence on the same road. Traffic has consequently been almost completely stopped, and it cannot be doubted that, unless the Sultan speedily displays a firm hand in dealing with this lawlessness, the evil will rapidly assume larger proportions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN FROST.

Inclosure 2 in No. 49.

Vice-Consul Fernau to the Governor of Dar-al-Baida.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.)

THE merchant Ramon Alvarez, a British subject, has complained that he sent by Abdallah-bin-Meludi-el-Ziadi-el-Abbasi-el-Bedowi and Hassan-bin-Thamy-el-Ziadi-el-Tarfawi twenty head of oxen, marked with his stamp, to the town of Tangier, for sale there, and that, when they left the town of Sallee on Sunday last, the 20th of the present month, for the aforesaid town, and had reached the [place called] "Karmatsnusf," at a spot called "Borzin," in the district of [the tribe] Amar, brethren of [the Governor] Bin-el-Arrosy, near Sallee, they were attacked by about thirty horsemen, with swords in their hands, and they took from them sixteen of the aforesaid oxen and a horse, and 24 dollars and a sulham, and a haik and two jillabs and a leather bag, and this by violence and outrage which cannot be permitted; consequently I desire you will write the Governor of Sallee, Cid Mohamed Abdallah-bin-el-Hadj Mohamed Bensaid, and urge him, on receipt thereof, to use every effort to discover the perpetrators of this act, and compel them to restore what they stole belonging to the aforesaid merchant and his employés without delay. And this is what I have to communicate.

Finished 11th May, 1893, corresponding to 24th Showal, 1310.

Inclosure 3 in No. 49.

The Governor of Dar-al-Baida to the Governor of Sallee.

(After compliments.) 24 *Showal*, 1310.

THE English Consul in Dar-al-Baida has written us the letter you will find on the other side, and on it you will report.

Peace.

Inclosure 4 in No. 49.

The Governor of Sallee to the Governor of Dar-al-Baida.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.) *Close of Showal*, 1310.

Praise be to the one God!

YOUR letter written on the back of the letter addressed to you by the English Consul at Dar-al-Baida has reached me on the subject of what the Zimmoor pillaged from Abdallah-bin-el-Meludi-el-Ziadi-el-Bedowi and Hassan-bin Thamy-el-Ziadi, employés of the English merchant Ramon Alvarez, in the district of Amar, according to his (the Consul's) letter. Learn that when this happened to them, they came to me, and I took down their statement, and what had been stolen from them, and I wrote to the Zimmoor to restore what they had pillaged. But they refused to do this, and stated that they had only twenty-seven head of cattle. We have recovered for the two men one ox, and for the other Showi two oxen. And now we will renew our efforts by God's help, and follow up the matter.

Peace.

(Signed) MOHAMED ABDALLAH BENSAID.

Inclosure 5 in No. 49.

Declaration of Abdallah-bin-Meludi and Hassan-bin-Thamy, Cattle Drovers, made to the Governor of Sallee, Cid Abdallah Bensaid, and noted by him on the 20th Showal, 1310 (*May* 8, 1893).

(Translation.)

Praise to the only God!

APPEARED Abdallah-bin-Meludi-Bedowi, on the 20th Showal, 1310, and declared that they took from him twenty head of cattle, and that Zeradani returned him four head, and that they took from him a pack horse and 20 dollars, and two jillabs and a sulham, and a faragia, and a cloth bidaa and a turban, and he declared that the amount paid for the cattle was 280 [dollars], and that they belonged to the merchant Lamb, and that the value of the horse was 20 dollars.

Likewise appeared Hassan-bin-Thamy-Bedowi, one of the assaulted, and declared that they took from him nine oxen and a haik, and a jillab and a leather bag containing 3 dollars, and a turban and a pair of slippers, and he declared that the cattle belonged to the merchant Ramon, the Englishman in Dar-al-Baida.

Peace.

Inclosure 6 in No. 49.

Mr. White to Cid Emfadl Gharneet.

(Translation.)
(Compliments.)

Tangier, August 17, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that serious complaint has been made of the frequency with which robberies have recently occurred on the road between Sallee and Mehedia, considerable numbers of cattle having now been stolen whilst on their way to Tangier, and it is feared that unless decided steps are at once taken the boldness of the robbers will increase, and neither cattle nor goods will be able to pass along that road, which would cause grave prejudice to trade. I request your Excellency to bring this matter to the notice of the Sultan, and I have no doubt that His Shereefian Majesty, once apprised of the evil, will give the necessary orders to insure the safety of goods and cattle in that district.

Peace.

No. 50.

Mr. White to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 131.)

Tangier, August 19, 1893.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit, for your Lordship's information, the translation of a letter addressed by Sir West Ridgeway to the Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of a Memorandum inclosed therein detailing certain improvements in the ports of the western coast which Sir West Ridgeway recommended to the Sultan's favourable consideration.

The reply of the Moorish Minister to this communication has only now reached this Legation, and I have the honour herewith to inclose a translation of it, with a Memorandum showing the orders which have now been issued by the Sultan in accordance with some of Sir West Ridgeway's suggestions, and the satisfactory intentions which His Majesty professes for the future adoption of the other suggestions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 50.

Sir West Ridgeway to Cid Emfadl Gharneet.

(Translation.)
(Compliments.)

Tangier, July 3, 1893.

HAVING returned from my visit to the ports, I deem it desirable to place your Excellency in possession of the result of my observations on their condition, and to

submit a short Memorandum containing suggestions for their improvement. In this Memorandum I have been careful to refrain from recommending that any costly or extensive works be undertaken, but have confined myself to pointing out various improvements that could be carried out at no great expense, but which would nevertheless prove of immense benefit to commerce and navigation on this coast, and also indirectly to the Sultan's revenue.

Although favoured with exceptionally fine weather, both on my voyage to Mogador and on my return, I could not but be much struck with the great loss of time that was suffered at nearly every port. This loss of time arose partly from the exposed nature of the ports, which little or nothing had been done to counteract, and partly from the lack of those facilities which one generally expects to meet with in all ports. The Memorandum I inclose herewith suggests remedies on both these points. I request your Excellency to have the goodness to submit it for the favourable consideration of His Shereefian Majesty, who, I am aware, is ever ready to promote the advancement of this country and its commercial prosperity.

Peace.

Inclosure 2 in No. 50.

Memorandum of Requirements at Ports.

Laraiche.—1. Four new lighters should be built.

2. The steam-launch at present lying useless at Rabat should be brought to Laraiche, where it would be of great service, and could be used without fear of damage.

3. Orders should be given that more sailors be provided.

Rabat.—1. A channel should be cleared out so as to allow lighters to approach the quay at low water.

2. The steam-launch now lying useless here should be sent to Laraiche, and a suitable shallow-draught launch with twin screw be substituted.

3. At least six new lighters should be made, as there are only four at present.

Dar-al-Baida.—1. Competent persons should be intrusted with the blasting of the rocks near the beach, which would be enlarged thereby, and a quay should be constructed on the rock foundation, the blasting being carried up to the line of the quay, so that there would be deep water alongside of the quay, and lighters could work there at any state of the tide. This could be carried out at small expense.

2. A small harbour should be made for mooring the steam-launch now lying idle for want of a safe place of anchor. This might be done by removing the sand at the spot where she now lies, and building a small harbour for her.

3. Custom-house officers should be ordered to work all through the day, as at Tangier and other ports.

4. There should be a greater number of Custom-house porters.

5. When the port is improved eight new lighters should be added.

Mazagan.—1. The harbour inside the quay should be deepened by blasting, so that the lighters could be worked at low tide. This could be done at small expense by a competent person.

2. The stones that fell from the end of the quay should be removed from their present position at the entrance of the harbour.

3. The steam-launch that was provided for this port, which was damaged owing to the carelessness of the official in charge, should be repaired.

4. The Custom-house officers should receive orders to work the same hours as at Tangier.

Saffi.—A small jetty about 50 metres long should be constructed at the northern end of the beach, where there is little surf. This would serve as a breakwater as well as a landing-place, and vessels could discharge and take in cargo in all weathers.

Mogador.—The port should be cleared of sand, with which it is at present choked, and the channel leading to the port should also be cleared out.

2. When this has been done more lighters should be provided.

Inclosure 3 in No. 50.

Cid Emfadl Gharneet to Sir West Ridgeway.

(Translation.) *Tangier, July* 28, 1893.
(After compliments.)

I HAVE received your letter saying that you visited the ports of this august Empire, and saw the state of things there, and it appeared to you that they required certain things in the nature of improvements. You stated these things in the Memorandum which you sent, and limited yourself to those things, as they do not entail great expenditure or much labour, and they would be of great advantage to trade and to the shipping visiting these ports. And you asked that your letter and the aforesaid Memorandum be brought to the knowledge of our lord (to whom may God give the victory).

I have done this, and the Sultan has approved of your notice in regard to these things, and has ordered me thank you for it, and has answered on the aforesaid matters in the manner shown in the accompanying Memorandum.

May you remain in good health.

Inclosure 4 in No. 50.

Memorandum.

ORDERS issued by the Sultan to the authorities of the following ports:—

Laraiche.—The number of lighters to be increased by six.

The number of sailors to be adequately increased.

Rabat.—Six additional lighters to be provided.

Dar-al-Baida.—Greater diligence to be exercised in the service of the port, which is to be assimilated to that of Tangier.

An additional number of porters to be engaged for the Custom-house.

Six additional lighters to be provided.

Mazagan.—The entrance of the harbour to be cleared of the stones fallen from the quay.

Steam-launch to be repaired at Gibraltar.

The port service to be more diligently attended to, and assimilated to that of Tangier.

Mogador.—Six additional lighters to be provided.

As regards the unsuitability of the steam-tug at present at Rabat for the service of that port, and the desirability of replacing it by another of smaller draught, the Sultan will communicate on the subject with the German Minister, through whom the launch was purchased, and who had already undertaken to procure another for the port of Laraiche.

As regards the further suggestions contained in Sir West Ridgeway's Memorandum, the Sultan admits the necessity of the improvements in question, and expresses his intention of proceeding to their execution by degrees.

No. 51.

Mr. White to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 132. Confidential.) *Tangier, August* 19, 1893.
My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that the Italian Minister, M. Cantagalli, informed me this afternoon that the Spanish Minister had on several occasions discussed with him the political situation in Morocco, and had explained to him very frankly his views on the subject.

The Marquis de Potestad, he said, had told him that, on his appointment to Tangier, he had heard and read a great deal about the ambitious designs of Great Britain in Morocco, of which his predecessor, M. Figuera, had been very suspicious; but that since his arrival here he had been able to form an independent opinion, and was convinced that there were no grounds for the fears entertained of British policy, and that the campaign carried on last year against British action in this country was

most injudicious and regrettable, for whilst setting the Sultan and his Ministers against Great Britain, it had, as a natural consequence, thrown them into the arms of France, whose position in this country had been enormously strengthened thereby.

The Marquis de Potestad had transmitted to his Government a report in the above sense, in which he had explained that it was France, and France alone, that constituted a real danger in this country, and he had urged that the true policy of Spain was to act loyally and frankly in concert with Great Britain and Italy, and thus guard against French encroachments. He had also combatted the opinion that had recently been gaining ground in Spain, that the policy advocated and pursued by the former Spanish Minister, M. Diosdado, was a wise one, and that since its abandonment Spain had lost much of her influence in Morocco: this, he had argued, was a mistake; Spain's true policy was to co-operate with other nations for the introduction of reforms—it was time to abandon the dog-in-the-manger policy of endeavouring to keep Morocco closed to all advancement and to European enterprise.

The Spanish Minister had further informed him that his Government was at the present moment entirely occupied with the financial question; but that M. Moret had told him that when that was settled, he intended to devote his attention to Morocco.

In conveying to me the preceding information, the Italian Minister was careful to explain that he had in great measure assisted the Marquis de Potestad to arrive at these conclusions, as they had discussed the subject together at great length, and he had assured him that the injudicious articles that had appeared in certain London papers last year did not reflect the views of Her Majesty's Government, and that the line of conduct alleged to have been pursued by Sir C. Euan-Smith during his recent mission was not in accordance with the instructions he had received.

M. Cantagalli added, in conclusion, that he had reported fully to the Italian Government the language held to him by the Spanish Minister, and that they were waiting with much interest to learn the conclusions the Spanish Government would come to after consideration of M. de Potestad's report.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

No. 52.

Mr. White to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 133.) *Tangier, August* 20, 1893.
My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 44 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to report that the Spanish Minister returned on the 18th instant in the gun-boat "Isla de Luzon" from his trip to the Spanish "Presidios."

In his Circular to the foreign Representatives announcing his departure the Marquis de Potestad had stated that he was about to visit "the Spanish possessions on the northern coast of Morocco;" his trip was, however, confined to visits to Ceuta and Melilla, and was of shorter duration than had been anticipated.

The Marquis de Potestad has informed me that the object of this tour was merely to see the places in question, and to make the personal acquaintance of the officers in command there, and he expressed himself as being well pleased with his trip. He found the relations between Spanish and Moorish officials at both places very satisfactory, and was informed by the Commandant at Melilla that the various incidents which had lately occupied the Spanish press had been much exaggerated.

The Spanish Minister also mentioned that there had been some talk of the Sultan's establishing a custom-house on the Moorish lines at Ceuta, but that up to the present time no proposition to that effect had been made by either Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

No. 53.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. White.

(No. 97.) *Foreign Office, August* 26, 1893.
Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 130 of the 17th instant, inclosing copy of Mr. Vice-Consul Frost's Report on Mr. Alvarez' claim arising out of a robbery of cattle near Sallee.

I approve the course which you propose to pursue in this matter, as well as the note which you have addressed to the Moorish Government calling attention to the insecurity of the roads in the district in question.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No 54.

Mr. White to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received August* 29.)

(No. 135. Confidential.)

Tangier, August 22, 1893.

My Lord,

WITH reference to Sir West Ridgeway's despatch No. 59 of the 4th April, and previous correspondence regarding Kaïd Ben Saïd's stores at Dar-al-Baida, which the Sultan granted to the Italian Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of further correspondence on the same subject, and I will proceed to recapitulate what has since passed.

On the 2nd instant M. Gentile called upon me and showed me two Shereefian letters he had obtained from the Sultan on his recent visit to Fez, which were addressed respectively to the Governor and Customs Administrators of Dar-al-Baida, informing them that His Shereefian Majesty had ceded the two stores in question, with all attached or pertaining thereto, to the Italian Government, and had authorized them to take possession and build thereon.

M. Gentile stated that he had been instructed by the Italian Minister to exhibit to me these two documents, and to request me to order the British subjects in whose hands were the keys of these stores to deliver them to the Italian Consular Agent at Dar-al-Baida.

I replied that I should be much obliged if M. Cantagalli would address me a letter on the subject, in order that I might the more easily communicate the request to the Acting British Consul.

On the following day I accordingly received the letter which forms the first of the inclosures accompanying this despatch; in it M. Cantagalli asks me to take the steps I may think necessary to cause the keys to be delivered to the Italian Consular Agent.

Messrs. Lamb Brothers having, as they state, hired these stores from Kaïd Ben Saïd at public auction on the strength of his declaration that they were not included in the grant to the Italian Government, would, I considered, probably object to deliver the keys to any one except at the request of the person from whom they received them, as were they to do so they would risk an action being brought against them, or might lose any right of claim they might have for the return of the sum paid as advanced rent.

I accordingly in my reply to M. Cantagalli observed that, in my opinion, the more regular course would be for Ben Saïd to recover the keys from his tenants and himself deliver them to the Italian Consular Agent. It appeared to me that, by adopting this course, we should avoid the difficulty that might arise should Messrs. Lamb Brothers refuse to deliver the keys to the Italian Consular Agent.

I transmitted copies of those letters to the Acting British Consul at Dar-al-Baida for his guidance.

I have received no official acknowledgment of my despatch from the Acting Consul, but in a private letter Mr. Fernau informs me that "the keys are held until the amount of 500 dollars paid for rent is returned, when they will be handed to the person from whom they were received."

On the 4th August I received a letter from the Italian Minister to the effect that Messrs. Lamb could, if they preferred, deliver the keys to the heirs of Kaïd Ben Saïd (the Kaïd having died), and that in that case he would obtain them from the heirs.

I met M. Cantagalli on the following day, and, in the course of conversation, he hinted vaguely that he would use force if necessary to obtain possession of the stores from Kaïd Ben Saïd's heirs, but I understood him to mean after they should have recovered the keys from Messrs. Lamb Brothers, and therefore I did not consider it necessary to pursue the matter further.

I heard no more on the subject until the 19th instant, when I happened to be calling on M. Cantagalli, and he mentioned, as though incidentally, that he had been unable to obtain orders from Cid Hadj Mohammed Torres to the son of Kaïd Ben Saïd, who is now at Tangier, to recover the keys from Messrs. Lamb, and that he had, therefore, on the

previous day sent explicit instructions to his Consular Agent at Dar-al-Baida to give formal notice to the Governor of that town that, if within six days the keys were not given to him, he would proceed to break open the doors and take possession of the stores by force.

I was much surprised at this communication, and frankly told M. Cantagalli that I regretted that he should have taken such a step whilst the keys were still in the possession of a British subject, as he must be well aware that such action would be interpreted by all as directed against us, and could not fail to produce a very bad effect, for it was the policy of our respective Governments to act loyally in accord with each other, and it was important that all should know of this accord, whereas action such as that he had ordered his Consular Agent to take would certainly give rise to the belief that friction existed between us.

M. Cantagalli replied that he himself very much regretted the necessity for such action, but that it was directed against the Moorish authorities, and not against us, and though he admitted that the effect produced would be as stated by me, he could not be held responsible for that.

I observed that, whatever his intentions might be, the seizure by force of stores in the nominal possession of a British subject (for in this country the person who holds the key is considered to be in possession, whether he occupies or not) would in fact be directed against that British subject, and I added that throughout this question the British Legation had acted with perfect loyalty and good faith, and that being actuated still by the same spirit, I was willing, in case it was out of regard for us that Cid Hadj Mohammed Torres had declined to give the orders required, to call upon his Excellency and urge that he should issue the necessary orders.

The Italian Minister having accepted my offer, I at once called upon the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, and informed him that the two Legations were in accord in this matter, and that I therefore hoped his Excellency would cause Ben Saïd to give orders without delay to his agent at Dar-al-Baida to return to Messrs. Lamb Brothers the 500 dollars paid in advance for rent and recover the keys. His Excellency at first stated that the contract for lease to Messrs. Lamb Brothers was valid, as at the time it was made the stores belonged to Ben Saïd, and it was only the last Shereefian letters just obtained that ceded them to the Italian Government, the original grant being only the right to build on the top of the stores. I replied that I believed his Excellency to be mistaken on that point, and I referred to the letter of Cid Emfadl Gharneet, translation of which was communicated to your Lordship in Sir West Ridgeway's despatch No. 5 of the 3rd April last, and I added that in any case there can be no doubt as to the grant now, and that I hoped his Excellency would give the orders asked for. Cid Hadj Mohammed Torres then consented, and promised to obtain a letter in that sense from Ben Saïd to his agent at Dar-al-Baida to be forwarded through the Italian Legation.

I communicated this arrangement to M. Cantagalli who thanked me for the steps I had taken, and said he would send off the letter by express courier as soon as received. I mentioned to him what Hadj Mohammed Torres had said as to the recent date of the grant of the stores themselves, and he declared to me most positively that the two stores had been included in the original grant four years ago.

This morning I received a private note from M. Cantagalli informing me that the promised letter from Ben Saïd had not yet been received, and that the instructions to his Consular Agent had consequently not been countermanded.

I informed M. Cantagalli, in reply, that I had again mentioned the matter to Cid Hadj Mohammed Torres, who had said he would send the letter as soon as possible. I pointed out once more the bad effect that would be produced should the Italian Consular Agent carry out his instructions, and I expressed the hope that, under the circumstances, he would be directed to suspend action. I added, in conclusion, that I considered we were entitled to have expected longer notice of the instructions he had given.

The Italian Minister has now informed me in a further private letter that, in proof of "his desire for a conciliation," he has dispatched a special courier with orders to his Consular Agent to suspend action for a further period of twenty days. M. Cantagalli appears to anticipate that Ben Saïd, after recovering the keys from Messrs. Lamb Brothers, will refuse to give them up, and states that he could not brook such conduct on the part of a Moorish subject, and that he has therefore assigned a term of twenty days, "after which he will act, and reject from this day any blame which might accrue to anybody from that cause."

In thanking M. Cantagalli for the orders he had given, I observed that once the keys of the stores had been given up by the British subject the matter would no longer concern us, and any action he might think proper to take would in no way affect us.

I trust that the matter may be satisfactorily settled before the expiration of the twenty days by Ben Saïd repaying the 500 dollars he has received as advanced rent, and recovering the keys from Messrs. Lamb Brothers; but unfortunately in dealing with Moors one can never be certain that promises will be fulfilled, and therefore, though I hope not probable, it is possible that some hitch may arise either by Ben Saïd declining to move in the matter at all, or by his refusing to refund the 500 dollars.

Messrs. Lamb Brothers are evidently not disposed, unless compelled, to give up the keys until they recover their 500 dollars, and I am not aware that we can compel them to do so, except under an order of the Consular Court, to which neither the Italian Government nor Ben Saïd may care to apply.

Should the Italian Consular Agent attempt to carry out the threat of taking forcible possession, the possibility must be considered of resistance being offered and a conflict ensuing, especially as I believe the English colony at Dar-al-Baida still feel annoyed at the high-handed proceedings of M. Gentile in connection with these same stores, and would perhaps not be inclined to allow the scene to be reached without opposition on their part.

It is in view of the possibility of regrettable consequences that I have thought it necessary to trouble your Lordship at such length, for I am anxious that your Lordship may be acquainted with the question in its present phase in order that your Lordship may be in a position to issue such instructions as may be deemed necessary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

P.S.—I have just learnt from M. Cantagalli that he has now received the letter for Ben Saïd's Agent at Dar-al-Baida.

H. E. W.

Inclosure 1 in No. 54.

M. Cantagalli to Mr. White.

Tanger, le 3 *Août*, 1893.

M. le Chargé d'Affaires,

LE Commissaire Impérial des Affaires Étrangères, auquel je me suis adressé pour qu'il me fît remettre les clefs d'un immeuble que Sa Majesté le Sultan a cédé en toute propriété au Gouvernement du Roi, m'a repondu—après avoir interrogé le fils de l'ancien propriétaire, Ben Saïd, qui se trouve à Tanger—que ces clefs sont entre les mains de sujets Anglais auxquels ce même Ben Saïd avait dernièrement loué la propriété susdite, bien qu'il n'y eût plus de droit. L'intervention de Sir West Ridgeway a fait annuler cette transaction, et, par conséquent, M. Lamb, auquel d'après les déclarations de M. Fernau, la propriété avait été louée en dernier lieu, devrait restituer les clefs.

M. le Chevalier Gentile vous a, par mon instruction, entretenu de cette affaire. Il vous a donné vision d'un Firman Chérifien, destiné à rester entre nos mains, et par lequel l'Empereur, résumant des ordres antécédents, confirme la concession et reconnaît au Gouvernement Italien la pleine et absolue propriété de l'immeuble en question.

Je viens donc vous prier, M. le Chargé d'Affaires, de vouloir bien prendre les mesures que vous jugerez nécessaires pour que les clefs soient remises à l'Agence Consulaire du Roi à Casablanca. Et en vous remerciant d'avance, je saisis, &c.

(Signé) R. CANTAGALLI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 54.

Mr. White to M. Cantagalli.

Tanger, le 3 *Août*, 1893.

M. le Ministre,

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception de la lettre de ce jour, dans laquelle votre Excellence m'informe que le Commissaire Impérial des Affaires Étrangères, auquel vous vous êtes adressé pour qu'il vous fît remettre des clefs d'un immeuble à Casablanca, que Sa Majesté le Sultan a cédé en toute propriété au Gouvernement du Roi, a répondu que ces clefs sont entre les mains de sujets Anglais auxquels le fils de l'ancien propriétaire, Ben Saïd, avait dernièrement loué la propriété susdite bien qu'il n'y eût plus de droit, et votre Excellence me prie de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour que les clefs soient remises à l'Agence Consulaire du Roi à Casablanca.

Je n'ai pas manqué d'envoyer au Consul Britannique *ad interim* copie de la lettre de votre Excellence, mais il me semble que si les clefs de la susdite propriété ont été livrées à

M. Lamb par Ben Saïd en la lui louant, il serait plus en règle que M. Lamb les rendent à celui-ci sur sa propre demande, afin de sauvegarder sa responsabilité vis-à-vis de Ben Saïd, aussi bien que les droits qu'il pourrait avoir contre ce même Ben Saïd pour lui avoir loué des magasins qui ne lui appartenaient pas.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 54

Mr. White to Acting Consul Fernau.

Tangier, August 3, 1893.

Sir,

WITH reference to past correspondence on the subject of the stores of Ben Saïd at Dar-al-Baida, I transmit to you herewith copy of a letter I have received from the Italian Minister, stating that he has been informed that the keys of the stores in question are in the possession of a British subject, to whom the said Ben Saïd had let them, although he had no right to do so, and requesting that the keys be delivered to the Italian Consular Agent.

The Italian Minister has shown me Shereefian letters in which it is clearly stated that the two stores of Ben Saïd, and all attached to them, have been given to the Italian Government.

I further inclose herewith copy of the letter I have addressed to the Italian Minister in reply to his above-mentioned letter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 54.

Acting Consul Fernau to Mr. White.

Dar-el-Baida, August 7, 1893.

Dear White,

WITH reference to Kaïd Ben Saïd's stores, the 500 dollars paid in advance for rent have not yet been returned, and the keys are naturally held until this amount is paid, when they will be handed to the person from whom they were received.

As is usually the case with Moors, when once they have received money, it is very difficult to get it back. Young Ben Saïd is at present Administrator of Customs at Tangier; his agent, Hadj Tiby Sebehhi, of Sallee, was written to on the subject some time ago, but no answer has been received. I am forwarding the letter from Hadj Mohammed Torres to the Kaïd of Emzamza, through the Kaïd of Dar-al-Baida; the answer will probably be delayed, because Hadj-el-Maaty is away with the Sultan.

Yours, &c.
(Signed) G. H. FERNAU.

Inclosure 5 in No. 54.

M. Cantagalli to Mr. White.

Tangier, August 22, 1893.

My dear Mr. White,

I HAVE not received any information as yet that Si Torres has fulfilled his promise to get a letter from Ben Saïd to agent. I have therefore been unable to give counter-orders to my Consular Agent regarding the breaking in of the doors of the two warehouses, an intention I announced to you from the first, should there be any unnecessary delay, and unjustifiable also.

I tell you this that I may be shielded completely from any charge of not having taken every possible step in order to get at a possible settlement, and also to avoid unpleasant comments. I am sure you will recognize I have done all that was in my power.

Believe me, &ç.
(Signed) R. CANTAGALLI.

Inclosure 6 in No. 54.

Mr. White to M. Cantagalli.

Tangier, August 22, 1893.

My dear M. Cantagalli,

I HAVE just received your note, and hasten to tell you that I saw Hadj Mohammed Torres again yesterday, and he told me he had spoken to Ben Saïd and would hand the letter to us as soon as possible.

I have now sent to him again asking for the letter, and I trust that, under the circumstances, even if there is delay on the part of Cid Torres, you will instruct your Vice-Consul at Dar-al-Baida to suspend further action for the present. As I pointed out to you the other day, action such as you have ordered your Vice-Consul to adopt can only be interpreted by Moors and Europeans as directed against us, and would produce an effect which I am convinced that you yourself would deplore, and you must allow me to add that, after the loyalty with which this Legation has acted in the matter, I think we are entitled to expect a longer notice of the action you had instructed your Vice-Consul to take.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure 7 in No. 54.

M. Cantagalli to Mr. White.

Tangier, August 22, 1893.

My dear Mr. White,

IN half-an-hour, and to give you the fullest proof of my desire for a conciliation, a special "rakas" shall proceed to Dar-al-Baida with orders to my Consular Agent to suspend for twenty more days after the reception of my letter the instruction given on Friday last to enter the premises belonging to the Italian Government with or without the keys. I trust that it may reach him in time.

Allow me to tell you that if your Legation has given evidence of its desire for an amicable settlement, every action of mine down to the end has been marked with a still greater desire of the same. I shall even waive the consideration that, in order to avoid unpleasantness (which, however, I cannot see how it could ever be visited on me or you), and as I consider you also and your Legation as entirely out of the question, which now only concerns the Moorish Government, I lay myself open to a practical impugnation of our rights. What if, after the keys have been given back to Ben Saïd's agent, he should refuse to give them up? Must I, for the sake of our mutual good accord, brook such a conduct on the part of a Moorish subject? Certainly not. I have therefore assigned twenty days, a time that is longer than necessary. After that I shall act, and reject from this day any blame which might accrue to anybody from that cause.

I have kept a copy of the present letter.

Yours, &c.
(Signed) R. CANTAGALLI.

Inclosure 8 in No. 54.

Mr. White to M. Cantagalli.

Tangier, August 22, 1893.

My dear M. Cantagalli,

I HAVE to thank you for your letter just received, and for the orders you have sent to your Vice-Consul at Dar-al-Baida.

Of course, the moment the keys of the stores in question have been delivered by the British subject to Ben Saïd, the matter will no longer concern us, and any action you may think proper to take could not in any way affect us.

Hadj Mohammed Torres informs me, in reply to the message I sent him, that the delay in sending the letter has been caused by the illness of Ben Saïd.

Believe me, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

No. 55.

Mr. White to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 134.)

My Lord,

Tangier, August 21, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter I have received from Mr. Lapeen, a merchant residing at Dar-al-Baida, informing me that his agent, who holds a Legation certificate, has been imprisoned by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Province of Mediuni near that town, and that, notwithstanding the action taken by the Acting Consul, the man continues in prison.

I beg further to inclose translation of a letter I have addressed Cid Emfadl Gharneet, requesting that orders be given for the release of this man, and also reminding his Excellency that the agents imprisoned by Kaïd Benreshid, of the neighbouring Province of Oolad Hariz, have not yet been released, notwithstanding the representations made by Sir West Ridgeway.

In conclusion, I have hinted that Mr. Satow would be furnished by your Lordship with instructions as to the action he should take should these men be still in prison on his arrival.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 55.

Mr. Lapeen to Mr. White.

Casablanca, August 14, 1893.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to bring under your notice that it is about one month that the Khalifa of Kaïd Hadj Hamet-bel-Arbi Mediuni imprisoned my agent, Mohamed Benselum Ziani, and it is only after exhausting all the means available in procuring his release that I recur to you with the object of procuring what could not be obtained here.

When this man was imprisoned I reported the case to Mr. Fernau, as it corresponded me to do, but all his exertions were of no avail. Not satisfied with the unjust imprisonment of my agent, he has imprisoned the wife the other day, when she went to take him provisions.

It is not long ago that a son of Benselum was also imprisoned under a false accusation of robbery, and he was only released after paying 100 dollars, having taken no notice whatever of official proceedings for it.

The crop gathered by this agent, besides cattle in which I am interested, has been abandoned, so I have no other course to take than to refer the matter to you, and hope that with your intervention the man will be released, and my property put in safety.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN LAPEEN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 55.

Mr. White to Cid Emfadl Gharneet.

(Translation.)

(Compliments.)

Tangier, August 21, 1893.

I REGRET to have to inform your Excellency that it has been reported to me that the Khalifa of Kaïd Hadj Hamed-bel-Arbi Mediuni has arrested and imprisoned Mohamed Benselum Ziani, who holds a certificate of this Legation as agent of the British merchant Mr. John Lapeen, of Dar-al-Baida.

The arrest of the certified agent of a British subject is, as your Excellency is well aware, a direct breach of the terms of Article IX of the Madrid Convention, and as lists of the agents of British subjects have been furnished to the Kaïds, as well as to Cid Hadj Mohammed Torres, and as the agents themselves hold certificates under the hand and seal of Her Majesty's Minister, on the back of which is quoted the whole of the said Article IX, it is impossible for the Khalifa in question to plead ignorance either of the terms of the Treaty or of the fact that Mohamed Benselum Ziani was the agent of a British subject.

It is now several months since Her Majesty's Minister brought to your Excellency's notice the imprisonment by Kaïd Benreshid of the agents of other British merchants of Dar-al-Baida, but although Sir West Ridgeway subsequently addressed your Excellency further communications on the subject, no letter has been received from your Excellency on the subject, and the men are still in prison.

Doubtless the Khalifa of Kaïd Mediuni, seeing that the neighbouring Kaïd of Oolad Hariz has apparently been permitted by the Sultan to retain as prisoners agents of British merchants, has concluded that he is at liberty to act in the same manner, in defiance of Treaty stipulations. I am convinced, however, that His Shereefian Majesty, when informed of the evil that has resulted from the delay in giving the necessary orders regarding the men imprisoned by Kaïd Benreshid, will direct that no further time be lost, and that stringent orders be at once issued to the Khalifas of Oolad Hariz and Mediuni to immediately release the agents of the British merchants, and to restore to them any property that may have been lost through the arrest of these agents, and further, that His Majesty will take such steps as will prevent the recurrence of similar breaches of Treaty.

In the meantime, it will be my duty to report this matter to Her Majesty's Government, in order that they may give instructions to the new Minister, Mr. Satow, as to the steps he should take should he, on his approaching arrival, unfortunately find that these men have not been released.

Peace.

No. 56.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. White.

(No. 98.)

Foreign Office, August 31, 1893.

Sir,

I APPROVE your action in the matter of Kaïd Ben Saïd's stores at Dar-al-Baida, as reported in your despatch No. 135, Confidential, of the 22nd instant.

I understand from the postscript to your despatch that the matter is now practically settled.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 57.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, September 2, 1893.

ASSAULT on Irwin at Dar-al-Baida: Mr. White's despatch No. 129 of the 16th ultimo.

Before sending proposed note to Cid Emfadl Gharneet, it would be advisable to institute local investigation into facts of the case.

No. 58.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, September 4, 1893.

INSIST on immediate release of imprisoned agents of British subjects.

Mr. White's action, as reported in his despatch No. 134 of the 21st ultimo, is approved.

No. 59.

Mr. White to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received September 5.)

(No. 137.)

My Lord,

Tangier, August 24, 1893.

WITH reference to Sir West Ridgeway's despatch No. 32 of the 10th February last, and to previous correspondence regarding the proposed sanitary improvements at Tangier, I have the honour to report that at a meeting of the foreign Representatives held on the 25th February a Sub-Commission consisting of the Ministers of France, Italy, and Portugal was appointed "to study (1) the sum that would be required annually to insure the proper maintenance ('bonne tenue') of the town of Tangier; and (2) the manner of raising that sum."

The French Minister ceded his place on the Committee to his First Secretary, M. Souhart, and I believe the Portuguese Minister did not take a very active part in the deliberations; the Report which has just been presented, and a copy of which I beg to inclose herewith, is thus really the work of Messrs. Cantagalli and Souhart.

A meeting of the foreign Representatives was held this morning at the Portuguese Legation to consider this Report, which, however, was only received from the printers and distributed late last night.

I do not propose in this despatch to enter into any criticism or discussion on the Report, as I have not yet had time to fully consider it, and as Mr. Satow will be here so shortly, he will then be able to furnish your Lordship with his views thereon; but I think it my duty to recount to your Lordship what took place at the meeting above referred to, as I unfortunately found myself in disagreement with nearly all the foreign Representatives.

The proceedings commenced with the reading of the Report, and then M. Cantagalli, having been given the parole, made a speech in which he expressed the opinion that, whilst it was desirable to allow more time for the consideration and discussion of the general question, it was necessary to decide there and then regarding the propositions contained on pp. 7 and 8 of the Report, as it was of utmost importance that the present "Commission d'Hygiène" should continue in existence and in the exercise of its functions.

He therefore proposed that the following taxes be at once levied, and that the foreign Representatives should engage to make the subjects of their respective nations pay them:—

1. 1 peseta ($\frac{1}{5}$ dollar) on each ox exported from Tangier.
2. 1 real vellon ($\frac{1}{4}$ peseta) ($\frac{1}{20}$ dollar) on each box of eggs (from 1,000 to 1,200) exported from Tangier.
3. 1 real vellon on each basket of chickens (four to five dozen) exported from Tangier.

The Representatives were invited in alphabetical order to vote on this proposition.

The German Chargé d'Affaires, Austrian Minister, Belgian Chargé d'Affaires, Spanish Minister, American Consul-General, and French Chargé d'Affaires, all voted in succession in favour of the Italian Minister's proposition, but on being asked for my vote I did not feel myself authorized to assent to these taxes being levied on British subjects without special instructions from your Lordship. In giving my vote in the negative I explained that these taxes, by whatever name they might be called, were in fact export duties, and that I did not consider myself competent without special authority to increase to however small an extent export duties which Her Majesty's Government had fixed by Treaty. I also observed incidentally that these taxes would fall almost entirely on British and Spanish subjects, as all the cattle, fowls, and eggs exported from Tangier, with the exception of a few for Portugal, are shipped to Gibraltar and Spain. The figures for last year were as follows:—

	To Gibraltar.	To Spain.	To Portugal.	Total.
Oxen (head)	9,519	1,130	41	10,690
Fowls (baskets)	1,300	282	..	1,582
Eggs (boxes)	2,450	13,561	..	16,011

The proposed taxes would thus be distributed as follows:—

	Pesetas.
Gibraltar	10,456
Spain	1,582
Portugal	31
Other countries	Nil.
Total	15,088

On hearing my objections the Spanish Minister asked to be allowed to withdraw the vote he had given in favour of the proposed taxes, as he said that he was not fully conversant with the matter, and desired time to reflect and to consult his Government.

The Italian Minister then proposed that, in case the British and Spanish Governments consent to the imposition of these taxes, the "Commission d'Hygiène" should be strengthened as a temporary measure, as proposed on p. 8 of the Report, *i.e.*, by the addition of nine official members, of which one should be named by each foreign Representative. This proposition was unanimously agreed to.

The French Chargé d'Affaires read to the meeting § 31 of the "Règlements Organiques de la Ville d'Alexandrie, 1892," showing that all foreign Governments had recognized the right of the Egyptian Government to impose municipal taxes, such as taxes on cafés and taverns without their consent being required; he argued therefrom that, Capitulations existing in Egypt as in Morocco, the two countries are in the same position in such matters, and rights accorded to one must be granted to the other, and that therefore the consent of our respective Governments was not necessary for the imposition of the proposed taxes on taverns and cafés (see p. 13 of Report).

Not being myself fully acquainted with the Egyptian Treaties I did not feel myself in a position to decide offhand that all such rights enjoyed by Egypt must necessarily be accorded to Morocco, and therefore, whilst expressing my full approval personally of the principle of taxing taverns, I stated that I preferred to reserve my vote. The Spanish Minister also reserved his vote, but all the other Representatives were of opinion that the consent of our respective Governments was not necessary for the imposition of such taxes.

It was with great reluctance that I felt myself compelled at this meeting to assume a position of apparent obstruction to a measure, the object of which I am as anxious as any one to see successfully accomplished, and I trust your Lordship will not consider that I have needlessly caused delay.

On being invited to the meeting I supposed its object was merely to take cognizance of the Report, and to hold a preliminary discussion of its main features. It appears to me that there was unnecessary haste on the part of the Committee in pressing for an immediate decision on points involving an important question of principle, such as the imposition of taxes. The Committee had occupied six months in preparing their Report, there could therefore have been no such great urgency as was represented, and a longer period than one night should have been allowed for its study before the meeting was summoned.

Moreover, in view of the fact that Her Majesty's Minister was already on his way to Tangier, I was anxious not to enter into any engagements that might in any way curtail his liberty of action in the matter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERBERT E. WHITE.

No. 60.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 100.) *Foreign Office, September* 5, 1893.

Sir,

WITH reference to Mr. White's despatch No. 131 of the 19th ultimo, I have to express my approval of Sir W. Ridgeway's recommendations for the improvement of the ports on the west coast Morocco, and my satisfaction at the reply which the Moorish Government have returned to his communication on this subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 60*.

Mr. E. H. Marquis to Mr. Forwood, M.P.—(*Communicated to Foreign Office, September* 7.)

(Private.)

Dear Sir, *September* , 1893.

DURING the number of times I have been in Morocco during the last twelve years I have heard a great deal of the history of the Moor, Cid Bubekir. Some years ago he was a porter in the store of Geo. Hunot at Saffi, the present Vice-Consul at that port. He after went to Morocco city, when he attracted the attention of Sir John Hay, who employed him as a courier, and Bubekir evidently made himself useful to Sir John, for the British Minister some time after made him British Agent in Morocco city. I have been told over and over again that once Bubekir got his English protection he commenced trading in it to such an extent, and in such manner, that the Sultan himself more than once requested that his protection be removed.

He is known as one of the largest slave-dealers, and has massed an immense fortune, viz., 500,000*l.*, and some 100,000*l.* in the Bank of England, by his unscrupulous transactions.

The Sultan was very disgusted to see him with Sir Charles Euan-Smith's Mission.

Yours truly,
(Signed) E. H. MARQUIS.

No. 62*.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 106. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 13, 1893.

I INCLOSE a copy of a letter communicated to this Office by Mr. Forwood, M.P., respecting Cid Bubekir.*

Mr. A. O'Conor, M.P., also states that he has a mass of detailed information about this person.

The principal accusations brought against him would appear to be:—

1. That he is a notorious slave-dealer.

2. That he kept houses of ill-fame, of which some were once closed by the Sultan.

These charges are not new, and you will find a good deal of correspondence on the subject in the Archives of the Legation.

As these attacks will without doubt be renewed, I have to request that you will institute a full and careful inquiry, with a view of ascertaining whether Bubekir's conduct and character render him unfit to be employed as Agent of the British Legation.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

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* No. 60*.

No. 61.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received September* 11.)

(No. 139.)

My Lord, *Tangier, September* 5, 1893.

WITH reference to Mr. White's despatch No. 137 of the 24th August, reporting on the scheme for giving effect to the Sultan's Concession with respect to sanitary improvements at Tangier, and especially the proposals concerning taxation, I beg to add that one result of the adoption of an export tax on cattle would be that a single British firm, which has the contract for supplying the Gibraltar garrison, would have to pay about 200*l.* a-year, or one-half of the estimated revenue of the Health Committee, from this source.

I have not yet had time to examine in detail the other questions involved in the Report of the Sub-Committee of the Corps Diplomatique, but it seems to me that such a conspicuous instance of the unequal incidence of this particular tax should be brought to your Lordship's notice without delay.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 62.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

No. 103. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 12, 1893.

I HAVE received Mr. White's despatch No. 132, Confidential, of the 19th ultimo, reporting the Italian Minister's account of his communications with the Spanish Minister respecting the political situation in Morocco.

I have to express my satisfaction at the language held by M. Cantagalli, and at the nature of the report which the Spanish Minister is said to have forwarded to his Government.

I have only to add that the earnest wish of Her Majesty's Government is to act in perfect accord with Italy and Spain in all questions affecting Morocco.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 63.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 107.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 14, 1893.

I HAVE received Mr. White's despatch No. 137 of the 24th ultimo, inclosing copy of a Report by a Sub-Committee of the foreign Representatives at Tangier on the measures necessary for effecting sanitary improvements in that town, and reporting what occurred at a meeting of the Diplomatic Body held to consider the same.

I have to request that you will convey to Mr. White my entire approval of his proceedings.

I should wish you to report to me fully on this question as soon as you have had time to study the Report of the Sub-Committee, and in the meantime, you should be careful not to agree to any arrangement involving the imposition of additional taxes or duties on British subjects without the previous sanction of Her Majesty's Government.

With regard to the alleged recognition by foreign Powers of the right of the Egyptian Government to impose municipal taxes, I will furnish you hereafter with information on the subject.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 64.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received September* 23.)

(No. 140.)
Tangier, September 13, 1893.

My Lord,

WITH reference to previous correspondence on the subject of the exportation of wheat and barley,* I have the honour to transmit copy of the collective note addressed by the Diplomatic Body to His Majesty the Sultan, urging the desirability, in the interests of foreign commerce and the welfare of his people, of prolonging the concession obtained by the German Minister in 1890.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure in No. 64.

Collective Note addressed to the Sultan of Morocco.

(Après les compliments d'usage.)

NOUS Soussignés, Représentants des Puissances étrangères au Maroc, accédant à la demande qui nous a été adressée par nos négociants venons prier votre Majesté de vouloir bien mettre en jeu ses sentiments de bienfaisance, dans l'intérêt général du commerce et des sujets de votre Majesté en accordant une nouvlle période pour l'exportation du blé et de l'orge dont le terme des trois années accordées, finirait le 12 Octobre prochain.

Les raisons sur lesquelles est basée la Pétition de nos sujets, sont en général celles-ci: les grands avantages résultant de l'exportation tant pour votre Majesté par l'augmentation de ses recettes douanières que pour les agriculteurs de votre Empire qui continueraient à trouver un débouché pour ces grains au lieu de les laisser forcément gâter en silos, ainsi que pour le commerce en général par l'augmentation des affaires.

Grevés comme le sont ces grains par des droits de sortie élevés, aucune cherté ne résulte de leur exportation, les prix quoique, suivant la fluctuation du cours Européen, restant à peu près les mêmes que si l'exportation en était prohibée et plus bas encore.

Les autres récoltes ayant beaucoup souffert cette année se trouvent au-dessous de la moyenne, tandis que les récoltes de blé et d'orge étant bonnes, si l'exportation en était arrêtée, il résulterait une véritable stagnation dans les affaires qui causerait au commerce des torts immenses et aux recettes douanières des pertes sensibles.

En appui de ces raisons, il y a des faits qui sont de partout incontestables, savoir: les fermiers et les laboureurs ont leur travail plus rémunéré avec l'exportation, qui donne aussi le gagne-pain à de nombreux conducteurs de chamaux, travailleurs des magasins, des douanes, ouvriers, bateliers, barcasses du Gouvernement, &c.

L'exportation induit les fermiers à cultiver une beaucoup plus large étendue de terrains, qui multiplie la production et la richesse du pays, en rendant les produits à meilleur marché, non seulement au bénéfice du commerce en général, qui est la meilleure richesse des peuples, mais au bien tout particulier du consommateur indigène qui obtient son pain plus facile à gagner, lui-même se trouvant dans une plus avantageuse condition d'existence, n'étant pas moins vrai que les habitants de la campagne ainsi adonnés à leurs travaux de labourage et satisfaits, ne pensent nullement aux sublivations [*sic*] et contribuent au bien-être des habitants des villes.

En outre, comme les récoltes du blé et de l'orge se réalisent de bonne heure, généralement elles deviennent facilement abondantes, la sécheresse de la fin de la saison ne les atteignant pas comme à celles des autres grains.

C'est aussi un point démontré que la plus grande somme de production rendue à l'exportation est une garantie solide de richesse recherchée par toutes les nations, car lorsque l'exportation devient plus considérable que l'importation, le pays devient créditeur et non débiteur des autres pays.

Il y a encore une circonstance qui renchérit dans l'actualité le mérite de ces exportations, et c'est que, comme le marché monétaire souffre des convulsions ici comme ailleurs, offrant des indécisions mutables quant à la stabilité d'une monnaie courante, le commerce trouve dans ces exportations un moyen efficace de remettre des valeurs en Europe, ce qui offre la plus grande convenance pour le paiement des articles d'importation de manière à arriver à meilleur marché aux habitants en général de cet Empire.

Les Soussignés ne doutent point que votre Majesté, prenant dans leur juste valeur les considérations exposées, et estimant à accueillir avec sa munificence habituelle, la juste

* Nos. 35, 46, and 48.

demande que par leur organe lui adressent les pétitionnaires au bénéfice réciproque du commerce, des recettes des Douanes Marocaines et en général des sujets de votre Majesté, daignera accéder à leur prière, en accordant le nouveau délai, au gré de votre Majesté, pour l'exportation du blé et de l'orge.

Salut.

Le 8 *Septembre*, 1893.

No. 65.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received September* 23.)

(No. 141.)
Tangier, September 16, 1893.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that a difficulty recently arose at Mazagan with respect to the export of wheat and barley, which I trust has now been satisfactorily arranged.

Mr. Redman reported in a despatch, dated the 9th instant, that two days previously the merchants at that port had been summoned to the Custom-house to receive a communication that no grain could be exported from that date.

As the day on which it was generally understood the export would cease was the 12th October next, Mr. Redman wrote to the Administrators expostulating and pointing out the losses that would be incurred by British subjects who had purchased considerable quantities of grain and had it actually lying in their warehouses.

To this the Administrators replied that, on the 7th, they had received letters from the Sultan ordering them to stop the exportation owing to the complaints of scarcity that had been made to His Majesty, which order they had no alternative but to obey.

Mr. Redman's despatch reached me on the evening of the 12th. On the following day Mr. de Vismes saw Cid Mohammed Torres at my request, to ask for an explanation. The Minister replied, with some expression of surprise, that the orders which had been sent through himself, were simply to the effect that the exportation was to cease as soon as the three years' period expired. He added, that according to his note to Mr. White of the 10th January, 1891, exportation was to begin on the 12th January of that year (1 Joumad II, 1308), and that the merchants still had three months in which to carry on their operations in wheat and barley.

Yesterday afternoon I received from his Excellency the inclosed Circular addressed to the foreign Representatives, in which he states that the time during which the exportation of these grains is permitted will come to on end in the last day of Joumad I next, being the 9th December, 1893. He further, by a misinterpretation, as it seems, of the original letter to Count Tattenbach, asks that British subjects should be instructed to furnish the Customs Administrators of the ports with statements of the quantities that they have in stock,

In reply, I drew his Excellency's attention to the fact that such statements are only to be supplied in the event of the shipment of grain being stopped before the expiration of the three years. His Excellency then addressed to me a second note acknowledging his mistake, and reiterating the statement that the exportation comes to an end on the 9th December.

Instructions are being dispatched by his Excellency to the ports, informing the Administrators that the export is to continue till the 9th December, and that it is not necessary under the circumstances that the merchants should declare their stocks.

I beg to add also copies of the instructions which I dispatched on the 14th to Mr. Redman by special courier and of the Circular despatch which I have addressed to the Vice-Consuls at the ports.

The general impression, both here and at the ports, seems hitherto to have been that the concession would expire on the 12th October next. I have not been able to ascertain the grounds on which this belief rested, but from the note of Hadj Mohammed Torres inclosed in Mr. White's despatch of the 12th January, 1891, it would appear that the coming into force of the German Treaty and the permission to export wheat and barley were regarded as being simultaneous, that is to say, as dating from the 1st of the month Joumad II, 1308 (12th January, 1891). I am given to understand that in these exceptional cases of permission to export being accorded by the Sultan, time is calculated by the Moorish year, which is eleven days shorter than our own. Consequently the three years expire on the 9th December.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure 1 in No. 65.

Vice-Consul Redman to Mr. Satow.

Mazagan, September 9, 1893.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour now to report to you that all the merchants at this port were requested to appear at the Custom-house on the 7th instant, and were informed by the Oomana (Administrators of the Customs) that no wheat or barley could be dutied or shipped from that date.

In consequence of this order the British merchants of this community have complained to me of this arbitrary proceeding on the part of the Moorish authorities, as the time had not yet expired of the term that had been granted by the Sultan for the export of these grains, and that they had a large quantity of both wheat and barley bought and in their stores ready for shipment within the period that export was granted for, namely, three years to expire on the 12th proximo, and that arrangements had been entered into for the securing of shipping for this purpose, and that serious complications and losses would accrue to them in consequence, and in their not being able to fulfil their engagements.

I addressed a letter to the Oomana of the Custom-house, and inquired of them the reason for this sudden stoppage of the export of wheat and barley prior to the expiration of the term that had been granted by the Sultan for the export of them, and was informed by them, as per inclosure No. 1 as per copy thereof, that they had received a letter from the Sultan through the Moorish Minister, Cid Mohammed Torres, to stop immediately the export of wheat and barley in consequence of the Moorish population having complained of their scarcity and dearness on account of the export of them being permitted.

I now beg to transmit to you inclosure No. 2, being a certified copy of a letter that was addressed to me by the Oomana of Mazagan, dated the 19th Joumad I, 1308 (18th December, 1890), advising that the Sultan had granted the export of wheat and barley for a term of three years to date from the first of the month of Arbœ 2, 1308, and which shows that the period has not yet expired.

In calling the attention of the Oomana to this letter they say that they can do nothing in the matter as the Sultan's orders are peremptory and must be obeyed by them.

It is stated in the Oomana's letter to me, dated 19th Joumad, 1308, advising of the Sultan's having granted the export of wheat and barley for a term of three years, that His Majesty stipulates that in the event of short crops or scarcity of grain he can stop the shipment of them by giving six months' notice for doing so, and for the exporting of the stocks in hand and already purchased; therefore the British merchants now claim an extension of time to be granted in consequence of the delay that has been caused by the stoppage of their operations by the Oomana of this port.

With reference to the pretext that has been made by the Moorish Government in the peremptory stoppage of wheat and barley from this country on account of its scarcity and dearness, I have to inform your Excellency the present prices ruling on this market and on those of the large producing grain districts of the Province of Duquella are about the same as they were prior to export being allowed for these grains, and which can be accounted for chiefly by the greater extent of land that has been put under cultivation through the export being permitted and the excessive high export duty on them not allowing higher prices than ordinary being paid for them; consequently, the Moorish populations have no occasion to complain by permission being granted for the export of wheat and barley, whence the agriculturists are greatly benefited thereby in having an outlet for their produce by immediate realization instead of storing it underground in metamors.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ALFRED REDMAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 65.

Administrators of Mazagan Custom-house to Vice-Consul Redman.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.) 26 *Safer*, 1311 (*September* 8, 1893).

WE have received your letter regarding the complaints of your merchants that we had prevented them from placing wheat and barley at the Custom-house to be dutied and exported, and you asked us to explain our reasons for doing this. We have to state that

yesterday afternoon we received a letter from our Lord to stop their exportation owing to the numerous complaints brought by the Sultan's subjects to his Shereefian Throne of the scarcity of these grains and the rise in their price, so that great harm accrues to them from this, and if they continue to be exported this may lead to [?] among the subjects.

On the Sultan's orders reaching us, we at once took steps and convened the merchants, and read to them the Shereefian order till they understood it and knew its purport. As to your observation that the merchants have in hand a great quantity of these grains, and that they would suffer great damage through the prohibition, we must tell you we have only to obey.

Peace.

(Signed) ABDDLINGID-BEN-ALLAL ETTAZI.
ABDERSELAM ZENHIR.

Inclosure 3 in No. 65.

Cid Mohammed Torres to Mr. Satow.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.) 3 *Rebia I*, 1311 (*September* 14, 1893).

IN accordance with my letter to your Excellency of the 28th Jumad I, 1308, regarding the permission for the export of wheat and barley during the term appointed by His Imperial Majesty, that is, for three years beginning with Jumad II of that year, the time during which the exportation of those grains is permitted will come to an end on the last day of Jumad I (9th December) next.

Therefore it is necessary to inform your Excellency of this in order that you may give notice of it to the merchants of your nationality and under your protection, and compel them to now give to the Oomana of the ports a statement of the amounts of those grains they have in stock, in accordance with the instructions which I have addressed to them (the Oomana), so that after the expiration of the month of Jumad I next none of the merchants will be allowed to export any wheat or barley at all.

Peace.

(Signed) MOHAMMED-BEN-EL-ARBI TORRES.

Inclosure 4 in No. 65.

Mr. Satow to Cid Mohammed Torres.

(Translation.)

(Compliments.) *Tangier, September* 14, 1893 (3 *Rebia I*, 1311).

I AM in receipt of your Excellency's letter of this day's date, in which you communicate to me the date on which the Shereefian permission for the exportation of wheat and barley will expire, so that I may give notice of the fact to the British and British-protected merchants trading in this country.

In thanking your Excellency for this communication, I would beg to point out to you that the last paragraph of your letter, in which you request me to compel the merchants to hand to the Oomana lists of the amounts of those grains which they have at present in stock, appears to have arisen out of some misconception, as this measure was only prescribed by His Shereefian Majesty in the event of the shipment being stopped before the expiry of three years, and in the present case there is no ground whatever for such a measure.

As I am unable, therefore, to direct British subjects and protégés to hand in to the Oomana the lists suggested, I must request your Excellency to be good enough to make it clear to the Oomana that they would not be justified in refusing to allow merchants, before the expiry of the term to ship wheat or barley, on the ground that they have not furnished such lists, or that having furnished them they afterwards desired to ship amounts in excess of those shown in the lists, for they are free to export as much as they wish until the expiry of the term fixed.

Peace.

Inclosure 5 in No. 65.

Cid Mohammed Torres to Mr. Satow.

(Translation.) 4 *Rebia I*, 1311 (*September* 15, 1893).
(After compliments.)

I HAVE received your letter dated the 3rd instant (*i.e.*, Rebia I) relating to what was contained in the last paragraph of my letter to you of the said date, asking you to compel your merchants to give a statement of the wheat and barley in their possession to the Oomana. I have taken this into consideration, and have to inform you that this request was not in its place, and the only action taken will be to enforce the termination of the export of wheat and barley on the last day of Jumada I, next of this year. That is all.

(Signed) MOHAMMED TORRES.

Inclosure 6 in No. 65.

Mr. Satow to Vice-Consul Redman.

Tangier, September 14, 1893.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch of the 9th instant, informing me that the Oomana of Mazagan had, on the 7th instant, intimated to the merchants of that port that no wheat or barley could thenceforward be exported.

There seems to have been some confusion as to the date on which the period of three years during which the exportation of grain was permitted should expire. The result, however, of the representations which I have made to Cid Mohammed Torres is that he has undertaken to address a Circular to the Administrators of Customs at the ports, acquainting them that the date for the exportation to cease is the last day of Jumad I, 1311, corresponding (according to comparative almanacks) with the 9th December, 1893.

I inclose, for your information, copy of the note which I have received from his Excellency on this subject. You will perceive that he speaks of the merchants having to deliver a statement of the quantities of corn in their possession. This is, however, the result of misconception, and I have pointed it out to his Excellency. I trust he will rectify it in the Circular to the Administrators of Customs, but I think it desirable to lose no time in acquainting you with this recognition on the part of the Moorish Government that the permission to export is still valid for some time to come.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure 7 in No. 65.

Circular addressed by Mr. Satow to Her Majesty's Vice-Consuls in Morocco.

Tangier, September 16, 1893.

Sir,

I INCLOSE, for your information and guidance, copies of correspondence with Cid Mohammed Torres relating to the recent stoppage of the export of corn by the Customs Administrators at Mazagan. You will perceive that the result of this correspondence is to fix the date for the expiry of the concession at the 9th December next.

In the archives of this Legation there is a note from Cid Mohammed Torres, dated the 10th January, 1891, in which he states that the German Treaty of Commerce would come into operation on the 1st of the month of Jumad II next of that year (12th January, 1891), and that orders had been given to the Administrators of Customs at the ports to allow the export of wheat and barley. The official date for exportation to begin, therefore, in his Excellency's view, was that of the Treaty coming into operation.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 66.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received September* 23.)

(No. 142.)

My Lord, *Tangier, September* 16, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy of a despatch from Mr. Macleod, reporting on two affrays that occurred at Fez on the 12th and 15th ultimo. On the first occasion, two Gibraltar Jews, of the name of Conquy, came to blows with a gate-keeper of the Sultan's Palace. In the second, Mr. Samuel McMath, a British subject, who practises as a doctor among the Jews of Fez, and a Syrian colporteur of the British and Foreign Bible Society, name Mirzan, engaged in a similar scuffle with another gate-keeper.

Mr. Macleod took the very proper step of accompanying the British subjects to the Palace, in order that their statements might be reduced to writing, but he did not lodge any complaint against the Moors, evidently being of opinion that there was blame on both sides. The Acting Governor of New Fez expressed the preposterous opinion that the gate-keepers would have been justified in shooting the Christians, and when Mr. Macleod offered to hear any charge that might be brought against the Conquys, if the Vizir would send the gate-keeper to lay his complaint, his proposal was declined.

On the 11th instant I received a note from Cid Emfadl Gharneet, in which all the blame is put on the Conquys and the other two persons mentioned, whom he accuses of having assaulted and insulted the gate-keepers, and that, too, without other provocation than the refusal to permit them to visit the Sultan's elephant. He adds that it is the duty of any gate-keeper to prevent strangers entering, without his master's leave, by any means in his power, even to the taking of life, and that the conduct of the British subjects in this case was likely to be a bad example to others.

I have replied to his Excellency, pointing out that, as the account furnished to me by Mr. Macleod does not tally with that which had reached the Sultan, it is necessary to hold a further inquiry, and urging that the gate-keepers should be sent to Mr. Macleod to put their complaint in proper form. I was confident, I wrote, that justice would then be done. I further remonstrated against the suggestion that the gate-keepers would have been justified in proceeding to the length of taking life.

At the same time I have addressed instructions to Mr. Macleod to endeavour to arrange for the cases being heard before him, and I trust that this course will meet with your Lordship's approval.

I beg to add that I should not have thought it worth while to trouble your Lordship with this affair, which appears to be of no political importance, had not the Minister for Foreign Affairs particularly requested me to report it to Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure 1 in No. 66.

Vice-Consul Macleod to Mr. White.

Sir, *Fez, August* 17, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to report the following occurrences:—

On the 12th instant, at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, Mr. Samuel Conquy, accompanied by his son, daughter, and cousin (female), went to the Court to visit the elephant's keeper, who had invited them to come and see him.

The party entered the outer door of the outmost of the Palace court (*i.e.*, the door next the public street) without hindrance. The door was open and no door-keeper on duty.

The party then proceeded towards the elephant house, which is situated at the entrance of an inner quadrangle, around which are the offices used by officials when the Sultan is in residence here.

When the party was about some two yards or so from the elephant house, a soldier sitting there jumped up, shouted to them in a very rough manner, and with many curses, to go away.

Mr. Conquy answered that they only wanted to see the elephant's keeper.

Instead of answering, the door-keeper then began to kick Mr. Conquy, and struck him in the chest.

Seeing this, Mr. Conquy's son, a strong youth of 20 years, intervened, and a struggle ensued between him and the soldier, the youth using his fists freely. Mr. Conquy and his cousin pulled the young man off. The soldier then called to a labourer near by to give

him the hoe he had over his shoulder; this the man would not do, but young Conquy then struck the soldier three or four blows with a cane on the shoulders.

The party then moved away to return home, he (the soldier) following them with a stone in his hand. He did not, however, throw the stone.

Mr. Conquy informed me of the affair next afternoon—Sunday (13th).

On Monday (14th) morning I happened to be at the Viceroy's Vizir's on some business of my own, when the Vizir said that he was glad I had happened to come, as he was just going to have sent for me. A soldier of the Court had "zooged" on the Viceroy respecting an assault committed upon him by certain English Jews, and he (the Vizir) would be obliged if I would send for the said Jews to the Court, so that he (the Vizir) might send in the statement of both parties to His Highness, and obtain instructions on the matter.

I agreed to this; at the same time expressing my own regret that we should have such unpleasant matters to discuss.

Next forenoon, Tuesday the 15th, I took Mr. Conquy, with his son, to the Court, when their statements were taken down by the Vizir's scribe.

About 2 o'clock the same afternoon Mr. Samuel McMath, who is the medical attendant to the Jews here, called to say that about 11 o'clock in the forenoon he had, accompanied by Mr. Mirzaa, Syrian colporteur of the British and Foreign Bible Society, gone to visit by invitation the elephant's keeper.

There was nobody on duty at the outmost gate of the Government quarters, and the gate was open.

They proceeded about half-way up the court when a soldier rushed out at them and ordered them off in a rough, uncivil way, but he did not curse them. Mr. McMath asked repeatedly if he was the door-keeper. The soldier did not answer him, but seized Mr. McMath, and began pushing him out. At the same time Mr. McMath threw down a walking-stick he was carrying so as to avoid even the appearance of retaliation. The soldier, remarking that he did not care if he went to prison for it, called to a man sitting near the elephant house to bring a stick. This was brought, and the soldier immediately struck Mr. McMath several blows on the left arm and shoulder. Seeing this, the Syrian caught up Mr. McMath's stick and dealt the soldier a hard blow on the head, breaking the skin and drawing blood. The stick was broken in two by the blow. The soldier retaliated by dealing the Syrian a severe blow on the forehead, making a cut over an inch long and raising a lump.

Mr. McMath then succeeded in wresting the stick from the soldier, and with the Syrian, made off, the soldier following them with a stone in his hand. This he was prevented from using by the Christians also picking up stones.

I went up to the Court with these two persons in the afternoon and showed the Vizir Mr. Mirzaa's wound, and the Vizir's scribe took down their statements, the soldier in the meantime having made his complaint.

I said to the Vizir that it was a pity the door-keepers were so unreasonable and so ready to strike English people, and it would have been much more regular had they detained them till a message had been sent to me, and the matter have thus been settled without blows.

In discussing the question the Acting Governor of New Fez, who is the soldier's chief, asserted that the soldiers would have done no more than their duty had they shot the Christians dead on the spot. To this I made no answer, except that I thought men of longer experience in such matters would not likely agree with him.

At the same time I have been careful not to lodge any complaint formally or informally, and I have told all our parties, in both cases, that I strongly disapprove their conduct in not immediately going away when called upon, rudely or not, and in arguing with such utter blockheads as the Court door-keepers are. And I have told them that they may not have heard the end of the matter.

All our people admit having retaliated; they have lost their right to complain.

At the same time it appears to me that the Moorish Government are to blame:—

1. For having the outmost door next the street open and with no door-keeper on duty to prevent people trespassing, particularly at a place generally thought to be open to the public. I was stopped myself, and with disgraceful rudeness too, once at the inner door; but I never heard that the outer quadrangle was forbidden ground.

2. The door-keepers might have got the parties out without using any personal violence. In each instance, and particularly the latter, there was an evident hearty desire of seizing the chance of giving the Europeans a beating.

Speaking generally, it would seem to be intolerable that such unreasoning fanatical people, as most soldiers of the Court and the Bashas here are, should be permitted

unchecked to be uncivil to English people and on the smallest provocation to knock them about and beat them.

If they do so with small provocation, may they not learn to do it without any? Certainly if called on they can invent a plausible story at any moment.

Messrs. McMath and Mirzaa were unaware of the Conquy affair when they went to visit the elephant-keeper. This latter's conduct has been very reprehensible and cowardly.

On going up to the Court on Monday I happened to meet him in the street, and in reply to my question he admitted having invited the Conquys.

On Tuesday, however, when called upon by the Vizir, he denied positively that he had ever invited the Conquys or Messrs. MacMath and Mirzaa to see him, and persisted in his denial although I remonstrated with him, and the Vizir assured him he had nothing to fear. The Vizir, I must say, did not seem to believe him. During the MacMath fracas the Mahout came out, and instead of explaining matters to the soldier, and helping his friends out of the trouble he had brought them in, he ran in again immediately to the elephant-house.

The Conquys and Mr. MacMath often read and write the Mahout's letters for him, hence their intimacy, and his invitations were given in the presence of plenty of witnesses. Mr. MacMath asserts that the Mahout particularly told him there was no objection to his going.

Mr. Mirzaa, indeed, further states that he had visited the Mahout without objection having been offered by anybody.

On the afternoon of the 18th, by appointment, I went to Court to see the Viceroy's Vizir on the above matters.

The Acting Governor of the Mellah and New Fez (the son of Kaïd Wuld Mohammed), was there.

I asked them (as they seemed puzzled and loth to begin the conversation) what they proposed to do about the recent events.

The Vizir answered that, in the meantime, they would only speak of the Conquy affair, and the Acting Governor would refer to it.

Thus appealed to, the Acting Governor began by asking me: "Would you tell me—Am I the Basha of the Mellah or not?"

I answered I believed he was, and hoped he would long enjoy his office.

"Well," he went on, "on the day of the trouble about these Jews I sent a soldier to them, and ordered them to appear before me and give an account of their conduct in resisting and assaulting my soldier. The Jews answered point blank that they would not go to see me. Now, what right has any one to disobey the command of his Governor and defy authority. Is this right?"

I answered that certainly no subject of the Sultan could do so rightly, but the Jews in question are British subjects, and were only legally bound to obey a British authority.

If any European chose to go to the Basha at the latter's request he might do so (without his Consul's order), but it was courtesy on his part, and not *right*. Further, his Consul might compel such subject to go to a Moorish authority for the purpose of giving evidence in a suit referring to himself *as the plaintiff*, or to a third party, but never, except in real property matters, could any British subject go to a Moorish authority as a defendant except of his own free will.

"Well, then," answered the Acting Basha, "I'll send Adools to these Jews and have witness taken that they refused to obey my summons, and I'll send that to the Viceroy."

I replied that of course he knew how to manage such affairs, but, I said, "Would it not be much better to send your soldier (complainant) to my house, with a scribe to assist him? I will have the Jews there, and take down all the statements in writing, and settle the affair justly and quietly."

To this the Vizir answered that the "Dar Maghzen" (*i.e.*, the Court) "sues no one, it only governs them. But the Viceroy would decide."

"Well, at any rate," I answered, "please take note that I have offered to do justice in these affairs as fairly as I can, and you have not accepted it. Even did you find my decision, afterwards, against your opinion, you could appeal to Her Majesty's Representative at Tangier, who would confirm or alter it."

This ended the interview.

I am happy to say that from the beginning of this affair no angry words or anything but friendly courteous remarks have been exchanged between the Moorish authorities and myself. I have been most careful to avoid even the appearance of annoyance, and we are all on good terms.

So far, I am quite uncommitted to any settlement of the disputes, either in favour of our people or the authorities; but I felt I could not, without your consent, agree to let the officials settle the matters as they liked and where they liked.

The authorities are manifestly trying to keep up the appearance of an absolute right of government over everybody here, foreigners as well as natives, but at the same time to have me present at the Dar Maghzen to give their action a show of legality in case of it being disputed.

At the same time, they have been quite civil, and even courteous, throughout, with the exception of the Acting Governor of New Fez, who at times was inclined to be rude. When it is considered, however, that his father and grandfather were Bashas in this district, it is easy to account for the young man feeling great irritation at having his mandates disobeyed by two inhabitants of the Mellah. This, and his inability to punish it himself, are such a new experience for him that I did not wonder at his irritation, and did my best to allay it.

I do not propose doing anything further in the foregoing matters until I receive your instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 66.

Cid Emfadl Gharneet to Mr. White.

(Translation.) 11 *Safer*, 1311 (*August* 23, 1893).

(After compliments.)

THE Khalifa of the Kaïd-el-Arbi Bu Mohammed at Fez has reported that two foreign Jews, under British protection, went to the Government House in that town and tried to enter the place where the elephant is kept, and the slave in charge of the lions turned them back, and they struck him with a stick and insulted him; and on the next day two English Christians went to Government House in order to see the elephant also, but the gate-keepers prevented them from entering, and they struck them with sticks and wounded one of them on his head, and they were not sparing in their attacks on them.

I am commanded by my Lord the Sultan to inform you of this, O friend, so that you may know (1) the injustice involved in such behaviour on their part towards the gate-keepers, for they are only posted at the gates of places in order to prevent such people as may wish to attack them or enter them without the permission of the masters, and to withhold them from that by every means in their power, even by killing, for the blood of the agressor may be shed according to the laws of all nations; (2) the injury arising out of the example given to others, and the dangers of the Sultan's turbulent subjects personating them and dressing up in their clothes, and behaving in that manner towards the gate-keepers, attacking Government House in an unguarded moment and robbing it, particularly as the Government is absent from it; and (3) the intention thereby disclosed of bringing about something regrettable, for had those gate-keepers not been afraid of the Government they would have been led to lengths which might have been irremediable; and (lastly) all the other evils which might have resulted from their action, and which cannot be hidden to reasonable men like yourself; and neither you nor your Government approve that such acts should be committed by your dependents—so that you may bring this to the knowledge of your Government, and the latter may command that they be punished, and others may be restrained, in accordance with the expectation entertained of your Government, and the experiences of its friendship and its habit of deprecating such acts on the part of those who are not its dependents, much more so on the part of those who are its dependents, and of endeavouring to restrain them and keep them within bounds.

Finished 11th Safer, 1311 (23rd August, 1893).

(Signed) MOHAMMED-EL-MUFADDAL-BEN-MOHAMMED GHARNEET.

Inclosure 3 in No. 66.

Mr. Satow to Cid Emfadl Gharneet.

(After compliments.) *Tangier, September* 15, 1893 (4 *Rebia I*, 1311).

I HAVE received on the 11th instant, O friend, your letter of the 23rd August, informing me by command of His Majesty the Sultan that the Khalifa of the Kaïd-el-

Arbi Bu Mohammed at Fez had reported that two foreign Jews under British protection went to the Government House in that town and tried to enter the place where the elephant is kept, and the slave in charge of the lions turned them back and they struck him with a stick and insulted him, and on the next day two English Christians also went to Government House in order to see the elephant, but the gate-keepers prevented them from entering, and they struck them with sticks and wounded one of them on his head.

I have also received from Mr. Macleod, the British Vice-Consul at Fez, a report in which he says that on the 12th ultimo a collision took place close to the elephant house between a soldier and two Jews under British protection, and that again on the 15th ultimo there was a collision about the middle of the outer court of the Government House between a gate-keeper and two Christians, and the account does not tally with that which is contained in the report made by the Khalifa of Kaïd-el-Arbi Bu Mohammed, and therefore it is necessary that a further inquiry be held. It is a dangerous principle to put forward, as you seem to do, that "the blood of the aggressor may be shed according to the laws of all nations." No man in the position of a gate-keeper is justified in using more force than is necessary to prevent a trespass, and it is only lawful to shed blood in defence of one's own life.

Mr. Macleod writes to me that he has several times conversed on these incidents, and especially about that of the two Jews with the Viceroy's Vizir, and had offered to summon the Jews to his house, if the Acting Basha would send the soldier with a scribe in order that all the statements might be taken down and the affair settled according to justice. But the Vizir answered him that "the Government sues no one, it only governs them."

It is not in accordance with the customs or the law of the English to decide a case unless the complainant and defendant are brought together before the judge, and your Excellency will, I am sure, agree with me that it is not reasonable to expect that the English Vice-Consul should hold the inquiry elsewhere than in his own house.

I am very grieved that disturbances of this kind should take place during the absence of His Majesty from the city of Fez, but as we are both at a distance we cannot decide who was most to blame for this incident without a proper inquiry being held on the spot, and I beg that arrangements should be made for this being done. If the authorities at Fez believe that the Jews and Christians were to blame, let them send the slave in charge of the lions and the gate-keepers to Mr. Macleod on a day agreed upon beforehand, and I am quite certain he will do justice.

However, as you have requested me, I will report the whole matter to the Government of my august Sovereign.

Peace.

(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure 4 in No. 66.

Mr. Satow to Vice-Consul Macleod.

Sir, *Tangier, September* 14, 1893.

I HAVE had under my consideration your despatch of the 17th ultimo, reporting in detail two collisions that had occurred between Mr. Samuel Conquy and party and a gate-keeper of the Sultan's Palace on the 12th August, and again on the 15th between a gate-keeper and Messrs. Samuel McMath and Mirzaa.

I approve of your having offered to deal with the case of Mr. Conquy if the Acting Basha would send the gate-keeper with a scribe to the Vice-Consulate. It is obvious that you cannot inquire into a charge against a British subject except the two parties are confronted before you, and it is unreasonable to expect you to hold the inquiry elsewhere but at the Vice-Consulate.

I think it desirable that you should urge this view on the proper authority at Fez, and endeavour to arrange for this case as well as that of Mr. McMath being heard by you in due form.

It is my intention to reply in this sense to a letter which I have just received from Cid Emfadl Gharneet complaining of the conduct of Messrs. Conquy, McMath, and Mirzaa.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 67.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received September 30.)

Tangier, September 30, 1893.

(Telegraphic.)
HARRIS spoke to me about Mulaï-el-Hadj, of Tamshot, getting protection. If your Lordship see no objection, I shall protect.

No. 68.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

Foreign Office, October 2, 1893.

(Telegraphic.)
YOUR telegram of 30th ultimo: protection to Mulaï-el-Hadj.
I agree.

No. 69.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, October 4, 1893.*

ON the 2nd instant the Kabyles attacked the Spanish garrison at Melilla, and several Spaniards were killed. The Government have ordered reinforcements to the scene of action. I am sending a report by post.

No. 70.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 65.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, October 4, 1893.*

AT an interview which I have just had with Señor Moret, his Excellency asked me to inquire of your Lordship by telegraph what course in your opinion should be pursued by the Spanish Government at the present juncture; whether war should be declared against the Sultan, which might lead to European complications, or whether they should confine themselves to punishing the Moors at Melilla, as at present.

His Excellency further asked me to say that, without full agreement with your Lordship, he would not commit himself to any definite policy.

No. 71.

Consul Finn to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received October 4, 7·35 P.M.)

Malaga, October 4, 1893, 10·55 A.M.

(Telegraphic.)
FIGHTING Melilla. Troops sent from here.

No. 72.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 111.)
Foreign Office, October 4, 1893.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 141 of the 16th ultimo, reporting on a difficulty which had arisen at Mazagan with regard to the export of wheat and barley, and the steps which you found it necessary to take with a view to remove the misapprehension of the Moorish authorities on the subject.

I have to inform you that your action in the matter is approved.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 73.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

No. 112.)
ir,

Foreign Office, October 4, 1893.

I APPROVE your proceedings in the matter of the recent affrays at Fez between British subjects and certain Moorish Palace Guards, as reported in your despatch No. 142 of the 16th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 74.

Señor del Mazo to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received October 5.)

(Translation.)
My Lord,

Spanish Embassy, London, October 2, 1893.

THE Government of His Majesty the King, my august Sovereign, has informed me that it very frequently happens that ships flying the British flag leave Gibraltar, and other places abroad, for Tetuan, with cargoes of cereals and minerals, having fire-arms destined for sale to the Moors concealed under the merchandize.

As His Majesty's Government has repeatedly been informed of occurrences of this kind, and as such proceedings are violations of the rules prohibiting contraband of war, I trust that your Excellency will, with your usual courtesy, exert your powerful influence with a view to the necessary measures being taken by Her Majesty's Government for the prevention of abuses of the kind indicated. Such action would furnish a new proof of the cordiality of the relations between the Government of Her Britannic Majesty and that of Spain.

I avail, &c.
(Signé) C. DEL MAZO.

No. 75.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, October 5, 1893.*

ON the 22nd ultimo a considerable body of Riffians attacked Melilla, but were driven back by the Spanish troops. Sixteen men were killed on the Spanish side, and thirty-three men wounded, whilst three men were reported as missing.

I am addressing your Lordship a despatch on this subject.

No. 76.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir G. Bonham.

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October 5, 1893.*

YOUR telegram No. 65 of yesterday.

I feel grateful to Señor Moret for affording me this proof of his personal confidence, and have no hesitation in urging on the Spanish Government the advisability of restricting their action to securing the local punishment of the Moors concerned in the attack at Melilla.

No. 77.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 254.) *Madrid, October 3, 1893.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to Sir Henry Drummond Wolff's despatches Nos. 180 and 182 of the 3rd and 4th July respectively, in which his Excellency called attention to the opposition, raised by tribes occupying the districts of Morocco contiguous to the Spanish fortress of Melilla, to the construction of an outpost fort named Sidi Gueriach, I have the honour to report that, according to telegrams published in this morning's papers, a conflict took place yesterday between the tribes in question, who are designated as Kabyles of the Riff, and the Spanish garrison of Melilla, resulting in the abandonment of the fort in question, with a loss of eighteen killed and thirty-three wounded.

The Moors, who, it appears, were in great force, commenced the attack on Sidi Gueriach at daybreak. It immediately became evident to General Margallo, who is in command of the Spanish troops, that the small force of forty men, comprising engineers and workmen, would not be able to withstand it. He accordingly occupied a detached fort of Camellas in the immediate neighbourhood, and devoted all his energies to covering the retreat of the exposed men. The action appears to have become general and lasted till the evening, when the Spanish force are stated to have successfully beaten off the assailants, who had, however, destroyed the obnoxious fort.

It is further stated that orders have been sent to the Governor-General of Andalusia to send reinforcements of artillery from Malaga.

In commenting on this event, the "Imparcial" calls attention to a similar act of aggression on the part of the Moorish tribes at Philipeville, when the French authorities took prompt repressive action without provoking any protest, and stating that this being an analogous case, sufficient force should be sent to protect the construction of the fort at Gueriach, and expressing the opinion that if it were found necessary to occupy temporarily a part of Moorish territory, no objection would be made on the grounds of its being an infraction of international law.

I am, &c.

(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 78.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 66.) *Madrid, October 6, 1893.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

SEÑOR MORET desires me to thank your Lordship for the views expressed in your telegram of yesterday's date, which I did not fail immediately to communicate to his Excellency. He says that they are in entire accordance with his own, his wish being to restrict operations to the neighbourhood of Melilla; at the same time, he fears that the patriotic feeling which has been aroused may, in the event of further Spanish losses, make more vigorous action necessary.

The object of the Spanish Government will be to strengthen the position of the Sultan.

He asks that instructions may be sent to the British Representative at Tangier to support the Spanish Minister in urging the Sultan's Government to take measures to prevent further aggressions on the part of the Kabyles.

No. 79.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 32.) *Foreign Office, October 6, 1893.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

MELILLA incident may develop into a general conflagration of a most serious character. You should therefore support Spanish Minister in urging Moorish Government to take every possible step in order to induce Moors to refrain from further hostile action against Spaniards.

No. 80.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir G. Bonham.

No. 22.) *Foreign Office, October 6, 1893.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

I HAVE instructed Mr. Satow in accordance with request of Spanish Government conveyed in your No. 66. You should point out to Señor Moret that any action hostile to the Sultan of Morocco would be likely to afford other Powers an excuse for interference, and might lead to most serious results. Urge that no such steps be taken, and remind him that the Sultan has little, if any, control over the tribes near Melilla.

No. 81.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 6, 1893.*

I AM directed by the Earl of Rosebery to transmit to you herewith a copy of a note from the Spanish Ambassador at this Court,* requesting that measures may be taken by Her Majesty's Government with a view to prevent the illicit importation of arms into Morocco by vessels "from Gibraltar and other places," which fly the British flag.

I am to request that, in laying this letter before the Marquis of Ripon for such observations as he may think fit to make upon the subject, you will move his Lordship to inform Lord Rosebery whether the Ordinance issued by the Governor of Gibraltar on the 30th April, 1878, prohibiting the export of arms, &c., is still in force.

I am, &c.

(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 82.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 255.)

My Lord, *Madrid, October 4, 1893.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 254 of yesterday's date, reporting that a conflict had taken place between the Kabyles and the Spanish garrison of Melilla, on the coast of Morocco, it may not be out of place to recapitulate the circumstances connected with the introduction of Spanish sovereignty in that region.

By the Treaty of 1861, at the termination of the war with Morocco, it was agreed that a certain district round Melilla should remain under Spanish jurisdiction for the greater security of the fortress and garrison. This district was to be a semi-circle with Melilla, situated on the coast, for its centre; the radius to be determined by a cannon-shot from the artillery then in use. In 1862 a Commission, consisting of two Moorish Delegates and two Spaniards fixed the limit, the projectile falling in the bed of a stream at a distance of 2,900 metres from the fort, close to a village named Farjana; the arc of the semi-circle was then continued at a distance of about 3,000 metres, following the inequalities of the ground, till it touched the Mediterranean to the north at Rostrogordo, to the south at a place subsequently named Casa Blanca.

From 1862 till 1870 the Spaniards did not assert their sovereignty in this territory, containing an area of about 1,500 hectares, so that their jurisdiction was only nominal. In 1870 the decision was made to divert the course of the stream, in order to drain an unhealthy marsh close to the fort. This, however, was not done without a series of skirmishes and small engagements, which necessitated the sending of a considerable force, acting in concert with troops sent by the Sultan of Morocco.

On the outbreak of the Carlist war in 1870, it was found necessary to withdraw nearly all the troops, and from that time till 1884 the reduced garrison of Melilla seems to have led a precarious existence, being constantly harassed by the Moorish tribes.

* No. 74

In 1884 the Government determined to carry out the plan of defence which had been sketched out as long ago as 1864, constructing the first of a series of detached forts—San Lorenzo. About the same time they granted a Concession of the land to the North African Society. Since that time the Spaniards claim that a real and effective sovereignty has always been exercised over that territory.

The accompanying rough sketch map will serve to show the position of the various forts which have since been erected, and in order to complete the system of forts for the defence of the valley of Rio Oro, it only remained to construct the fort at Sidi Anariach, which has been the cause of the recent conflict. The strategical importance of this fort consists in its effectually securing Melilla from attacks on the part of the Moors, and also from its proximity to the Moorish cemetery, the village of Farjana, and the spot where the more important fairs are held; it is thus a most convenient point for observing the enemy's movements.

The Kabyles themselves were not slow in perceiving the importance of the situation, having shown their opposition to its construction from the very first.

It is stated that alarming symptoms have for some time manifested themselves among the native tribes in acts of piracy and outrage, which have been unpunished, and it is pointed out that, though, in consequence of representations made at Tangier, an indemnity is sooner or later forthcoming, the real offenders invariably escape.

In these circumstances the Government is being urged on all sides to take strong and decisive measures.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 83.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 7.)

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, October* 7, 1893.

ON the receipt of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, I have spoken earnestly to Señor Moret in the sense of your instructions.

His Excellency told me that it was his desire "to place himself on the side of the Sultan," but that he would take no action without reference to your Lordship "if events should prove stronger than" him. He appears to be fully alive to the gravity of the situation.

The Sultan's absence in the south is, he considers, an advantage, as any action he could take might be less efficacious than the threats which the Moorish Government at Tangier will be enabled to hold out.

No. 84.

Consul Finn to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 9.)

(No. 30.)
My Lord, *Malaga, October* 4, 1893.

THIS morning I had the honour of reporting that fighting was going on between the Spanish garrison at Melilla and the Moors.

It appears that on large numbers of the latter having collected round the place in a hostile attitude the Military Governor attacked them, and, as it would appear, not very successfully, for he has asked for reinforcements.

About eighty artillerymen were sent off at once from here, and it is reported that a war vessel is expected in Malaga to convey a battalion of the regiment which is in garrison here and troops which have just arrived from Almeria to Melilla.

The Spanish losses are said to be eight killed and thirty-three wounded; those of the Moors are not known.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ALEXANDER FINN.

No. 85.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 9.)

(No. 257.)
My Lord, *Madrid, October* 5, 1893.

THE attitude of the press with regard to the state of affairs at Melilla has been, up to the present time, moderate. All the organs of public opinion, it is true, are unanimous in approving the dispatch of troops, and in recommending the adoption of strong measures towards the Moors who have attacked the Spanish forces in Spanish territory; but I have not met with any article advocating such an extreme measure as war with Morocco. Indeed, in one or two the idea is only mentioned as one to be disapproved of.

The "Liberal" has an article in which the following passages occur, which, although mainly historical, are not without interest at the present time:—

"Since the most sad and memorable day in which our troops, victorious at Tetuan and at Wad Ras, were stopped by a note in which Sir A. Buchanan, the English Minister, called on our Minister of State to put a stop to our action in Morocco, and threatened us, if he did not do so, with war, Spain has not witnessed in that territory a situation as difficult and critical as the present one."

After describing the attack of the Moors and the gallant defence of the Spanish force in much the same terms as I have already reported them to your Lordship, except that it is stated that the Spaniards were pursued to the walls of Melilla, the article continues:—

"To remain quiet, to do nothing, to suspend on whatever pretext the works at Guariach, is to fall so deep into the abyss of weakness that we should be looked upon by the Moors as dead, and the whole of Europe, which has seen our soldiers enter Melilla, chased by the frontier hordes, and lighted by the fires of the burning fort, would regard us with pity. That which Sir A. Buchanan did to us in 1858 would be a small matter compared with the pretensions which those who have their eyes on Morocco would now be able to advance to our prejudice."

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 86.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 113.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 9, 1893.

I UNDERSTAND from Mr. White's despatch No. 137 of the 24th August that M. Souhart, Secretary to the French Legation in Morocco, in proposing the imposition of certain taxes on exports in order to raise a revenue for the Tangier Sanitary Commission, contended that the Government of Morocco would have the right to levy these taxes on foreigners without the consent of the Powers. M. Souhart argued that because in the case of the Municipality of Alexandria the Powers had agreed to allow the Egyptian Government to impose municipal taxes, such as taxes on cafés and taverns, without their consent, therefore the permission must be held to extend to Morocco, which, owing to the Capitulations, was on the same footing as Egypt in matters affecting foreigners. It is, I apprehend, scarcely necessary to point out the erroneous character of this analogy.

The Municipality of Alexandria was instituted under a Khedivial Decree, which conferred on the Egyptian Government the power referred to by M. Souhart, but this Decree was only issued with the consent of all the European Powers, who thought fit to waive their Treaty rights in a particular case in Egypt, but who cannot be considered as having thereby waived them in any similar cases that may occur in other countries.

There have been instances at Constantinople of a tax on foreigners being assented to by the Ambassadors, but in those cases as in that of the Egyptian Decree the preliminary consent of the Powers was required, although to justify M. Souhart's argument that would seem to have been superfluous, and, indeed, impertinent.

In 1858 a Municipal Council was instituted for Pera and Galata, for the improvement of the condition of the town, and the foreign Embassies agreed to the imposition of a tax on their nationals on condition that they were fairly represented on the Council.

Subsequently, however, a question arose in consequence of the promulgation of a law depriving foreigners of the right of representation, and thereby withholding from them any control over the expenditure. Lord Granville thereupon authorized Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to agree to the imposition of the tax upon British subjects on the following conditions:—

1. That the tariff should be revised.
2. That the entire amount realized by the tax should be applied exclusively to clearing and keeping in order the streets of the capital.
3. That rules should be drawn up in concert with the Embassies, establishing the mode in which the tax was to be levied, as well as the procedure to be followed in case of dispute.
4. That Her Majesty's Government should reserve the right to revoke their assent to the levy of the tax on British subjects in the event of any violation of the conditions of its imposition.

Again in 1887, Lord Salisbury sanctioned a proposed note to the Porte, in which it was stated, amongst other things, that Her Majesty's Government, whilst consenting conditionally and exceptionally to the payment of this tax, reserved the right of revoking that consent should it be found in practice that the tax had not been equitably levied or properly applied, or that it otherwise worked any injustice to British subjects. The above information may be useful to you in dealing with the amazing contention raised by M. Souhart and with the general questions raised by the Tangier Sanitary Commission, but I need not point out that the Ottoman Empire and Morocco are entirely distinct from one another, and that the Treaties and customs which regulate the one have no bearing on those which regulate the other.

The relations between this country and Morocco are regulated by the General Treaty and the Commercial Convention of the 9th December, 1856, and by the Madrid Convention of the 3rd July, 1880.

It is stipulated in the Commercial Convention that the export duties to be paid by British subjects in Morocco shall not exceed the sums indicated in the tariff embodied in the Convention, which Convention may be amended by mutual consent after the expiration of five years.

The impost now in question, although made to take the form of an export duty, is in reality a municipal tax, and according to Article IV of the General Treaty of the 9th December, 1856, British subjects shall not, under any pretence whatever, be obliged to pay any taxes or impositions. The modifications of this stipulation in regard to the payment of an agrarian and a gate tax, which will be found in Articles XII and XIII of the Madrid Convention, are not material to the present discussion.

British subjects, moreover, obtain most-favoured-nation treatment under both the Commercial Convention and the Madrid Convention, and the imposition of a tax which would fall mainly upon them would be at variance with this provision also.

In view of the above considerations, the contention that they may be taxed in Morocco without the consent of Her Majesty's Government is wholly inadmissible.

I have, accordingly, to instruct you, when the question of the taxation of foreigners for municipal purposes is again considered, to make it clearly understood that Her Majesty's Government will not consent to any tax unless it is equitably levied and does not press unduly upon British subjects.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 87.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 11.)

Downing Street, October 10, 1893.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Marquis of Ripon to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th instant, inclosing a copy of a note from the Spanish Ambassador at this Court, on the subject of the export of arms from Gibraltar to Morocco.

In reply, I am to acquaint you, for the information of the Earl of Rosebery, that the Gibraltar Exportation of Arms Ordinance of 1878 is still in force, but that it does not prohibit the export of arms, but only empowers the Governor to do so by Proclamation.

Under "The Importation of Arms Ordinance, 1885," however, a copy of which is inclosed, arms, &c., can only be imported into Gibraltar under licence. Until recently,

licences were not required for the importation of arms and storing them in hulks in the bay, under a mistaken view that the Ordinance did not extend to the harbour; but this mistake has been pointed out to the local authorities, and on the 24th August last, Lord Ripon instructed the Officer administering the Government, pending the consideration by the newly-appointed Governor of the conditions which should be attached to such licences, to decline to issue importation licences except in particular cases, in which he might consider it expedient to issue provisional and temporary licences.

Lord Ripon is disposed to think, therefore, that the acts of which the Spanish Ambassador complains cannot have taken place recently; but in order to prevent their recurrence effectively during the present disturbances in Morocco, he has caused the telegram, of which a copy is inclosed, to be sent to the Governor.

His Lordship trusts that the steps taken will satisfy the Spanish Government of the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government to prevent any action detrimental to the interests of a friendly nation.

I am, &c.
(Signed) R. H. MEADE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 87.

ANNO QUADRAGESIMO NONO. VICTORIÆ REGINÆ.

[L.S.]

By his Excellency Sir John Miller Adye, Royal Artillery, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Knight Commander of the Legion of Honour, and of the First Class of the Military Order of the Medjidie, General of Her Majesty's Forces, Governor, Vice-Admiral and Commander-in-chief of the City and Garrison of Gibraltar, &c.

[No. 5 of 1885.] [*7th September*, 1885.]

JOHN MILLER ADYE,
General and Governor.

An Ordinance to regulate the Introduction into Gibraltar of Arms and other Material of War.

BE it enacted and ordained by his Excellency the Governor of the City, Garrison, and Territory of Gibraltar, as follows:—

Short title.

1. This Ordinance may be cited as "The Importation of Arms Ordinance, Gibraltar, 1885."

Arms or other utensils of war not to be landed or introduced in Gibraltar unless by licence.

2. No person shall land or introduce in Gibraltar any arms, ammunition, or utensils of war, or any military or naval stores, or any articles capable of being converted into or made useful in increasing the quantity of military or naval stores, unless by licence, to be granted under the hand and seal of the Officer administering the Government of Gibraltar for the time being, and the said licence shall contain the conditions upon which such arms, ammunition, or utensils of war, and such military and naval stores, and other articles as aforesaid, may be so landed or introduced.

Arms, &c., introduced without licence shall be forfeited, and person so offending liable to penalty.

3. If any arms, ammunition, or utensils of war, or any such military and naval stores, or other articles as aforesaid, shall be landed or introduced, or attempted to be landed or introduced, into Gibraltar without such licence as is hereinbefore mentioned, the same shall be forfeited to Her Majesty, and the person so landing or introducing, or attempting to land or introduce, the same without such licence as aforesaid, shall be liable on conviction to a penalty not exceeding 250 pesetas, and all such arms, ammunition, and other articles may be seized by any person in any way employed in the management or collection of Her Majesty's revenues at Gibraltar, and shall be taken forthwith and delivered into the custody of the Treasurer and Collecter of Her Majesty's revenues of Gibraltar, who shall secure the same by such means and in such manner as to him shall appear fit and expedient.

Penalties how recoverable, and offences how dealt with.

4. All penalties imposed by this Ordinance shall be recoverable in a summary manner, and all offences hereby made cognizable shall be inquired into, dealt with, heard and determined, as the case may be, in the manner and subject to the provisions contained in "The Ordinance to improve the Administration of the Law by Justices out of Sessions,

Gibraltar, 1867," which is and shall be deemed and taken to all intents and purposes to be incorporated with, and shall be read as part of, this Ordinance.

Application of penalties.

5. All penalties recovered under this Ordinance shall be divided, paid, and applied as follows, that is to say, one moiety, or such part thereof not exceeding one moiety as the Officer administering the Government of Gibraltar for the time being shall direct, to the person who shall inform and sue for the same, and the other moiety or remaining part thereof to and for the use of Her Majesty, her heirs and successors.

This Ordinance not to extend to Queen's stores, offices, &c.

6. Nothing in this Ordinance contained shall extend, or be deemed or taken to extend, to Her Majesty's naval and military stores, or to any act, matter, or thing done, or omitted to be done, by any officer in Her Majesty's Service, or by any other person employed by or under the direction of any such officer, and in the execution, or *bond fide* intended execution, of his duty.

Ordinance not to come into operation until Her Majesty's pleasure not to disallow the same be notified by Proclamation.

7. This Ordinance shall not come into operation unless and until the Officer administering the Government notifies by Proclamation that it is Her Majesty's pleasure not to disallow the same, and thereafter it shall come into operation upon such day as the Officer administering the Government shall notify by the same or any other Proclamation.

Passed 7th September, 1885.

(Signed) GIFFORD, *Colonial Secretary.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 87.

The Marquis of Ripon to Governor Sir R. Biddulph.

(Telegraphic.) *Colonial Office, October* 10, 1885.

SPANISH Ambassador at this Court has made a representation on the subject of the secret export of arms from Gibraltar to Morocco. See my Confidential despatch of the 29th August: you should continue to refuse importation licences for the present, and issue a Proclamation under Ordinance of 1878 generally forbidding the export of arms.

No. 88.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir G. Bonham.

(No. 131.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 11, 1893.

THE Spanish Ambassador conveyed to me to-day a complaint from his Government that boats were supplying the Moors with munitions of war under the British flag, and that one of them had been captured with a cargo of flour, under which was concealed a number of Remington rifles.

I said I would at once ask the Colonial Office if they had any information on the subject, and that, in any case, we would at once communicate with Gibraltar.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 89.

The Earl of Rosebery to Señor del Mazo.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Foreign Office, October* 11, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 2nd instant, requesting that measures may be taken by Her Majesty's Government with a view to the prevention of the illicit importation of arms into Morocco by vessels from Gibraltar and other places which fly the British flag.

In reply, I beg leave to assure your Excellency that the matter will receive careful consideration.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 90.

The Earl of Rosebery to Señor del Mazo.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Foreign Office, October* 11, 1893.

I HAVE had under my consideration, in communication with Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, your Excellency's note of the 2nd instant, in which you call attention to the importation of arms into Morocco from Gibraltar and other places by vessels which fly the British flag, and request that steps may be taken to prevent this practice.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Governor of Gibraltar has been instructed by telegraph to forbid the importation and exportation of arms within his jurisdiction.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 91.

Consul Finn to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 12.)

(No. 31.)

My Lord, *Malaga, October* 7, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to report, in continuation of my despatch No. 30 of the 4th October, that the first battalion of the Borbon Regiment, consisting of 543 officers and men and 60 volunteers from other regiments, left here yesterday for Melilla amidst great enthusiasm.

The usual garrison at that place being about 1,400; and further reinforcements are to be sent from here and other parts, while the Moors are said to be 14,000 men and other tribes coming in.

Owing to some confusion in the arrangements this battalion was kept ready to start for three days by the steamer "Rabat," which was in quarantine at Seville.

In the morning a boat arrived from Melilla with thirty-two sick and wounded, bringing also a great number of telegrams which could not be sent direct as the cable had broken down.

The medical arrangements at Melilla also are said to be so defective that Colonel Viana Cardenas paid for a supply of medicines and medicaments out of his private purse and took them with him for the use of his regiment.

The immediate cause of the outbreak is said to be that the Spanish authorities considered it of strategical necessity to erect an advance post overlooking a shrine much frequented by Moorish women; and here it is firmly believed that English policy is at the bottom of the rising, an idea which is confirmed by the reported seizure the other night of a falucho flying the British flag which was trying to smuggle arms on to the Riff coast, whereas little notice is taken of the fact that Moors have been exporting arms from this place and elsewhere for a long time.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ALEXANDER FINN.

No. 92.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 12.)

(No. 260.)

My Lord, *Madrid, October* 9, 1893.

THE Spanish press continues to devote almost its entire space to the dispatch of troops and the smallest incidents connected with Melilla.

It appears that this affair has been sufficient to reveal certain deficiences in the means of transport, as well as in the Commissariat and Sanitary Departments of the Spanish army. In the prevailing atmosphere of exaggeration it is difficult to arrive at the exact truth, but the following information with respect to troops sent, which has been communicated to the German Military Attaché by the authorities at the War Department, may doubtless be relied on.

Volunteers from various regiments of the Second Corps	300
One battalion Rifles of Cuba	500
Two battalions Regiment of Borbon	750
One Artillery Company	100
From Regiment of Savoy	50
From Regiment of Porto Rico	25
	1,725

These two latter are armed with Mauser rifles.

No cavalry have been sent.

It is not intended for the present to send any more reinforcements as there is no accommodation for them and provisions would run short.

The reinforcements now sent should, it is thought, be sufficient to enable the Spaniards to inflict chastisement on the Moors in the immediate neighbourhood of Melilla and to construct the fort of Al Guariach, but not to undertake a campaign against the Kabyles in the hilly regions near the coast.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 93.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 12.)

(No. 261.)
My Lord, *Madrid, October* 9, 1893.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to transmit herewith a despatch which I have this day received, under flying seal, from Her Majesty's Consul at Malaga,* giving information with regard to the embarkation of troops to Melilla.

Mr. Finn's statement with regard to the origin of the outbreak, namely, that the fort of Al Guariach is too near a shrine frequented by Moorish women, is confirmed by a communication made to me by Señor Moret, which I have had the honour to report to your Lordship in my Confidential despatch No. 256 of the 4th instant, but which I have not yet had an opportunity of sending.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 94.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 13.)

(No. 256. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Madrid, October* 4, 1893.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 254 of the 3rd October, relating to recent events in Morocco, I have the honour to report that in a conversation which I had with Señor Moret this afternoon his Excellency confirmed what I have already reported with regard to the conflict at Melilla, adding minor details, which are not, however, without interest. For instance, he explained that the rooted objection entertained by the Kabyles to the construction of the fort is that it is within sight of a mosque or shrine, and that the Spanish soldiers would be able to see the Moorish women going thither. I ought, perhaps, to have reminded his Excellency that it was a want of consideration to Mahommedan religious rites which had led to the Indian mutiny.

He further stated that the Moors were well armed with Remington rifles, but that they fortunately had no artillery.

Since the action on the 2nd they had been endeavouring to obtain concessions from General Margallo, who, however, declined to make any with regard to territory which was undoubtedly Spanish. The Moors of the Riff were, he said, a turbulent race, being practically independent of the Sultan, who had no control over them.

I thanked his Excellency, and was about to allude to other subjects, when he said there was a point of great importance on which he wished to speak to me, saying that if I had not myself asked for an audience this afternoon he was about to send for me. He

* No. 91.

proceeded to enunciate his views respecting the future of Morocco, asking me to inquire by telegraph what were your Lordship's views respecting the policy Spain should pursue at the present juncture, as stated in my telegram No 65 of to-day's date, laying stress on the fact that he will not commit himself to any definite policy without previous consultation with your Lordship.

On his speaking of extreme measures towards Morocco, and hinting that England might possibly derive some advantage from the dismemberment of that country, I told him, speaking quite unofficially, that hitherto the independence of Morocco had been a cardinal point of English policy, and that what he had said about the independent attitude of the Kabyles of the Riff made it seem hard that the Sultan should be made responsible for their misdeeds. His Excellency interrupted me, saying he had taken these arguments into consideration; that as regards the independence of Morocco, it could not last long, and that in her action against barbarous tribes England had frequently taken very strong measures. His Excellency continued at some length in this strain, but I did not think it incumbent on me to say more without instructions, and passed on to other subjects.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 95.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 13.)

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, October* 13, 1893.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of to-day, Señor Moret addressed me a note which I received on the 10th instant, stating that instructions had been sent to the Spanish Minister at Tangiers to authorize the Consul at Tetuan to give evidence, and I telegraphed to Mr. Satow in this sense.

No. 96.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir G. Bonham.

(No. 129.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 13, 1893.

THE language that you used to Señor Moret, as recorded in your despatch No. 256, has my entire approval.

Señor Moret appears to have argued that as Great Britain has at times been compelled to adopt strong measures in barbarous countries, Spain would be justified in active hostilities against the Moors of the Riff.

It is of course impossible to object to this proposition so far as it involves the security of a Spanish post bearing the Spanish flag and secured to Spain by Treaty.

But should Señor Moret be disposed to carry it further and deduce from it that his Government would be justified in commencing a war against the Sultan, with the result, and possibly the object, of dismembering the Shereefian Empire, he should carefully weigh the consequences.

You stated to him with perfect justice that the policy of Her Majesty's Government in regard to Morocco is based on the preservation of the *status quo* in Morocco, not because they considered the condition of that Empire to be by any means satisfactory, nor because they believe that it could not easily be changed for the better, but because they fear that any sudden convulsion that should dislocate the framework of that State would probably produce evils much more serious than those which at present exist. The alarms and jealousies that would be excited among several European Powers, which would in all probability hasten to secure by force of arms what they believed to be their several interests, would bring about a war as terrible as it would be unlimited, while the reaction of savage fanaticism in Morocco itself would devastate and ruin that country. From every point of view, therefore, and more especially for the preservation of European peace, no statesman could wish to rudely disturb the existing Government of Morocco.

It may be said that this is only a postponement, but postponement in the case of a war is always a good in itself. Time assuages many passions, and settles many questions which would otherwise be insoluble.

For these reasons, then, Her Majesty's Government do not wish to see the question of Morocco suddenly and forcibly raised. Should this be done, they would know how to secure what British interests might be affected. But none the less do they deprecate any movement in a direction which can only raise, under present circumstances, a vast and endless contest.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 97.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 14.)

(No. 262.)
My Lord, *Madrid, October* 11, 1893.

THE following contains the substance of the official despatch relating to the events which took place at Melilla on the 2nd instant. General Margallo's despatch is dated the 4th instant, and reached the Ministry of War yesterday. It will be seen that it does not differ in any important point from the unofficial versions which I have had the honour to transmit to your Lordship.

The night of the 1st passed without anything remarkable, the Moors having fired a few shots against a shed which was being constructed near the site fixed upon for the fort of Sidi Aguariach, and as this could not be looked upon as a sufficient reason for suspending the work and taking extraordinary measures of precaution, the workmen set out at the usual time, arriving at the fort about 7·30, with the engineers and soldiers forming the escort.

A fair was being held that day at Trajana, so that no surprise was roused by the large number of Moors who assembled.

On the arrival of the labourers, the detachments of soldiers, numbering forty men, told off to guard the shed occupied by the labourers during the night, set out for Melilla; but on the Moors opening a sustained fire, the labourers and their guard, together with the forty men returning to Melilla, were forced to take refuge within the shed, where they were practically besieged by a large number of Moors. The party consisted of an officer and 40 men of the Regiment of Africa, 2 officers and 41 men of the disciplinary battalion, 1 officer and 27 sappers and miners, and 73 unarmed workmen.

As the shed is dominated by positions occupied by the Moors at a distance of 1,500 metres from the fort of Camellos, and 2,000 from that of Cabrerizas, it was not thought possible to render assistance from those forts from the uncertainty of artillery fire upon scattered bodies of men at that distance, it became necessary to send reinforcements from Melilla. The General in command accordingly proceeded to Camellos, giving orders that all the troops available should follow, and that fire should be opened from the forts on the groups of Moors, and on the villages in which there was good reason to suppose that the enemy was being harboured. Part of the garrison was also employed in attacking certain bodies of Moors threatening to cut off communication with Aguariach. The first reinforcements to arrive consisted of 100 men from the Regiment of Africa.

The Moors, evidently emboldened by the smallness of the Spanish force, maintained their position against Sidi Aguariach, advanced towards Camellos, and threatened the fort of San Lorenzo on the flank.

As the necessity for stopping the Moors' advance became urgent a detachment of cavalry was dispatched to attack them on the flank, which was done with such effect that no further attack occurred in that direction during the day.

Other troops were then employed in opening out a way for the passage of two pieces of mountain artillery, which, having been placed in a convenient position, kept up a fire on the enemy till 1·30 in the afternoon.

At that time an advance was made with 145 men of the Regiment of Africa, 86 of the disciplinary battalion, and 16 sappers and miners. A detachment consisting of 50 men, supported by a second detachment of 50, and a reserve of another 50, was to clear the country near the shed and take up a position on a height beyond it. Another detachment of 50 was sent to reinforce the skirmishers on the right, the disciplinary force to remain as a reserve, and the force of cavalry employed in repelling the enemy were to return and place themselves in front of Camellos, three cavalry soldiers being retained in order to take an opportunity of reaching the shed and informing the defenders that it was time to retire.

Although the movement was carried out in the manner indicated, the men did not retire from the shed. One of the soldiers returned saying that there was very heavy firing going on and that they could not leave their shelter.

The main part of the enemy's fire around the shed had from the commencement of the action been protected by thickets of Indian fig trees, from which it would have been rash to try to dislodge them, so that the only course was to take measures for covering the retreat of the besieged men, who did not appear to have comprehended the General's plan.

As the numbers of the enemy continued to increase, orders were given to make the advance more complete, and to make known to the men that they must retire from the shed. This was done under the cover of skirmishers, and they reached the fort of Camellos, abandoning in the shed their workmen's tools and the body of one man who had been killed.

Having attained this object the retreat was effected in the most orderly manner. At 4·30 the troops had been formed behind the fort of Camellos. All the wounded had been placed in hospital, and a skirmishing force of the disciplinary body was maintained to keep the Moors at a distance.

It is impossible to calculate exactly the number of the enemy, but it cannot have been less than 4,000.

The Spanish losses were 15 killed, 4 missing, 3 officers and 34 regulars and convicts wounded, and 13 bruised. There is good reason for believing that the enemy's loss was considerable as the villages were bombarded.

Some bodies were left on the field, which were given up on the following day by the Pasha, having been disgracefully mutilated, which caused great indignation in the fort.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 98.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 14.)

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, October* 14, 1893.

MY Spanish colleague understands that exportation of arms and ammunition for the use of the Riffian Moors is being carried on under the British flag from the hulks in Gibraltar Bay. Can any steps be taken to prevent this?

No. 99.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 16.)

(No. 145. Very Confidential.)
My Lord, *Tangier, October* 5, 1893.

MY Spanish colleague, the Marquis de Potestad-Fornari, informs me that on the 2nd instant a serious engagement took place at Melilla between the garrison and a large body of Riff Moors, in which the former lost 16 killed, 33 wounded, and 3 missing, while the loss of the latter is unknown, though supposed to be very considerable.

When the boundary was laid down, in pursuance of the Agreement signed in March last between Spain and Morocco, instead of drawing a straight line from point to point, a slight deviation was made, in order to preserve to the Riff Moors a mosque which lay in the way. Subsequently, the Spaniards commenced to build a fort to the south-east of Melilla, which the Riff Moors objected to, on the ground that it would overlook the mosque, and thus become a source of annoyance to their women going backwards and forwards. From time to time shots had been fired at the workmen, and the Commandant was compelled to post a detachment of troops for their protection. On the night of the 1st instant, it seems, the Riff Moors had endeavoured to destroy the works, and on the following day they made an attack in great force on the labourers and the troops, and large bodies attempted to cut them off by landing from boats on the shore

between them and the fortress. Fire was thereupon opened from the ramparts, and the disembarkation was prevented. The garrison, after successfully repelling the attack, withdrew within the walls of the fortress. On the following day small bodies of Riff Moors were seen hovering on the hills in the vicinity, but no attempt was made to renew hostilities.

The Marquis de Potestad thinks that the garrison ought to be reinforced with troops sufficient to enable the Commandant to take the offensive in case of a fresh attack, and to make a razzia in French fashion on the villages of the offenders. He will also recommend his Government to send a couple of gun-boats to Melilla to guard the shore until the fort can be completed. Cid Torres had bewailed his powerlessness to take any effective measures. He offered to send a dozen men (recruited from the prisoners in the Tangier gaol), but when they were taken alongside a Spanish steamer that happened to be lying in port, bound for Melilla by way of Cadiz and Malaga, the master declined to receive them, on the ground of their unhealthy appearance.

I understand from a native source that the Governor of the Moorish territory close to Melilla telegraphed on the 1st to Cid Torres, informing him that the tribesmen had wrecked the fort, and asking for instructions. Cid Torres had intended to ask the Spanish Minister to stop the works until the Sultan's authority could be invoked to restrain his turbulent subjects, but the events of the 2nd instant rendered this idea impracticable.

I am not sure that my Spanish colleague may not also have in view the further extension of the zone which surrounds Melilla, as far as may be thought necessary for defensive purposes. But the more usual way of settling the affair, according to Moorish notions, would be the payment of an indemnity by the Sultan. If it be true that the Spanish Government, as the Marquis de Potestad has stated to me, once informed the French Government that they would put an army in the field to prevent the Algerian frontier being pushed forward to the Mouluya, it would seem to be extremely imprudent to provoke a move on the side of France by even the slightest addition to the territory already possessed by Spain in Morocco.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 100.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 16.)

(No. 147.) *Tangier, October* 7, 1893.

My Lord,

ON the receipt of your Lordship's telegram of this morning instructing me to support the Spanish Minister in urging the Moorish Government to do its utmost to induce the Riff tribesmen to cease their attacks on Melilla, I lost no time in communicating its contents to the Marquis de Potestad-Fornari. His Excellency said he should have great pleasure in informing his Government of your Lordship's offer, which he accepted readily.

He read to me two notes, with their replies, which he had addressed to Cid Mohammed Torres, which were conceived in very moderate terms. In the first he presented, by order of his Government, a protest against the destruction of the works which were being carried on within Spanish territory, and against the attack of the 2nd instant. He demanded the punishment of the aggressors, and stated that indemnities for the dead and wounded, as well as for the destruction of property, would be required. In the second he stated that unless the Moorish Government intervened effectually Spain would be compelled to take the law into her own hands and chastise the hostile tribes. The replies of Cid Mohammed Torres were studiously vague, but I understand that he verbally accepted the principle of an indemnity. The Marquis de Potestad further informed me that he was endeavouring to obtain from Cid Mohammed Torres copies of the instructions he has sent to the Basha near Melilla, in order to enable the Spanish Government to show the public that the accredited Agent of the Sultan at Tangier is acting in good faith and with all the energy at his command.

It seems that the French Chargé d'Affaires has had more than one interview with Cid Torres, who sought advice from him as to the terms in which he should reply to the Spanish Minister's notes.

I have sent Mr. de Vismes to Cid Torres with a *note verbale*, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy, based on your Lordship's telegram, and should the Spanish Minister address the Court direct on the affair, I purpose sending a note in similar terms to Cid Gharneet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure in No. 100.

Note Verbale.

HER Majesty's Government have heard with the gravest concern of the unprovoked attack made on the Spanish garrison of Melilla by subjects of His Shereefian Majesty, and have instructed Her Majesty's Minister to represent to the Moorish Government the urgent necessity of their immediately taking steps to control and restrain these turbulent mountaineers from acts of violence, which, if repeated, will certainly bring grave trouble upon His Shereefian Majesty. It is like the small cloud on the horizon, no bigger than a man's hand, which threatens to cover the whole sky. Her Majesty's Minister hopes that Cid Torres will dispatch his swiftest messengers to the Sultan to inform him of what has occurred, and at the same time exert himself by taking immediate and extraordinary measures to keep in order the Riff tribesmen who are round Melilla.

His Excellency must know that the news of the attack by thousands of Moors on a mere handful of Spaniards, the unequal contest, the barbarous treatment of the corpses of those who fell in the fight, will produce great excitement throughout Spain, and it is impossible to foretell what grave consequences may ensue to the Empire of Morocco, unless its rulers at once take proper measures and offer satisfactory reparation to the Spanish Government.

No. 101.

Lord Vivian to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 16.)

(No. 272. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Rome, October* 12, 1893.

SIGNOR BRIN spoke to me yesterday about the Spanish difficulty at Melilla. His Excellency said that Count Rascon, the Spanish Ambassador, had brought him two days ago a telegram from Señor Moret, instructing him to urge the Italian Government to support the demands of the Spanish Government on the Sultan of Morocco, which, as I understand him, were that His Majesty should put a stop to the attacks on the Spanish garrison, punish the aggressors, and pay an adequate indemnity for the loss of life they had occasioned. Signor Brin had at once consented to do this, and had telegraphed instructions in this sense to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier; but on learning, in reply, that as the Sultan was absent from Fez it would take a month to get an answer from him, he had repeated his instructions, and insisted on the necessity of prompt satisfaction being given to Spain.

Señor Moret had added in his telegram that the Spanish Government were very uneasy at the suspicious attitude of the French Minister at Tangier, who was in constant communication with Cid Gharneet, and appeared to hold aloof from giving any countenance to the demands of Spain; yesterday, however, Count Rascon brought a second telegram from Señor Moret stating that the Spanish Government had been reassured by a spontaneous offer from the French Ambassador of the good offices of the French Minister at Tangier in promoting a settlement of the grievances of Spain.

I gave Signor Brin the substance of the instructions which your Lordship had sent to Mr. Satow on the subject, as conveyed to him in your telegram of the 6th instant, adding that you had urged at Madrid that nothing should be done in a sense hostile to the Sultan, who had little, if any, control over the tribes at Melilla. His Excellency repeated on this occasion what he has often previously said to me, namely, that being thoroughly convinced of our self-denying policy in Morocco, and of our sincere desire for the maintenance of the *status quo*, Italy would always be prepared to give it her moral and, in case of need, her material support.

I have, &c.
(Signed) VIVIAN.

No. 102.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 16.)

(No. 263.)
My Lord, *Madrid, October* 13, 1893.

ONE of the more enterprising newspapers as regards the practice of interviewing, which has been brought in Spain to a high state of perfection, publishes at great length the substance of an interview with a Member of the Government, which corresponds to such a remarkable extent with the language held to me and to some others of the foreign Representatives by Señor Moret, that I venture to send a summary.

With regard to the fort at Sidi Guariach, two plans have been submitted to the Government, one by General Margallo, who commands the forces at Melilla, and one drawn up in the Ministry of War. The latter, which appears to have been approved by the Government, consists of the construction of a fort on a larger scale than had been originally intended, capable of containing 250 men, with the necessary artillery and munitions of war. Some time must necessarily elapse before such a fort can be constructed, as the preparatory works will of themselves require some weeks.

The objects which have to be undertaken by Spain and the Government are stated to be:—

1. The construction of the fort at Sidi Guariach.

2. The punishment of the Chiefs of the Riff country and the principal Moors, who have infringed the rights of Spain and killed Spanish soldiers.

3. The exaction of a pecuniary indemnity for the families of the men thus killed.

These three conditions are those to which the Sultan of Morocco is absolutely bound by the Treaty of Wad Ras, concluded in 1839, and it would be ridiculous if Spain did not now insist on their being carried out. By the prompt settlement of those claims, the object of the Treaty of Wad Ras would be attained with the minimum loss of life and money to Spain.

With regard to the course to be pursued in the event of the Sultan being unable or unwilling to carry out the provisions of this Treaty, the Minister is reported to have said that at present there is no reason to think that the Sultan will refuse the satisfaction demanded by Spain, supported, as her claims are, on the grounds of general interest, by the foreign policy of Europe.

Up to the present time Sidi Mohammed Torres, the Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs, has shown himself to be entirely in favour of making reparation, and, by means of messages and threats, has done everything in his power to make the Chiefs of the Kabyles at Melilla understand that the Sultan will cause them to be seriously punished for their unjustifiable act of aggression. The opinion, moreover, of all the higher class at Tangier is that Spain is entitled to just reparation. At the same time, if these signs were to prove delusive, Spain would not hesitate to declare war against Morocco, in which case Melilla would not be chosen as a base of operations.

Although the Minister was not sufficiently sanguine to suppose that the works of fortification which are about to be undertaken at Melilla will be accomplished without some hostile demonstrations on the part of the Kabyles, as there are always fanatics ready to disobey their Chiefs when it is a question of slaying Christians, the Government still had reason to believe that their warlike spirit had been much broken. They know that the Sultan will show no mercy towards the authors of the attack on the 2nd instant, and will take severe measures against those who resist his authority. They are, moreover, aware that Spain has resolved to send sufficient troops to inflict severe chastisement for the losses which she has sustained. The Minister added that the Government had strong reason for hoping, although they could not of course be certain, that the fear entertained by the Moors of the Sultan, whose moral authority was much greater than is generally supposed, coupled with threats of reprisals on the part of Spain, would result in the submission of the Moors, without the necessity for severe fighting, before the completion of the fort which is about to be constructed.

Military experts, the Minister added, are unanimously of opinion that there is no object to be attained by sending a large army to Melilla; a force of 8,000 men could with difficulty manœuvre in the plain, and the result of an advance into the enemy's country could only be the destruction of a few miserable villages. If necessary, a much larger army would be sent to Africa, but only a sufficient garrison would be left at Melilla to insure the necessary submission on the part of the Moors.

The Minister of War has now been empowered by the Government to take the requisite measures that the expeditionary force destined for Melilla should consist of from

7,000 to 8,000 men, comprising 6,000 infantry, a regiment of cavalry, twelve pieces of artillery, and two companies of engineers. The force is to be under the command of General Chinchilla, although later, should it be deemed necessary, the Minister of War might go to direct the campaign in person.

Although I have not yet had an opportunity of testing the accuracy of the statements attributed in the article of which I have given a summary to a Member of the Government, I have thought myself justified in reporting them to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 103.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 16.)

(No. 264.)
My Lord, *Madrid, October* 13, 1893.

SINCE writing my immediately preceding despatch, I have been informed that the newspaper from which I had taken the account of an alleged interview with a member of the Government is Señor Moret's especial organ.

The views therein expressed relating to the present policy of the Government with regard to the Melilla incident may therefore be looked upon in the light of a "Communiqué."

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 104.

Señor del Mazo to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 16.)

(Translation.)
My Lord, *Spanish Embassy, London, October* 13, 1893.

THE Minister of State, to whom I yesterday communicated by telegraph the substance of your Excellency's note of the 11th instant, respecting the instructions given by the Minister for the Colonies to the Governor of Gibraltar to prevent the importation and exportation of contraband of war within his jurisdiction, instructs me by telegraph to thank your Excellency most cordially for this action, and I now have the pleasure of doing so.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. DEL MAZO.

No. 105.

Señor del Mazo to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 16.)

(Translation.)
My Lord, *Spanish Embassy, London, October* 14, 1893.

IN a note which I had the honour to address to your Excellency yesterday I expressed the thanks of the Spanish Government for the orders given by Her Britannic Majesty's Government, through the Minister for the Colonies, to the Governor of Gibraltar to prevent the exportation and importation of arms within his jurisdiction.

By a telegram received at an early hour to-day the Minister of State informs me that recent reports show that there are on board the pontoons anchored in Gibraltar Bay actual workshops for getting arms ready before dispatching them as contraband of war.

In these circumstances the Government of Her Majesty the Queen Regent instructs me to request your Excellency, as I now do, to cause fresh instructions to be sent in order that the English authorities may place under supervision the pontoons where the improper proceedings which I have mentioned are taking place.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. DEL MAZO.

No. 106.

Howard Association to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received October 16.)

THE Secretary of the Howard Association respectfully invites your attention to the inclosed.

5, *Bishopsgate Without, London,*
October , 1893.

Inclosure in No. 106.

Extract from Howard Association Report of October 1893.

MOROCCO CRUELTIES.—Two members of the Committee of the Howard Association, Mr. Donald Mackenzie and Mr. Henry Gurney, have several times visited Morocco, and, whilst there, they have been much pained by witnessing the cruel treatment of prisoners. They therefore, in conjunction with Miss C. Hanbury, a lady who has done great good in that country, urged their colleagues of this Association to make some efforts on behalf of the oppressed inmates of Moorish gaols. But inasmuch as Morocco is a State quite independent of Great Britain, and not unreasonably jealous of foreign interference, it was felt to be a peculiarly difficult and delicate matter to attempt interposition under such conditions.

However, a statement of the worst evils of Morocco prisons was carefully drawn up, and, through the kindness of the editor of the "Times," inserted in that journal. Copies, and also reprints, were widely circulated at home and abroad. Indeed, a Morocco French newspaper, "Le Réveil du Maroc," remarked that the Howard Association had sent "an avalanche of papers through the universe." Certainly public attention, both in Morocco and elsewhere, was effectually aroused by this effort.

In these papers it was shown that, in the Morocco prisons generally, the wretched inmates (many of whom are not criminals at all, but the victims of false charges or of most usurious creditors) are not even supplied with bread or water by the Government, but have to depend on their relatives, or on chance charity, for the barest support, and this, too, amid darkness and filth, vermin and chains. And not only so, but in various instances tortures are inflicted, as, for example, by blinding them (putting out their eyes) for theft, and depriving them permanently of the use of their limbs by cutting deep gashes in the flesh, filling them with salt, and binding up the limbs until lifelong stiffness is produced.

On these statements being thus widely published, they were promptly confirmed from various sources, including the well-informed foreign correspondents of the "Leeds Mercury" and the "New York Herald." The latter indeed stated that there is another punishment repeatedly resorted to in Morocco, "They fill a man's mouth and ears with gunpowder and then light it."

Later on the Committee sent a Memorial to Lord Rosebery (Foreign Secretary), and a deputation to the Foreign Office, asking if that Department of State would invite British Consuls in Morocco to use their influence in drawing the attention of the Provincial Governors to special cases of cruelty and oppression. In a very courteous reply, through Sir Philip W. Currie, Lord Rosebery promptly stated: "British Consular officers in Morocco will be instructed to use their influence with the local authorities."

And now the Committee have to touch upon a delicate point—to Englishmen—but one which needs national and especially Government attention. They have gratefully to acknowledge the courtesy of the Foreign Office, and also the willingness of various British Consuls in Morocco to use their influence on behalf of the oppressed. Nevertheless, a very important fact remains, that, for some reason or other, British Diplomatic influence in Morocco does not seem to have that weight which it ought to have, in regard to protests against such cruelties as those above mentioned. And perhaps the Sultan would appear to have some good reasons for the disinclination which he has shown to attach much importance to British and other European official representations. For he has had to suffer great inconvenience from evils connected with the protégé system and its pecuniary claims.

The Spanish Government has wisely ordered its Diplomatic officials in Morocco to keep themselves free from trading interests and entanglements. Consequently, it is stated that the Spanish Representatives there occupy a high position in point of general respect.

About three-fourths of the trade of Morocco passes through English hands. It is therefore eminently important that British influence in that country should possess its due weight. And in order to secure this, British Consuls should be required to avoid all connection with local pecuniary interests.

No. 107.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 16, 1893.

IN reply to your telegram No. 50, Gibraltar authorities have already been instructed to prohibit the exportation or importation of arms.

The step was taken in consequence of representations received from the Spanish Government through their Ambassador here.

No. 108.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 16, 1893.

WITH reference to my letter of the 12th instant, I am directed by the Earl of Rosebery to transmit to you herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, copy of a telegraphic correspondence with Her Majesty's Minister at Tangier, as marked in the margin,* respecting the exportation of arms from Gibraltar to Morocco.

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 109.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 17, 1893.

WITH reference to your letter of the 10th instant in regard to the exportation of arms from Gibraltar to Morocco, I am directed by the Earl of Rosebery to transmit to you herewith, for such action as the Marquis of Ripon may think right and proper, a translation of a further note from the Spanish Ambassador at this Court,* calling attention to the alleged use of the hulks moored off Gibraltar as workshops for preparing the arms in question.

I am to request that Lord Rosebery may be informed what answer should be returned to this representation.

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 110.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 18, 1893.

WITH reference to my letter of the 17th instant, I am directed by the Earl of Rosebery to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Marquis of Ripon, copy of a despatch to Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid,* recording a conversation with the Spanish Ambassador as to the supply of arms to the Moors by boats flying British colours.

Señor del Mazo stated on this occasion that one of these vessels had been captured with a cargo of flour, under which was concealed a number of Remington rifles.

* Nos. 98 and 107. † No. 105. ‡ No. 88.

I am to inquire whether any information on this point has reached the Colonial Office, and I am to suggest that the attention of the Gibraltar authorities should be drawn to the subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 111.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 19.)

(No. 268.)
My Lord, *Madrid, October* 16, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith two copies of a plan of Melilla which has been published to-day. Although not official I understand that it has been drawn up by an engineer officer, and may be considered reliable.

I also inclose a plan published in an illustrated paper, which, although not so accurate as regards the fortress, shows a mountain of, I understand, considerable altitude, marked Gurugo, situated just outside the Spanish territory.

As the fort which the Spaniards are about to construct at Sidi Guariach is dominated bythis mountain, I understand that it is contemplated by them to take it.

The German Military Attaché from whom I have derived this information appears to consider that, although not strictly within their rights, the Spanish would, under the circumstances, be justified in doing so.

The Moors, it appears, have unearthed some old cannons (four, I think, in number) which had been buried since the last war, which, if placed in a commanding position, might possibly do some execution.

I understand, further, that although the number of men ordered to Melilla is nominally 6,000, the actual number is probably considerably less, as it includes men on furlough and absent for other causes. The number sent, however, is amply sufficient according to the military authorities for any action that may have to be taken in Melilla itself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

Inclosure 1 in No. 111.

Plan of Melilla and surrounding Country.

Inclosure 2 in No. 111.

Croquis del Campo de Melilla.

No. 112.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 20.)

Sir, *Downing Street, October* 19, 1893.

IN reply to your letters of the 16th, 17th, and 18th instant, respecting the alleged export of arms from Gibraltar to Morocco, I am directed by the Marquis of Ripon to request that you will call the attention of the Earl of Rosebery to the letter from this Department of the 10th instant, in which it was pointed out that on the 24th August instructions had been given that the importation and storing of arms in hulks had been prohibited except in special cases, where the Officer administering the Government might think it advisable to grant a provisional licence.


A Málaga 113 millas
A Athucemas 53 millas
A Chafarinas 27 millas
C.º Treforcas
Farallones
C.º Viejo
Pta del Peñon hendido
Cala de las Higueras
C.º de las Peñas
Pta Bermeja
Cala Bermeja
Cala Blanca
Cala Tramontana
Pta de las Charranes
Pta Sabanilla
Limites
Rambla del agua
Cala Pájaro
C.º del Pino
Cala Huertas
Rostro Gordo
Punta de Rostro Gordo
Cala Galeota
Kª Benisicar
Cala Morrillo
Cala Castilla
Cala Guiorf
Cabrerizas altas
Cabrerizas bajas
Poligono
Cementerio
MELILLA
Colonia
Campo de instruccion
Kª Frajana
Camellos
S. Lorenzo
Rio Oro
Arroyo de Frajana
Colonia
La Mezquita
Sidi Guariax
Kª Mezquita
Limites
La Restinga
Las Salinas
Colonia
Kª Mazuza
Atalayon
La Laguna ó Puerto Nuevo
Alcazaba de los negros
Kª Beni Buifuror
(62 11/93. 890)(F.O. 732
Harrison & Sons Lith. St Martins Lane W.C.

CROQUIS DEL CAMPO DE MELILLA.

Caserios de Frajana
Caserios de Frajana
Huerta del moro Amar Aguariah
Huerta de Kandor
CAMPO NEUTRAL DE FRAJANA
CAMPO NEUTRAL KABILA DE BENISICAR
KABILA
Caseta de los Moros de Rey
Mezquita y Cementerio de Sidi Aguariah
20m. Fuerte de Sidi Aguariah
F
Río Oro
Barranco
Fuerte de Cabrerizas Altas
Barrio de Mezquita
Huerta de Lahacen
Mezquita de Sidi Majamot
Barranco
Barranco
Fuerte de Rostrogordo
CAMPO NEUTRAL DE BARRIO DE MEZQUITA
Fuerte en proyecto
Norte
Fuerte de los Camellos
Sur
Barranco
Fuerte de Cabrerizas Bajos
Río Oro
Altura de Sn Francisco
Altura de Santiago
Fuerte
Altura de las Horbas
Fuerte de Sn Lorenzo
Cementerio
Barrio del Polígono
Altura del ataque seco
Casa de la Marina
Ensenada de los Galapagos
MELILLA
CAMPO NEUTRAL KABILA DE MAZUZA
MAR MEDITERRANEO

A. Primer reducto.
B. Segundo idem.
C. Tercero idem.
D. Cuarto idem.
1. Torreón de las Cabras.
2. Bateria de la Parada.
3. Torreón del Bonete.
4. Fuerte de la Concepción.
5. Torreón de Santa Florentina.
6. Muelle.
7. Varadero.
8. Alcazaba.
9. Fuerte del Rosario.
10. Fuerte Victoria Grande.
11. Torre de Santa Lucia.
12. Fuerte de San Miguel.
13. Fuerte de San Carlos.
14. Torreón de Plataforma.
15. Mantelete exterior.
16. Mantelete interior.
F. Emplazamiento primeramente propuesto para el Fuerte Sidi Aguariah.

Escala.

100 50 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1 Km.º 2 K. 3 K.

Reducion á 25 mm. Lith. D. Martinez Ibarra, 70 C.

(62. 1/90. 1390.) F. O. 732.

In these circumstances Lord Ripon is disposed to think that the complaint of the Spanish Government cannot be well founded; but in order that there may be no doubt in the matter he has sent the accompanying telegram to the Governor directing him to make a strict inquiry into the allegations of the Spanish authorities.

I am, &c.
(Signed) JOHN BRAMSTON.

Inclosure in No. 112.

The Marquis of Ripon to Governor Sir R. Biddulph.

(Telegraphic.) *Colonial Office, October* 18, 1893, 6·30 P.M.

THE Spanish Ambassador states a vessel flying the British flag with a cargo of flour under which Remington rifles were concealed has been captured, also that there are workshops on board the hulks in Gibraltar Bay for getting ready arms for shipment.

Make strict inquiry and report as to these statements. Have any importation licences been issued since my despatch of the 24th August, and, if so, to whom, and what has become of any arms introduced under such licences?

No. 113.

The Earl of Rosebery to Lord Vivian.

(No. 184.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 20, 1893.

HER Majesty's Government approve your Excellency's language to Signor Brin on the Spanish difficulty at Melilla which is reported in your despatch No. 272, Confidential, of the 12th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 114.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 21.)

(No. 149. Secret.)
My Lord, *Tangier, October* 11, 1893.

THE French Chargé d'Affaires called on me to-day to tell me that the Spanish Minister, by the order of his Government, yesterday addressed to the Sultan an ultimatum, framed in somewhat uncompromising language, demanding indemnities for the costs to which Spain will be put in consequence of the attack made on Melilla, and guarantees against any future repetition of attempts to interfere with the construction of Fort Sidi Guariach.

M. Souhart went on to express the opinion that the indemnities thus claimed, when the dispatch of troops and the provisioning of Melilla, which is now cut off from its ordinary sources of supply, are taken into account, would probably amount to some 10,000,000 fr. He thought the Spanish authorities were much to blame for their imprudence in commencing the fort, to the construction of which they knew the Riffians were so earnestly opposed, all the more that the limits between Spanish and Moorish territory had never been finally laid down, or at least not agreed to by the Sultan, and he strongly suspected that the Government of M. Sagasta, in order to prove to the Spanish nation that they were acting with the energy demanded by the circumstances, would undertake an expedition of some magnitude into the Riff country. In short, he looked upon the situation as one of great gravity.

I have not heard whether M. Potestad has dispatched the supposed ultimatum, and as to the intention to make reprisals I have understood from him that General Margallo would for the present stand on the defensive. I contented myself, therefore, with throwing cold water upon M. Souhart's alarmist suggestions, and only offering the opinion that whether the Spanish Government harboured such intentions or not, it might be well if counsels in the direction of prudence and coolness were offered to them by England and France.

The impression left on me by M. Souhart's language was that he wished, for French purposes, to make out that the situation is very critical, and that the intentions of Spain are not to be trusted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 115.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 21.)

(No. 150. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Tangier, October* 13, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 106, Confidential, of the 13th ultimo, inclosing copy of a letter communicated to the Foreign Office by Mr. Forwood, M.P., respecting Cid Bubekir, and informing me that Mr. A. O'Conor also states that he possesses a mass of detailed information as to that person. Your Lordship instructs me to institute a full and careful inquiry with a view of ascertaining whether Bubekir's character and conduct render him unfit to be employed as Agent of Her Majesty's Legation.

I have perused the correspondence on the subject in the archives of the Legation, and am of opinion that, as far as it goes, it proves that no grounds exist for the conclusion either that Bubekir is a slave-dealer, or that he ever kept houses of ill-fame.

Nevertheless, as your Lordship has directed me to institute an inquiry, I shall endeavour to carry out these instructions. For this purpose, I think that the accusers of Bubekir should furnish me with any documentary evidence which they have in their possession, and also with a list of the names of persons who would be able and ready to give oral testimony in support of the charges.

I think it may prove difficult to prosecute the inquiry at Tangier, and that it may perhaps be necessary to carry it on, in part at least, at Morocco city, where Bubekir usually resides. At all events, it seems likely that some months must elapse before the results of the investigation could be attained.

Pending the inquiry, however, I purpose to refrain from making use of Cid Bubekir as Confidential Agent of the Legation, and I shall request him to return to me provisionally the document mentioned in Sir J. D. Hay's despatch No. 26 of the 10th May last, to Lord Granville, in which he was informed that he would continue to be employed so long as he conducted himself in such a manner as to give satisfaction to the Moorish Government and to Her Majesty's Minister.

This will not involve the withdrawal of the protection which was formally granted to him in 1886, in recognition of the valuable services he had constantly rendered during a period of twenty years.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 116.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 21.)

(No. 151. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Tangier, October* 16, 1893.

THE Portuguese Minister visited me on the 13th instant, and, after informing me that he had been instructed by his Government to support the diplomatic action of the Spanish Minister with regard to the Melilla question, asked me to tell him confidentially what I had done. I read to him the *note verbale* inclosed in my despatch No. 147 of the 7th instant, and he stated that he should adopt precisely the same course.

My Spanish colleague informs me that, acting on the instructions of his Government, he has within the last few days presented a note to Cid Mohammed Torres notifying him that Spain will demand from the Sultan, in addition to the indemnities already claimed for loss of life and damage to property at Melilla, the cost incurred for the dispatch of additional troops.

The garrison of Melilla has now been increased from 700 to 3,200.

At the request of the Spanish Minister I telegraphed to your Lordship on the 14th instant that arms and ammunition are believed to have been exported from Gibraltar to

supply the Moors of the Riff, and asking whether any steps could be taken to stop this. Later in the day I learnt from the Colonial Secretary at Gibraltar, who arrived on a visit to me, that an Ordinance had been published by the Governor on the 11th prohibiting this trade absolutely.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 117.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 21.)

(No. 270. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Madrid, October* 17, 1893.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 268 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report that in a conversation with the German Military Attaché the Minister of War stated with regard to Melilla that unless unforeseen circumstances occurred the operations connected with the building of the forts must necessarily be delayed by the want of implements. The plan, moreover, originally drawn up by General Margallo, after having been altered in some important particulars in the Ministry of War, has been sent back to Melilla, where it will be examined by competent officials on the spot and sent back to Madrid. This will doubtless give time for the necessary preparations to be made.

It appears that the principal difficulty with which the Spanish forces have to contend is want of provisions and water. The former, which, under ordinary circumstances, were procured from the Moors, have now to be brought from Spain and from the Algerian Province of Nemours, and as to water they have, it appears, been under the necessity of bringing it from Malaga, as the amount available is quite inadequate for the increased force, and has, moreover, made it impossible for them to send over the number of mules requisite for their artillery.

It appears, moreover, from what the War Minister said, that the mountain marked Gurugu, to which I alluded in my last despatch as being one which the Spanish forces may wish to occupy, is considered to be too distant to be of use to them. I therefore hasten to make this correction.

The action of the Spanish military authorities is being considerably impeded by the impatience shown by the organs of public opinion, which clamour incessantly for immediate hostilities such as might in their present unprepared state lead to disastrous results to the Spanish troops. In order to satisfy this unreasoning enthusiasm the Government is obliged to send a larger force than the object in view appears to demand.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 118.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 21.)

(No. 271.)
My Lord, *Madrid, October* 18, 1893.

ONE of the most serious difficulties with which the Spanish Government have at present to contend is the attitude of the press with regard to Melilla.

The sudden outburst of patriotism which occurred when the events of the 2nd became known was no doubt justifiable, and the uninterrupted flow of telegrams which continued long after there was any event to record, and was only, in fact, stayed when the cable got out of order, was what may be expected in a country like Spain, where allowance has to be made for grandiloquence and exaggeration; but it has, I think, become apparent that the object is now as much to hamper the action of the Government as to restore the prestige of Spanish arms, and I regret to say that with this object articles are sometimes published in which, very much at the expense of truth and probability, it is sought to establish the complicity of England in recent events.

The most objectionable of these articles appeared in the "Liberal" of yesterday, is signed "A. Regidor," and dated from London. It appears, from information which I have been able to obtain, that Señor Regidor is a resident in London, being, I believe, a political refugee. He occupies a quasi-official position, living in the same

house as the Spanish Consulate-General, styling himself Legal Adviser of the Spanish Consulate-General.

In the article to which I allude the visit of Her Majesty's Ambasador to England is ascribed to political reasons connected with a proposed cession of Gibraltar to Spain in return for Spanish possessions in Morocco, together with the Canary Islands.

The Melilla affair could not have taken place, the article continues, without the assistance of England in providing the Moors with Remington rifles. Allusion is then made to the negotiations which took place in July last relating to smuggling at Gibraltar, which were brought to a successful conclusion, it is stated, by a previous article written by A. Regidor and the exertions of the Spanish Ambassador at London.

The article concludes by saying that the question is an Anglo-Morocco one. France in Siam has given Spain a rule of action. No vacillation, negotiations, or rectification of frontiers is to be tolerated; Spanish honour is not to be made subservient to the smugglers of Gibraltar.

I have not attempted to reproduce the style of this article, which has caused some slight impression, but I have ventured to give the substance, in order to show an increasing tendency in the press to stir up a feeling of hostility to England.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 119.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 118.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, October 21, 1893.

I APPROVE the action you have taken in support of the representations made to the Moorish Government by your Spanish colleague in the matter of the difficulty at Melilla, as reported in your despatch No. 147 of the 7th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 120.

Consul Finn to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 32.)
My Lord,

Malaga, October 17, 1893.

GENERAL ORTEGA, whose official title is General of the Second Brigade of the Second Division of the Second Army Corps, Military Governor of Malaga, left this yesterday with his Staff to take command of the troops before Melilla.

Small detachments have left here several times during this week, but, including those reported in my despatches No. 30 of the 4th October and No. 31 of the 7th October, it is said that no more than 800 men have left this place for the African coast.

A Spanish squadron, consisting of the
"Pelaye,"
"Reina Mercedes,"
"Alfonso XII,"
"Reina Regente," and
"Isla de Luzon,"
made a demonstration before Melilla, and then went on to Algeciras.

I beg to inclose copy of a map of the surroundings of Melilla which has been published here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ALEXANDER FINN.

Inclosure in No. 120.

Plano del Campo Exterior de Melilla: A. Pezzi.

PLANO

DEL CAMPO EXTERIOR DE MELILLA.

A. PEZZI.

EXPLICACION.

THE RED LINE INDICATES THE (SPANISH) LIMITS.
THE RED FIGURES SHOW THE ALTITUDES ABOVE THE SEA.

1. FORT.
2. LIME KILNS.
3. ENGINEERS' BRICK KILNS.
4. GARDENS BELONGING TO OFFICERS OF GARRISON.
5. " " " ENGINEERS.
6. " " " REGIMENT OF AFRICA.
7. " " " CONVICT BATTALION.

Barranco ... *Gully, Ravine.*
Rambla ... *Beach, Dry River Bed.*
Cala ... *Hole, Deep Water, Creek.*
Alta ... *High.*
Baja ... *Low.*
Casa ... *House.*
Huerta ... *Orchard, Garden.*
Mezquita ... *Mosque.*
Cerro ... *Hill.*
Pozo ... *Well, Cistern.*
Colonia ... *Agricultural Settlement.*
Guarrera ... *Pig-sty.*
Puerta ... *Gate.*
Hondo ... *Deep.*
Chico ... *Small.*
Barrio ... *Quarter, Suburb.*

Barranco hondo
Muelle colorado
Punta de Sabanilla
Barranco chico
Rambla del agua
F.TE DE ROSTRO GORDO
Punta de Rostro-Gordo
N.
Cala Morrillo
Cable Submarino á la Isla Alboran y Almeria
KÁBILA DE BENISICAR
Casa del Nano
F.TE CABRERIZAS ALTAS
Ruinas
F.TE CABRERIZAS BAJAS
Barrio del Polígono
F.TE DEL POLIGONO
Cementerio
Casa de Hamar
F.TE S. FRANCISCO
Victoria grande
S. Ramon
S. Carlos
MELILLA
Huerta de Candor
Colonias
Cerro de Santiago
Las guarreras
Campo de instruccion
S. Miguel
Sta. Barbara
KÁBILA DE FRAJANA
Mezquita
Cementerio moro
Puerta de Sta. Barbara
F.TE DE SIDI GUARIACH
(EN CONSTRUCCION)
F.TE CAMELLOS
F.TE S. LORENZO
Colonias
Tesorillo
ESTRIBACIONES DEL GURUGU
Colonias
Casa de la marina
Pozo
KÁBILA DE MEZQUITA
Mezquita
Pico del Gurugú ó Caramu.
Pozo
Huerta
Casas de la Colonia
Pozo
Jenquieras
Café de Titian
KÁBILA DE MAZUZA

Escala de $\frac{1}{20{,}000}$.

0 100 200 400 600 800 1000 2000

(60, 11/93 (396) r. c. 732.

No. 121.

Sir E. Monson to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 180.)

My Lord, *Vienna, October 18, 1893.*

COUNT KÁLNOKY told me yesterday that he had heard from Madrid that there was the fullest and most satisfactory understanding between the British and Spanish Governments in regard to the steps to be taken by the latter at Melilla, and that he believed that they were equally anxious to give every reassuring explanation to France also.

I said that as far as my information went there was entire harmony between Her Majesty's Government and that of Spain.

Count Kálnoky observed that the Spaniards had a very disagreeable task before them; and that as it is notorious that there is almost more jealousy between these Powers about their respective dealings with Morocco than about any other subject that mutually concerns them, it is very satisfactory that so far it seems to be agreed that Spain should have a free hand in retaliating for the aggression made upon her.

As far as he could make out, however, security for the future could only be obtained by a considerable extension of the defence at Melilla, and that would involve acquisition of fresh territory, which might not be so quietly acquiesced in by the other two Powers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 122.

Messrs. Hunot and Co. to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received October 24.)

My Lord, *Saffi, October 7, 1893.*

AS British merchants, trading at the ports of Saffi and Mogador and in Morocco city, we venture to bring under your Lordship's notice the fact that we have two claims long pending against the Moorish Government: one for duty paid on a quantity of beans, which were not allowed to be exported, and the other, for loss of our property occasioned by the murder and robbery of our commercial agent in Terodant, southern Morocco. The details of these claims are well known to Her Majesty's Representatives at the Legation at Tangier, and were put forward originally by his Excellency Sir John Drummond Hay, who pronounced the first-mentioned claim as reasonable. The second claim was met by the Moorish authorities, as is the general custom, with evasions, and proofs were demanded from the Cadi, who was implicated in the robbery, and who forbad the adools or notaries from writing it.

On the 13th December, 1890, our chief, Mr. Hunot, when in England made a written application for assistance to Her Majesty's Secretary of State, Lord Salisbury, and a reply was received from his Lordship, dated the 16th idem, promising that Her Majesty's Minister in Morocco would be requested to report upon our claims against the Moorish Government.

Her Majesty's Minister, Sir Kirby Green, when at the Morocco Court, endeavoured to obtain a settlement, when unfortunately his Excellency met with a sad, untimely end, without accomplishing it. Our Mr. Hunot started for Morocco city, but did not arrive there until after his Excellency's death. He had, however, several interviews with the Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cid Gharneet, who gave him Shereefian letters to the authorities in Soos, which he was to forward and obtain replies; the replies were obtained, and forwarded to Rabat in time to meet the Sultan's expedition there. The Minister, after receiving them, requested our Talab to accompany his servants to Fez, where the settlement of the claims would be arranged. After keeping him at Fez several months he directed him to proceed to Tangier, and get other letters from the new British Minister, Sir Charles Smith, promising that on their receipt the claims would be settled. He accordingly went to Tangier, and returned, after an interview with Sir Charles Smith, who directed him to accompany Cid Bubekir, who was to precede the British Mission, to obtain a settlement of various claims, amongst them ours.

We then addressed Sir Charles Smith, viz., in March 1892, who replied that, as he proposed shortly to start on his Mission to the Shereefian Court, he would defer taking any further action in these matters until his arrival at Fez. His Excellency, when at Fez,

obtained letters from the Sultan to the authorities at Terodant, where the murder and robbery occurred, which were sent to us to forward, and get replies. We forwarded the said letters, and the reply to one given was, we understand, that the claim for murder and robbery had been settled by the Kaïd of Imtooga. Our claims were included in the list of unsettled British claims. His Excellency, however, had to leave the Court without obtaining redress for most of the claims pending, and, consequently, ours was amongst those without a settlement. We subsequently applied to his Excellency Sir West Ridgeway, who furnished our Mr. Hunot with letters to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, requiring the settlement of our claims, which letters were presented by him at the Shereefian Court at Fez. The Minister received and handed these letters to His Majesty the Sultan, who welcomed Mr. Hunot, and ordered that a place might be provided for his reception, promising to adjust the claims satisfactorily in four or five days, when he would be at liberty to return to the coast. He requested that Mr. Hunot should send his Moorish Talab to Court daily until he could arrange the settlement. Whenever Mr. Hunot called the Minister said, "Wait only two days more, and the questions would be arranged," offering apologies for the delay. On another occasion, after examining our documents, he said His Majesty would compensate us for our losses in the manner suggested by Sir Kirby Green, and would give Shereefian letters to the authorities at the ports to terminate the questions; that he was satisfied of the justice of the claims; that, having examined our documents, that was sufficient. On another occasion he said, we have really no defence to offer, and he told His Majesty so. For a long time he kept our chief in daily expectation of receiving these letters, and when he showed signs of impatience at the delay, he requested him to obtain fresh letters from Sir West Ridgeway, dictating himself what he wished written, which was, "that the expenditure on these claims had already amounted to a serious item; that the bean claim was for money paid as export duty on beans, which were not exported." He alleged that this letter was to give him an opportunity of reminding His Majesty of his promise to settle the claims; at the same time, he expressed a desire that he should not be mentioned in the letter, either favourably or unfavourably. Mr. Hunot then sent a special courier to the coast, and Sir West Ridgeway kindly forwarded the desired letter, which was handed by Mr. Hunot to the Minister, in the presence of Mr. Macleod, the British Vice-Consul at Fez. After reading the letter, the Minister said that Sir West Ridgeway had urged him to come to a speedy settlement of our claims. He added that in three or four days Mr. Hunot would be dispatched with a settlement. After another week had passed, he told Mr. Hunot that His Majesty would make the Terodant people pay the claim when the Shereefian expedition reached Soos. He requested Mr. Hunot to go there himself, or send an agent. He then promised replies to Sir West Ridgeway's letters, and gave Mr. Hunot a Shereefian letter, open, addressed to all the officials throughout the Empire, to provide food, fodder, and guards as long as Mr. Hunot remained in any district. This, he said, will enable you to go to Terodant, or anywhere else you may wish. We believe he intended at one time to come to a settlement, when suddenly he heard that Sir West Ridgeway was soon leaving his post; he suddenly changed, and, after spending sixty-seven days at Court at Fez, our Mr. Hunot returned to Tangier without the replies to Sir West Ridgeway's letters, the drafts of which were shown to him, and with only the Shereefian travelling letter. We have since applied to Her Majesty's Legation at Tangier, and the reply we have received is "that no reply has yet been received from the Court on the subject of your claims." The foregoing is the treatment we have received after long delays and outlay of expenditure.

We have now the honour to appeal to your Lordship, in the hope you will kindly give directions to his Excellency Mr. Satow, recommending our claims to his attention, that we may obtain some compensation for the losses we have suffered.

We have, &c.

(Signed) HUNOT AND Co.

No. 123.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 24.)

Downing Street, October 24, 1893.

Sir,

WITH reference to the letter from this Department of the 19th October, I am directed by the Marquis of Ripon to transmit to you, for the information of the Earl of

Rosebery, a copy of a telegram from the Governor of Gibraltar respecting the alleged traffic in arms between that place and Morocco.

From this telegram it appears that since the 25th August only one case of cartridges has been exported from Gibraltar to Tangier.

I am, &c.

(Signed) JOHN BRAMSTON.

Inclosure in No. 123.

Governor Sir R. Biddulph to the Marquis of Ripon.

(Telegraphic.) *(Received October 21, 1893.)*

YOUR telegram of 18th.

Since Confidential telegram of the 24th August, three permits have been issued for storage of arms; these permits were all dated 25th August, one case of cartridge sent to Tangier, remainder here. No workshops on hulks, but there is evidence that stocks have been removed from barrels for packing. I have arranged, with consent of the owners, for arms and the ammunition to be stored in Government magazine pending future disposal.

Despatch follows by mail.

No. 124.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir G. Bonham.

(No. 23.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October 24, 1893.*

HER Majesty's Government hope that the Spanish demands for an indemnity from Morocco will be moderate, as European questions and intrigues might arise from too extensive claims.

You should give the Spanish Government a hint in the above sense, should the opportunity of doing so present itself.

No. 125.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 34.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October 25, 1893.*

WITH reference to your despatch on the subject of Bubekir, I do not see any necessity for suspending him during the proposed inquiry, as it may last a long time.

The precise form of the inquiry can be settled as soon as his accusers have furnished the evidence for which they will be asked.

No. 126.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 51.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, October 25, 1893, 6·30 P.M.*

IN reply to your Lordship's telegram No. 34 of to-day's date, I have the honour to report that I have received a letter from Cid Bubeker, dated the 15th instant, which must have been written before my communication can have reached him, and in which he, of his own accord, resigns his position as Agent of the British Legation.

No. 127.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir G. Bonham.

(No. 139.)

Foreign Office, October 25, 1893.

Sir,

THE Spanish Ambassador called on me to-day to say that, though he had already thanked me for the action of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the contraband exportation of arms from Gibraltar into Morocco, Señor Moret felt that this was not enough, and had instructed him to tender his acknowledgments in person.

His Excellency went on to explain that his Government were very anxious to maintain the most cordial relations of confidence with that of Her Majesty in reference to the Melilla incident. What was desired was satisfaction for the army, and this would, no doubt, be speedily obtained. He needed not, he thought, to assure me that the Spanish Government are supporters of the "*status quo* in Morocco," and have no idea of territorial extension.

I took the opportunity of hinting to Señor del Mazo the desirability of not asking too heavy a pecuniary indemnity of the Moorish Government. Such a demand might lead to a resistance not impossibly fomented by other European Powers, and might thus raise the whole question of Morocco from the European point of view, which it is so desirable to avoid.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 128.

The Earl of Rosebery to Señor del Mazo.

Foreign Office, October 25, 1893.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

WITH reference to your Excellency's note of the 14th instant, I have the honour to inform you that, according to a telegram just received from the Governor of Gibraltar, an inquiry has been held as to the rumoured employment of the hulks in Gibraltar Bay as workshops, with the result that the statement is proved to be unfounded.

In order, however, to guard against any possible evasion of the recent Regulations prohibiting the importation and exportation of arms, it has been arranged that the arms and ammunition stored in the hulks, under Government "permits," shall be removed to the Government magazine, pending future disposal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 129.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Foreign Office, October 25, 1893.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letters of the 19th and 24th instant, I am directed by the Earl of Rosebery to transmit herewith, for the information of the Marquis of Ripon, a copy of the reply which his Lordship has returned to the Spanish Ambassador's representation that the hulks in Gibraltar Bay were being used as workshops for the preparation of arms destined to be exported to Morocco.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

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* No. 128.

No. 130.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 273.)

Madrid, October 22, 1893.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 271 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to report that the state of tension which has been increasing ever since the Spanish and Moorish forces have been confronting each other at Melilla appears to have at length given way, and that hostilities have been commenced by the Spanish gun-boat "Conde de Venadito" opening fire on the Moors on shore.

The facts, however, are not as yet known with certainty, for whereas the press contains sensational accounts of the way in which the Moors, having refused to retire from a position within Spanish territory, were, after due warning, fired upon by the Spanish war-ship, the official telegrams communicated by the War Department give the following version of the affair.

According to a telegram, dated Melilla, the 20th October, 9·50 P.M., from General Margallo to the Minister of War, the General informed his Excellency that the Moors had made entrenchments in their camp close to the boundary, and that at landmark No. 2 they appeared to have gone somewhat beyond the stone marking the limits. General Margallo added that he had requested the Pasha to destroy these works or entrenchments within two days, threatening that if this was not done he would carry out his Excellency's instructions.

There appears to have been some firing on the morning of the 21st on account of a mule which the Spaniards had captured, and which the Moors wished to retake, but, according to a further telegram received on the evening of yesterday, the 21st, the Pasha had been to the landmark No. 2, and had a conference with the Moors in order to decide what was to be done. Instructions had been given to the Captain of the "Conde de Venadito" to fire if he saw operations going on within the Spanish boundary. None were carried on, but the Moors having fired some shots from the beach, he fired some shells at the houses on the shore.

Considerable surprise and dissatisfaction are expressed at the fact that the cannonade was discontinued, and has not since been renewed.

The following details respecting the "Conde de Venadito" may be of interest. She is described as being an iron vessel 63·85 metres in length, 9·73 metres in breadth, depth of hold, 5·34 metres. Her displacement is 1,189 tons, and her machinery 1,500 horse-power.

Her armament consists of four Hontona guns (12 centim.), 2 Hotchkiss (57 millim.), four machine-guns (37 millim.). She carries also two torpedo tubes.

Her crew numbers 168 men, and she is commanded by a Captain ("Capitan de fragata") and ex-Deputy D. Emilio Diaz Moren.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 131.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 69.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Madrid, October 26, 1893.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No 23, I am informed by the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs that no hint has as yet been given by him to the Sultan of Morocco as regards the sum to be eventually demanded by way of indemnity. The attitude of the Sultan will determine the amount, but I understood from his Excellency that the expense of constructing forts at Melilla, as well as those of maintaining troops, will have to be covered by it.

No. 132.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 26, 1893.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 51, report the cause of Cid Bubekir's resignation.

No. 133.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, October* 26, 1893.

IN reply to your Lordship's telegram No. 35, Cid Bubekir's resignation, grounded on age and bad health, is due probably to advice given him in June last, and subsequently by his agent at Tangier.

No. 134.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 120. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 26, 1893.

I HAVE to convey to you my approval of the language which you held to M. Souhart, as reported in your despatch No. 149, Secret, of the 11th instant, relative to the Spanish difficulty at Melilla.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 135.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 277.)
My Lord, *Madrid, October* 25, 1893.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 131 of the 11th instant on the subject of a complaint from the Spanish Government, that the Moors are being supplied with rifles and ammunition from Gibraltar, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I learn, on what I believe to be good authority, that the arms which are stated to have been sold to the Moors by British firms in Gibraltar were manufactured at Eibar, sent to Malaga as dry goods, forwarded to Spanish firms in Gibraltar, still as dry goods, and by them shipped to Morocco.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 136.

Señor del Mazo to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received October 28.)

(Translation.)
My Lord, *Spanish Embassy, London, October* 27, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 25th instant relative to the steps taken by the Governor of Gibraltar with a view of preventing the importation and exportation of contraband of war intended for Morocco, and I have not failed to communicate its contents to the Government of Her Majesty the Queen-Regent.

I beg leave to express to your Excellency my best thanks for the information conveyed to me, and for the measures adopted to prevent the laws recently passed on this subject from being broken, and I avail myself, &c.

(Signed) C. DEL MAZO.

No. 137.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 121.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 28, 1893.

WITH reference to the Report on the claims of British subjects in Morocco which accompanied Sir West Ridgeway's despatch No. 109 of the 10th July last, I transmit to you herewith, for such steps as you may consider advisable, a copy of a letter from the firm of Hunot and Co.,* pressing for a settlement of their long-pending claims against the Moorish Government, and requesting that compensation may be obtained for the losses which they have suffered.

A copy of the reply which has been returned to Messrs. Hunot and Co. is also inclosed, for your information.†

I concur in Sir West Ridgeway's suggestion, that it would be desirable in the interests of exploration that Mr. Hunot should take the opportunity offered him of visiting Soos.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 138.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Hunot and Co.

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, October* 28, 1893.

I AM directed by the Earl of Rosebery to inform you that a copy of your letter of the 7th instant, calling attention to your long-pending claims against the Moorish Government, will be forwarded to Her Majesty's Minister at Tangier for such steps as he may consider advisable.

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 139.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 70.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, October* 29, 1893.

GENERAL MARGALLO was killed in a sortie from Melilla yesterday. The extent of the reverse suffered by the Spanish forces is not yet known; but the attack on Fort Cabrerizas was very determined. General Macias has started to take command. The above information is official.

No. 140.

Mr. Gosselin to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 251.)
My Lord, *Berlin, October* 28, 1893.

BARON VON MARSCHALL told me yesterday that he had received very reassuring news from Spain with regard to the action which the Spanish Government propose to take in Morocco; that they would be satisfied with maintaining the *status quo* at Melilla, and would await the return of the Sultan to the capital before pressing their claim for an indemnity.

* No. 122. † No. 138.

His Excellency said he was the more glad of this, as he felt convinced that the French Government would never agree to an extension of Spanish territory in Africa without demanding an equivalent territorial compensation for France.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MARTIN GOSSELIN.

No. 141.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 30.)

(No. 53.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, October* 30, 1893.

THE Spanish Minister has received a telegram from his Government, informing him that the attitude of the Spanish Government towards the Sultan is not modified by the occurrences of the last two days. The Marquis de Potestad communicated this message to his German, French, and Italian colleagues in addition to myself, and, in calling attention on behalf of the Spanish Government to the gravity of the situation, urged on us the desirability of impressing on the Sultan the necessity for his speedy return to his seat of Government in order to take the necessary steps for according satisfaction to Spain's demands, and providing against similar outbreaks in the future.

The French Minister promised to address a letter to the Sultan in this sense, and the German Minister also signified his willingness to do so, after he had obtained the necessary instructions from his Government.

Have I your Lordship's authority to act? If so, I would propose to my French, German, and Italian colleagues to concert general outlines of a note to the Moorish Government.

No. 142.

The Earl of Rosebery to the Marquis of Dufferin.

(No. 95.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 30, 1893.

ON reference to my despatch No. 219 of the 30th August, 1892, you will see that M. Waddington received instructions last year that the French Government desired to cordially co-operate with Her Majesty's Government in the affairs of Morocco.

This object has never been lost sight of in our policy. I may refer to my No. 6 of the 9th January in proof of this.

Your Excellency should assure the French Government that our wishes in this respect remain unchanged, and add that the actual state of affairs at Melilla appears to make it especially advisable that the relations of mutual confidence should be maintained.

No. 143.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 30, 1893.

WITH reference to my letter of the 18th instant, I am directed by the Earl of Rosebery to transmit to you herewith, for the information of the Marquis of Ripon, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid in regard to the alleged exportation of arms from Gibraltar to Morocco.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

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* No. 135.

No. 144.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 31.)

(No. 282.)
My Lord, *Madrid, October* 28, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to report that a Royal Decree has been published in the official Gazette authorizing an extraordinary credit to meet the expenditure required for operations at Melilla. The following is a translation of the Decree:—

Article 1.—An extraordinary credit is granted to a supplementary Estimate, additional chapter, in the fourth section, "Ministry of War," of the Estimates of the Departments of the current economical year, for the amount required for the unforeseen services connected with the military operations rendered necessary by events which have taken place at Melilla.

Article 2.—The amount of this expenditure will be covered by the floating debt of the Treasury if the sum provided in the Estimates is not sufficient.

Article 3.—The Government will account at the proper time to the Cortes for the present Decree.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 145.

The Marquis of Dufferin to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Recived October* 31.)

(No. 100.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, October* 31, 1893.

IN accordance with your Lordship's instructions, I to-day placed in M. Develle's hands a note with regard to affairs in Morocco.

His Excellency seemed much pleased with the tenour of my communication.

No. 146.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received October* 31.)

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, October* 31, 1893.

SEÑOR MORET has told me that the Spanish losses in the fighting which has recently taken place at Melilla are seven killed (including General Margallo) and thirty wounded. This is less than in unofficial reports.

No. 147.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 31, 1893.

YOU may act as proposed in your telegram No. 53.

No. 148.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 31, 1893.

WITH reference to previous correspondence on the subject of the alleged exportation of arms from Gibraltar to Morocco, I am directed by the Earl of Rosebery to transmit

herewith, for the information of the Marquis of Ripon, copy of a despatch, as marked in the margin,* drawing attention to the anti-English attitude of the Spanish press in connection with this question.

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 149.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 31, 1893.

WITH reference to my letter of the 25th instant, I am directed by the Earl of Rosebery to transmit herewith, for the information of the Marquis of Ripon, translation of a note from the Spanish Ambassador in London on the subject of the alleged exportation of arms to Morocco from Gibraltar.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 150.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 152. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Tangier, October* 19, 1893.

THE Spanish Minister, to whom I had already communicated the contents of your Lordship's telegram of the 16th instant that the export of arms and ammunition from Gibraltar has been prohibited, called on me yesterday to say that he had reason to believe that the smuggling of munitions of war into the Riff country would nevertheless continue unless some further measures were adopted. He stated that the traffic is carried on chiefly by small sailing-vessels, under the English flag, commanded and mostly manned by Spanish subjects, who obtain their cargoes from Malaga, and perhaps from Tarifa also. He asked, therefore, whether it would not be possible to allow Spanish cruizers to board such vessels, and to detain them if contraband, arms, &c., were found on board.

I replied that I felt assured that Her Majesty's Government were disposed to give to that of Spain whatever support might be practicable, but suggested that the request should be made direct by the Spanish Government to your Lordship. I also begged him to bear in mind that such smugglers when arrested would have to be handed over to the British authorities for trial.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 151.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 153. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Tangier, October* 23, 1893.

THE Spanish Minister informed me yesterday that he had received the most satisfactory assurances from the French Chargé d'Affaires of his willingness to support him in the representations he is making to the Moorish Government with regard to the Melilla affair. Acting on the most positive instructions of his Government, M. Souhart has written direct to the Sultan, impressing upon him the justice of the Spanish demands, and has also desired Dr. Linares to speak seriously to His Majesty in the same sense.

The unanimous action of the Powers on this occasion, added the Marquis de Potestad, was quite a new thing in the history of diplomacy in Morocco, and could not fail to produce a marked effect on the Sultan. He thought that possibly the untoward events at Melilla might prove a turning point in the foreign relations of this country, by showing to the Powers that it was possible to act in harmony for a common object. As far as he

* No. 118. † No. 136.

could see, no Government had any desire to disturb the *status quo*, whatever might have been the policy of Great Britain at the time of Sir Charles Euan-Smith's mission, and he did not believe that serious projects were entertained by France.

I interrupted him here, in order to assure him that the instructions of Her Majesty's Government to my predecessor, far from tending to any alteration in the present state of things, had prescribed to him the greatest possible circumspection, and that their policy in this country had undergone no alteration.

M. Potestad went on to say that M. Souhart had spoken to him quite freely about Figuig and Tuat. France did not wish to possess the former, but the acquisition of the latter, with its neighbouring oases to the south of Algeria, were for her an absolute necessity. He had replied that, speaking for himself personally, and entirely without any authority from the Spanish Government, he could see no reason whatever for objecting to its being brought under French domination.

The Spanish Minister on a previous occasion had said to me that he saw very little use in harping on the string of maintaining the *status quo*, so long as the boundaries of Morocco and Algeria remain undefined throughout the greater part of their extent, and I have no doubt that he had Tuat in his mind when making this remark.

No answer has yet been received from the Sultan to the letters sent from here by Cid Mohammed Torres immediately after the attack on Melilla, and it is calculated that it will not be possible for his reply to arrive for another week. In the meantime, the Spanish Government appear to have adopted an expectant policy, abstaining both from attacks on the Riff and from the construction of the fort, and the general impression here seems to be that there will be no repetition of hostilities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 152.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 155.)
My Lord, *Tangier, October* 25, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch from the Vice-Consul at Mogador, reporting that Mr. Ratto, the local agent of Sir Alfred Kirby's Syndicate, had laid before him, for certification, documents purporting to be an Agreement with, or Concession to, Messrs. Kirby and Cross, for trading in minerals and other articles of commerce, and for opening a port at or near Zafat.

The Zafat tribe, according to Mr. Ratto's statement to Mr. Johnston, dwells at a distance of one and a-half days' journey, or 60 miles, south of Cape Juby.

Mr. Johnston informed Mr. Ratto that he had reason to believe that Her Majesty's Government would not support the enterprise of Messrs. Kirby and Cross.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure in No. 152.

Vice-Consul Johnston to Mr. Satow.

Sir, *Mogador, October* 18, 1893.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 23rd June last, transmitting a Report addressed to the Foreign Office on the subject of a project entertained by an English Syndicate, formed, as I understand, by Sir Alfred Kirby for the purpose of opening up trading relations with tribes in the neighbourhood of Cape Juby, I have the honour to report that during the past week Mr. Joseph L. Ratto, the local agent of the Syndicate in question, laid before me certain documents purporting to be an Agreement with, or Concession to, Messrs. Cross and Kirby, of London, through their said agent, for trading in minerals and other articles of commerce, for opening up a port at or near Zafat, and engaging in other similar operations.

The persons granting the Concession are described as "independent and hereditary Sheikhs."

Mr. Ratto informed me that Zafat, the tribe chiefly interested in this negotiation, is about a day and a-half's journey, or, say, 60 miles, south of Cape Juby.

Bearing in mind the instructions received from the Foreign Office, of which I herewith transmit copy,* I told Mr. Ratto clearly, both for his own personal guidance and for that of his friends, that I had reason to believe Her Majesty's Government would not support this enterprise.

On Mr. Ratto asking me to certify translations, and attest certain signatures on the documents referred to, I deemed it my duty to accede to his request, such attestation seeming to me to be a notarial act, not in any sense depending on the legality of the Articles of the Agreement. I nevertheless pointed out to him that, should there be anything illegal in the said Agreement, he must not suppose that the attestation of signatures would make the invalid Articles valid, or secure any support from Her Majesty's Government.

I am not aware of the period when the Syndicate will take steps to act upon this "Concession," or whether they propose to obtain from the Sultan his ratification.

On learning anything likely to be of interest in connection with this subject I shall lose no time in reporting further.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. L. W. JOHNSTON.

No. 153.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 1.)

(No. 156. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Tangier, October* 25, 1893.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 150 of the 13th instant, stating the steps which I purposed taking with regard to Cid Bubekir pending the result of the inquiry which your Lordship has instructed me to institute, I have the honour to report that on the 15th instant a letter was addressed to him by Mr. de Vismes, in my name, acquainting him with the intention to hold an inquiry, and requiring him to deliver up provisionally the document by which he was appointed Agent in the year 1873.

Cid Bubekir has, however, anticipated my action by the spontaneous offer to resign the position he has hitherto occupied in relation to this Legation, which is contained in a letter from him, dated the 15th October. From the translation, which I have the honour to inclose, your Lordship will perceive that he places his resignation on the ground of advancing age and ill-health, and I have reason to believe that he has been contemplating this step for some time past.

I propose leaving this letter unanswered until I receive his reply to that which I have already caused to be addressed to him. Their combined effect, however, without any further correspondence on the subject between him and myself, is that he is no longer in any sense a Confidential Agent of Her Majesty's Legation.

I venture at the same time to repeat what has always been understood, that the protection granted to him in 1886 in consideration of the important services he has rendered does not cease in consequence of his connection with Her Majesty's Legation coming to an end. His is precisely one of the cases contemplated by Article XVI of the Madrid Convention.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure in No. 153.

Cid Bubekir to Mr. Satow.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.) *3rd Rebia II,* 1311 (*October* 15, 1893).

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that I wrote you a letter to congratulate you on your arrival, because I was prevented from coming myself through the illness which attacked me when I was at Fez with the Minister who has left, and which has clung to me since that time, this illness having been caused by what happened then. I had asked to be excused from that which necessitated my travelling, namely, acting as an intermediary, and attending to claims or other matters pending with the Moorish Government, with which former Ministers had intrusted me in the service of the British Legation.

* No. 37.

It is now about twenty-seven years since the time of the late Sultan Sidi Muhamed, father of Mulaï Hassan, that I have been acting as an intermediary in these matters, and endeavouring to strengthen the friendship between the two Governments, in sincerity and for their (mutual) advantage, whilst giving information as to the proceedings of foreign officials, who oppose the action of the Legation. Since that time, praise be to God, nothing has been seen in me which is at variance with this sincerity, or of a nature to cause apprehension, except the illness which has fallen upon me through the loss of my strength, owing to the length of the time and the number of my journeys in summer and winter. On that account I had asked the cessation of my action as an intermediary, and to be excused from serving on this ground, my friendship remaining the same as before, retaining at the same time the protection which has been granted to me by the glorious Queen, and that I should in future have no anxiety except as to what concerns my well-being until God terminates my days.

When I heard of your arrival I was much pleased, especially in view of all the praise I heard of you. I pray God that I may obtain this request, which I had already put forward through you, and that you will do me this favour, if it meets with your approval, excusing me from continuing this service as an intermediary, which I have performed for a very long time, as I am advanced in years, and if God prolongs my life, I will continue to render services in the way of friendship and advice, as occasion may occur, not in the character of an intermediary. This is what I ask of you, whilst requesting your favourable consideration and a preservation of the (former) friendship and amity unchanged. I had presented this request about three years ago, my intention being to seek rest and to divert attention from my services to the Government here in the character of an intermediary and in other ways, and I should be situated towards them in the position of an ordinary protégé, on friendly terms, but they would take no account of me. Notwithstanding this, if you require anything of me, I am completely at your disposal, and ready to carry out y our wishes as an act of friendship, not as an act of service.

Peace!

(Signed) BUBEKIR-BEN-EL-HADJ-EL-BESHIR-EL-GHANJAWI.

No. 154.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 1.)

(No. 157.)
My Lord, *Tangier, October* 25, 1893.

MY despatch No. 156 of to-day's date, reporting Cid Bubekir's resignation as Confidential Agent of this Legation, had been already written when I received your Lordship's telegram, instructing me that you see no necessity for suspending him during the inquiry that is to take place. I then telegraphed to your Lordship the substance of the above-mentioned despatch. I had, however, caused a letter to be addressed to him on the 15th instant, copy of which I have the honour to inclose, informing him that an inquiry was to be held, and requesting him to send me his letter of appointment, much as an officer is required to deliver his sword to a court-martial.

By a curious coincidence, he wrote from Morocco on the same day asking to be allowed to resign.

This letter I propose to leave unanswered until I receive your Lordship's further instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure in No. 154.

Mr. de Ponthieu to Cid Bubekir.

(After compliments.) *October* 15, 1893.

I HAVE been instructed by Her Majesty's Minister to write to you the following:—

Questions have been asked about you of Her Majesty's Government by a Member of the House of Commons, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has been told that you are a dealer in slaves, and that some years ago among houses belonging to you at Morocco, which had been closed by order of the Sultan's officials, were some houses of ill-fame. "There is no smoke without a fire," says the proverb, and the Secretary for

Foreign Affairs is of opinion that there may be incidents in your past life which may lend colour to these reports, and he has directed the Minister to institute full and searching inquiry, in order that the truth may be ascertained, and the question be set at rest once for all.

Consequently, the Minister is about to make preparations for holding an inquiry, and as in a trial of an officer by court-martial he is first required to lay his sword before the Court, so you are required to send here the letter which Sir John gave you in 1873, appointing you to be an agent for the transmission of letters; and when you have sent it, then you will be informed of the place and date when the inquiry will be held, in order that you may be prepared with documents and oral evidence.

(Signed) G. DE VISMES DE PONTHIEU.

No. 155.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 1.)

(No. 281.)

My Lord, *Madrid, October* 28, 1893.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 273 of the 22nd, in which I reported that hostilities had been commenced at Melilla by the Spanish man-of-war "Conde de Benadito" opening fire on the Moorish intrenchments, I have the honour to report that, according to a telegram which has been communicated by the Ministry of War to the press, an action took place yesterday between the two opposing forces under the following circumstances.

At 11 A.M. the works connected with fortifying and constructing trenches in front of the fort of Camellos were commenced by a company of engineers protected by parties of skirmishers armed with Mauser rifles, the battalion of Chasseurs from Cuba, and a mountain battery. A second company of engineers with some convicts were working at Redoubt X (this doubtless refers to the official plan, of which I have not been able to obtain a copy), and a third in conjunction with the forces of the Bourbon aud Extremadura regiments and convicts was proceeding with the construction of intrenchments at Rostrogordo and Cabrerizas Bajas.

About 4 o'clock in the afternoon the enemy opened fire on the Spanish troops from their intrenchments and all round the Spanish exterior camp.

General Margallo was at Camellos, and General Ortega in Rostrogordo.

The forces at Camellos succeeded in overpowering the enemy's fire, and in retiring in good order.

At Rostrogordo the entire regiment of Extremadura collected, of which a battalion occupied the Poligon.

The fire at Camellos ceased. General Margallo, on returning to the fortress and seeing that the Spanish soldiers had not retired to Cabrerizas Altas and Rostrogordo, proceeded thither in person in order to direct the retreat.

The fire had ceased, and General Margallo remains at the forts.

To-morrow more details will be sent.

The foregoing telegram was dispatched from Melilla at 11·30 last night, the 27th, by the Colonel of the Regiment of Africa, presumably because General Margallo had not returned to Melilla.

It is thought that it does not contain the whole of the information received by the Minister of War.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

P.S.—Since writing the foregoing despatch, I have procured two copies of the official plan of Melilla, which I have the honour to inclose herewith.

G. F. B.

Inclosure in No. 155.

Plano del Campo Exterior de Melilla: Croquis del Campo Marroqui Fronterizo, formado con los datos que existen en el Depósito de la Guerra.

PLANO DEL CAMPO EXTERIOR DE MELILLA

Y

CROQUIS DEL CAMPO MARROQUI FRONTERIZO

formado con los datos que existen en el Depósito de la Guerra


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No. 156.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 1.)

(No. 283.)

My Lord, *Madrid, October* 29, 1893.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 281 of yesterday's date, announcing the fact that hostilities had recommenced at Melilla, I have the honour to report that, in consequence of the serious news received, a Supplement to the official Gazette was issued late last night containing the following telegrams:—

The first, from the captain of the "Conde de Venadito" to the Minister of Marine, dated 8 A.M. on the 28th instant, refers to the action of the previous day before the fort of Camellos, stating the part taken by the ship under his command. He opened fire on the enemy in front of Camellos at 2,500 metres with the quick-firing guns, and at 3,500 metres at the village of the Mezquita, by which means he was able to keep the enemy in check until 5·30. The forts of Cabreriz das Altas y Bajas continued firing until 6 o'clock.

The second telegram is from General Ortega, who, I may mention, was in command at Rastrogordo and Cabrerizas, from Melilla, but undated, stating that he had just arrived at Melilla, continues as follows:—

"Firing commenced yesterday (the 27th) at 3·30 P.M., and continued without interruption during the night. Reinforcements received from the garrison of Melilla, but that they had been obliged to cede to the enemy the trenches which had been constructed, in which they had established themselves during the night. The situation is serious, and the necessity for large reinforcements most urgent."

A telegram from Colonel Casiellas to the Minister of War, from Melilla, reports the death of General Margallo at the head of his troops in a sortie from the fort of Cabrerizas.

A telegram from Melilla, dated the 28th October, 1·50 P.M., from the captain of the "Venadito" to the Minister of Marine, states that the body of General Margallo had just reached Melilla, that the fort of Cabrerizas Altas had been provisioned, and that the convoy had returned in good order; that there were some wounded in the fortress belonging to the force which had attempted to make a sortie under General Margallo before the force protecting the convoy had arrived.

The telegram continues: "Artillery fire continues without interruption, the enemy experiencing great loss; but they have advanced to within 23 metres of the fort of Cabrerizas."

From the foregoing telegrams read in connection with those which I had the honour to report to your Lordship yesterday, it may be gathered that General Margallo, having repelled the attack of the Kabyles at Camellos on the afternoon of the 27th, found, on his return to the fortress at Melilla, that a severe attack had been made simultaneously on the Spanish forts at Rostrogordo and Cabrerizas (whether Altas or Bajas or both is not clear), that he went in person to the relief, and that he lost his life in a sortie; that a force arrived subsequently, sufficient to prevent the fort falling into the possession of the Moors.

General Ortega, who was originally in command of the detached forts, has, it appears, arrived at the fortress of Melilla. The fact that the Moors had arrived close under the walls of the fortress would appear to require additional explanation, as it is not absolutely clear whether they were allowed to remain there.

The action taken by the Government on receipt of the foregoing information has been to order the embarkation to-day of three battalions of Chasseurs and a complete brigade of infantry in Cadiz and Malaga; to approve the immediate departure of the cruizer "Alfonso XII" from Algeciras for Melilla; to make arrangements for the embarkation, immediately on their arriving at Malaga, of the regiment of cavalry of Santiago quartered near that city, besides which other brigades of infantry are to await orders to embark.

In connection with the foregoing, I have further the honour to report that previously to the serious intelligence received yesterday some important changes had already been made with regard to the Generals commanding the forces at Melilla.

General Macias, who embarked at Malaga last night, and who should in the ordinary course have now reached Melilla, having been appointed to take over the supreme command from General Margallo, who was to have returned to Madrid at once in order to confer with the Minister of War, and, if I am correctly informed, to explain his conduct in having ordered the construction of the fort at Sidi Guariach without previous instructions from Madrid.

A further appointment is that of General Chinchilla, commanding the forces in Andalusia, who will also proceed to Melilla.

The regiment of Wad Ras, which was already under orders, left Madrid yesterday afternoon for the scene of action. Previously to their departure Her Majesty the Queen-Regent, with the young King, visited the barracks in which they were quartered, after which the regiment, numbering, it is stated, some 800 men, proceeded to the station amidst a scene of great enthusiasm.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 157.

London Chamber of Commerce to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 1.)

My Lord, *Botolph House, Eastcheap, London, October* 31, 1893.

IN connection with the present events in Morocco, the Executive Committee of this Chamber, which, at its last meeting, had this question before it, desires me to inform your Lordship that it is confident that the maintenance of British interests in that part of the world is receiving due attention from your Lordship at this juncture.

I am, &c.
(Signed) KENRIC B. MURRAY,
Secretary.

No. 158.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 1.)

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November* 1, 1893.

LATEST news from Melilla is satisfactory. A sortie to provision the forts was successfully carried out. The Moors have been driven from their intrenchments within Spanish territory.

No. 159.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir G. Bonham.

(No. 142.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 1, 1893.

THE Spanish Ambassador read to me to-day a telegram from his Government, of which I transmit to you a copy herewith, respecting the presence of a number of British war-ships at Gibraltar, and their connection with the Melilla incident.

I told his Excellency that the arrival of the fleet at Gibraltar was part of the autumn manœuvres, which had long ago been arranged.

I had on various occasions interposed to prevent our ships going to Gibraltar for fear of offending Spanish susceptibilities in regard to Morocco. This could not go on for ever, as Gibraltar was one of our most important stations, and we could not debar ourselves altogether from the use of it.

He might, however, give Señor Moret the most explicit assurances that the fleet was not there for any purpose other than their manœuvres, and that we had no intention of intervening in Morocco under present circumstances.

Señor del Mazo thanked me in the most cordial manner for this communication.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

Inclosure in No. 159.

Señor Moret to Señor del Mazo.

(Télégraphique.) *Le 1er Novembre,* 1893.

LA presse fait des commentaires sur la réunion des vaisseaux de guerre Anglais à Gibraltar : veuillez télégraphier la signification pour guider l'opinion publique. La presse

Française tâche de l'impressionner en supposant que l'Angleterre s'oppose à l'Espagne au Maroc et profite de cette occasion pour occuper Tangier. A cet effet elle annonce que France est identifiée avec l'Espagne non seulement dans la question du Maroc, mais dans toutes celles de la Méditerranée, et que la Russie se mettra à côté des deux nations.

Veuillez communiquer ces impressions au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

No. 160.

Consul Finn to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 2.)

(No. 6. Commercial.)
My Lord, *Malaga, October* 28, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to inclose translation of an article which has appeared in a local newspaper on the advantages which Spain should derive were she to establish a factory at the Rio de Oro, a spot on the Riff coast near Melilla.

As Spaniards are not likely to make use of these advantages, British merchants may like to know of the opportunity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ALEXANDER FINN.

Inclosure in No. 160.

Extract from the "Noticias." of October 26, 1893.

The Commerce of the Rio de Oro (River de Oro), near Melilla, on the Riff Coast.

(Translation.)

THAT the commercial interests of Spain would greatly benefit by the possession of the River de Oro is proved by the exceptional conditions which this settlement offers.

It is known that the grand market of this part of Africa is Timbuctoo, as caravans from Socoti, Borneo, and the country of the Tauregs converge to that centre. Well, Timbuctoo, as well as Adraan, also a centre of considerable importance, are much nearer to the River de Oro than to San Luis Senegal and Mogador in Morocco, the only ports of export now used by the inhabitants of the interior.

All that requires to be done to enable Rio de Oro to attain the commercial importance due to it is to induce these caravans to come to the Spanish factory, an easy undertaking if one considers the many advantages of nearer distances and the greater facilities of portage through populous districts; but as no caravans would venture on new routes without a security that they would be able to dispose of the merchandize, and a certainty that they would obtain a return in the shape of goods for sale or consumption, they therefore proceed to the point which offers them the greater advantages of sale and purchase, such as is to be had at St. Luis, for the factory at Rio de Oro is, through negligence or want of foresight, unprovided with the articles consumed or required in these markets (districts).

The articles of more general use among the Moors are, cotton goods of two or three classes, stills, single or double-barrelled guns (of these, flints are mostly used and obtained at Senegal), tea, iron pottery, leaf tobacco, tar (used for curing camels), loaf sugar, gumias (short swords), razors, knives, scissors, combs, small looking-glasses, wooden boxes, and other cheap light goods; in exchange for which there are ostrich feathers, wool skins, gold, ivory, gum, rubber, and animals.

The ostrich feathers are of four classes according to quality, the first valued at about 1,250 pesetas the kilog., and the fourth class at about 30 pesetas; these prices less than one-half the value in England or European markets. The quintal (cwt.) of wool (of superior quality) in the Sahara only realizes 25 pesetas; skins of antelope, gazelle, tiger, &c., are worth to the natives about 1 real (2½*d.*); the finest cattle bring about 80 pesetas a-head; sheep, &c., 4 pesetas; goats, 2; and other animals in the same proportions.

If this were not sufficient to induce the establishment of a market, such as indicated, there are also the products of the rich fisheries, in old times followed by the

inhabitants of the Canary Islands. With slight outlays curing establishments could be constructed on the coast, the fish being somewhat similar to the Newfoundland cod-fish.

This fish would be suitable for supplying the traders visiting the coast, and available for export to the different colonies in the Gulf of Guinea, who consume it on a large scale. This industry would yield large profits.

To sum up, there is little to be got out of agriculture on account of the poorness of the soil and want of water; the ground is capable of cultivation, but the returns would not repay as compared with other countries.

With regard to development of trade with the natives, and the attraction of the caravans as a centre of barter and exchange on account of the shortening of routes, we believe that a strong Company has a very fair field to work on.

The appointment of Lieutenant Gonzalez (the liberator of the captives of Scod) as Governor of Rio de Oro leads us to hope that he will know how to improve on the intercourse which he has already had with the Chiefs of the country, and benefit Spanish commercial relations; but all these efforts will be of little avail if met with Spanish indifference, and if private enterprise does not come forward with capital and energy in developing the interests of the colony.

Rio de Oro is of importance both politically and commercially.

For the first it requires the attention of the Government, and for the second only individual push and enterprise are necessary.

No. 161.

Consul Finn to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 2.)

(No. 15.)
My Lord, *Malaga, October* 28, 1893, 9·30 P.M.

INTENSE excitement is reigning here owing to telegrams received with the news that Generals Ortega and Margallo have been defeated in a sortie against the Moors round Melilla. Very little is known of the details, but it is said that they have lost the artillery they had with them, and that they were unable to make good their retreat into the fortress, though they were able to take shelter in two of the advanced forts.

General Mouroy, the newly-appointed Military Governor here, and General Macias, the latter as Commander-in-chief, start at 12 o'clock to-night with all the troops at their disposal in the "Isla de Cuba," of the Spanish navy, and a hired transport, the "Luis de Cuadra."

I have, &c.
(Signed) ALEXANDER FINN.

No. 162.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 2.)

(No. 284.)
My Lord, *Madrid, October* 30, 1893.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 283 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report that there is but little to change in the account of the events of the 27th instant which I derived from the telegrams published in the official Gazette. It may make the matter more clear if I state that General Margallo was engaged in constructing trenches on the western or inland side of Fort Camellos, when he was attacked by the Moors, who were in large force on the high ground at Sidi Guariach; he then sent large reinforcements from Camellos, leaving the fort almost deserted, on seeing which, the Moors attacked the fort on the south side, but were kept in check by the guns of the "Conde de Venadito." He subsequently had to retire into Camellos, and later on he withdrew, with the forces he had taken in the morning, to Melilla.

It was then that, on hearing firing at Cabrerizas Altas, he proceeded thither with a small force, and on arriving there found himself cut off from Melilla and also from Rostrogordo. The Moorish entrenchments were on the north and west side, and the enemy advanced to within 25 metres of the fort, and remained there during the night.

In the morning of the 28th, the Colonel Casiellas, in command at Melilla, realizing the dangerous position in which the forts were left, and the fact that they were without

provisions, as it appears they have to be victualled every day, took a convoy with provisions and water under a strong escort, and after what is described as very severe fighting, in which they lost and recaptured two guns, succeeded not only in reaching the fort, but in driving the Moors out of Spanish territory. It was on the approach of the convoy that General Margallo, going out to meet it, met his death.

This information is from Spanish sources; their losses are said to have been slight, but it is difficult to reconcile this statement with the severe fighting which must have gone on for two days.

An additional regiment left Madrid last night, and it is stated that there are already sufficient tents for a large force, and that contracts have been made for provisioning the forces from Malaga, and from the Algerian province of Nemours.

I also understand that the command of the troops may possibly be given to General Martinez Campos, and not to the present Minister of War. By this means popular sentiment would be gratified, and the Ministry will not be weakened at a critical moment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 163.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 2.)

(No. 285.)
My Lord, *Madrid, October* 30, 1893.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, I have now the honour to report, on the authority of Señor Moret, whom I had an opportunity of seeing just as he was going to attend a Cabinet Council, that the Spanish killed and wounded during the engagements of the 27th and 28th amounted to seven killed and thirty wounded, of whom not more than five or six seriously. He stated that if it had not been for General Margallo's unfortunate death the military operation would have been looked upon as a successful one for the Spanish arms, as the Moorish forces had been driven beyond the Spanish boundary.

In answer to my question, he said that nothing had been decided with regard to General Martinez Campos taking the command at Melilla. He was very anxious to do so, but being a Marshal he was of almost too great importance to send on such an expedition.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 164.

The Marquis of Dufferin to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 2.)

(No. 448.)
My Lord, *Paris, November* 1, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship copy of the note which I addressed yesterday to M. Develle, in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram received on the evening of the 30th ultimo, expressing the desire of Her Majesty's Government to continue a policy of cordial concurrence and mutual confidence in the affairs of Morocco, especially in view of the existing crisis at Melilla.

I have, &c.
(Signed) DUFFERIN AND AVA.

Inclosure in No. 164.

The Marquis of Dufferin to M. Develle.

M. le Ministre, *Paris, October* 31, 1893.

IN an interview which M. Waddington had with the Earl of Rosebery on the 30th August, 1892, his Excellency said that it was the wish of the French Government to act in cordial concurrence with Her Majesty's Government in the affairs of Morocco, and that all that France desired in that country was the preservation of the *status quo*.

That this wish was reciprocated by Her Majesty's Government is proved by the instructions given to Sir W. Ridgeway on his appointment to Tangiers (and communicated verbally by me to M. Ribot in January last), to the effect that he should act in close co-operation with the other Representatives of foreign Powers, and especially with that of France; because Her Majesty's Government was convinced that, in the delicate and critical condition of the Moorish Empire, and in the present temper of the Sultan and his Advisers, it was only by a sincere and unselfish co-operation of all the Powers that a favourable result could be obtained.

I am now instructed by Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to state to your Excellency that this attitude continues to be the wish of Her Majesty's Government, and that a policy of mutual confidence seems particularly desirable in view of the existing crisis at Melilla.

I have, &c.
(Signed) DUFFERIN AND AVA.

No. 165.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 2.)

Downing Street, November 1, 1893.

Sir,

IN reply to your letter of the 30th ultimo respecting the alleged exportation of arms from Gibraltar to Morocco, I am directed by the Marquis of Ripon to acquaint you, for the information of the Earl of Rosebery, that the Governor has been instructed to inquire into the statements in Sir George Bonham's despatch of the 25th October as to the manner in which the arms are said to have reached Gibraltar.

I am, &c.
(Signed) JOHN BRAMSTON.

No. 166.

Consul Finn to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 34.) *Malaga, October* 29, 1893.

My Lord,

SINCE writing my despatch No. 33 of yesterday's date, I have had an opportunity of speaking with eye-witnesses of the events at Melilla, and was told by them that the Spanish troops, all told, at that place do not number 4,000 men, while the Moors swarm all round the place, and cannot be less than 20,000, and are more likely 30,000, while more of the tribesmen come in every day.

The country round Melilla is described as consisting, for several miles inland, of deep ravines running at right angles with the coast, up which the enemy creeps to right under the walls of the forts, and even up to the walls of the fortress of Melilla, and as none of the forts are built so as to command these ravines there is no means of preventing the Moors from doing so. Artillery, I am told, is useless unless the Moors chose to expose themselves on the hillocks between the ravines, and cavalry would be entirely out of place.

On the evening between the 27th and 28th, the Riffians came close under the fortress walls, and killed a number of pigs that were within a few yards of them; while for several days no Spanish soldier had dared to show himself by day or night without receiving a volley from utterly invisible foes. In order to put an end to this state of things, Generals Margallo and Ortega made a sortie on the morning of the 28th. Fighting began immediately they left the town, and as the Spaniards were only 3,000 men and four guns, and the Moors at least six times their number, soon became very desperate. Large numbers of the Riff people threw away their muskets, and, using only their long knives, charged up to the cannon mouth; there they overpowered the artillerymen and captured three of the guns. On seeing this, General Margallo himself charged with a body of infantry, and, although he was successful in getting the guns back, was soon after killed by three bullet wounds in the head, neck, and side. A bullet also passed through General Ortega's collar. The latter managed to withdraw his men under shelter, but was shut up himself in the Fort of Cabrerizas Altas, where, when my informants left, he was surrounded by the Moors, who kept a

musketry fire all night, the Spanish artillery and the guns of the "Conde de Venadito" cruizer firing in return whenever the Moors showed themselves.

My informants left Melilla by the mail-boat last night, and so could give no idea of the number of killed and wounded; but they agreed that the number of Spaniards who fell was comparatively small, while of the Moors, they say, at least 1,500 were left on the field. They said that, with the exception of bread, provisions were abundant; but that apart from the supply which was sent from here last night there was not two days' supply of ammunition left at Melilla, and they tell me that early on the morning of the 28th the enemy had succeeded in cutting the telegraph and telephone wires, so that the outlying forts could neither communicate with the town or with each other until a successful attempt was made to introduce signalmen from the "Conde de Venadito." I was also informed that the soldiery got completely out of hand of their officers, and amply revenged on the Moors any cruelties which they may have performed on their comrades after the action of the 2nd.

Generals Marcias and Mouroy left here last night with a battalion of 500 men of the "Cazadores de Cataluña," and further reinforcements are expected here to-night and to-morrow. Meanwhile, all Civil Guards and Carabineros that can be spared have been called into Malaga to take the place of the troops sent to the war.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ALEXANDER FINN.

No. 166*.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 3.)

Sir, *Downing Street, November* 2, 1893.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of the Earl of Rosebery, with reference to previous correspondence, a copy of a despatch from the Governor of Gibraltar relative to the storage and exportation of arms and ammunition.

I am, &c.
(Signed) R. H. MEADE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 166*.

Governor Sir R. Biddulph to the Marquis of Ripon.

My Lord, *Gibraltar, October* 23, 1893.

IN extension of my telegraphic despatch of the 21st instant, I have the honour to submit further particulars on the subject of the storage of arms and ammunition at Gibraltar and their exportation from this port.

2. On receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 20th June, 1893, a Public Notice was issued, stating that from and after the 23rd July licences would be required for the storage of arms and ammunition in the Bay, and between that date and the 24th August five licences were so issued, as shown in the accompanying list.

3. In consequence of further applications being received for similar licences, Major-General Smart, administering the Government, requested further instructions, which instructions were received in your Lordship's telegram of the 24th August. Those instructions gave a certain latitude to the Administrator, and he thought it right to issue three provisional licences for arms, &c., which were already on their way to Gibraltar. These licences, as shown in accompanying List (B), were all issued on the 25th August, since which date no licences have been issued.

4. On the 11th instant a Proclamation prohibiting the exportation of arms, &c., was issued, in accordance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram of the previous day.

5. On receipt of the telegraphic instructions of the 18th instant, a strict search was made in the hulks which had been licensed for the storage of arms and ammunition, the result of which was to show that of the goods introduced under the licences issued on the 25th August, only one case (of cartridges) had been re-exported, which case went to Tangier.

6. No workshops were found on any of the three hulks upon which storage had been permitted, but in some instances the stocks had been removed from the barrels since arrival at this port. The barrels were packed in bundles covered by hessian, and the stocks were packed separately. Cartridges have also been treated in much the same manner, that is, they have been made up into small packages. Many of the cartridges, and some of the arms, have the appearance of having come from Spain. Indeed, one case of arms was found labelled "manufactured in Spain." Many of the cartridges are of an obsolete pattern, and some considerable number have had their bullets extracted. The owner states that he had bought these from the Spanish Government for the purpose of breaking up to sell the lead and metal cases.

7. The three owners of the hulks in question have been notified that the special licences for storage of arms and ammunition have been withdrawn, and that they cannot therefore continue to keep arms, &c., in these vessels. The owners have consented to their removal, under the superintendence of Government officials, to magazines in charge of the Port Department. This is now being carried out, and as soon as full lists have been prepared and signed by the owners and consignees, copies will be transmitted to your Lordship.

8. Steps have been taken to warn masters of vessels that no transhipment of arms can be allowed in the Bay, and that if any such arms are carried in such vessels they must be returned to their shippers. One shipment which arrived here in the steam-ship "Zeus" has already been sent back to Hamburgh. Steps are being taken to ascertain whether any other hulks contain arms or ammunition, but from the search already made it is not believed that they do so.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ROBERT BIDDULPH.

Inclosure 2 in No. 166*.

EXTRACT from Register of Licences to Introduce Arms and Ammunition.

LIST (A).—HARBOUR ONLY.

No.	Date.	To whom issued.	Purport.	Conditions.
43	July 26, 1893	Francis Carreras ..	10 cases of arms, containing 353 fire-arms for exportation. To be stored in Hulk No. 48.	To be presented at the Port Office for record.
44	„ 26,	Ditto	About 500 boxes (as per list) of obsolete cartridges, "Berdan." About 276 boxes of obsolete cartridges, "Remington;" 12 fire-arms and 12 pistols. To store in Hulk No. 48 for export.	To be delivered to Captain of the Port for record in his Department.
45	„ 27,	Manuel Portunato ..	To continue storing in his Hulk No. 27, 29 cases of fire-arms and 19 cases of cartridges, already so stored for export.	To be delivered to Port Department for record.
49	Aug. 8,	M. Abecasis ..	To continue to store in Hulk No. 41, 16 cases of fire-arms, 24 cases of safety cartridges, 18 packages of same, and 24 useless fire-arms.	It must be handed to Port Department for record.

LIST (B).—HARBOUR, PROVISIONAL ONLY.

No.	Date.	To whom issued.	Purport.	Conditions.
52	Aug. 25, 1893	M. Portunato ..	3 cases of rifles and 2 cases of cartridges, to introduce and store in Hulk No. 27.	It is provisional only, and subject to cancellation by Governor. It is to be left at Port Office for record.
53	„ 25,	T. Gamble and Co. ..	4 packages of rifles and cartridges, to introduce and store in Hulk No. 27.	Ditto.
54	„ 25,	M. Abecasis ..	10 cases of rifles, to introduce and store in Hulk No. 41.	Ditto.

No. 167.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 73.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Madrid, November 3, 1893.

THERE was an unsuccessful attempt yesterday to organize a demonstration of sympathy with France and hostility to England. It seems to have been got up by the Republican party acting under influence from Paris.

No. 168.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 54.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Tangier, November 3, 1893.

KAID HARRY MACLEAN, who left Denmat on the 25th October, hoped to arrive at the Sultan's camp on the 31st ultimo. His Shereefian Majesty had not reached Tafilelt at that date, but was expected to arrive there in a short time.

The Portuguese and Italian Ministers and myself are dispatching notes in similar language to Cid Emfadl Gharnit, urging upon him the gravity of the situation. The German and French Representatives have written to the Sultan independently.

The Beni Snassen, it is reported, have declared their intention of joining in with the Riffians. If that takes place the Spaniards will have a hard task before them.

I have received reports from Morocco, dated the 29th ultimo, stating that the Sultan had requisitioned that place for money, and was raising troops in the Sahara for operations against the Riff.

No. 169.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 123.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, November 3, 1893.

I HAVE to request you to inform Mr. Johnston, the Acting British Consul at Mogador, that I approve the language which, as reported in your despatch No. 155 of the 25th ultimo, he held to Mr. Ratto respecting the commercial enterprise of Messrs. Kirby and Cross.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 170.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 146. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, November 3, 1893.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 142 of the 1st instant, the Spanish Ambassador read me to-day the following telegram from Señor Moret:—

"J'ai communiqué à Sa Majesté la Reine et au Conseil des Ministres votre satisfaisante dépêche d'hier. Veuillez dire à Lord Rosebery la confiance que nous inspirent ses déclarations et la grande importance que le Gouvernement donne à l'amitié de l'Angleterre. Je tâcherai de rectifier l'opinion publique malgré l'insistance de certaine partie de la presse Française à l'égarer."

M. del Mazo assured me that his Government intended to approach all questions connected with Morocco in a spirit of moderation. As a proof of this, he informed me that General Martinez Campos would not be appointed to command at Melilla. The selection of so considerable a General would inspire suspicion, and it would be supposed that Spain had great objects in view; while, as a matter of fact, the Spanish Government maintained entirely the declaration which his Excellency had made to me with regard to territorial acquisition.

M. del Mazo also announced that the Moors had retired from before Melilla, but he could not tell, of course, if this implied an abandonment of warlike proceedings.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ROSEBEBY.

No. 171.

Consul Finn to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 35.)

Malaga, October 30, 1893.

My Lord,

I WOULD beg to correct an error in my despatch No. 34 of yesterday's date. I should have said that the ravines ran at "right angles to" instead of "parallel to" the sea-shore.

Yesterday there left this by the "Gerona" frigate for Melilla 760 men and officers of the "Alava" Regiment, 73 mules and 24 carts, with a large number of grape-shot, several guns, and an electric reflector.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ALEXANDER FINN.

No. 172.

Foreign Office to London Chamber of Commerce.

Foreign Office, November 4, 1893.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Earl of Rosebery to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st ultimo in regard to the maintenance of British interests in Morocco, and in conveying to you his Lordship's thanks for this communication, I am to request that you will state to the Executive Committee of the London Chamber of Commerce that the question has Lord Rosebery's constant attention.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. V. LISTER.

No. 173.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 74.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November* 5, 1893.

AN unofficial telegram received here from Oran appears to confirm the rumour reported in Mr. Satow's telegram to your Lordship, that the Beni Suassan had joined the Riffs.

The Active Reserves have been called out by Royal Decree, dated yesterday.

No. 174.

Sir H. Macdonell to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 74.)

(Extract.) *Lisbon, October* 31, 1893.

IT is reported in the public journals that the iron-clad "Vasco da Gama" is being got ready to proceed to Morocco.

No. 175.

Sir E. Monson to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 196. Confidential.)

Vienna, November 2, 1893.

My Lord,

MY German colleague called on me yesterday, and asked me whether I had any information as to the views of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the hostilities now being waged between Spain and the Moors at Melilla.

Prince Reuss spoke of the jealousy with which France watches any step taken by England in Morocco, and said that he believed it was reciprocated on the other side of the Channel, and I found that he had been discussing the matter with Count Kálnoky, who had also mentioned it to me when I saw his Excellency the day before yesterday.

I said to Prince Reuss, as I had done to Count Kálnoky the previous day, that I had no reason for believing that there had been any change whatever in the harmony which existed between Her Majesty's Government and that of Spain with reference to this question. As far as my information went, there was a thorough understanding and complete confidence between the two Governments as to the object and scope of Spanish action.

Prince Reuss having asked me whether it was not the determination of Her Majesty's Government not to permit France to annex any portion of Morocco, I said that my opinion was that we recognized very strongly the inexpediency of raising at this moment the question of any territorial change by which France, Spain, or England might profit, and that in all the region of the Mediterranean, and of contiguous countries, we desired to maintain, as far as possible, the *status quo*.

I may mention that in his observations regarding events at Melilla, Count Kálnoky said that it appeared that General Margallo had been guilty of great imprudence, and might be said to have deserved his fate.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 176.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 288. Confidential.)

Madrid, November 2, 1893.

My Lord,

IN a conversation which I had this morning with a leading banker here, who is, I think, well known to your Lordship, he asked me what I thought would be the result of the present conflict in Morocco. I answered that it was impossible to say, but that, as I

tell everybody who asks me, peace and the maintenance of the *status quo* are the main objects of Her Majesty's Government.

He then said this might be so; but people, meaning presumably officials, were very much under the influence of what Sir West Ridgeway had said when he was here, which was to the effect that affairs in Morocco could not go on as they were for more than a year, and that then the "cataclysm" might be expected.

I answered that it was extremely improbable that Sir West Ridgeway would have used any such language, even if they were his sentiments, which I had no reason to believe. He then alluded to the presence of the combined Channel and Mediterranean squadrons at Gibraltar. I answered that as regard the Channel squadrons it always went to Gibraltar about this season of the year, and that there were many reasons why the Mediterranean squadron should do the same, such as its being popular with the officers.

He said that, speaking for himself, he should be very glad if Spain could get rid of her Colonies on the Morocco coast, as they were a continual source of anxiety, and no profit could be derived from them. As this statement appeared to me to be thrown out with the object of eliciting an opinion as to what England might do in such an event, I answered that we could fully appreciate his feeling, as England has many Colonies which are a source of weakness rather than anything else.

In this connection, he stated that, in his opinion, France did not want anything on the coast of Morocco, though she might have fixed her eyes on an oasis in the interior, of which I could not catch the name.

I said that the language held by the press was calculated to do a great amount of harm, and expressed my astonishment that statesmen should submit to such a tyranny. He answered that this had always been so, that Señor Canovas and his party were just as much at the beck and call ("à la sonnette") of journalists as the party at present in power. He further alluded to the good-will which your Lordship personally feels towards Spain, as shown on the occasion of your visit to this country, and I was glad to be able to confirm his opinion as to the favourable impression then made on your Lordship.

As the connection between "haute finance" and politics is certainly not less intimate in Spain at this moment than in other countries, I have thought it right to report the conversation to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 177.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 6.)

(No. 289.)
My Lord, *Madrid, November* 3, 1893.

THE language held by the press is not a subject on which, under ordinary circumstances, I should think it necessary to address your Lordship. Except to those Englishmen living in Spain, it is not a matter of vital importance if their compatriots are described as Gibraltar robbers, or any other name which may take the fancy of a writer of leading articles, and even they soon begin to look upon the matter with philosophic indifference.

The matter, however, assumes a different aspect when the press begin to advocate an alliance with France, and the French press reciprocate with assurances of undying friendship.

Some of these articles would appear to be written in a provocative spirit, with the object of getting some English newspapers to answer their remarks; but it seems more probable that they are only intended to fall in with the popular feeling which for the moment is much excited with the idea that the English are about to occupy Tangier, the grounds for this being the concentration of the fleet at Gibraltar, and a visit paid about a month ago to Tangier by a Lord of the Admiralty, accompanied by a high functionary from the War Office.

Gibraltar is, I need hardly remark, a perennial source of hard words in the Spanish newspapers. At present, the construction of docks is described as an encroachment on the Neutral Ground for the purpose of building two new forts. Such random shots would not appear to deserve any attention, were it not that the intimate relations between Ministers and the press would make it easy for the latter to obtain correct information; but it is of course possible that Ministers are not averse to public attention being diverted from matters which are to them of greater importance.

In order to show the intimate relations existing between the press and the Government, I inclose a translation from an evening newspaper of yesterday with reference to what had just taken place at a Cabinet Council, and which is no doubt a praiseworthy attempt to stem the flood of opposition against England.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

Inclosure in No. 177.

Extract from the "Correspondencia de España" of November 2, 1893.

(Translation.)

IN the Council presided over to-day by Her Majesty the Queen, the Minister of State read a telegram from the Spanish Ambassador in London, giving an account of an interview with Lord Rosebery yesterday, in which the British Minister reiterated the genuine and frank feeling of friendship entertained by Her Britannic Majesty's Government towards Spain, as well as its decided intention not to intervene in Morocco, and to leave Spain a free hand to conduct her own operations.

These assurances of Lord Rosebery are confirmed by the attitude of the British Minister in Tangier, of the Governor of Gibraltar with regard to the contraband of arms, and by all the information in possession of the Spanish Government.

No. 178.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 6.)

(No. 290.)
My Lord, *Madrid, November* 3, 1893.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to report that I learn, on trustworthy information, that the unanimous onslaught made in the press during the last few days against England, and in favour of France, is the result of an understanding with the French press.

These articles, however ridiculous in themselves, had the desired effect on the mind of an unreasonable and excitable mob, and resulted yesterday in a demonstration being held in front of the Civil Governor's official residence. Their avowed object was to go in the first instance to the French Embassy, make demonstrations of good-will and sympathy, and then to the English Embassy, in order to make demonstrations of a contrary character. These intentions were, however, frustrated by the action of the police, who charged the mob, and dispersed them.

The Ministers profess themselves unable to check these objectionable articles in a direct manner; but, as your Lordship will have gathered from the inclosure in my preceding despatch, they are taking measures to do so in what they consider to be a more effectual manner.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 179.

Mr. Gosselin to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 6.)

(No. 260.)
My Lord, *Berlin, November* 3, 1893.

BARON VON MARSCHALL told me to-day that the German Representative in Morocco had been instructed to use his best endeavours in urging the Sultan to accord as quickly as possible to the Spanish Government all reasonable compensation for the aggression made by the Riff tribes on the Melilla garrison.

I informed his Excellency that I gathered from the official correspondence received here last night, that similar instructions had been forwarded to Mr. Satow.

Baron von Marschall said he was glad to hear this: the German Ambassador at Madrid had reported only two days ago that, in spite of the good understanding which

was known to exist between Her Majesty's and the Spanish Governments with regard to the attack on Melilla, nearly every organ of the Spanish press ("no doubt," added his Excellency, "inspired by your friends, the French") agreed in declaring that England was frustrating the efforts of Spain to avenge the insult to her flag, that arms were being smuggled across to Morocco from Gibraltar, and that the British fleet had been ordered to the Straits to be in readiness to seize Tangier at the first favourable opportunity.

I replied that I hoped it was needless for me to state that there was no foundation whatever for these rumours.

Baron von Marschall said he was sure of this: he had merely mentioned the German Ambassador's report as illustrating the mischievous influences which are at work in Spain at the present moment: with an excitable population to work on, and a weak Government at the head of affairs, the field was left open for any amount of international intrigue.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MARTIN GOSSELIN.

No. 180.

Mr. Gosselin to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, November 6, 1893.*

THE Emperor told Colonel Swaine yesterday evening that orders have been issued to the French fleet to follow the British fleet while cruizing off Morocco. It appears that the reason for these instructions is the suspicion that Great Britain is plotting against Spanish interests. A Memorandum on the subject will be forwarded by the Queen's Messenger on Saturday.

No. 181.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November 6, 1893.*

URGE Moorish Government to lose no time in taking all possible steps with a view to the cessation of further hostilities on the part of its subjects against Spaniards at Melilla.

You should generally support the action of your Spanish colleague in the matter.

No. 182.

The Earl of Rosebery to the Marquis of Dufferin.

(No. 472.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 6, 1893.*

HER Majesty's Government approve the note which your Excellency has addressed to M. Develle respecting British policy in Morocco, and of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch No. 448 of the 1st instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 183.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir G. Bonham.

(No. 143.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 6, 1893.*

THE Spanish Ambassador called here to-day, and was informed of the substance of my telegram to Mr. Satow No. 38 of the 6th instant respecting the support to be given to the Spanish policy in Morocco.

His Excellency expressed his gratitude, and said that the unanimity of the Powers as to the troubles at Melilla was, he believed, secured, and was of great value and importance at the present conjuncture.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 184.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 124.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 7, 1893.*

I HAVE received and considered carefully your despatches Nos. 150, 156, and 157 of the 13th and 25th ultimo.

It appears from your Report that Cid Bubekir has been requested to provisionally surrender his letter of appointment, pending the investigation of the charges that have been made against him.

I regret that you should have thought it necessary to take this step, which is one of much severity, and seems hardly warranted by the conclusions at which you have arrived, as recorded in your despatch No. 150.

The charges are unsupported by any evidence as yet brought before me, and are, indeed, at variance with the archives of this Department, which contain strong testimony to the able and efficient manner in which Cid Bubekir has carried out the duties intrusted to him. Under these circumstances, it was not my intention that the inquiry which you were authorized to make should be of a strictly formal character, still less that Cid Bubekir should be suspended during its progress.

As Cid Bubekir has now spontaneously resigned his post, on the ground of ill-health, it would serve no useful purpose to prosecute the investigation further, and it only remains for me to request that you will address a letter to him, as soon as may be practicable, regretting his infirmity, thanking him heartily for his past services, which you are sure will still unofficially be at the disposal of Her Majesty's Government, and extending to him British protection as a private individual.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 185.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 276.)
My Lord, *Madrid, October 25, 1893.*

IN the present crisis the Spanish Government would perhaps do well to be guided by the opinions of the Conde de Benomar, a Spanish diplomatist of some repute, whose testimony should carry additional weight, inasmuch as he was Spanish Minister in Morocco between 1860 and 1872, during which period the Moors made three distinct attacks against Spanish authority, all of which were satisfactorily arranged without recourse being had to arms.

These opinions have been published in the press, and form an agreeable contrast to the wordy declamation with which they are in juxtaposition.

It is shown that in the old Treaties between Spain and Morocco the Sultan was not responsible for any hostilities on the part of the Moors, simply recognizing the right of the Spaniards to repel them with artillery, but by the Treaty of Wad-al-Ras, which was negotiated by Count Benomar, it was stipulated (Article VII) that any act of aggression against a Spanish fortress or any impediment to raising fortresses in a conquered district would be considered to be an act of disobedience to the Sultan which he would be bound to punish.

The first instance occurred in 1863, when a conflict arose between the Moors of the Riff at Melilla, which was repressed by the Sultan sending a large army, under the command of his brother, to punish them. On this occasion the Spaniards assembled a large force of men and ships between Alicante and Malaga, in case the Sultan should not fulfil his duty.

The second occasion occurred in 1871, when the Spaniards desired to alter the course of the Rio de Oro, which the Moors thought would be in some way prejudicial to them. The Conde de Benomar again had recourse to the Sultan, calling on him to carry out Article VII of the Treaty of 1860. A large Moorish force was again sent, in spite of which an attack was made on the Spanish force, which was repelled. The works were stopped, and the Sultan was again appealed to.

Meanwhile, public opinion in Spain was becoming very excited, and the press was calling on the Government to send a force of from 6,000 to 8,000 men to Melilla.

Count Benomar accordingly sent two telegrams, in the first of which, dated the 20th September, he stated that the action of the Moors of the Riff had been recognized as an insult to the Sultan's authority, and would be severely punished when his troops arrived; that the resistance of the Moors at River Oro had been foreseen, and a special Protocol had been drawn up to provide that the Sultan should find means for repelling it. The Moorish Government therefore requested that the Governor of Melilla be instructed not to make sorties from the fort, but to confine himself to being a spectator of the conflict between the Sultan's troops and the Moors, giving assistance with artillery from the fortress; that the question was one between the Sultan and his subjects, and that he (Count Benomar) would answer for the Sultan fulfilling his engagements.

In his second telegram, dated the 7th October, his Excellency states that as he notices that the Government was being urged on by public opinion and the press to take the matter into their own hands and to send a force to Melilla to attack the Moors, he gave it as his opinion that if this were done the matter would be most serious, the force actually there being too small, whereas to enter the Riff an army of 12,000 men would be necessary; that a delay would be no disadvantage, whereas it would be decidedly disastrous, in view of the Sultan's assurances, to take action before diplomatic measures had been exhausted.

The Spanish Government, acting on this advice, did not send troops, but waited.

In December the Moorish Commander arrived before Melilla, gave up the ring-leaders of the attack in chains, made excuses in the name of the Sultan before the assembled garrison, and begged that the works at the River Oro might be continued. This was done without any further interruption on the part of the Moors, and the utmost satisfaction was manifested by the press at what was described as a diplomatic triumph and the settlement of the question without loss of Spanish blood. A somewhat similar case occurred in 1873, the details of which are not given.

Since 1860 the policy carried out by the Spanish Government with regard to their African possessions has practically not changed, and has consisted in calling on the Sultan to give satisfaction, while making preparations to take action in case he should not comply with the demand, either from bad faith or inability to do so.

The Count concludes his review by stating as his opinion that, if at the present juncture the Spanish Government alter their policy by paying no attention to the Sultan, and proceeding against the Moors themselves, an army of 12,000 will be necessary, as he said in 1871, when the Moors were not armed with Remington rifles; and preparations will also have to be made for the contingency of war with Morocco, in the event of a "holy war" being proclaimed, and of the Spanish Settlements of Ceuta, Peñon, and Albucemas being attacked by fanatical hordes.

I have been induced to reproduce Count Benomar's impressions because the events of 1871 appear to offer a very exact parallel with those of to-day; and although the Sultan's answer has not yet been received, the broad fact remains that, until it has been received, and he shows himself unwilling or unable to chastise the Moors of the Riff, the Spaniards are precluded from taking the matter into their own hands, at all events beyond their actual position at Melilla.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 186.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 8.)

(No. 279.)
Madrid, October 25, 1893.

My Lord,

IN a conversation which I had to-day with Señor Moret, I asked him whether he had good news from Melilla. His Excellency answered that it was a question of considerable anxiety to him. The Kabyles of the Riff were fortunately divided, and part of them would

side with the Sultan. At the same time, he could not disguise from himself the fact that with this large force of armed soldiers, animated with the strongest feelings of patriotic ardour on one side, and a host of barbarous savages on the other, there was every prospect of severe fighting before very long, and it might then be difficult to restrain the Spanish forces within their strict limits. He appeared to be quite sensible of the effect this might have, so I did not think necessary to press it. He expected, he said, that the Sultan's answer would be entirely favourable. At the same time, until he received it in about a week's time, he would feel considerable anxiety. He thought it probable, he said, that the Sultan would send a large force to chastise his rebellious subjects, perhaps 20,000 men; but they could not reach the Riff country till some time in December, and, in the meantime, there was this inflammable material, consisting of the large force of soldiers in Melilla, as well as the irrepressible press in this country. I then asked whether the expenditure on such a large force would not be very considerable, alluding to the purchase of Mauser rifles. He said it would no doubt be large, and on my alluding to an indemnity, he said it must be a large one, as it must be sufficient to maintain the large force and construct their batteries. He went on to say that the three conditions which he had proposed to the Sultan were, the fulfilment of his Treaty obligations, the punishment of the men responsible for the act of aggression at Melilla (which he said he would leave entirely to the Sultan), and an indemnity. I said I hoped it would not be a very large one, as Morocco, being a poor country, in the event of her inability to pay, an excuse might be given for the interference of foreign Powers. His Excellency seemed surprised at this remark, but said that an indemnity was the best means of punishing the offending Moors, as it would be from them that the Sultan would extort the money. He added, however, that he had not in his communication to the Sultan made any allusion to the amount of the indemnity, and that it would depend to a great extent on the attitude which he assumes.

On taking leave of his Excellency, I said that at present all the Powers seemed to be anxious to prevent a conflagration, and that I hoped it would be found possible to restrain the ardour of the soldiers at Melilla until the Sultan had time to send his forces.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 187.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 8.)

(No. 280. Confidential.)
Madrid, October 26, 1893.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to report that, before my interview with Señor Moret, I had seen the German Military Attaché, who had himself had an interview with Señor Moret the previous day.

The conversation appears to have turned principally on the military aspect of the situation. Señor Moret told him emphatically that the object of the present expedition is the construction of a line of forts within the actually defined Spanish territory, that it has been found necessary to send a large force, because 2,000 men will be required to guard the exterior lines, and a large number will be occupied in building the forts and in keeping guard. He further stated that a severe battle is expected to take place early in November, for which the Spaniards wish to be fully prepared.

In answer to the inquiry whether the Moors actually encroached on Spanish territory on the occasion when the trenches were bombarded by the "Conde de Benadita," his Excellency said that the question had been asked by the Minister of War, and that General Margallo had answered, "It appears they did." On my informant expressing surprise that the General in command could not give a more decided answer Señor Moret acquiesced, but said it was to be accounted for by the fact that the boundary-line was not very clearly marked at that place.

The Technical Commission sent to examine the proposed plan of operations on the spot has returned, and submitted their Report to the Minister of War; but the results have not been allowed to transpire.

My German colleague gave it entirely as his own opinion that the danger of the present situation lies in the possibility that the French, whose influence in Morocco is said

to have increased since Sir Charles Euan-Smith's mission, may possibly induce the Sultan to resist the Spanish demands. Whether he has anything beyond mere conjecture to support this opinion I have no means of knowing.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 188.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 56.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, November 8, 1893.*

A FAIRLY satisfactory reply has been received by the Spanish Minister from the Sultan through the Moorish Agent for Foreign Affairs at Tangier, in answer to his representation sent from here at the beginning of last October.

In it the Sultan expressed his regret at what had taken place, his wish to be on terms of friendship with Spain in common with all the other European Powers, and his intention of sending troops to Melilla to keep the Riffians in order.

No. 189.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 127.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 8, 1893.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 152, Confidential, of the 19th ultimo, reporting a conversation which you have had with your Spanish colleague respecting the contraband exportation of arms, &c. from Gibraltar and other places to Morocco.

With regard to the suggestion made by Señor Potestad, that suspected vessels, flying the British flag, should be held liable to search on the high seas by Spanish cruizers, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government must suspend any expression of their views upon the subject until they receive direct from the Spanish Government a formal application to the same effect.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 190.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 8, 1893.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 2nd instant in regard to the alleged exportation of arms, &c. from Gibraltar to Morocco, I am directed by the Earl of Rosebery to transmit to you, confidentially, for any observations which the Marquis of Ripon may see fit to make, the accompanying copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Minister at Tangier,* reporting a conversation which he has had upon the subject with his Spanish colleague.

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 191.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 291.)
My Lord, *Madrid, November 5, 1893.*

ACCORDING to the intelligence officially published yesterday a convoy conducting ammunition to the outlying forts of Rostrogordo and the two Cabrerizas was attacked on the 3rd instant by the Kabyles, with a loss of two killed and thirteen wounded. It is

* No. 150.

thus shown that although the Spanish forces were able to drive them beyond the boundary, they are unable to prevent them from returning again under cover of darkness, and it would appear that, for the present at all events, the operations of the Spaniards will be confined to keeping the outlying forts provisioned and maintaining connection between them and Melilla itself.

The reported action of General Macias in sending a cruizer some considerable distance down the coast to bombard certain villages inhabited by Kabyles, said to be implicated in the recent attack on Melilla, is one which, if confirmed, may be considered to be not entirely justified.

The published accounts of what took place in a Cabinet Council on Friday stated that it had been decided to call out the reserves, and to-day's "Gazette" contains the following announcement:—

"The tenacious resistance of the Kabyles of the Riff to the exercise of our lawful dominion in the territory outside the fortress of Melilla renders it indispensable, having regard to events which may occur, to increase the forces of the permanent army, bringing up the strength of the active forces comprising it, this case having been foreseen in Article 150 of the Law of Substitutes of the 11th July, 1885, which provides that with this object the troops of the active reserve may be called out."

The Royal Order calling out the reserves, of which I have the honour to inclose a translation, is annexed.

It is difficult to obtain reliable information, but I am informed that commissariat and sanitary arrangements at Melilla are still in a deplorable state.

I may here mention that General Chinchilla, whose departure for Melilla had been reported, has not yet left, but it is stated that he will do so when the forces sent to Melilla have reached a sufficient number. According to present arrangements, neither General Martinez Campos nor the Minister of War will proceed thither.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

Inclosure in No. 191.

Translation from the "Madrid Gazette" of November 5, 1893.

Ministry of War.

Royal Decree.

IN conformity with the provisions of Article 150 of the existing Law of Recruitment and Substitution for the Army, at the instigation of the Minister of War and in accord with my Council of Ministers; in the name of my august Son, King Alphonso XIII, and as Queen Regent of the Realm,

I hereby decree the following:—

Article 1. All classes and categories of troops of the various arms and corps of the army in the Peninsula and military commands of Ceuta and Melilla, who, having received military instruction, belong to the active reserve, are called to the colours.

Article 2. The Minister of War will issue the necessary instructions for giving effect to this Decree.

Given at the Palace, this 4th day of November, 1893.

(Signed) MARIA CRISTINA.

The Minister of War:
(Signed) José Lopez Dominguez.

No. 192.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 9.)

(No. 292.)

My Lord, *Madrid, November* 6, 1893.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 291 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy and translation of the Article of the Law of Substitutes of the 11th July, 1885, which is alluded to in the Royal Decree issued yesterday calling out the reserves.

I also inclose a Table showing the strength on a war footing of the Spanish army as shown in the Royal Decree of the 29th August last, of which copies were forwarded in Sir Henry Drummond Wolff's despatch No. 233 of the 1st September, 1893, amounting, it will be seen, to 132,076 infantry and 16,856 cavalry.

A Circular is also published in the official organ of the Ministry of War providing for the immediate incorporation in the corps which garrison the military posts of Ceuta and Melilla of all troops, including sergeants who have not completed their three years' service in the ranks, who for any reason may be absent from the corps to which they belong, or who may be on leave of absence, temporary or permanent, with the exception of those absent on account of sickness.

It is further stated that a Circular will be issued by the War Department, calling out with the least possible delay the reserves of 1888, 1889, and 1890.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

Inclosure 1 in No. 192.

Translation from the "Liberal" of November 6, 1893.

The Provision of the Law of Substitutes.

IN order that the Decree of the 4th instant may be better understood, we reproduce below the Articles of the Law of the 11th July, 1885, to which it refers.

Article 2. The duration of military service in the Peninsula shall be of twelve years from the day on which the recruits are enrolled.

During these twelve years the recruits enlisted at each enrolment shall be included in the following classes and categories :—

1. Recruits on the rolls.
2. On permanent service with the colours.
3. In the first reserve or on leave.
4. Recruits in depôt or conditionally enlisted.
5. In the second reserve.

Categories 2, 3, and 4 are active, and recruits must serve six years in them, completing the obligatory total in the first and fifth categories.

Article 5. The third or active reserve category shall consist of those soldiers, corporals, and sergeants who, having served their appointed time with the colours, in conformity with the previous Article (three years), may receive permanent leave to go to their homes, without by this acquiring a right to do so ("sin goce de haber alguno").

In this category they shall serve the remaining time necessary to complete their first six years of service from the day on which they were appointed to their respective corps, to which they will continue to belong, liable to be reincorporated on the first notice.

Article 150. In time of war, or when, from extraordinary circumstances, an unforeseen increase of the permanent military forces [? is necessary], the Government may, by virtue of a Decree issued by the Minister of War, place on a war footing the whole or part of the active forces, as he may deem necessary, by summoning to the colours those soldiers of the active reserve included in them. The Government may likewise mobilize and call to arms the whole or part of the forces of the second reserve before or after forming new fighting units from the recruits remaining in depôt after supplying the deficiencies of the permanent active corps. For the completion of the second reserve and the formation of the above-mentioned units from the recruits in depôt, a law or a Royal Decree is necessary if the Cortes are not in session.

Inclosure 2 in No. 192.

Translation from the "Liberal" of November 6, 1893.

Increase of Forces.

THE Royal Decree of the 29th August last fixes as follows the war strength of the infantry and cavalry of the Spanish army :—

	Men.
Infantry—	
1 Regiment = 2,001.	
1 Battalion of Rifles = 1,001.	
56 Regiments	112,056
20 Battalions	20,020
Total	132,076
Cavalry—	
1 Regiment = 602.	
28 Regiments	16,856

No. 193.

Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 9.)

(No. 293.)

My Lord, *Madrid, November* 6, 1893.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 278 of the 25th ultimo, reporting that the Spanish Government had acquired 10,000 Mauser rifles from Germany, I am now informed that the rifles, with regard to the acquisition of which there had been some difficulty in consequence of their having been made for the Argentine Government, are now on their way to Melilla, having been shipped at Bremen.

I understand, further, that a Commission of Spanish officers left Madrid yesterday for Germany, in order to negotiate with Herr Krupp for a number of guns.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. F. BONHAM.

No. 194.

The Marquis of Dufferin to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 9.)

(No. 455.)

My Lord, *Paris, November* 8, 1893.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 448 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship copy of a note which I have received from M. Develle in reply to my note of the 31st ultimo, assuring me of the pleasure with which he has received the assurance of the desire on the part of Her Majesty's Government for the cordial co-operation of France in the affairs of Morocco, and alluding to the friendly action in this sense already taken by the French Representative at Tangier.

I have, &c.

(Signed) DUFFERIN AND AVA.

Inclosure in No. 194.

M. Develle to the Marquis of Dufferin.

M. le Marquis, *Paris, le 4 Novembre*, 1893.

PAR une lettre en date du 31 Octobre, votre Excellence a bien voulu rappeler les déclarations faites, dans le courant du mois d'Août 1892 par M. Waddington a Lord Rosebery, touchant le désir de la France d'agir au Maroc dans un esprit d'entente cordiale avec l'Angleterre en vue d'y maintenir le *statu quo*. Elle ajoutait que ce vœu

était également celui de Sa Majesté Britannique, aux yeux duquel une coopération sincère et désintéressée de toutes les Puissances au Maroc peut, seule, assurer une solution favorable des difficultés actuelles. Vous insistiez, en même temps, sur l'importance que le Cabinet de Londres attache spécialement à une coopération confiante avec la France sur ce terrain.

J'ai été d'autant plus heureux de recueillir ces assurances que nos propres dispositions répondent entièrement à celles que votre Excellence a été chargée de me faire connaître, et dès le début de la crise à laquelle elle fait allusion, notre action amicale s'est exercée à Tanger dans le sens où le Gouvernement Anglais tient, de son côté, à diriger ses efforts.

J'ai, d'ailleurs, la confiance que les conseils et l'appui diplomatique donnés par les deux Puissances au Gouvernement Espagnol lui permettront de régler l'affaire de Melilla dans des conditions conformes aux vœux exprimés par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) J. DEVELLE.

No. 195.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 9.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, November* 7, 1893.

HAVING laid before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your letter of the 6th instant, respecting the movements of the French fleet in the Mediterranean in connection with disturbances in Morocco, I am commanded by their Lordships to request that you will lay before the Earl of Rosebery, for his information, the attached copy of the instructions issued by the Admiralty to the Admiral commanding the Channel squadron, observing that, if thought desirable, special directions might be given not to visit the Morocco ports without instruction.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure in No. 195.

Admirally to Vice-Admiral Fairfax.

(Extract.) *Admiralty, October* 16, 1893.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to signify their direction to you to leave Portsmouth in Her Majesty's ship "Royal Sovereign" with Her Majesty's ship "Immortalité," on Wednesday, the 18th October, and, having by arrangement picked up the Plymouth ships off that port, to proceed with the squadron under your command to Gibraltar, which is to be considered as your head-quarters during the winter.

2. You are to inform Admiral Sir Michael Culme-Seymour, the Commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, of your arrival within the limits of the station under his command.

3. You are to cruize from Gibraltar, as may be considered desirable, on the coasts of Spain, and in the Western Mediterranean in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar; but not to visit a French port without special permission.

4. A division of the Mediterranean squadron, under the Commander-in-chief, will probably visit Gibraltar after Spezia, and my Lords consider it desirable that the two squadrons should meet at Gibraltar on that occasion.

5. My Lords have not thought it desirable to fetter your discretion by fixing absolute dates for arrival and departure, or to lay down the precise ports to be visited; but they desire that you will give due notice of your intentions, and submit from time to time in advance a programme of your proposed movements, in order that approval may be given, and arrangements may be made with regard to the mails for the vessels under your orders, and that their Lordships may be kept informed of your postal and telegraphic address.

No. 196.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 9.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, November* 8, 1893.

WITH reference to my letter of yesterday's date, inclosing extracts from the orders issued to the Vice-Admiral commanding the Channel squadron for his guidance while cruizing, with Gibraltar for his head-quarters, and with reference to subsequent personal communications, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request that you will inform the Earl of Rosebery that they have this day issued telegraphic orders that the Channel squadron is to remain at Gibraltar for the present.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

No. 197.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 9.)

(No. 77.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November* 8, 1893.

SEÑOR MORET has earnestly requested me to telegraph to your Lordship expressing his gratitude for the loyal way in which Her Majesty's Government have supported him in Morocco. Before consulting any other Government, his Excellency wishes to learn your Lordship's opinion as to what course should be adopted in case no answer is received from the Sultan, or if the answer is unsatisfactory. If no answer is received by the 12th, which, according to his Excellency's calculation, is an amply sufficient delay, it will be difficult not to declare war. Public opinion has been too much excited; already, on the 28th, when news of the Spanish reverse arrived, the expression of feeling was such as to threaten even the safety of the Monarchy.

To confine the campaign to the neighbourhood of Melilla will be extremely difficult owing to the deficiency of water and supplies, and to the impossibility to find room for troops sufficiently numerous to crush the 50,000 Riffs who at present surround the Spanish lines. In the event of war being declared, operations would be extended to Tangier and other places.

With regard to the attitude of France, his Excellency has had no official communication, but believes that the declaration of war would not be displeasing.

He has not communicated with the Spanish Ambassador in London or any one except myself, under pledge of secrecy, and relying on the friendliness of the British Government.

The above is merely a reproduction of the language used by his Excellency, who appeared to be a good deal excited and alarmed at the state of opinion in Spain.

No. 198.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 9.)

(No. 78.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November* 9, 1893.

SEÑOR MORET has just informed me that he received the Sultan's reply last night; that it was satisfactory, "but yet not quite sufficient."

No. 199.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 10.)

(No. 158.)
My Lord, *Tangier, October* 28, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to inclose translation of a note dated the 4th instant, addressed to the foreign Representatives by Cid Emfadl Gharneet, stating that certain tribes, notably those of the Gharb and the Beni Hassan, taking advantage of the absence of their Governors, who had accompanied the Sultan on his journey to the Sahara, had amongst other misdeeds, attacked the Government couriers and those of the foreign Representatives. He adds that the Sultan wishes the latter to be informed that as soon as the object of his expedition is accomplished, and the Governors have returned to their tribes, the culprits will be severely punished.

The robberies of postal couriers between Rabat and Laraiche, to which his Excellency is evidently referring, began early in September. As soon as the first was reported to me, I lost no time in addressing a note to him, urging that measures should be taken to punish the perpetrators of the outrage, and to insure the safety of the couriers and others using that route. This was on the 14th ultimo, and a week later M. Souhart, the French Chargé d'Affaires, who had equal reason to complain, likewise addressed a emonstrance to the Moorish Government. Owing, however, to the distance at which the Sultan then was, and still is, for aught we know at Tangier, it seems scarcely likely that this letter addressed to the foreign Representatives in general can be in answer to our complaints. Even supposing that our notes of remonstrance had reached the Sultan's camp before the 4th October, such alacrity in answering would have been altogether contrary to Moorish habits. It seems probable, therefore, that the note of the Vizier for Foreign Affairs is due to reports having reached the Sultan direct from the Governors of Laraiche and Rabat.

Several subsequent cases of robbery of couriers having recently been committed in the same region, I have on each occasion addressed the Court, urging them to take the necessary measures to put a stop to this lawlessness. I trust that the promise contained in the note of Cid Emfadl Gharneet will be fulfilled, and that the aggressors will be punished. Otherwise I shall consider it my duty to ask your Lordship's permission to demand from the Moorish Government indemnification, not only for the couriers who have been assaulted, but also for the Gibraltar Post Office Administration, whose revenue has doubtless been diminished owing to reports of the insecurity of the route, and which may possibly find itself called on to make good their value to the senders of registered letters that have been stolen or destroyed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure in No. 199.

Cid Emfadl Gharneet to Foreign Representatives.

Aux Représentants des Puissances Amies.

(Traduction.)
(Après les compliments d'usage.)

NOTRE maître m'a ordonné de vous informer que quelques tribus de ses États fortunés qui n'étaient pas accoutumés à voir le Makhzen entreprendre une expédition au Sahara, lorsqu'elles l'ont vu partir pour cette région et leurs Gouverneurs s'absenter avec lui, les malfaiteurs se sont mis à répandre la nouvelle que Sa Majesté Chérifienne (que Dieu l'assiste !) avait emporté avec lui le Trésor public, et s'était dirigé à Tafilelt pour y séjourner et ne pas revenir aux villes de ses États, à l'instar de quelques anciens Souverains et leur esprit leur a suggéré pour cette raison l'idée de s'écarter de la voie de l'ordre et du bon sens et de s'occuper de désordre et d'assaillir les routes, et particulièrement les tribus du Gharb et des Beni H'sen, réputées comme partisans de la paix et de la tranquillité, soit que leur Makhzen se trouve près d'elles ou éloigné entre autres méfaits les malfaiteurs de la tribu du Gharb ont attaqué les couriers de la Poste, chargés du transport des lettres du Makhzen et de quelques dépêches des Représentants, et se sont emparés de cette correspondance, qu'ils ont ensuite déchirée, d'après les informations du Gouverneur de Salee.

En conséquence notre Seigneur vous informe que lorsque le Makhzen aura accompli le but de cette expédition fortunée et que les Gouverneurs seront rentrés dans leurs tribus quiconque se sera rendu coupable de ces méfaits sera traité avec toute la sévérité applicable en ce cas et châtié, par la force et la puissance de Dieu, ce dont nous vous informons pour votre gouverne. Nous désirons ardemment que vous en ayez le cœur net et que vous n'en éprouviez pas d'inquiétude, car ce n'est là qu'un nuage d'été prêt à s'évanouir et disparaître grâce à la présence de Sa Majesté (que Dieu la fortifie !).

Conservez-vous toujours bien.

Le 24 Rebi I, an 1311 (4 Octobre, 1893).

(Signé) MOHAMMED-EL-MUFADDAL-BEN-MOHAMMED GHARNEET.

No. 200.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 10.)

(No. 159.)
My Lord, *Tangier, October* 28, 1893.

WITH reference to the note from the Vizir of Foreign Affairs inclosed in my despatch No. 158 of this day's date, speaking of the Sultan's projected expedition to Tafilelt, I have the honour to report that His Majesty had not up to the 7th instant reached that place. The latest information in my possession shows him to have been still at that date at Guers or Tiatlatin, about 25 miles to the south of the crest of the Atlas. It has been stated that the strong opposition of the Sultan's half-brother, Mulaï-el-Reshid, who governs the Oasis of Tafilelt, is the reason why His Shereefian Majesty has penetrated no farther. There is no doubt that with his large following of some 40,000 men he has experienced much difficulty in obtaining provisions in sufficient quantity, and that it has been found necessary to dispatch supplies from Morocco and other parts more obedient to his rule. A rumour was extensively circulated about a fortnight since to the effect that he was surrounded by hostile Berber tribes, who killed any stragglers, and completely prevented his moving forwards or retreating. But the arrival, a few days ago, of a body of sixty men, who came direct from the camp to Tangier to carry off the well-known prisoner El Hammam to Morocco, and the delivery of letters from the Court with which their leader was intrusted, have set these alarms at rest. Whether the Sultan will ultimately be able to pay a visit to the Sanctuary at Tafilelt, even with a reduced escort, seems still uncertain, but all the circumstances point to the probability of his return to Morocco city about the middle of next month.

During His Majesty's absence on the other side of the mountains there have been disturbances in the Province of Shawia, south of Casablanca, but the Sultan's cousin, Mulaï-el-Kebir, is already there engaged in restoring the authority of the ruling powers, while it is rumoured that his eldest son, Mulaï Mohammed, is to be dispatched against the Zemour, Beni Hassan, and people of the Gharb, who have been in almost open revolt for the past two months.

Absolutely nothing is known as yet of the effect produced on His Majesty's mind by the news of the conflict between the garrison of Melilla and the neighbouring Moors of the Riff. I am much inclined to believe that he will carry out his original intention of proceeding to the city of Morocco when the lateness of the season warns him to recross the mountains before the passes are covered with snow. The general opinion seems to be that he will not undertake any repressive operations against the Akalaia tribe, to which the aggressors belong. There are, according to the opinion of a Moorish official of high standing, two courses open for choice: the Sultan might send a large force to crush the tribe, or even proceed to do so in person; or he might let loose the neighbouring tribes to "eat up" the Akalaia. The Beni Snassen, for instance, would be able and ready to perform the operation alone. It was added that the former alternative would be the best, but the latter simpler and more economical.

It will also, I believe, be more in accord with the traditional policy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 201.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 10.)

(No. 160.)
Tangier, October 30, 1893.

My Lord,

THE Spanish Minister has just communicated to me a telegram which he received late last night from his Government, of which the following is a translation:—

"The occurrences of the last two days do not modify in any way the attitude of the Spanish Government towards the Sultan. You will be careful to accentuate with more insistance each time. We have been again attacked within our own possessions, whilst making defensive works, independent of and distant from the fort of Sidi Guariach. Up to the very eve of the attack the Riffians had given assurances that they would commit no hostilities as long as the fort was not constructed. The Government therefore makes the Sultan responsible for what has happened, and emphasizes its demands, requiring exemplary chastisement of the rebels, indemnities for the victims, as well as for any material injuries that may have been sustained. It will also be necessary to require guarantees against the repetition of such attacks in the future. When communicating with your colleagues of the Diplomatic Body, you will point out to them the very grave aspect the question has assumed in view of recent events, as well as the urgent and imperious necessity of impressing on the mind of the Sultan the duty of hastening back with all speed, and making all necessary arrangements for giving Spain satisfaction and insuring peace for the future."

In reply to the question what he would like me to do, the Marquis de Potestad said that he had already made a similar communication to Count d'Aubigny, who had at once offered to write in urgent language to the Sultan and to Count Tattenbach, who, while expressing his willingness to take the same step, which his personal acquaintance with the Sultan would naturally facilitate, felt it necessary to first obtain the authorization of his Government. After informing me of this, it was the Marquis de Potestad's intention to visit the Italian Chargé d'Affaires for the same purpose. He would feel greatly obliged if I would also write to the Court to impress on the Sultan the grave position which had been created by this renewed and unexpected attack.

To this I responded that I would at once telegraph to your Lordship for the necessary permission, and suggest the desirability of the action of the foreign Representatives whom he had consulted being taken conjointly. With this idea the Marquis de Potestad heartily agreed, for, as I reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 153 of the 23rd instant, he would fain hope that joint action with regard to Melilla might inaugurate a more harmonious phase of European diplomacy in Morocco than has hitherto prevailed. At the same time, he thought it might be difficult to induce the German and French Representatives to act openly in concert. I myself am not sanguine of success, but it is worth while to make the endeavour.

The Marquis de Potestad appears to be of opinion that the language to be adopted towards the Sultan should be calculated to inspire him with alarm. He should be warned that if he does not give complete satisfaction to Spain, that Power will be forced by the course of events to declare war against Morocco with the object of chastising the aggressors, and of securing a material guarantee for the future in the shape of an addition to the territory of Melilla, and that, should that come to pass, probably other Powers would consider it necessary to secure their interests by active measures. Otherwise the Sultan, who is under the impression that he scored a triumph over Great Britain last year, may be unwise enough to believe that England and France will, for their own sakes, combine to prevent Spain from inflicting any serious penalty.

I trust, however, that the desired object may be attained without resorting to anything in the nature of menace.

Unanimity of action among the Representatives of the Great Powers interested would probably suffice to produce the required impression on the Sultan's mind, without its being necessary to foreshadow either a joint coercion or a general scramble for the fragments of his Empire.

I should mention that it is not the Spanish Minister's intention to address the Sultan direct. He will continue as heretofore to present the demands of his Government to the Sultan's Agent at Tangier, to be by him transmitted to the Court. His reason for adhering to this course is that he may avoid any appearance of departing from the policy adopted by him from the first in accordance with the instructions of his Government. That policy is intended to exhibit the patience and moderation of Spain, and her determination not to proceed to extremities so long as there is any reasonable ground of

hope that the Sultan will himself undertake the chastisement of these, who hitherto have been recognized as his subjects. At the same time, he suggests that his colleagues who are offering advice to the Sultan in a friendly capacity may perhaps see their way to speaking more vigorously than he can under the circumstances.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 202.

The Marquis of Dufferin to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 10.)

(No. 208. Africa.)
Paris, November 9, 1893.

My Lord,

DURING the course of a conversation yesterday M. Develle informed me, of his own accord, and without my having made any previous reference to the subject, that the reports in relation to the dispatch of a French expedition to Tuat were untrue and destitute of all foundation.

He added that there appeared to be a suspicion in the mind of the Spanish Ambassador that the attack by the Arabs upon Melilla was being encouraged by the Emperor of Morocco.

He again repeated his desire to act with England in preventing the present disturbances from assuming such proportions as might superinduce further complications.

I have, &c.
(Signed) DUFFERIN AND AVA.

No. 203.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 10.)

Admiralty, November 9, 1893.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter of the 8th instant respecting the presence of a number of British ships at Gibraltar, to which the Spanish Ambassador at this Court had called attention, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request that you will state to the Earl of Rosebery that Admiral Sir M. Culme-Seymour has left Gibraltar for Malta with his squadron in accordance with his programme of movements, and that the Channel Squadron are the only ships now at Gibraltar.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

No. 204.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 10.)

(No. 80.)
(Telegraphic.) P.
Madrid, November 10, 1893.

MOROCCO. At an interview which I had with Señor Moret last night, his Excellency showed me the text of the telegram in which the communication from the Sultan was conveyed. No mention is made of the indemnity, but it is understood to be covered by the following passage in the Sultan's note:—

"With God's help I hope to leave nothing undone that may be necessary to efface the last vestige of displeasure caused by the Riffs to Spain, whose great friend I am."

His Excellency is anxious that the British press should make the most of the Sultan's letter, as a Spanish success. This will be an assistance to him in his endeavour to pursue a policy of moderation, as urged in your Lordship's telegram No. 23 of the 24th ultimo, in opposition to the popular demand for strong measures.

No. 205.

Señor del Mazo to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 10.)

THE Spanish Ambassador presents his compliments to Sir Philip Currie, and has the honour to inclose him the text of a telegram from the Minister of State relative to the Sultan's answer to the note of the Spanish Government upon the affairs of Melilla, which he received yesterday after he had been to the Foreign Office.

Spanish Embassy, London, November 10, 1893.

Inclosure in No. 205.

The Minister of State to the Ambassador of His Catholic Majesty in London.

(Translation.) *Madrid, November* 9, 1893.

THE Spanish Minister at Tangier has communicated to me, by telegraph, the text of the note sent to him by Mohammed Torres, by order of the Sultan, in answer to our first communication. The Sultan's letter is dated Tafilelt, and has taken nineteen days to arrive at Tangier. Its contents correspond exactly with the demands made by Spain of the Sultan, who, after lamenting deeply what has occurred, and condemning the conduct of the Riff tribes, announces that he is sending cavalry at once to prevent them continuing their attacks on Melilla, and is preparing an army in case that they should not obey him. The Sultan assures us that, with the help of God, he will do all that lies within his power to remove all traces of the grievance felt by Spain at what has occurred, in order that the great and loyal friendship binding Spain to Morocco may continue. Be pleased to communicate the above to the Government to which you are accredited.

No. 206.

The Marquis of Dufferin to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 10.)

(No. 102.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, November* 10, 1893.

M. DE LEON Y CASTILLO, the Spanish Ambassador, having received instructions to consult me on the affairs of Morocco, called on me this morning.

His Excellency began by saying that the position of the Spanish troops at Melilla had become unendurable. It was impossible to undertake a campaign against the Kabyles. The Sultan had the proper remedy in his hands, and should reduce the tribes to order, as he was obliged to do by Treaty. If he refused to do so, it only remained for Spain to go to war with Morocco. A war of this kind might have disastrous consequences for Europe. Such pressure ought therefore to be brought to bear by England and France on Morocco as would put a stop to the present disturbances.

I told his Excellency that I had heard that the terms in which the Sultan had replied to the Spanish demands were not altogether unsatisfactory.

M. de Leon y Castillo stated that he himself had no notification to this effect.

Upon my asking his Excellency what view the French Government took of the situation, he stated that M. Develle held the same view of the matter as himself.

No. 207.

*The Earl of Rosebery to the Marquis of Dufferin.**

(No. 105.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November* 11, 1893.

I UNDERSTAND that the course which Spain has hitherto consistently pursued has been, in the event of outrage or attack, to call upon the Sultan to restore order and indemnify her, and that she has not proceeded to take up arms herself until satisfied of his failure to do so.

* Also to Sir H. Drummond Wolff (No. 27).

It seems clear that this is the proper course for Spain now to pursue, and I am glad to notice that the requirements of the case appear to be satisfied by the reply which the Sultan has sent.

No. 208.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 144.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 11, 1893.

I APPROVE the language, on the Morocco question, held by Sir George Bonham in an interview with a leading banker in Madrid, as recorded in his despatch No. 288, Confidential, of the 2nd instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 209.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir E. Monson.

(No. 139.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 11, 1893.

I HAVE to convey to your Excellency my approval of the language which you held to Prince Reuss respecting the good relations existing between this country and Spain, as recorded in your despatch No. 196, Confidential, of the 2nd instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 210.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 12.)

(No. 81.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November* 12, 1893.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 27 of the 11th instant, I have heard on good authority, but not from an official source, that the Sultan will be called on to pay a large indemnity, and to make territorial concessions round Melilla which are stated to be necessary for the security of the fortress.

It appears that these conditions are approved by the French Ambassador. The second might form a pretext for advancing the Algerian frontier to the Muluja.

Telegrams have been published here, announcing that the Russian and French fleets have left Algeciras for Tangier.

The warlike preparations and movement of troops continue.

The presence of a Military Attaché would be an advantage for direct communication with the Ministry of War, and to furnish technical details.

No. 211.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 12.)

(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November* 12, 1893.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding telegram, Señor Moret doubts the accuracy of the announcement as to the movement of the French and Russian squadrons.

Referring to the indemnity, he informed me that the amount had not yet been determined. On the question of the cession of territory round Melilla, his Excellency's answers were not quite satisfactory. The matter is to be arranged with the Sultan, after consultation with the Spanish Generals on the spot.

The French are endeavouring to circulate a report that we wish to annex Tangier.

His Excellency particularly called my attention to an article which was about to be published by the Stefani Agency expressing the views of Signor Crispi. It will be

an attack on the policy of the present Italian Government in Africa, as inconsistent with an understanding between Great Britain, Spain, and Italy in the Mediterranean. His Excellency would like to know your Lordship's opinion as to what answer should be made to this article when published.

He thanks your Lordship for the contents of your telegram of the 11th instant.

No. 212.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 162. Confidential.)

Tangier, November 3, 1893.

My Lord,

IN continuation of my despatch No. 160 of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to inclose a copy of the note which, acting on the sanction conveyed in your Lordship's telegram No. 36 of the 31st ultimo, I have this day addressed to the Minister, Cid Emfadl Gharnit.

This note is conceived in somewhat stronger language than that employed in the *note verbale* I caused to be delivered to Cid Mohammed Torres on the 7th ultimo. It draws the attention of the Minister to the fact, that though a month has elapsed since the first unprovoked attack on Melilla, the Moorish Government is not yet known to have done anything to afford satisfaction to Spain. The tribes, encouraged by impunity, have returned to the assault, actually invading Spanish territory. Delay not only emboldens the Riffians, but also tries the patience of the Spanish Government, who could easily have applied the necessary repressive measures, but refrain because they hold the duty of keeping his subjects in order to be incumbent on the Sultan. If the idea were to get abroad that his power was insufficient, the Empire would be in great danger. Her Majesty's Government are much concerned that he should happen to be at such a distance when his attention is urgently needed in the Riff, and trust he will at once proceed to take the necessary steps for putting an end to the outbreak, and afford satisfaction to Spain. It adds that this is the advice which Her Majesty's Government, sincerely anxious for the welfare of the Sultan and the integrity of his dominions, have instructed me to offer.

The Italian Chargé d'Affaires and the Portuguese Minister have to-day addressed notes in almost identical language to the Vizier, Cid Emfadl Gharnit, but the French and German Ministers have preferred to act independently. The former informs me that, on the 30th ultimo, he dispatched a note to the Vizier urging the Sultan, in so many words, to return at once from Tafilelt and to proceed to the Riff in person, as His Majesty could not trust his lieutenants to act with the necessary vigour. The German Minister has also stated to me that he wrote to the Sultan the day before yesterday in very forcible terms, offering to His Majesty the same specific advice as the French Representative.

News has reached me to-day from the city of Morocco to the effect that on the 29th October messengers arrived there from the Sultan with instructions to send him money and ammunition, as he was preparing an expedition against the Riff. It was also reported that His Majesty was endeavouring to raise soldiers among the tribes of the Sahara by offering extremely high rates of pay.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure in No. 212.

Mr. Satow to Cid Emfadl Gharnit.

Tangier, November 3, 1893.

(Compliments.)

IT is now a whole month since the tribes of the Riff made a sudden and unprovoked attack upon the Spanish garrison of Melilla, and we do not yet know that the Moorish Government have done anything to restore order, or afford the satisfaction claimed by the Spanish Government. The news was forwarded to the Sultan's camp without delay, and must long ago have come to His Majesty's knowledge. But the tribes, encouraged by impunity, have again made an attack in large force upon the Spanish lines, actually invading the territory of Spain. I have already, by the commands of my Government, addressed Cid Mohammed Torres, pointing out to him the gravity of the situation, and the necessity of adequate measures being taken at once to restore order, and to afford to Spain

the reparation to which she is entitled. Every day's delay on the part of the Shereefian Government increases the danger. On the one hand, the hostile tribes are emboldened; on the other, the patience of the Spanish Government approaches exhaustion. It would have been easy for them long before this to have repressed the violence of the aggressor, but they have refrained, because they are unwilling to let it be supposed that the Sultan is unable to keep order among his own subjects. If that idea should become widely diffused the Empire of Morocco would be in great danger. I am instructed, therefore, to express the regret (concern) of my Government that His Majesty should happen to be at such a distant part of his dominions just at the moment when a serious event of this kind demands his immediate attention, and they trust that he will at once make all necessary arrangements for giving complete satisfaction to Spain and insuring peace hereafter. This is the advice which the British Government, sincerely anxious for the welfare of the Sultan and the integrity of his dominions, has instructed me to offer.

(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 213.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 164.)

Tangier, November 4, 1893.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 155 of the 25th ultimo, I have the honour to state that a correction should be made as to the locality of the Zafat tribe, with which Sir A. Kirby's Syndicate state that they have made an Agreement for opening a port to trade.

Mr. Vice-Consul Johnston has written privately to inform me that from independent inquiry he finds this tribe is located not beyond Cape Juby, but at only a few hours' distance from Wad Noon.

In that case Zafat is probably to be identified with Azouafil, about latitude 28° 30′, and longitude 13° 15′ west* of Bienconi's Map of Morocco. But as this spot is clearly within the dominions of the Sultan of Morocco, it would be expedient, I think, to warn the Syndicate that their so-called concession or agreement is contrary to the international stipulations between this country and Morocco, and that trading to Zafat they would be liable to confiscation of any goods attempted to be imported, besides the other penalties specified in Article XIII of the Commercial Convention of 1856.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 214.

Sir H. MacDonell to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 76. Secret.)

Lisbon, November 3, 1893.

My Lord,

IN a conversation with Senhor Hintze Ribeiro, his Excellency referred to the political situation in Spain, and made no attempt to conceal his serious anxiety lest the course which the Spaniards seem bent to pursue in Morocco should lead them into insurmountable internal complication, and raise diplomatic questions of considerable importance.

His Excellency spoke about the contents of the Circular which the Spanish Representatives have been instructed to communicate to foreign Governments, and remarked that the tone of that document appeared to him most incautious, the more so when coupled with the language held by the Spanish Minister at Tangiers.

"The attitude of the Spanish Government in the Morocco incident, if I correctly understand it," he said, "seems to indicate that Spain has now entered on a venture which is likely not only to open the way to international disagreements, but is fraught with the greatest danger both to herself and to Portugal.

"So far as I am able to judge," his Excellency added, "Spain has assigned to herself a task of no mean proportions which she is now bound to fulfil, and which, if carried out in its entirety, must involve her in difficulties with other Powers. On the other hand, if she fails in accomplishing it, I am of opinion that nothing can save her from a military

* Of Paris, or 10° 55′ West of Greenwich.

administration, which would only be a stepping stone to a Republican régime. Such an event would necessarily prove fatal to Portugal by placing the Monarchy in imminent danger.

"We are," Senhor Hintze Ribeiro further said, "fully prepared to meet a Republican movement which may be set on foot in Portugal; but if it were to come from Spain, under the circumstances I have described, it would be idle to suppose that we could stem the current which will then sweep across our frontier, and that we can then hope to save the Monarchy, the more so, as the Spanish Republicans are well aware that, so long as the Monarchy continues in Portugal, no Spanish Republic can look forward to prolonged existence.

"In any case," he added, "I cannot account for the extraordinary excitement which the events of Melilla have aroused in Spain, or for the reason that has prompted Señor Sagasta to give way to public opinion; it is a known fact that on a former similar occasion, he obtained satisfaction from the Riff tribes without all the noise and *éclat* given to the present incident."

His Excellency then informed me that he knew that the Spanish Republicans, probably aided by foreign agents, were actively fomenting the discontent which the Morocco question is creating; and that a number of their French and Portuguese *confrères* have lately crossed the frontier into Spain. He also called my attention to the fact that whenever the Republicans are preparing to agitate, their journals at once commence to abuse England.

In conclusion, Senhor Hintze Ribeiro requested me to assure your Lordship that, in any question that the present crisis may give rise to in Tangiers, the Portuguese Representative has been instructed to act in concert with Her Majesty's Minister, and his Excellency, at the same time, gave me to understand that he himself would gladly be guided by your Lordship's views on the subject, confident that the course which your Lordship proposes to follow with regard to Spain and Morocco will be best calculated to protect the interests of this kingdom.

On taking leave, his Excellency asked me to report to your Lordship what had passed between us in a strictly confidential form.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. G. MACDONELL.

No. 215.

Consul Harford to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 27.)
My Lord, *Teneriffe, November* 3, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a letter received to-day through Mr. Vice-Consul Miller, of Las Palmas, Grand Canary. Mr. Donald Mackenzie is, I understand, manager of the trading station at Cape Juby. The vessel "Adan" is a Spanish schooner, usually employed trading between the Canary Islands.

I have, &c.
(Signed) S. H. HARFORD.

Inclosure in No. 215.

The North-West African Company to Vice-Consul Miller.

Cape Juby, October 18, 1893.

Dear Sir,

WE beg to report that a vessel called the "Adan," from Las Palmas, has lately communicated with this coast on several occasions between this port and Cape Bojador. Arms, ammunition, money, &c., have been distributed amongst the natives by those on board the vessel.

We beg to state that this Company possesses rights over the country from Cape Bojador in the south to Wad-Draa in the north, and that any vessel or vessels communicating with that portion of the coast of Africa without licence or permission from this Company may be proceeded against. We have frequently pointed out the dangers and risks of these clandestine voyages. As they still continue, this Company may find itself under the necessity of taking some steps regarding this matter.

We have further to point out that the distribution of arms amongst the natives of this country by the "Adan" is, we believe, an infringement of international law, which may lead to serious complications.

We have further to state that, after the "Adan" had done what is reported above, the patron (captain) endeavoured to obtain a bill of health at this port on the 11th instant.

On the following day he took two Moors on board for Canary, from a place some distance south of here.

We should be glad if you would kindly communicate the substance of this letter to the Commandante of Marine, and also kindly forward a copy of this letter to Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Teneriffe.

We are, &c.
(For the North-West African Company, Limited),
(Signed) DONALD MACKENZIE.

No. 216.

Consul Finn to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 38.)
My Lord, *Malaga, November* 6, 1893.

ACCORDING to fairly trustworthy authority, the following was the number of Spanish soldiers in Melilla on the 31st ultimo :—

GARRISON.

Regiment.	Number of Men.
"Africa"	875
Disciplinario	493
Melilla (cavalry)	45
Marines	90
	1,503
Reinforcements lately sent—	
Artillery (7 companies)	672
"Segorbe"	396
Engineers	360
"Barbon"	720
"Estremadura"	720
"Pavia"	720
"Cuba" (Rifles)	396
"Cataluña" (Rifles)	396
"Tarifa" (Rifles)	396
2 mountain batteries	200
2 field batteries	160
	5,136
Add garrison	1,503
	6,639

But from these must be deducted the total of 22 killed and 88 wounded, leaving an efficient total of 6,529 men, besides the Commissariat and Medical Staff, and 300 men of the "Santiago" Dragoon Regiment, who passed through here on Wednesday last.

The steamer "Sevilla," which in peace time used once a-week to take 300 tons of water for drinking from here for the use of the garrison, now does so three or four times in the week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ALEXANDER FINN.

No. 217.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 297.)
Madrid, November 8, 1893.

My Lord,

A CERTAIN change seems to have come over the language of the press, and the hostility reported by Sir George Bonham is diminished.

In to-day's "Liberal," a paper which has been very violent on the subject of England, there appears the following article :—

"All the acts and manifestations of the British Government show, in our opinion, an unquestionable loyalty.

"The Spanish Government knows perfectly what to expect on this point.

"Sir Drummond Wolff, who arrived last night at Madrid, and who will certainly have a conference to-day with the Minister of State, will repeat to Señor Moret, in the opinion of other Ministers, what the Government have known for some days by means of our Ambassador in London, Señor Mazo, namely, that England recognizes as natural and legitimate the claim of Spain with all its consequences, and, on her part, has addressed, and will continue to address, earnestly her counsels to the Sultan to adjust his conduct to the stipulations of our Treaty with Morocco.

"The Government received intelligence yesterday from our Consul at Gibraltar, which serves as a further proof of the sincerity with which the Ministry of Queen Victoria is proceeding with respect to Spain.

"The Secretary of the Governor of that Fortress told the Consular Agent we have mentioned that the authorities had ordered the concentration in one place of all arms and munitions of war which were for sale, and have further forbidden under severe penalties that any sales should take place without special permission.

"The Government of Madrid does not therefore foresee that their action in Melilla, or, should the necessity arise later, in the Empire of Morocco, will give rise to any international difficulty, as this can clearly be deduced from the attitude towards Spain of the other Powers interested in Africa, and especially of England."

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

No. 218.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 299.)
Madrid, November 8, 1893.

My Lord,

YESTERDAY I called by appointment on Señor Moret, and had a long interview with his Excellency.

His Excellency informed me that the excitement in Spain with respect to Morocco was increasing daily, and that unless an answer was returned by the Sultan by the 12th it would be impossible to avoid taking the most stringent measures. His Excellency was of opinion that the Sultan was trying to evade giving an answer altogether. At his earnest instance, I telegraphed in my telegram No. 77 the complete substance of his Excellency's remarks.

His Excellency went on to say, though somewhat in contradiction with opinions he had formerly expressed, that France exercised considerable influence in Spain. This circumstance he attributes to the following causes.

Between 1813 and 1833, when the Bourbonic idea prevailed, great pains were taken by France to associate with her own the public opinion in Spain. In the press and in the pulpit the advantage of despotic theories was contrasted with liberal ideas, to which were attributed the sufferings of Spain during the absence of the Bourbons from the Throne of France. These views were encouraged by the Dynasty and Government of Spain, and propagated by every possible means.

On this followed the part taken by Mr. Canning in the emancipation of the Spanish Colonies, whereby Spain has been lowered and impoverished.

Side by side with these considerations is the continuous mortification to Spanish patriotism, caused by the sight of the British flag over the fortifications of Gibraltar. This feeling, his Excellency added, could not be argued away.

More recently the spread of Republican feeling in Spain had been fostered by the success of the Republic in France, and no effort was spared by the French Republicans to

enlist the sympathies of that party in Spain. Recently a Madrid telegraphic agency, known as Fabras, had passed into the hands of Havas. His Excellency still retained a certain control over it, but the transfer was a symptom of French activity.

He himself had been gibbeted and caricatured as the creature of England. He had worked with success to modify the anti-English attitude of the Spanish press. His policy was English, and he wished to act under the advice of Her Majesty's Government. But unless satisfaction were promptly given by the Sultan of Morocco, war was inevitable. Melilla was not of sufficient strength to maintain a larger army than the present. There was no neighbourhood from which supplies or water could be obtained, and the Riffs, whose food consisted of barley bread, were constantly relieving each other and harassing the Spanish troops. If this went on, his Excellency apprehended danger both for the Queen-Regent and the future of the Monarchy. On the 28th October, when a movement was on foot for a friendly demonstration before the French Embassy and a hostile manifestation before this Embassy, the danger, which was very great, had been averted by the strong will of Señor Aguilera, the Governor of Madrid ; but further delay was impossible.

I reluctantly consented to address to your Lordship the telegram I forwarded, but the anxiety, not to say alarm, of Señor Moret were so evident, that I found it necessary to give him the promise.

I inclose the translation of the version of the conversation given by his Excellency to the "Liberal," over which he has regained some influence.*

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

No. 219.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 300. Confidential.)
Madrid, November 9, 1893.

My Lord,

IN the course of my conversation yesterday with Señor Moret, his Excellency informed me that the Powers which had supported Spain in Morocco were Austria, Germany, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom. Portugal had also done so apparently, not with his Excellency's cordial approval, as there was an evident misgiving that at a given period that Iberian Power might put forth her claim to a reward.

His Excellency also said that he fancied Russia would have been quite willing to take a similar course, but for this he had given no opening.

In the Minister's opinion, France was labouring under delusions respecting Russia. The latter country had made herself mistress of the situation by recent manifestations, and would alone reap the benefit. The Emperor was bent on peace, and France was mistaken if she thought to obtain assistance from Russia for a war with the Triple Alliance. Such support would be limited to the Mediterranean, into which Russia wished to establish an access.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

No. 220.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 301.)
Madrid, November 10, 1893.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 79 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to inclose herewith, copy and translation of a supplement to the evening newspaper "El Correo," which publishes the substance of the Sultan of Morocco's answer to the representations made by the Spanish Government with regard to recent events at Melilla.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

* Not printed.

Inclosure in No. 220.

Supplement to "El Correo" of November 9, 1893.

(Translation.)

THE SULTAN'S NOTE.—According to intelligence which we consider to be from a good source, important telegrams have been received this morning from Tangier, in which precise information is given as to the whereabouts of the Sultan, and furthermore, certain ideas are here advanced as to his reply to the note from our Government. The Sultan was in fact staying at Tafilelt, and his letters had been delayed nineteen days in reaching Tangier; the bearers of these letters being certain soldiers of His Shereefian Majesty.

The Sultan, as we have heard, according to the note delivered yesterday by Sidi Mohammed Torres to our Minister in Tangier, condemns the conduct of the Riffs, protests his firm friendship for Spain, and threatens his subjects with punishment.

He has likewise sent orders to the Riffs to suspend any attitude of hostility towards Spain, the bearer of his instructions being a notable personage of the Court. Meanwhile, the Sultan is preparing an army to chastise the rebels should they disobey his orders, and has ordered a force of cavalry to march for the Riff forthwith.

The note of the Sultan's Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed to our Minister at Tangier ends more or less in the following words:—

"The Sultan has commanded us in the most categoric manner to give you every information, and to assure you that he will act with rigour, so that, by the grace of God, no traces may remain of anything likely to cause discord in the solid friendship uniting the two Governments."

We believe that this important intelligence has occupied the attention of the Ministers in the Council, presided over to-day by Her Majesty the Queen.

No. 221.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 302. Most Confidential.)

Madrid, November 10, 1893.

My Lord,

THE Pope's Nuncio has told me that the French Ambassador who has just returned has been charged with the most friendly messages to the Queen and the Spanish Government.

M. Roustan informed Mgr. Cretoni that before leaving Madame Carnot had said to him that the French Government knew too well the cares which surrounded the Queen-Regent to think of adding to them, and an intimation has, I am told, been given that the question of Tuat will not in any way be raised.

At the same time, I am convinced that in conveying these friendly messages on the part of France, some attempt has been made to sow distrust as to the intentions of Her Majesty's Government.

I am to be honoured next week with an audience by Her Majesty the Queen-Regent, when I shall endeavour to reassure Her Majesty as to the intentions of England, respecting which I have reason to believe doubts have been insinuated.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

No. 222.

Mr. Edwardes to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 297. Very Confidential.)

Rome, November 9, 1893.

My Lord,

WHEN some days ago I called on Signor Brin, his Excellency told me that M. Rascon, the Spanish Ambassador, had just left him, and that, naturally, their conversation had principally turned on the state of affairs in Morocco, brought about by the conflicts at Melilla, and on the course of action to be followed by the Spanish Government

for the punishment of the Kabyles, and to avenge the check which Spanish arms had encountered.

Signor Brin told me that he had spoken very openly to Signor Rascon, urging the imperative necessity of moderation on the part of the Spanish Government, so that France should have no pretext for a sudden development of her policy of encroachment in Morocco, and Signor Brin had added, he said, that he was confident that any material disturbance of the *status quo* in that country, which might be brought about by the demands of Spain, would oblige Great Britain to adopt a very energetic policy for the defence of her own interests.

"J'ai dit à M. Rascon," M. Brin went on to say, "que je pourrais jurer que l'Angleterre désire bien sincèrement le *status quo* dans le Maroc, mais vous pouvez être bien sûr qu'elle ne vous permettra jamais de mettre la main sur Tanger, ni sur bien d'autres choses."

Signor Brin repeatedly told M. Rascon that he sincerely hoped that Spain would obtain all the satisfaction which she had a right to demand on account of the attacks of the Kabyles, but he trusted that the demands she would make would be measured by moderation.

From the reports which had reached him, M. Brin said that he was glad to think that the Spanish Government appeared to wish to act with moderation, being fully cognizant of the dangers which might follow on any other course; but it evidently appeared to M. Brin, that Signor Rascon might not be a good adviser on this point to his Government.

M. Brin told me that he had also had a conversation on the state of affairs in Morocco with M. Billot, the French Ambassador, who had also spoken of the importance of the maintenance of the *status quo* in Morocco, but that, when the question of the French advance on Tuat, &c., was incidentally referred to M. Billot had remarked, "mais tout ça nous appartient."

M. Brin concluded by observing to me that France's views as to the maintenance of the independence of Morocco were certainly peculiar and convenient to herself.

I made no remark to his Excellency, beyond saying that there could be no shadow of a doubt but that the independence of Morocco had always been an unvarying point in the policy of England, but that I believed that Her Majesty's Government desired that the maintenance of the *status quo* should be interpreted as genuinely and as loyally by other countries as by England.

I thanked Signor Brin for the counsels of moderation which he had given to M. Rascon, and which I ventured to believe were entirely in accordance with your Lordship's wishes.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. G. EDWARDES.

No. 223.

North West African Company to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 13.)

132, Cheapside, London, November 11, 1893.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship has already been informed, on the 5th April last, that Messrs. Cross and Kirby were making investigations upon the coast of Tekna.

The copy of a letter appended to this, and marked (A), indicates the intentions which they then professed to entertain. Their overtures were at first unfavourably received, but they have since been renewed, and ammunition, arms, and money have been distributed through their agency amongst the tribes. The matter is so serious that I think it my duty to communicate to your Lordship in detail such information as I at present possess.

There was recently in the employment of my Company a Druse Interpreter named Talhook. In spite of his professions of fidelity when in our service, this man has now become the go-between for Messrs. Cross and Kirby and the tribesmen. During the month of September last he has been endeavouring to seduce the friendly Azzurgeens to act against us, although they have been hitherto subsidized by us, as he well knew. Messrs. Cross and Kirby, being ignorant of the tribal language, have little control over their agent, and there can be no doubt that he is furthering his employers' design and his own ends by scattering broadcast promises as impossible as they are unbounded. The terms of one of their arrangements are that Messrs Cross and Kirby will pay the Azzurgeens 500 dollars a-month, and will build them houses in the Dourah, on condition that they shall act for the benefit of Messrs. Cross and Kirby, and separate themselves from our trading operations.

A consideration of the geographical position which this tribe occupies will at once convince your Lordship of the harm which such an arrangement must occasion to us, as well as show, from what I shall have to say later, that these arrangements involve an infringement of our rights.

My Lord, this is not all. One Hammad, a younger brother of El Bashir, and who is still bound to us by an agreement of service, together with a Foycat named Mudrish, have been brought to England by Talhook, and they are now masquerading in London as Moorish Potentates, under the protection of Sir Alfred Kirby and his sons. The Agreement to which I have referred is appended, and is marked (B).

The only object which we can conceive Sir Alfred Kirby can have in making a parade of our truant servant and of the low caste Arab, his companion, in London, is to obtain from them their execution of some pretended Treaty relating to the country of Tekna, on which pecuniary advances may in some manner be obtained.

Your Lordship will remember that in April 1889 El Bashir, the present Ruler of Tekna, who was then solemnly chosen Sheikh by representatives of all the seventeen tribes, granted to the Company political rights of an extensive character over the whole of Tekna. Such a Treaty as that which we believe is in the contemplation of Messrs. Cross and Kirby would, therefore, be an infringement of the Company's rights, as well as derogatory to the sovereignty of El Bashir.

It may be that Messrs. Cross and Kirby do not fully realize the impropriety and danger of the course they are being induced to pursue since their only means of information are from discharged servants of our own, who are themselves entirely ignorant of the true condition of affairs.

We do not know of any pecuniary resources which Messrs. Cross and Kirby can command, and if the public is appealed to, being without information, the public may as easily be deceived as Messrs. Cross and Kirby may themselves have been. The public may besides be induced to support these gentlemen in consequence of the credit attaching to an allegation which I am unable to believe, and which I trust your Lordship will inform me is entirely without foundation. Sir Alfred Kirby's son declared to the Company's representative that Messrs. Cross and Kirby were acting with the approval of Her Majesty's Government, and that they had the assurance of their support.

Assurances of assistance and encouragement on the part of Her Majesty's Government were in 1875 accorded to my Company, and except upon the faith of them our settlement at Cape Juby would never have been made.

Our entire enterprise long ago might have been advantageously disposed of to foreigners had we not deferred to the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, and agreeably to those wishes the Company have for years continued to hold their station and encounter alone the active hostility of the Sultan of Morocco. If it be true, as is alleged, that the Government are prepared to support a rival British Company which cannot exist without an infringement of our Treaty rights, it will be impossible for us to reconcile such a course of action with the assurances which Her Majesty's Government has been pleased to give to us, and the position of our Company will become intolerable.

The French on the east, the Spanish on the south, on the north the Sultan—all are disturbing factors to which fresh elements of discord will be added if Messrs. Cross and Kirby are not discouraged from continuing their intrigues amongst the tribes.

My Lord, to conclude. If encouragement is to be given to the projects of these gentlemen, it can only be given contrary to the assurances of Her Majesty's Government to ourselves, and in defiance of the Treaty to which I have adverted.

If these gentlemen are encouraged to proceed, no good can result to the tribes, to the public, or to Her Majesty's Government, and the consequences to our Company must be disastrous in the extreme. I venture, therefore, to hope that Her Majesty's Government will refrain from offering any such encouragement or countenance to Messrs. Cross and Kirby in their enterprises in the neighbourhood of Cape Juby as is apprehended, and I venture to request that your Lordship will kindly inform me that any assertion that such encouragement has been or will be given has no foundation in fact.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOSEPH C. LEE, *Chairman.*
(G.R.)

Appendix (A).

Yacht "Fingal," January 5, 1893.

Sir,

THIS will be handed to you by my confidential and faithful servant, Khalel Abraham James, who will explain to your Highness our business on your shores.

And greeting your Highness in all faith from English gentlemen, ask you to grant us an interview and camel escort, or if you will come on board our steamer we send you a hearty welcome.

We have come here deceived by a Captain Wood, who has handed us a Concession drawn up by your Council assembled, and have stores, houses, well-boring apparatus, and machinery at a cost of 15,000 dollars, and if you do not grant us the Concession we will be great losers, and require to take back to England all we have brought out. If you grant us the Concession it will make you very rich, and we are prepared to make railways, warehouses, piers, &c., and spend millions of dollars on your territory, and we are, great Sheikh, yours, &c.

(Signed) CROSS AND KIRBY.

To his Highness Hassan Bairook,
Territorial and Hereditary Freeholder, Sheikh, &c.,
Africa.

Appendix (B).

Memorandum of Agreement between the North West African Company and Hammad Woold Mohamed Bairook.

The Company agrees to employ Hammad, and he agrees to serve the Company at Tarfaya or elsewhere on the following conditions:—

1. The Company shall pay Hammad a salary of 25 dollars in cloth and other goods; also two bags of rice and ten loaves of sugar per month. The payment or salary shall commence on the date of this Agreement, and shall continue until either party shall give three months' notice to terminate this Agreement.

2. Hammad shall serve the Company as Mokkaddem or Chief of Police at Tarfaya. He shall engage at first five men to act as police, for which the Company shall pay him one sack of rice and one piece of cloth and one loaf of sugar for each man; the number of men to be increased should the Company wish it, and the pay of each additional man to be the same as above, viz., one bag rice, one piece cloth, and one loaf sugar.

3. The police shall be under the orders of Hammad, and shall serve the Company faithfully, and protect its interests in every way. Hammad shall be responsible for good order amongst the native residents at Tarfaya, or those who may come from time to time. He shall have the power and shall punish such persons amongst the natives who may attempt or do mischief, or insult the Company's servants. He shall drive away any mischievous persons who may resort to Tarfaya. He shall also facilitate the Company's business.

4. Hammad shall assist in paying the allowances to the different Chiefs, and generally advise as to the character of each person who receives allowances. He will also check his brother, El Bashir, in any act that might injure himself or the Company, and will do his utmost to direct him in what is right. He will always be obedient to the orders of the manager of the Company.

5. No advance shall be made of the salary either to Hammad or to his men, but he shall receive it monthly as it becomes due. Should Hammad fail to carry out his duties, the Company reserves to itself the right to dismiss him.

The North West African Company (Limited),
(Signed) DONALD MACKENZIE.

Witnesses:
(Signed) NAJIB KISBANY.
FRED. S. ZAYTOUN, M.B., &c.

August 1, 1893.

No. 224.

The Earl of Rosebery to the Marquis of Dufferin.

(No. 106.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November* 13, 1893.

REFERRING to my previous telegram respecting Morocco, endeavour to ascertain what are the views of the French Government with regard to a possible Spanish demand for an addition of territory near Melilla, sufficient for the erection of works to protect that fortress.

No. 225.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November* 13, 1893.

REFERRING to your Excellency's telegram No. 81, it is difficult to see how, in view of the geographical position of the Spanish defences at Melilla, Her Majesty's Government could object to a limited addition of territory, sufficient for the protection of that place.

You are at liberty to hint as much to Señor Moret, in the event of his sounding you on the subject; but everything would naturally depend upon the extent of the proposed addition.

No. 226.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November* 13, 1893.

PLEASE explain what is the Article to which your Excellency refers in the last paragraph of your telegram No. 82.

No. 227.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November* 13, 1893.

M. ROUSTAN, the French Ambassador, informed the Queen-Regent at an audience on the 11th instant, that if Spain wished to take possession of Tetuan she could count on the support of France.

Her Majesty's reply was to the effect that her Government would not think of adding to the present complications by such a step.

No. 228.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 146 A.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 13, 1893.

I RECEIVED a visit from Señor del Mazo to-day, who called to thank me for the words in which Lord Kimberley had spoken of Spain at the Guildhall. They had, he said, caused great satisfaction to the Spanish Government.

His Excellency also alluded to the article on Morocco in the "Times" of to-day, which he described as extremely gratifying.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 229.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 146 B.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 13, 1893.

THE Spanish Ambassador spoke to me this afternoon respecting the contraband exportation of arms to Morocco. His Excellency said that there were a number of Spaniards engaged in this traffic on board vessels which had obtained registration at Gibraltar. Thus, when pursued, they were able to hoist the British flag, and, as the trade was principally with Tetuan, the Spanish revenue cruizers had no jurisdiction to treat them as pirates, which was the only means by which they could be searched.

The arms did not always come from Gibraltar; there were also shipments from Liverpool. Some, too, were sent from Germany, besides those actually manufactured in England, and the German Government had given a warning to the house suspected of exporting munitions of war to Morocco. The French authorities in Algeria had also shown themselves ready to assist and co-operate with the Spanish authorities.

Her Majesty's Government, who had so often given proof of friendship to the Government of Spain, would lay them under a fresh obligation if such measures were taken as would most efficaciously prevent the damage caused by the illegal use of the British flag for a contraband purpose.

I replied that, to the best of my belief, the traffic had been repressed. I could only assure his Excellency once more that we had every wish to stop it, and that I would ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he could take any further measures to that end.

M. del Mazo thanked me, and then, conversing more generally, he spoke of the reply received from the Sultan as satisfactory, but said that public opinion in Spain was still much excited. His Excellency renewed, however, his assurance of the strict adherence of Spain to the *status quo* in Morocco.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 230.

The Earl of Rosebery to Señor del Mazo.

LORD ROSEBERY presents his compliments to the Spanish Ambassador, and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the telegram from Señor Moret, communicating the answer returned by the Sultan of Morocco to the Spanish representations on the subject of Melilla. In returning his best thanks for this communication, Lord Rosebery avails himself of this opportunity to request Señor del Mazo to convey to the Spanish Government his cordial congratulations upon the satisfactory tone of the Sultan's reply.

Foreign Office, November 13, 1893.

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No. 231.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 14.)

(No. 304.) P.
Madrid, November 11, 1893.
My Lord,

I HAVE received a communication from Señor Castelar, suggesting that the Spanish Government should be advised to abandon the idea of building the fort at Sidi Guariach which was the origin of the conflict.

I do not consider it advisable to volunteer any such advice to the Spanish Government, nor, if consulted, to go beyond general expressions in favour of moderation, in accordance with your Lordship's telegram of the 24th ultimo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

No. 232.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 14.)

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) P.
Madrid, November 13, 1893.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of to-day's date No. 29, the article which is to appear will be based on Signor Crispi's revelations.

He will also, it is believed, bring forward a motion in the Italian Chamber.

No. 233.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 14.)

(No. 85.)
(Telegraphic.) P.
Madrid, November 14, 1893.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegrams Nos. 30 and 31 of to-day's date, I have avoided further notice of Señor Castelar's communication.

With regard to the Crispi revelations, Señor Moret has given his instructions at Rome.

His Excellency wishes me to make inquiries concerning a certain Mr. O. W. Marden, mentioned by the Marseilles correspondent of the "Kölnische Zeitung" as being intrusted with a mission by Her Majesty's Government to the Sultan of Morocco friendly to Spanish interests.

No. 234.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) P.
Foreign Office, November 14, 1893.

SEÑOR CASTELAR'S suggestion, as reported in your Excellency's despatch No. 304, cannot be touched by Her Majesty's Government; it would not be accepted and could not work, and the suspicions at present entertained of our policy in Morocco would be for ever confirmed.

It looks to me as if another Power, to which Señor Castelar is friendly, were using him in this matter as an unconscious tool.

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No. 235.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) P.
Foreign Office, November 14, 1893.

I HAVE received your telegrams Nos. 82 and 84 respecting Melilla; but, until I see what is the real scope of Signor Crispi's action and revelations, it would not be possible for me to give my support to any particular course of action with regard to them.

No. 236.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 147.)
Foreign Office, November 14, 1893.
Sir,

HER Majesty's Government approve the language held by Sir G. Bonham to Señor Moret in regard to the situation at Melilla and the conditions proposed to the Sultan of Morocco by the Spanish Government, as reported in his despatch No. 279 of the 25th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 237.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 129.)
Foreign Office, November 14, 1893.
Sir,

I APPROVE your language to the Spanish Minister, as reported in your despatch No. 160 of the 30th ultimo, respecting the action to be taken by the Diplomatic Representatives at Tangier in support of the demands made by Spain in consequence of the conflict at Melilla.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 238.

Mr. Phipps to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 15.)

(No. 464.)
Paris, November 14, 1893.
My Lord,

AS I found on calling at the Foreign Office to-day that M. Develle had gone to attend the opening of the Chambers I inquired from M. Nisard, the Directeur Politique, what views the French Government held with reference to any demand by Spain for such extension of territory as might suffice for the erection of fortifications for the security of Melilla.

M. Nisard said no such proposal had been brought before the French Government either by the Spanish Ambassador at Paris or by M. Roustan, and were it to be put forward the Government would have to be guided by the latter as to the circumstances under which such a proposal were made. They would also have to consult the Governor-General of Algeria.

Speaking generally, the French Government felt that a certain latitude should be afforded to Spain in regard to such steps as she might have to take in vindication of her honour, but within the limits of existing Treaties. However, since the French Government were ready to accord such freedom to Spain, they expected (and they believed Her Majesty's Government shared that view) that Spain would exercise it with moderation.

I said that the note which Her Majesty's Government had addressed to M. Develle proved how desirous we were of co-operating cordially with the French Government in

th s phase of the Morocco question, and I trusted that if any proposal such as I had indicated took shape, M. Nisard would communicate with me. To this he agreed.

I asked M. Nisard whether he could inform me if the French fleet was in that neighbourhood, and he replied that the only naval force in those waters was composed of, he thought, four cruizers, constituting the flying squadron on its road homewards from Newfoundland. It was now off Oran, where it was intended to remain two or three weeks.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. C. H. PHIPPS.

No. 239.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 15.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November* 14, 1893.

WITH reference to Admiralty letter of 7th instant, forwarding copy of the instructions issued by the Admiralty to the Admiral commanding the Channel Squadron, and to the subsequent orders issued to him to remain at Gibraltar for the present, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request that you will state to the Earl of Rosebery that the Admiral reported on the 6th instant that he proposes that the squadron should visit the following ports:—

Date of Arrival.	Port.	Date of Leaving.
..	Gibraltar	15th November.
16th November	Malaga	22nd ,,
25th ,, ...	Port Mahon	2nd December.
3rd December	Palma Bay	6th ,,
9th ,, ...	Gibraltar	16th ,,
20th ,, ...	Arosa Bay	..

I am to request that their Lordships may be informed if there is any objection to the squadron now proceeding in accordance with this programme, observing that, in accordance with the Secretary of State's request, the squadron was ordered on the 8th instant to remain at Gibraltar for the present.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

No. 240.

Mr. Phipps to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 105.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, November* 15, 1893.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that no allusion whatever was made by the Spanish Ambassador (in an interview he had just had with his Excellency) with regard to the questions of indemnity or of territorial compensation.

This latter question had not been broached to M. Roustan, the French Ambassador at Madrid, who obviously would refrain from embarking on it of his own accord.

M. Develle added that in the event of such a question being mooted, the French Government would at once consult Her Majesty's Government.

It appears, however, that the Spanish Ambassador had, some days ago, referred in vague terms to the cramped position of the forts at Melilla, and to the necessity of having to extend them.

No allusion was of course made by me to the substance of your Lordship's telegram of the 13th instant.

No. 241.

Memorandum by Sir E. Hertslet.

ZAFAT is, apparently, not marked either on the Intelligence Department Map of Morocco or on Bianconi's Map.

If it be the same place as *Azoufil*, as suggested by Mr. Satow, it is, according to Bianconi's Map, between the Wady Draa (the recognized southern boundary of Morocco) and the Wady Nun, a river about 40 miles to the north, and therefore clearly within the boundary of Morocco.

But, according to the Intelligence Department Map, the mouth of the Wady Draa is placed at about 28° 45′ north latitude, and not at about 28° 15′ as placed on Bianconi's Map, so that, should the latitude given by Mr. Satow be correct, 28° 30′, Azoufil would, according to the Intelligence Department Map, come below the Wady Draa, and not above it, and Azoufil would, in that case, not be within Moorish territory.

The longitude of Azoufil given in Mr. Satow's despatch, 13° 15′ west, taken from Bianconi's Map, is that of Paris, the longitude of Greenwich would be 10° 55′.

The North-West African Company, in their letter of the 11th instant, state that Messrs. Cross and Kirby have been making investigations on the coast of Tekna, and they assert that the present Ruler, in April 1889, granted to the Company political rights of an extensive character over the whole of Tekna; but here again the English and French maps differ.

According to the Intelligence Department Map, Tekna is an extensive district, which commences above the Wady Draa, and, crossing it, extends far below it, whereas, according to Bianconi's Map, it is placed entirely above the Wady Draa.

E. H.

Foreign Office, November 15, 1893.

No. 242.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 86. Secret and Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November* 15, 1893.

AT an interview which I had to-day with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, his Excellency told me that the French Government were now strongly advocating the *status quo*, having failed in their efforts to induce the Spanish Government to endanger it. They were alarmed at the possibility not only of an outbreak of religious fanaticism in Algeria, but even of a European conflagration, and had deferred the expedition to Tuat while endeavouring to calm the excitement on the Malaja.

The article in the "Times" of Monday has given much satisfaction to his Excellency.

No. 243.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 32.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November* 15, 1893.

AM I right in thinking that the man alluded to in your Excellency's telegram No. 85 is supposed to be a "Cologne Gazette" correspondent, sent by us on a secret mission?

I know nothing of such a person, nor are Her Majesty's Government at present employing any one on a special mission to the Moorish Sultan.

No. 244.

Foreign Office to Consul Finn.

(No. 1.)

Foreign Office, November 15, 1893.

Sir,

LORD ROSEBERY has had under his consideration your Commercial despatch No. 6 of the 28th ultimo, referring to an opportunity to which the "Noticias" has drawn attention of establishing a factory at the Rio de Oro, near Melilla.

In reply, I am to point out to you that, in the present excited state of public opinion in Spain, you should carefully avoid giving any encouragement to the idea of such an occupation by British subjects, which would be entirely contrary to the views of Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 245.

Mr. Phipps to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 467.)

Paris, November 15, 1893.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship a despatch which I have received from Colonel Talbot respecting the movement of troops in South Algeria.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. C. H. PHIPPS.

Inclosure in No. 245.

Colonel Talbot to the Marquis of Dufferin.

London, November 13, 1893.

My Lord,

I BEG to draw your Excellency's attention to a movement of the French troops in South Algeria.

Captain à Court, of the Intelligence Branch of the War Office, has drawn up a Minute recapitulating the circumstances which bear upon the position of France on the South-west Algerian frontier, with special reference to the Tuat question. This Minute has been communicated to the Foreign Office, and I, therefore, need go into no details.

In an article in the "Éclair" of the 30th October, it was announced that the Government had determined to put an end to the movement of a hostile population in Tuat, stimulated by emissaries from Morocco, which militated against the ancient and legitimate influences of France in the extreme south, and stated that an expedition has been organized "not to conquer the Tuat," . . . . but to hold in check certain Chiefs who wish to render paramount the influence of the Sultan, Muley Hassan, to the detriment of French rights.

In various newspapers it has been stated that on the 26th October an expeditionary force was constituted in two columns, one at El Golea to operate towards In-salah in the Tidikelt, and to start on the 28th November; the other column to be formed at Gardaia, but the information of the destination of this column is somewhat contradictory. The strength of the force, not including the garrison of Ain Sefra (which has been ordered to hold itself ready for any eventuality), will be about 4,000, giving 1,500 to each column, with 1,000 on the line of communication.

The details of the force are given:—

1st Squadron Spahis from Laghouat.
1 Peloton 5 Squadron Spahis from Djelfa.
3rd Squadron 1st Chasseurs d'Afrique from Laghouat.
2 Battalions African Light Infantry from Laghouat.
2 " Algerian Rifles from Laghouat.
1 " Zouaves.
3 Sections (six guns) mountain batteries.
Engineers, &c.

In an article in the "France Militaire" of the 10th November, apparently communicated, it is stated that there is no expedition contemplated, but these flying columns have been formed, as is the usual practice in Algeria, to march along the frontier to remind the turbulent tribes of the presence and power of the French flag, and that they are not intended for any aggressive operations in Tuat. In support of this statement it is announced that General Hervé, the Commander-in-chief, had left Algiers for Paris on the 7th instant. On the other hand, the language of M. Cambom at Oran on the 10th November has rather a warlike ring. He said that "far from France having accomplished its mission, she would continue to march forward on the day and at the hour which suited her to conquer for civilization those countries which still escaped her," and ended by calling upon her native allies [? subjects] to rally round her flag.

It will be sufficient for me, without deducting any inference, to merely draw your Lordship's attention to the fact, that there has been some increase in the numbor of troops in South Algeria, and that two small columns are ready to be put in motion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. TALBOT, *Colonel,*
Military Attaché, Paris.

No. 246.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 87.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November* 15, 1893.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 32, I have the honour to inform your Lordship, in reply, that the correspondent of the "Cologne Gazette" stated that he had met the person in question at Marseilles, and reported the conversation he had had with him.

No. 247.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 57.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, November* 16, 1893.

CID TORRES yesterday sent a note to the Spanish Minister, acquainting him that 400 horsemen have been dispatched to the Riff by the Sultan under his brother, Mulai Araga, to gather men as they go, and arrive at Melilla shortly. Letters have been sent by the Sultan to six of the tribes, commanding them to cease opposition to the construction of the fort on pain of his curse falling on them.

The Sultan says that as soon as his affairs permit he will remove to a position nearer the Riff, but, in case the tribesmen should not obey his orders, he begs the Spanish Government to delay building the fort until he can intervene effectually.

The Spanish Minister thinks his Government may dislike this suggestion, but otherwise the answer is regarded as very satisfactory by him.

No. 248.

Mr. Gosselin to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 18.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, November* 16, 1893.

AT the conclusion of the parade held to-day the Emperor told Colonel Swaine that, during an audience granted to the French Ambassador at Madrid by the Queen-Regent, the former had, in the name of his Government, offered the assistance of France in obtaining for Spain a portion of Morocco, joint action against England being the equivalent expected in return.

The offer was refused by Her Majesty.

No. 249.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 131.)
Foreign Office, November 16, 1893.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 162, Confidential, of the 3rd instant, forwarding copy of a note which you have addressed to the Moorish Government, urging them to take immediate action in order to repress the outbreak of the Moorish tribes near Melilla, and to satisfy the demands of Spain; and I have to inform you that the terms of your communication are approved by Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 250.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. MacDonell.

(No. 65. Confidential.)
Foreign Office, November 16, 1893.

Sir,

I HAVE to request you to express to the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at the language he held to you in the course of a recent conversation on the Spanish difficulty at Melilla and its possible consequences, as reported in your despatch No. 76, Secret, of the 3rd instant.

I have at the same time to inform you that it is the desire of Her Majesty's Government to continue to afford their moral support to Spain in restoring order at Melilla, and in pressing upon the Moorish Government her just demands for satisfaction and indemnity, so far as these do not unduly interfere with the Sultan's prerogative or disturb the *status quo* in Morocco.

Her Majesty's Government are convinced that in the delicate and critical condition of the Moorish Empire, and in the present temper of the Sultan and his advisers, it is only by a warm and honest co-operation of all the Powers that a favourable result can be obtained.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 251.

Foreign Office to Consul Harford.

(No. 1.)
Foreign Office, November 16, 1893.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Earl of Rosebery to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 27 of the 3rd instant in regard to the proceedings of the Spanish schooner "Aden" on the North-west Coast of Africa.

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 252.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 17.)

(No. 308.) P.
Madrid, November 14, 1893.

My Lord,

A FABRA (now Havas) Agency telegram from Oran reports agitation among the tribes in the neighbourhood of the Muluja, and it is thought they will join the Riffs round Melilla.

This may give an occasion for French intervention, as, it will be remembered, a similar pretext was made to inaugurate the invasion of Tunis by M. Roustan, the present French Ambassador in Madrid.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

No. 253.

Mr. Badger to Mr. Haldane.—(*Communicated to Foreign Office, November* 17, 1893.)

Sir,

Haddington, County Buildings, N.B.

WILL you pardon me writing to you and trespassing on your time and favour?

I have a brother, Robert Badger, who has been for four years a missionary in Morocco, in connection with the Southern Morocco Mission. He has been stationed in Mogador, Tangier, Mazagan, and Saffi, and at the latter two places has had charge of the Medical Mission work.

On several occasions, he has, in company with others, made journeys into the interior for the purpose of extending the operations of the Mission by securing new stations in fresh districts. Last month, in company with another Medical missionary, John Geddes, he visited a number of towns and villages among the Atlas mountains. Then they were, as they have always been, very much hindered by the want of a written authority to travel about, and found very much difficulty in reaching certain places on that account.

He and the others desire to visit many places in districts hitherto unreached to carry on Medical Mission work, and increase the usefulness of the Society, but without the Sultan's written authority they are completely hampered, and can do nothing for these needy districts of that unfortunate country.

If it is at all within your power, and does not encroach too much upon your valuable time, would you be so good as to endeavour, through the Home or Foreign Office, to obtain a Sultan's letter for my brother and his friend, Mr. Geddes, so that the country, so far as travelling about for the limited purposes of carrying on Medical Mission work, may be open to them.

By doing so you will very much oblige them and yours, &c.
(Signed) GEO. BADGER.

No. 254.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Edwardes.

(No. 204.)
Foreign Office, November 17, 1893.

Sir,

I HAVE to express to you my approval of your language to Signor Brin with respect to the desire of Her Majesty's Government for the maintenance of the *status quo* in Morocco, as recorded in your despatch No. 297, Very Confidential, of the 9th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 255.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 17, 1893.

WITH reference to my letter of the 8th instant, in regard to the illicit exportation of arms, &c., to Morocco, I am directed by the Earl of Rosebery to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a despatch which his Lordship has addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid,* recording certain representations which have been made by the Spanish Ambassador as to the registration at Gibraltar of vessels engaged in this contraband trade.

I am to request that, in laying this letter before the Marquis of Ripon, you will move him to inform Lord Rosebery what reply should be returned to Señor del Mazo's representations.

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

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* No. 229.

No. 256.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Foreign Office, November 17, 1893.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Earl of Rosebery to request that you will inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that there is no objection to the proposed movements of the Channel Squadron, as laid down in the programme submitted in your letter of the 14th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 257.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 18.)

(No. 309.)

Madrid, November 15, 1893.

My Lord,

SHORTLY before my return Mr. Bennett Burleigh, correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph," arrived at Madrid on his way to Melilla. He brought a letter addressed to me by Sir Edward Lawson, and, I believe, one from the Spanish Ambassador in London to the Minister of War. Mr. Burleigh had left for Morocco before my return, and I believe he had not obtained any formal permission for his journey.

A few days ago I received from him at Malaga a telegram, a copy of which is inclosed, stating that he had been courteously requested by General Macias to quit Melilla. On inquiry, I was informed by Señor Moret that the authorities for the present have resolved to allow no foreigners whatever within that place, not even the Military Attachés of Foreign Missions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

Inclosure in No. 257.

Mr. Burleigh to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

Malaga, November 12, 1893.

(Telegraphic.)

GENERAL MACIAS, acting under orders Government, most courteously requested me quit Melilla. General states I require written sanction of each Ministers War and Foreign Affairs. Can you kindly assist thereto? Assure them my perfect friendliness.

No. 258.

Señor del Mazo to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 18.)

THE Spanish Ambassador presents his compliments to the Earl of Rosebery, and has the honour to inclose him copy of a telegram received from Madrid referring to the affairs of Melilla.

Spanish Embassy, London, November 17, 1893.

Inclosure in No. 258.

Señor Moret to Señor del Mazo.

Madria, November 16, 1893.

(Translation.)

I HAVE just received a second note from the Minister of the Sultan, which is in clearer and more definite language than the first. The Sultan was sending his brother, Muley Araafer, to the Riff, with troops which were to concentrate at Bichinad, where

he ought to have arrived already. The note forwards a copy of the Sultan's Circular to the Governors of the Riff, which is couched in very definite language, and in which he threatens the rebels with his curse, and with exemplary punishment if they do not yield at once.

No. 259.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 18.)

Downing Street, November 17, 1893.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Marquis of Ripon to acquaint you, for the information of the Earl of Rosebery, that he has had under his consideration your letter of the 8th instant, respecting the alleged importation of arms and ammunition into Morocco in vessels under the British flag, and also a Memorandum received to-day of a communication on the same subject made by the Spanish Ambassador to Lord Rosebery, from which it would appear that some of the vessels in question are registered at Gibraltar.

Lord Ripon proposes to instruct the Governor to make inquiry whether any vessels not entitled to be registered as British ships have been so registered, so that if there are any such vessels, their registration may be cancelled, and the cancellation may be intimated to the Spanish Government.

The Spanish Government are aware that all possible measures have been adopted to prevent the exportation of arms and ammunition from Gibraltar.

Lord Ripon is unable to suggest any further action which could be taken by Her Majesty's Government to assist the Spanish Government in the matter; but he would suggest that the Law Officers of the Crown might be asked to advise whether there is any lawful means of complying with the request of the Spanish Ambassador.

I am, &c.
(Signed) R. H. MEADE.

No. 260.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 132.)

Foreign Office, November 18, 1893.

Sir,

IN reply to your despatch No. 164 of the 4th instant, respecting the geographical position of the Zafat tribe, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a Memorandum which has been drawn up by the Librarian of this Office,* from which you will observe that the precise situation of Zafat is still open to doubt.

Under these circumstances, I think it would be advisable that you should abstain from expressing any opinion, or taking any action in the matter, until it is more clearly ascertained where the territory actually lies of which Messrs. Cross and Kirby are said to have obtained a Concession, and what are the claims to which the North-West African Company take exception.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 261.

Foreign Office to North-West African Company.

Foreign Office, November 18, 1893.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Earl of Rosebery to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th instant, in which his Lordship's attention is called to the proceedings of Messrs. Cross and Kirby in the neighbourhood of Cape Juby, on the north-west coast of Africa.

In reply, I am to state that no encouragement has been given to the projects of Messrs. Cross and Kirby, and that when Sir A. Kirby called at the Foreign Office in the

* No. 241.

month of December last, and explained the designs entertained by his Syndicate, he was informed by Sir Philip Currie that he must not expect to receive any support or countenance from Her Majesty's Government, who could not encourage any enterprises on the coast between Cape Juby and Cape Bogador which might have a tendency to disturb the *status quo*.

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 262.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 19.)

(No. 88.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November* 18, 1893.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 34 relating to Morocco, I have the honour to report that the Spanish Government consider that the progress made with the negotiations is satisfactory. The Sultan has menaced the Riffs with his malediction if they persist in hostilities, and has justified the building of the fort.

With regard either to an indemnity or a rectification of frontier, the Minister for Foreign Affairs does not intend at first to ask for either, thinking that the Sultan may propose them himself.

No. 263.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 19.)

(No. 89. Secret and Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November* 18, 1893.

THE report reaches me that General Macias, in deference to the press, and the wishes of the troops at Melilla, intends to have some fighting in a day or two, with or without authority from the Government.

No. 264.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 20.)

(No. 310.) P.
Madrid, November 16, 1893.

My Lord,

IN the course of recent conversations with Count Dubsky, the Austrian Ambassador, his Excellency has more than once urged on me the danger of Great Britain being isolated, and the expediency of her joining the Triple Alliance.

The transfer of political activity to the Mediterranean is not, he thinks, displeasing to Germany, who does not possess there the same direct interests as her two allies, and much of his anxiety seems to be due to this cause.

This feeling is frankly avowed by the German Ambassador in private, who says that he is sure that Russia will not allow the Alsace-Lorraine question to be mooted, and that he therefore feels quite secure as to the immunity of Germany from attack by either France or Russia.

Count Dubsky further expressed the opinion that should peace be concluded between Morocco and Spain, it would come well from England to suggest that the Powers should not consider as an infringement of the *status quo* any rectification of frontier which may be necessary for the security of the fortress of Melilla. France, after her recent offers to Spain, could not oppose the suggestion, while the Triple Alliance would support us.

I agreed with Count Dubsky that a slight local readjustment of the frontier for the security of Melilla should not be considered as affecting the *status quo*, but beyond this I carefully avoided expressing any opinion on the foregoing points.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

No. 265.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 20.)

(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November* 20, 1893.

THE arrival is reported of the Sultan of Morocco's brother at Guilaya. He has sent to ask for an interview with the General, and declares that his mission is to promote peace.

The interview will probably take place to-morrow.

No. 266.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 21.)

(No. 165.)
My Lord, *Tangier, November* 9, 1893.

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 155 and 164 of the 25th ultimo and 4th instant, respecting the rumoured concession to Sir A. Kirby's Syndicate of permission to trade at a port somewhere south of Mogador, I have the honour to report that to-day the Italian Chargé d'Affaires put a question to me about this affair, of which notice has been taken in the local papers.

In reply to M. Gentile, I informed him that I had heard that these persons entertained some scheme of the sort; but that I did not know for certain where their intended field of operations lay. In any case he might rest assured that no countenance would be given to them by Her Majesty's Government.

To my Spanish colleague, who has also referred to this subject, I have held the same language.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 267.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 21.)

(No. 166.)
My Lord, *Tangier, November* 9, 1893.

THE Spanish Minister showed me this afternoon a translation of the note which he received yesterday from the Sultan's Agent at Tangier in reply to his earliest representations respecting the Melilla affair.

The note states that the Sultan has learnt with much annoyance of the hostilities commenced by the tribesmen with the object of preventing the construction of that which was being constructed, and that they will have to pay for their weak understanding which has caused them to suppose that His Shereefian Majesty would permit anything to be done which could injure the long-standing friendship between the two countries. That His Majesty is sending a detachment of horsemen to the spot for the purpose of restoring order in the meantime, and that he will proceed to act with such vigour that no trace shall remain of anything that might cool the existing friendship between the two Governments.

My colleague states that, in the judgment of those who know the country, this is a fairly satisfactory answer, especially when it is remembered that at the date of the Sultan's letter His Majesty had no knowledge of the events at Melilla subsequent to the 2nd October.

In addition, information has been furnished to him unofficially that the Sultan is preparing to send a considerable force to the Riff, under the command of a Shereef of importance related to His Majesty, to support the commands which will be transmitted to the tribesmen by the leader of the detachment above mentioned.

The messengers, who brought the Sultan's reply, left His Majesty near Tafilelt on the 21st ultimo, having thus employed nineteen days on the journey. Travelling on horseback, as they have done, they naturally took a longer time than the runners,

dispatched from Tangier on the 6th ultimo, with the letters containing the first news. It is evident that His Majesty was duly impressed by the gravity of the occasion, for he lost no time in making up his mind to the reply he had to give. The apparent vagueness of the Sultan's language, as compared with the terms of the Spanish Minister's demands, reported in my despatch No. 147 of the 7th October, is not thought to indicate any desire to decline responsibility, but rather to be due to a characteristic Moorish habit of avoiding precise expressions.

Cid Mohammed Torres has stated to me that, as far as he knows, the Sultan's intention, at the moment of dispatching his messengers, was to remain some time yet in the region of Tafilelt. The best information I have been able to obtain shows him to have then been still two days' march from the Sanctuary, to visit which formed the declared object of his expedition. But it is just possible that the advice given in the letters dispatched to the Court, after the engagement in which General Margallo was killed, by Cid Mohammed Torres, at the instance of the Spanish Minister, and by the majority of the foreign Representatives, may induce His Majesty to hasten his return to this side of the Atlas.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 268.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 21.)

(No. 167. Secret.) *Tangier, November* 13, 1893.

My Lord,

THE Spanish Minister has drawn my attention to an article in the "Diario de Tanger" of the 11th instant, of which I beg to inclose an extract, alleging that the Sultan, more farsighted than certain European Governments, on the 30th September last *officially requested the Spanish Government to suspend the construction of the Fort of Sidi Guariach until his return from Tafilelt, in order to avoid disturbances or conflicts with the Riffians.* (The italics are those of the journalist.) The reason being, it adds, that the Sultan saw what the unfortunate General Margallo could neither see nor foresee, because the Monarch was aware of the friction that had taken place between the Commandant of Melilla and the Chiefs of the Riff country. It goes on to say: "Illogical conclusion: the Sultan has had to endure the shameless smuggling openly carried on through Melilla, in spite of his efforts to prevent it; the Sultan tried to avoid sanguinary conflicts, and no notice was taken of his wise warnings; and now *he will have to pay for it all.*" The article winds up by saying that it will be the duty of the Spanish Government to place in the scales the shortcomings as well as the rights of both parties, when the accounts between them and the Sultan come to be made up.

The paper in question is believed to be the property of M. Kerdec, and is regarded here as an organ of the French Legation. It is this latter fact which gives the article importance in the eyes of my Spanish colleague. Up till now the "Diario de Tanger" has warmly supported the Spanish cause, and this sudden change of tone has surprised others of my colleagues besides M. de Potestad.

Quite recently rumours have been circulated that the settlement of the Melilla affair would probably be submitted to arbitration, to the annoyance of M. de Potestad, who sees in this an indication that some of the Powers wish to intervene. The origin of the suggestion has been attributed to various Legations in turn, and this article of the "Diario" seems, in his opinion, to fix it on the French. He is not altogether convinced that the French Government are acting straightly, and fears that while ostensibly giving their support to Spain at both Paris and Tangier, they may be working in a contrary direction through Dr. Linares, who is with the Sultan.

M. de Potestad assures me that, as far as he knows, the assertion that the Sultan had warned the Spanish Government in the manner indicated is absolutely false.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure in No. 268.

Extract from the "Diario de Tanger" of November 11, 1893.

(Translation.)

THE incident of Melilla has once more demonstrated that Mulaï Hassan is gifted with more foresight than certain European Governments.

Under date of the 30th September *he officially requested the Spanish Government to suspend the construction of the Fort of Sidi Aguariach until his return from Tafilelt in order to avoid disturbances and conflicts with the Riffians.* This is because the Sultan saw what the unfortunate General Margallo was not able to see nor foresee, because the Moorish Sovereign knew the friction which had taken place between the Governor of Melilla and the Chiefs of the Riffian country.

Illogical conclusion: the Sultan has had to suffer the barefaced contraband which has been carried on openly through Melilla, in spite of his efforts to prevent it; the Sultan wanted to avoid bloody conflicts, and no account was taken of his wise warnings, and now *he will have to pay for the whole.*

* * * * * * *

Now the Spanish Government is bound to act with a due regard to justice, throwing into the scales of the balance the faults as well as the rights of every one when the accounts are settled between them and the Sultan, if they wish to maintain with the Moorish Government relations and a *prestige* more than diplomatic, that is to say, more than superficial.

We shall see.

No. 269.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 21.)

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, November* 21, 1893.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 57, Mulaï Arafa, the Sultan's brother, arrived at Melilla yesterday.

No. 270.

Sir E. Monson to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 21.)

(No. 19. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, November* 21, 1893.

MOROCCO. Baron Pasetti informed me yesterday of the fact, should your Lordship not have heard of it already, that the French Ambassador at Madrid proposed to the Queen-Regent that Spain should make territorial acquisitions in the direction of Tetuan. He offered support of France for this purpose, but the Queen-Regent absolutely rejected the offer.

No. 271.

The Earl of Rosebery to Señor del Mazo.

THE Earl of Rosebery presents his compliments to the Spanish Ambassador, and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of his Excellency's note of the 17th instant, inclosing a copy of a telegram from the Minister of State as to the attitude of the Sultan of Morocco towards the Riff tribes at Melilla.

Lord Rosebery begs leave to thank Señor del Mazo for this communication.

Foreign Office, November 21, 1893.

No. 272.

Conjoint Foreign Committee of the Jewish Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 22.)

My Lord, 36, *Finsbury Circus, London, November* 17, 1893.

MINDFUL of the benevolent efforts which your Lordship has already made to procure for the Jewish inhabitants of Morocco city protection against the barbarous conduct of the Governor, Haj Mohammed Waada, we venture once more to plead with your Lordship on behalf of our oppressed co-religionists in that city.

We have received from a trustworthy correspondent at Mogador a letter, of which we inclose a copy. As your Lordship will perceive from a perusal of this document, Haj Mohammed Waada, in conjunction with a most inhuman ally, named Khadi Moustapha, is pursuing his career of barbarity without let or hindrance, that the cruelty of these two men is now extended to weak and defenceless women suffering from the throes of child-birth, and to the forcible conversion of Jews to the Mahommedan faith.

We earnestly beg of your Lordship that you will be pleased to instruct Her Majesty's Minister at Tangier to use his best efforts to procure the immediate dismissal of Haj Mohammed Waada and Khadi Moustapha from their offices which they so disgracefully abuse, and that proper compensation may be made to those who have suffered from their cruel proceedings. We feel sure that nothing short of the dismissal of these men will secure the Jews of Morocco city from a repetition of the numerous outrages that have already been perpetrated. We believe that the "Alliance Israélite Universelle" of Paris are appealing to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs that he may lend his powerful influence to procure the removal of the Governor of Morocco city.

We have, &c.
(Signed) JULIAN GOLDSMID, *President of the Anglo-Jewish Association.*
ARTHUR COHEN, *President of the Jewish Board of Deputies.*

Inclosure in No. 272.

Letter addressed to Mr. Montagu, M.P.

Dear Sir, *Mogador, October* 8, 1893.

BEING on a visit to Mogador, it has been to my grief to observe atrocities and cruelties perpetrated in this age of civilization which even our fathers in the darkest ages never complained of.

In Morocco city, one of the capitals, the Jews, young and old, rich and poor, are suffering harshly at the hands of an inhuman Governor, a Haj Mohammed Waada, and a more inhuman Khadi Moustapha.

News and particulars have already been forwarded to England of the revival of flogging, and measures were taken which put an end to the practice for a time. But now the system has revived in all its barbarity, and it is practised by the Governor of Morocco city more cruelly than ever.

It is impossible to describe the barbarous system, rendered all the more terrible by the readiness of the Moors to vent their hatred on the Jews when an opportunity offers itself.

But not content with attacking the body, the Governor and his Lawgiver now aim at the heart and mind of the wretched Jews. Not satisfied with causing the death of several miserable beings, victims to flogging, every endeavour is now used to spoil the minds of the weaker Jews, the roots of their faith and religion.

Indirectly victims to threats and persuasions, two Jews have become converts to Mahommedanism, both conversions being the source of further troubles and grief to the Jewish community of Morocco city.

The first convert, after denying his religion, demanded his wife and children, who refuse to follow his example. The Khadi, the Lawgiver, then ordered the woman to become a Mooress, to avoid which she fled to another town with her children.

The Elders of the Jewish community in Morocco city are now called upon to produce the woman, with or without her consent, failing which they are threatened with flogging and imprisonment and abuse of the most sacred points of our religion.

This is made an excuse for all sorts of injustice and ill-treatment, and the whole community are at the mercy of the Governor.

The case of the second convert is even more cruel. The conversion took place the day after Kippur last, and on the self-same day, as a precaution, the Khadi sent his messengers and caused the convert's wife to be dragged from her bed of accouchement, her twelve days' old babe in her arms, to the Moorish quarters, where she is detained.

Ill-treated in every possible manner, she is obliged to work on Saturdays and break all the laws of our faith, notwithstanding which she persists in her religion. The Khadi again turns his threats to the Elders of the community, who are in despair, fearing flogging and imprisonment every minute, justice and mercy being things of the past.

The latest atrocity, of which news has been just received, will show how far this statement may go.

Last week a young Jewish fellow, having bought some vegetables in a plot of ground, went to collect them, when he found they had been stolen. On complaining to the Moors who were on the plot, he was without further cause roughly beaten almost to death. He was carried unconscious to his home, where he succumbed on the morrow to the blows he had received, but not before his dying deposition had been taken by Moorish scribes to the effect that he died from the injuries received on the day previous.

Knowing the weakness of the poorer classes, it is impossible not to foresee the danger which threatens our faith altogether. In their helplessness, they are terror-stricken at the atrocities committed before them as above related. Frightened by threats, urged by indirect persuasions, and victims to their poverty, it is to be feared many will give way to their tyrants and abandon their religion for the safety of their bodies.

The principal citizens of Morocco city have applied to us for help, but we are powerless.

The only course we can adopt is to apply to our more influential brethren abroad, asking them to use their influence to succour tyrannized and oppressed Jews.

Knowing your charitable action in the case of other oppressed brethren, I address myself to you on behalf of our co-religionists; let but the roots of the evil be removed, and its traces will be abolished. The Petition is then that the Governor and Khadi be removed, and future Governors taking example will not so readily tyrannize and oppress the weak. If the evil is not cut off in its youth, it will spread and add to the troubles of a much suffering race.

Hoping your help will be granted and urging prompt action, I have, &c.
(Signed) SAMUEL MONTAGU.

No. 273.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 22.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Downing Street, November* 21, 1893.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of the Earl of Rosebery, a copy of a despatch from the Governor of Gibraltar, reporting his visit to the Spanish Governor of Algeciras.

I am, &c.
(Signed) R. H. MEADE.

Inclosure in No. 273.

Governor Sir R. Biddulph to the Marquis of Ripon.

(Confidential.)
My Lord, *Gibraltar, November* 7, 1893.

A FEW days after my arrival at Gibraltar I paid a visit of ceremony to General Don Adolfo Rodriguez Bruzon, the Spanish Governor at Algeciras, which visit was returned by his Excellency on the 25th ultimo.

On both occasions the General expressed his earnest desire to preserve the most cordial relations with the Governor of this fortress, a desire which I warmly reciprocated.

I took occasion to allude to the reports regarding the exportation of arms and ammunition from Gibraltar to Morocco, and I informed his Excellency that I had issued a Proclamation forbidding such exportation; also that I had made a search on board the hulks, and had caused all arms and ammunition found therein to be landed and placed in Government magazines. I also assured him that I would do all in my power to stop any illicit exportation of arms and ammunition.

The General thanked me, and added that, according to his information, the traffic in arms was mainly carried on by persons who are not British subjects.

On taking leave his Excellency begged that, if any circumstance should occur which necessitated my communicating with him, I would do so by a personal letter to himself rather than by an official letter, and that I should always find him ready to remove any difficulty that might arise.

It is perhaps hardly necessary for me to assure Her Majesty's Government that I shall ever use my best endeavours to cultivate the most friendly relations with the Representatives of the Spanish Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ROBERT BIDDULPH.

No. 274.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 93. Most Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November* 22, 1893.

AT an interview which I had yesterday with Señor Moret, his Excellency told me that the Spanish Ambassador at Paris had sent him a version which appears to be incorrect of the communications made by Lord Dufferin respecting Morocco to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

A copy of Lord Dufferin's despatch to your Lordship on the subject No. 448 reached me by the messenger yesterday. May I read it to Señor Moret? His Excellency seemed to be annoyed, as he appears to be under the impression that the language was unfriendly towards Spain.

As there will be an opportunity by Spanish messenger next Saturday, I propose, though with some misgiving, to send an important communication to your Lordship by this means, as delays may at present produce difficulties.

The next steamer does not leave Lisbon till the 29th, and is a slow one.

No. 275.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 160 A. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 22, 1893.

I HAD a conversation of considerable interest to-day with the Spanish Ambassador respecting affairs in Morocco, which, his Excellency said, were proceeding not unfavourably. The Sultan's brother had arrived in the neighbourhood of Melilla to arrange matters, but, nevertheless, it was in contemplation to make a sortie in order to satisfy Spanish public sentiment, which was much excited. Replying to an observation of mine, expressing fear that a sortie might lead to a war, M. del Mazo stated that it

was only intended to destroy a road and some earthworks constructed by the enemy, and that the Spanish Government reiterated in the strongest sense their determination of maintaining the *status quo*. "Not an inch of territory," he repeated, "as I have said before." He added that he should cease to hold his post were this policy departed from.

I then told M. del Mazo of the overtures made by the French Ambassador at Madrid to the Queen-Regent with reference to Tetuan, information respecting which had reached me from various quarters, but of which his Excellency had apparently not heard, and I also told him, in confidence, that M. Develle denied all cognizance of the matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 276.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November* 22, 1893.

TERRITORY round Melilla.

Have you spoken to Señor Moret in the sense authorized by my telegram No. 28 of the 13th instant?

With reference to suggestion of your Austrian colleague, reported in your despatch No. 310, Secret, of the 16th instant, you may communicate to him substance of said telegram, adding that Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to support the views of Spain with the other Powers if the occasion arises hereafter.

No. 277.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November* 22, 1893.

MOROCCO. You are authorized to read to Señor Moret the note which Lord Dufferin addressed to the French Government on the 31st October, and a copy of which is inclosed in his No. 448.

If he wishes for any fuller explanations on the point referred to in your telegram No. 93, I am ready to send them in writing.

No. 278.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 133.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 22, 1893.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a copy of a letter from Mr. G. Badger, which has been communicated to this Office by Mr. Haldane, M.P.*

You will perceive that Mr. Badger writes on behalf of his brother, who is desirous of obtaining for himself and his friend, Mr. Geddes, a "Sultan's letter," to enable them to travel and prosecute medical mission work in the interior of Morocco.

I have to request that you will report to me what steps, if any, can be taken with a view to obtain for these gentlemen the facilities they desire.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

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* No. 253.

No. 279.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Edwardes.

(No. 213. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, November 22, 1893.

Sir,

THE Italian Ambassador informed me to-day that M. Develle had given to M. Ressmann the same assurances as he had afforded to Lord Dufferin, that he was entirely without cognizance of the overtures with regard to Tetuan made to the Queen-Regent by the French Ambassador at Madrid.

I alluded to the rumour that Signor Crispi intended to denounce the understanding, as regards the Mediterranean, between Italy and Spain, but Count Tornielli seemed to know little or nothing with regard to that report.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 280.

Foreign Office to Mr. G. Badger.

Foreign Office, November 22, 1893.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Earl of Rosebery to inform you that the letter which you addressed to Mr. Haldane, M.P., in regard to medical mission work in Morocco, will be communicated to Her Majesty's Minister at Tangier, with instructions to report as to what steps, if any, can best be taken with a view to obtain for your brother and his friend, Mr. Geddes, the facilities they require to enable them to travel in the interior of the country.

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 281.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Foreign Office, November 22, 1893.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter of the 17th instant relative to the importation of arms and ammunition into Morocco by vessels under the British flag, I am directed by the Earl of Rosebery to express his concurrence in the instructions which it is proposed to issue to the Governor of Gibraltar, with a view to ascertain whether any such vessels have been improperly registered as ships at that port, and, if so, to cancel their registration.

The Spanish Ambassador has been informed of the nature of these instructions, and the result of the steps taken in the matter will be communicated to his Excellency upon receipt of a further report from the authorities of Gibraltar.

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 282.

The Earl of Rosebery to Señor del Mazo.

Foreign Office, November 22, 1893.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

I DID not fail to communicate to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies the representations made by your Excellency on the 13th instant on the subject of the contraband importation of arms and ammunition into Morocco by vessels under the British flag, and I now beg leave to acquaint your Excellency that no time has been lost in instructing the Governor of Gibraltar to ascertain whether

any such vessels have been improperly registered as British ships at that port, and, if so, to cancel their registration.

The result of the steps taken in the matter will be duly communicated to your Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 283.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 168.)

Tangier, November 16, 1893.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy of a despatch from Mr. MacLeod reporting on the increase of lawlessness at Fez and its neighbourhood, which he attributes in some degree to the absence of the Sultan, but more particularly to bad trade, the want of employment, and the dearth of breadstuffs.

The precaution which Mr. MacLeod recommends should be adopted by British subjects residing in or visiting Fez, of being attended by a Moslem servant or soldier when moving about the city, appears to be very desirable, and I have authorized him to recommend it officially to all British subjects. But as regards the suggestion that they should invariably have one or more servants sleeping in their house, I have intimated that he may safely leave it to be acted on according to the judgment of the individual householder. I have also instructed him to take an opportunity of impressing on the Basha that it is incumbent on the Government to take due measures for the preservation of public order and the protection of property, and that the cost of placing a guard, as suggested by the Basha, at Mr. Edwards' garden, ought to be borne by the Sultan.

Those who are familiar with Morocco and its ways inform me that the state of things depicted in Mr. MacLeod's despatch is scarcely to be regarded as unusual under the circumstances of the Sultan's absence, but at the same time, it is very desirable that the prudent advice which he reports having given to British subjects should be followed by them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure in No. 283.

Vice-Consul MacLeod to Mr. Satow.

Fez, November 6, 1893.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to address your Excellency the present, to draw attention to a subject which has lately been causing some uneasiness here.

I allude to the increasing lawlessness of the population, both in this city and the surrounding districts, which has been manifesting itself in many unmistakable ways of late.

For the past four or five years, Fez, in the unanimous opinion of the Europeans residing here, or visiting the capital regularly, improved very much from year to year in its behaviour towards Christians; but during the last two or three months there seems to be a distinct change for the worse; cursing and spitting at Europeans is much more common, and there have been several cases of assaults against foreigners, for the most part caused by pure anti-Christian feeling.

This change is, I think, due in some degree to the Court's absence, but more particularly to the bad trade, want of employment, and dearth which is being felt more acutely each month by the poorer classes.

Just now, breadstuffs are at almost double last year's prices, and two and a-half times what it was two or three years ago, and, should the incoming year's crop prove scanty, still greater suffering may be expected, and so it may not be surprising if, during the approaching winter, more manifestations of bad temper and robberies occur.

And so, while I do not see any immediate cause for alarm, still I think it better to inform your Excellency of these facts, so that, if it be deemed advisable, precautions may be taken to avoid the occurrence of any mishaps, and to insure that, if such should occur, they may be of a simple and uncomplicated kind.

Should your Excellency approve, I would suggest that British subjects residing in or visiting Fez should be notified that they should not go about the city unattended by a Moslem servant or a soldier, and that they should invariably have one or more servants sleeping in their houses.

In any case here where a Christian is assaulted or insulted, it is, as a rule, practically impossible to get the offenders arrested, much less punished, if no Moslem was with the complainant, as the bystanders invariably try to falsify the European's statements. Besides which, the people are not so apt to give expression to their feelings when a European is attended as when he is alone, and they think what is said will not be understood fully or at all. The other day the Basha mentioned the subject to me, and asked particularly that Mr. Edwards' garden should have a guard. In conformity with the Basha's suggestion I advised Mr. Edwards to have a guard in addition to their Moslem servant who sleeps on the premises, and I have, privately, advised the other missionaries as well not to go about unattended.

News has reached here that a party of Jewish traders travelling to the Sôk at Sidi Kassim from Mequinez on the 1st instant were attacked by a band of mounted highwaymen. Three of the Jews managed to escape, but the fourth, an old man, was murdered, and all his belongings taken.

The following day a Jewish trader pitched his tent at Sidi Kassim Sôk, and when standing at some distance from it heard a shot fired. Turning round, he saw his assistant running away from the tent. After calling, ineffectually, to the assistant not to leave the tent unguarded, he went up to it himself, and was horrified to find the dead body of a Moor near the door. He then entered the tent, but had scarcely done so when he was struck by a shot in the lower part of the spine, and fell unconscious on the ground. The wounded man was brought here yesterday, but is thought by Dr. Churcher to be in a dying state.

The motive of the murder of the Moor is said to be a vendetta feud, but no object, except perhaps the desire to destroy a witness of the crime, can be assigned for the shooting of the Jew.

The perpetrators of both the foregoing outrages are still at large.

A few evenings ago a respectable citizen of Fez (a Shereef indeed) was struck on the back of the head by a club, in a dark street, by a band of thieves, who thereafter stole most of his clothes and personal effects. The criminals got clear away before the hue and cry was raised, and although seen escaping by several persons they have not yet been arrested. The unfortunate man is said to be still dangerously ill from his wounds.

The road between Mequinez and Rabat and between Fez and Rabat, *i.e.*, the district lying between Sidi Kassim and Rabat, is still impassable except to large armed parties of travellers.

I would point out in this connection the great risk of injury to which merchants who have to remit specie to the coast are exposed, by the laxity of the Government in permitting such crimes to pass unpunished.

I would remark also that the owners of the 5,800 dollars robbed from the muleteer Bushaih, near Siboo, as reported in my despatch of the 4th March, have not received any compensation whatever, nor have the thieves been brought to justice.

I have hitherto refrained from reporting in the sense of this letter, as it was thought at first here that the outrages were merely local and particular. But of late they have been so general, and keep recurring with such increasing frequency, that I think it advisable to draw your Excellency's attention to the matter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. MACIVER MACLEOD.

No. 284.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 23.)

(No. 94.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November* 22, 1893.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 35, Spain will hardly know what she wants until the negotiations with Morocco really begin, but I have generally spoken to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of your Lordship's telegram No. 28.

I think it would be premature for your Lordship to take the lead in the suggestion, in the manner the Austrian Ambassador wished.

It is reported that there is a slight delay in the Conference between the General and the Sultan's brother on account of the illness of the latter.

No. 285.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 23.)

Sir, *Downing Street, November* 22, 1893.

WITH reference to previous correspondence respecting the alleged export of arms from Gibraltar to Morocco, I am directed by the Marquis of Ripon to transmit to you, for the information of the Earl of Rosebery, a copy of a despatch on the subject from the Governor of that Colony.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD WINGFIELD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 285.

Governor Sir R. Biddulph to the Marquis of Ripon.

My Lord, *Gibraltar, November* 6, 1893.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 23rd ultimo, I have the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, the accompanying lists of arms and ammunition brought on shore from hulks in the bay, with the consent of the owners, and stored in the magazine in charge of the Port Department.

Since this action was taken, a further examination has been made of the hulks in the bay, and no munitions of war found on any of them, and I am satisfied that, for the present, there is no possibility of arms or ammunition in any quantity being shipped to Morocco from any source within the jurisdiction of Gibraltar.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ROBERT BIDDULPH.

Inclosure 2 in No. 285.

Lists of Arms and Ammunition brought on Shore from Hulks in Gibraltar Bay.

(A.)

Gibraltar, October 21, 1893.

BROUGHT on shore from hulk No. 27, by the consent of the owner, M. Manuel Portunato, the following cases of rifles and ammunition:—

1 case guns, marked "Valentine."
15 packages of cartridges, marked H.L.R.B. One case containing 1,000 and 14 cases containing 2,000 each.
2 cases of ammunition, marked E.B.
6 packages of guns (barrels), marked R.B.
3 ditto stocks for same, marked R.B.
1 package guns, containing 6, marked M.P.
1 case of rifles, marked E.B.

(Signed) MANUEL PORTUNATO.

Witness:
(Signed) JOSEPH MACHIAVELLO, *Coxswain.*
(Signed) WILLIAM UNDERY, *Boarding Officer.*

(B.)

Boarding Station, Gibraltar, October 23, 1893.

The following goods have been brought on shore to be stored in the magazine on the Old Mole Battery by the consent of M. M. Abecasis (owner hulk No. 41) :—

10 cases of ammunition, marked M.A.
11 „ „ „ B.
18 packages „ „ T.
3 cases „ „ M.A.
5 „ guns „ 7½.
15 „ „ Spanish. Mt. 53, 19½ × 14 inch.
2 cases of rifles (Winchester), marked M.A. & M.L.
2 „ guns marked XX.
1 case, containing a sample gun.
1 „ marked T.B. 24, containing two sample guns.
1 „ containing twenty-four obsolete guns.

(Signed) MOSES ABECACIS.

Witnesses:
(Signed) MELCHOR GARCIA.
A. BRUZON.

(Signed) WILLIAM UNDERY, *Boarding Officer.*

(C.)

Gibraltar, October 26, 1893.

Brought on shore from hulk No. 48, by the consent of the owner, Francis Carreras, to be stored in magazine at the Old Mole Battery, the following cases of arms and ammunition :—

767 cases of ammunition.
13 „ guns.
2 packages of ammunition.
1 sword.
1 case containing about 36 loose artridges.

(Signed) FRANCIS CARRERAS.

Witness:
(Signed) S. S. CONTE.

(Signed) WILLIAM UNDERY, *Boarding Officer.*

Goods left on board—
About 80 boxes of empty cartridge cases.
30 boxes of lead.

No. 286.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 24.)

(No. 314.) *Madrid, November* 20, 1893.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 304 of the 11th instant, and to your Lordship's telegram No. 30 of the 14th instant, on the subject of a suggestion emanating from Señor Castelar respecting certain action to be taken at Melilla, it appears that a letter has been addressed by that statesman to Señor Sagasta, in which he sets forth his views as to the course and possible results of events in Morocco.

The letter itself has not been published; but, according to the newspaper which professes to give the substance of its contents, Señor Castelar felt no alarm for Spain, or for the maintenance of her rights, so long as the conflict was confined to the aggression, on the part of certain rebel tribes, against a civilized country which had not only the right but also the power to punish such acts of hostility with energy and

severity. But when recourse has been had to diplomatic action, and repeated promises have been obtained from the Sultan to reduce his rebel subjects to obedience, and to guarantee the rights of Spain by means of his troops, and when no result ensues, and the Riffs continue their hostilities regardless of the Sultan's mediation, the question assumes an international character, and becomes a war between Spain and Morocco.

It is this state of affairs which causes Señor Castelar anxiety on account of the complications which a rupture of the *status quo* in Morocco would entail by gravely compromising the peace of Europe. In this connection he recalls the part which he himself played in similar circumstances, when, believing as he did that a rupture with the United States on the question of the "Virginius" would result in a general conflagration, and would imperil Spanish independence, he did not hesitate to sacrifice everything to the interests of his country.

The newspaper from which Señor Castelar's views are taken does not profess to give the precise means which his Excellency advocates for terminating the war. It confines itself to stating that, in that statesman's opinion, a termination should be placed to the existing state of affairs, which is mortifying to the national dignity and degrading to the spirit of the army, and which constitutes besides a serious menace for the future relations between Spain and Morocco, and for the peace of Europe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

No. 287.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 24.)

(No. 315.)

My Lord, *Madrid, November* 21, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a translation of a telegram from General Macias, announcing the arrival, near Melilla, of the brother of the Sultan, and his desire of an interview.

In one of the morning papers, it is asserted that a part of the telegram has been suppressed asking the Spaniards to postpone the construction of the objectionable fort.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

Inclosure in No. 287.

Extract from the "El Liberal" of November 21, 1893.

Official Telegram from Melilla from General Macias.

(Translation.)

THE Minister of War received the following telegram yesterday :—

"*Melilla, November* 19, 1893, 10·40 P.M.

"The General Commandant to the Minister of War :—

"In the reconnaissance carried out to-day before the forts of Cabrerizas Altas y Rostro Gordo, by sections of "disciplinaires" (penados), and soldiers with Mauser rifles, with the object of protecting the works which the engineers were completing, one of the "disciplinaire" was killed.

"Very stormy weather continues to prevail, rendering the departure of ships impossible; those which have attempted to leave having been obliged to return. The discharging of steamers has consequently been suspended, and the engineers have been obliged to stop work. Neither the city nor the forts have opened fire to-day, no enemy having been seen. At three o'clock this afternoon there presented himself with a letter from the Pasha of the camp a Moor from Rey, informing me that a brother of the Sultan was in the neighbourhood of Guelaia, and that he was coming to hold a personal interview with me, in order to bring about a termination of the troubles between Spain and the frontier tribes; to use his words.

"In addition, he informed me in his letter that he had sent me another messenger, but that he had been unable to reach me owing to the fire of the outposts and the forts.

"I replied that as the Sultan was a great friend of my King, I should feel highly honoured in receiving his brother; but the orders of my Government were so explicit, and the disloyalty of the Kabyles towards Spain so great, that I was unable to order the cessation of fire so long as a single Moorish soldier could be seen in the neighbourhood of our lines near or far; but that I should give orders that care should be taken not to fire when a white flag appeared, so that the Sultan's brother might enter our lines without danger, requesting that this might take place soon, since I could not any longer restrain myself from chastising the rebels and commencing the construction of Fort Sidi Guariach and any other forts which the Government of my King Alfonso XIII (whom God preserve) should deem fit to command."

No. 288.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 24.)

(No. 95. Secret and Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November* 23, 1893.

THE Spanish Ambassador in London has telegraphed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to say that M. Develle has denied that any authority has been given to the French Ambassador at Madrid to propose an acquisition of Moorish territory affecting the *status quo* to the Spanish Government.

Señor Moret would be glad to learn, at your Lordship's earliest convenience, what was the statement made to M. Develle by Lord Dufferin by which this disavowal was elicited. Mention was made of Tetuan. His Excellency fears that this communication may prevent further confidences on the part of France.

No. 289.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 162. Confidential.)
Foreign Office, November 24, 1893.

Sir,

THE Spanish Ambassador called to-day and communicated the substance of a telegram from Señor Moret respecting the communication said to have been made by the French Ambassador at Madrid to the Queen-Regent on the subject of Tetuan. It represented the report as exaggerated, and as being inaccurate in one point.

Señor Moret expressed the hope that I should suspend my judgment of the incident until the receipt of a written communication which he is sending to the Spanish Embassy.

Señor del Mazo was informed, in reply, that the report had reached me from many quarters, and that, as I had already mentioned to him, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had denied that there was any foundation for it. His Excellency remarked that M. Roustan was very "remuant," and an intriguer, and that it was possible that he had made the suggestion without authority.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 290.

The Marquis of Dufferin to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 25.)

(No. 478.)
Paris, November 24, 1893.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship a despatch which has been addressed to me by Colonel Talbot, Military Attaché to Her Majesty's Embassy, with regard to the movement of French troops in South Algeria, and inclosing an extract from the "Temps" on the subject.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
(Signed) E. C. H. PHIPPS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 290.

Colonel Talbot to the Marquis of Dufferin.

My Lord, *Paris, November* 23, 1893.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 22 [*bis*] of the 15th November on the movement of troops in South Algeria, I have the honour to forward extracts from the "Temps" of the 20th and 22nd November, which tend to show that any military operations in the Tuat district have been abandoned for the present year; but it appears certain that, sooner or later, the French will contest, with the Sultan of Morocco, the sovereignty of the tribes in Tuat, carrying out the intentions referred to in M. Cambon's speech at Oran on the 10th November.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. D. TALBOT, *Colonel*,
Military Attaché.

Inclosure 2 in No. 290.

Extracts from the "Temps" of November 20 *and* 22, 1893.

[Not printed.]

No. 291.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 25.)

(No. 96.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November* 24, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to report that no result has ensued from the meeting between General Macias and the Sultan's brother.

The latter asked for delay until the Sultan could arrive at Fez, and promised that the Riffs should be punished, but the General replied that he could not accede to this delay.

The Prince then asked that permission to trade with the fortress should be granted to the Riffs, but this was also refused, the General saying that he must continue operations.

The General accordingly continues his preparations, while the Sultan's brother promises to do all in his power to give satisfaction, and to punish the Riffs.

There are rumours of a Ministerial crisis, and no decision seems to have been arrived at by the Government.

No. 292.

Señor del Mazo to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 25.)

(Translation.)
My Lord, *Spanish Embassy, London, November* 24, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's note of the 22nd instant, in which you inform me of the instructions given by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor of Gibraltar on the subject of vessels unduly entered in the register of that port, which are devoted to the trade in contraband of war; and I have to return thanks to your Lordship, in the name of my Government, for the decisive measures which have been taken with regard to the matter.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) C. DEL MAZO.

No. 293.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 137.)

Foreign Office, November 25, 1893.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch to Sir W. Ridgeway No. 17 of the 1st February last, I transmit herewith a copy of a letter from the Anglo-Jewish Association and Jewish Board of Deputies, calling attention to the renewed persecution of the Jewish inhabitants of Morocco city.*

I should wish you at once to take such representations, either alone, or in conjunction with your colleagues, as you may deem advisable, to induce the Moorish Government to put a stop to the ill-treatment of which the Jews of Morocco city complain.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 294.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 138.)

Foreign Office, November 25, 1893.

Sir,

I APPROVE the language held by you to your Italian and Spanish colleagues in regard to the proceedings of Sir A. Kirby's Syndicate, as reported in your despatch No. 165 of the 9th instant.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 295.

Foreign Office to Sir Julian Goldsmid.†

Foreign Office, November 25, 1893.

Sir,

IN reply to your letter of the 17th instant, I am directed by the Earl of Rosebery to state that Her Majesty's Minister at Tangier will be at once instructed to make representations as he may think best suited for the purpose to induce the Moorish Government to put a stop to the ill-treatment of which the Jews of Morocco city complain.

I am, &c.

(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 296.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 319.)

Madrid, November 23, 1893.

My Lord,

A GREAT sensation has been caused by the publication of an interview of a journalist with Señor Sagasta, in which the latter states openly his desire for a speedy peace with Morocco. His Excellency dwells on the "uselessness of the war," from which nothing could be gained, his conviction that a heavy punishment had already been inflicted on the Riffs, his apprehensions as to increasing expenditure, and the order given to the General to stop the advance against the tribes whenever he considers it convenient, subject to the exigencies of the struggle.

I have the honour to inclose a translation of the remarks of Señor Sagasta. They have created a violent excitement in the press.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

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* No. 272.

† Also to Mr. A. Cohen.

Inclosure in No. 296.

Extract from "La Epoca" of November 22, 1893.

(Translation.)

BOTH opinions, carried to extremes, are exaggerated; but the most lamentable part of the question is the uselessness of the war.

What city, what territory is there that we can conquer at the end of our labours, and as the reward of our victory? None; for this territory of the Riff is of no use to us, and it will happen that when our troops go to Gurugu, and even encamp there, they will find no Moors with whom to fight; yet when they return the Moors will reappear, occupying the positions from which they had been dislodged.

I know very well that public opinion is very strong on the subject of "inflicting a severe chastisement on the Kabyles;" but if, in inflicting this chastisement, even though we killed 500 Moors, 20 Spaniards were to die, the chastisement would cost us very dear, since nothing could repay us for the lives of our soldiers uselessly sacrificed.

What has occurred is, that though no chastisement has been inflicted upon them in battle, in a potent and brilliant manner, they have nevertheless been severely chastised, since their casualties have amounted to more than 300 killed and 1,000 wounded, in addition to the serious destruction of their villages and dwellings.

With regard to the slowness of the operations, it must be borne in mind that it was at first proposed to employ 8,000 men to bring them to their conclusion; then 12,000 to 15,000 were talked of, after which 20,000; and now an encampment is proposed large enough to hold 25,000 to 30,000 men.

All this requires time, and the Government cannot precipitate the action of the Commandant of the forces at Melilla. On one occasion it was pointed out to him that there was no apparent advantage in provisioning the forts for a few days at a time, as this merely occasioned a loss of time and lives, and that it would be better to provision them for two or three months. General Macias replied, however, that he was acting in this manner in order to gradually accustom his troops to active service, by employing different regiments and corps in turn on convoy duty.

As to the cost of all this, added Señor Sagasta, it is simply alarming. I believe it will amount to 60 millions of pesetas, since 30 are already spent, and I do not think that the contracts and requisitions already made will fall much below this figure; for since everything has to be bought in a hurry, and on disadvantageous terms, it results that we pay much more than we should have to in normal times.

Bearing in mind that there are 16,000 men over there, more than 2,000 of which are cavalry, that the remittance of ammunition is enormous, that a demand has just been made for 30,000 shells, and further, that the army cannot move one step without even transporting its drinking water, since the Moors have filled up the wells, and the ruinous cost of this war becomes apparent.

No. 297.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 321.) P.

Madrid, November 23, 1893.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 36, I think that Señor Moret's susceptibility has been aroused by your Lordship's having alleged as a reason for making the communication to the French Government the present state of the Melilla affair.

That the French have purposely misrepresented the words in Lord Dufferin's note of the 31st October, 1893, "especially with that of France," appears to me very probable, and I think that instead of my reading to Señor Moret the despatch in question, it would be preferable if your Lordship would send a telegram friendly to Spain.

It is evident from the statements made yesterday by Señor Sagasta that the state of things in Morocco causes grave apprehension to the Prime Minister.

Mr. Bennet Burleigh, the correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph," arrived here to-day from Melilla. His account of the condition of the Spanish troops there is very unfavourable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

No. 298.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 99.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November 27, 1893.*

MOROCCO. A note has been addressed by the Spanish Government to the Sultan, stating that it is impossible to grant the truce asked for by Muley Araaf so long as there are any Moors within the Spanish territory. The Spaniards will themselves undertake to expel the Riffs, and they call upon the Sultan to carry out the provisions of the Treaty of Wad Ras.

This note will be communicated to the Representatives of European Powers at Tangier.

It is evident that the Sultan's brother has little or no influence with the Riff tribesmen.

No. 299.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November 27, 1893.*

IN reply to your Excellency's despatch No. 321, I do not know that I can say more than that Her Majesty's Government have never for a moment doubted that the assurances of the Spanish Government were given in good faith.

The object of Lord Dufferin's communication to the French Government was merely to force their hand and elicit their intentions, by reminding them of M. Waddington's previous communication on the subject.

No. 300.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November 27, 1893.*

THE appointment of Marshal Campos will, I fear, lead people to anticipate that hostilities on a great scale are contemplated.

No. 301.

Consul Finn to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 40.)
My Lord, *Malaga, November 23, 1893.*

SINCE my last despatch No. 39 of the 15th instant, the troops that have been sent from here to Melilla have been the 1st Battalion of the Regiment of "Mallorca," 729 men; 1st Battalion of the Regiment of "Toledo," 760 men; and 120 sailors with General of Brigade Berry and his Staff.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ALEXANDER FINN.

No. 302.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 100.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November 28, 1893.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegrams Nos. 37 and 38 of the 24th and 27th instant respectively, M. Roustan, the French Ambassador, has stated to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that his alleged offer with regard to Tetuan was a misunderstanding.

I would therefore propose, with your Lordship's sanction, to let the matter drop, unless otherwise requested by the Minister.

No. 303.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 101.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November 28, 1893.*

WITH reference to the appointment of Marshal Martinez Campos in Morocco, it was inevitable to avoid a Ministerial crisis and to satisfy public clamour.

As the cost now is at least 20,000*l.* a-day, I cannot think that the Spaniards want a great war; at the same time, an early ending seems to depend on the execution of the VIIth Article of the Treaty of Wad Ras by the Sultan after the first Spanish success.

Prince Gorchakoff, the Russian Minister, informed me last night that Russia would insist on being consulted in all questions affecting the Mediterranean.

No. 304.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 323. Secret and Confidential.)
My Lord, *Madrid, November 24, 1893.*

YESTERDAY evening, on calling at the Ministry of State, Señor Moret asked me if I could explain the meaning of a telegram he had just received from Señor del Mazo. He showed me the document, which I had only time to read cursorily.

The Ambassador telegraphed to say that your Lordship had sent for him to tell him that M. Develle had repudiated the action of M. Roustan in offering to the Queen-Regent the support of France if Spain took possession of Tetuan; that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had declared that M. Roustan was not authorized in using such language, and that your Lordship asked whether Spain would tolerate an Ambassador who had taken such a course without instructions.

Señor Moret seemed much concerned by this telegram, as he feared that the incident reported would cut off, both from himself and also from Her Majesty's Government, a source of information as to the real attitude and intentions of France.

His Excellency therefore urged me to telegraph at once to request your Lordship to inform me, as a guide for his own language, the exact nature of the communication made by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris to M. Develle, and which elicited from that Minister the disavowal of M. Roustan's language.

With regard to the subject treated in my telegram No. 93 I had but little conversation, as our time was occupied with the discussion of Señor Mazo's telegram. I told Señor Moret that the communications made by Lord Dufferin to the French Government, which he had referred to on a former occasion, were merely a reproduction of the language employed by your Lordship to all friendly Powers on the occasion of Sir West Ridgeway's mission, namely, that Her Majesty's Government wished to maintain the *status quo*, a policy which could best be carried out by the friendly co-operation of all Governments.

I should say that the information respecting the Tetuan offer was supplied to me by a colleague, who had heard it from Señor Moret immediately after it had been made. In order not to commit my informant, I did not mention it until I had heard it from

other sources, when I thought it best to let Señor Moret know indirectly that I was not ignorant of what had occurred, to which, in conversation with me, his Excellency had only alluded vaguely, and with a certain mystery. I imagine that Señor Leon y Castillo is very much under French influence, and gives a French colouring to any statements made to him at Paris in connection with Her Majesty's Government.

Probably, under this influence, Señor Moret has been more guarded than before in his communications with me, as, before dispatching my telegram No. 93, he was clearly annoyed at what he had heard from Paris.

Your Lordship will receive by post to-morrow a despatch in cypher (No. 321), sent off yesterday.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

No. 305.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 324.)
Madrid, November 25, 1893.

My Lord,

I LAST night had the honour to telegraph to your Lordship a summary of the Report by General Macias of his interview with Prince Muley Araaf.

I have now the honour to transmit a translation in full, as well as a translation of the decision thereon taken by the Council of Ministers late yesterday evening, after a prolonged sitting.

The newspapers report dissensions in the Cabinet. Señor Moret, while agreeing with his colleagues in rejecting the truce requested, considered the request as logical, and pointed out the problems of international gravity which he considered would follow if this difficult question were not handled with extraordinary prudence.

General Lopez Dominguez, it is understood, persists in his determination to resign if not allowed to take the command of the expedition.

Señor Sagasta asked for a short delay to consider the importance of the Ministerial question, and a further Council will probably be held to-day.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

Inclosure 1 in No. 305.

Extract from the "Imparcial" of November 25, 1893.

(Translation.)

THE following is the official note communicated to the press:—

The Council of Ministers, having carefully studied the telegram in which the General commanding the forces at Melilla gives an account of his interview with Prince Muley Araaf, are agreed to approve of the conduct held by General Macias, as being a faithful interpretation of the instructions received. They are also agreed that General Macias should inform the said Prince that the Government cannot grant his Petition of suspending, by any delay, the operations indispensable to the defence of their territory and to the respect due to their flag, and that it maintains the demand already communicated to the Sultan, exacting the complete and immediate fulfilment of Article VII of the Treaty of Wad Ras, throwing on the Empire all the responsibility that may result from its non-observance.

The Government, considering that the visit of Prince Araaf to the camp has in no way altered the pending situation, has resolved to repeat the orders it had previously transmitted, and to further pursue and terminate the operations judged proper to conciliate the different elements and necessities of the situation.

Inclosure 2 in No. 305.

Extract from "El Pais" of November 25, 1893.

(Translation.)
Melilla, November 23, 1893.

The General in Command to the Minister of War,

TO-DAY at twelve o'clock, according to appointment, the interview with the brother of the Sultan took place in the Central Camp, known by the name of "Instruction."

He presented himself, preceded by the Pasha, escorted by twenty infantry and thirty cavalry.

I went forward on horseback to greet him, and the regiment of Santiago in line saluted. The brigades held themselves in readiness to avoid any gathering of people. One of the tents used for a General-in-chief had been already pitched. After mutual salutes, he charged me to signify to the Government the loyal friendship the Sultan entertains for Spain, and that no efforts will be left untried to insure its continuance. That he acknowledges our perfect right to construct whatever we think fit on our territory, and that he proposes to severely punish the Kabyles. He petitioned a delay, so that the Sultan might come to Fez with the object of distancing the Kabyles, and taking them from the interior. He insisted again and again on this.

I answered in the name of Her Majesty, thanking him for his good intentions, promising to make them known to the Government, but that on no account could I grant him one moment of delay in the work and movement of the troops which may be necessary; that as a soldier, I could but obey the order of your Excellency. He begged me also, with the object of softening asperities on both sides, to allow the Riffs to trade with the Camp, to which I answered in the negative, and that this could not be done until my Government ordered it. After having first satisfied the national honour, and insisting much on one or two other petitions which I roundly refused, he left, renewing his phrases of friendship. In a word, what he offered is to do what he can to chastise the rebels and give satisfaction, while I shall continue the work with more activity in the measure of my powers.

On leaving he made me a present of an ancient arquebuse and a scimitar.

No. 306.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 325. Secret.)
Madrid, November 25, 1893.

My Lord,

LAST night I had a long conversation with Major von Funcke, the German Military Attaché, as his opinions and views of the present state of things in Morocco are founded on military knowledge as well as personal acquaintance with the country. I beg to call to them the serious attention of Her Majesty's Government.

Major von Funcke considers that the whole crisis has been unnecessary. Spain ought never to have begun building the fort at Sidi Guariach, although within the Spanish territory, and this for three reasons:—

1. The site chosen was, from a military point of view, not a good one, as it is dominated by two other hills also within the Spanish radius.

2. The opposition of the Moors was quite justifiable, as the building was most offensive to their religious feeling.

3. When built, the distance from the town, about 3 kilom., and the scarcity, not to say absence, of water and supplies, would entail endless expense. Melilla itself is dependent for water, in a great measure, on Malaga and Nemours, from which places it is conveyed in barrels.

With respect to the existing position Major Funcke considers that, with the best intentions, the Sultan will be unable to give any material assistance in coercing the Riffs. It will be some time before the news can reach His Majesty of the breakdown of the negotiations, and the Spanish troops cannot remain idle during this period. Moreover, the Sultan, he thinks, will fear undertaking operations against the Riffs, his co-religionists, conscious as he is that he may perhaps before long require their assistance against foreign aggression or invasion. Spain therefore has no alternative but to proceed with her operations against the Riffs. A compromise is possible

between her and her adversaries, but only at the cost of national pride. If Spain undertook not to proceed with the fort at Sidi Guariach, but to content herself with fortifications on the two hills before mentioned, the Riffs would be perfectly satisfied, and strategical requirements would be fully carried out. This is, I believe, the course advocated by Señor Castelar, but in the present Chauvinistic wave rolling over the army and the press, it is impossible to foresee what might be the consequence of adopting it. It therefore seems inevitable that Spain should pursue her operations against the Riffs, and carry matters to their bitter end. But if she does so, the victory would appear to be worse than sterile. The ordinary garrison at Mellila has been hitherto from 1,500 to 1,700 strong. The present forces on the spot are from 16,000 to 20,000, maintained at a large cost. No one can well foresee the expense of further operations, to say nothing of the risk of ulterior complications.

But supposing the Spanish army to triumph, the new fort or forts could not be held with a garrison of less than from 8,000 to 10,000 men, the cost of which, in comparison to the 1,700 till now maintained in Melilla, would be a heavy if not intolerable burden on Spanish resources.

This burden would be largely augmented if Spain, as she it is said wishes, were to take possession of the Hill of Gurugu, which would increase the Spanish territory from 3, as it now is, to 8 kilom.

This view may appear pessimistic, but Major von Funcke is remarkably calm and clear-headed, and I attach great weight to his opinion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

No. 307.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 169. Secret.)

Foreign Office, November 29, 1893.

Sir,

I HAD another conversation to-day with the Spanish Ambassador with regard to the difficulty at Melilla. He said that Señor Moret would not remain in office if there were any disturbance of the *status quo* in Morocco, because he had pledged himself so entirely in that direction to the Great Powers of Europe. He also told me that Marshal Martinez Campos had been appointed to command the troops, in order to satisfy the demands of public sentiment in Spain.

I remarked to his Excellency that what I had foreseen at the outset had already become evident, which was, that any claim for pecuniary satisfaction, which would reimburse the expenditure incurred by Spain, was out of the question. The Sultan could not possibly pay what had already been spent. M. del Mazo admitted that this was so; but hinted at some security in the shape of a "Douane." Without entering into any discussion on this suggestion, I continued that, on the whole, the best solution of the question would, in my opinion, be that Spain should demand such small amount of territory (provided that it was small) as would make the fortress secure. I understood that the whole Peninsula of Melilla was insignificant in area, and, I was sure, if there were no territorial encroachments sufficient to cause a real disturbance of the *status quo*, or to encourage the pretensions of others, that this would be the least objectionable method of terminating the difficulty. His Excellency said that 2 kilom. at the most would be required, and I told him that if he would procure from his Government a map showing what was the line required to secure Melilla against attack, I would then be prepared to consider seriously the arrangement I had proposed. What was more, should the Government of Spain so desire, I would submit to the other Powers concerned this solution of the dispute. I would do this to show that Her Majesty's Government were disinterested in the matter, and out of my warm regard for Spain, though I should prefer not being put forward, and should only act if it was the real desire of the Spanish Government.

His Excellency thanked me cordially, and promised to transmit my proposition to his Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 308.

The Earl of Rosebery to Señor del Mazo.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Foreign Office, November* 29, 1893.

WITH reference to my letter of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to inclose herewith, for your Excellency's information, a statement respecting the steps taken by the Gibraltar authorities to control the storage and exportation of arms and ammunition.*

I have, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 309.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 329.)

My Lord, *Madrid, November* 26, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a Memorandum containing a short account by Sir George Bonham, taken from official sources, of the course of events at Melilla since the 6th instant until the arrival of Muley Araaf, the Sultan of Morocco's brother.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

Inclosure in No. 309.

Memorandum.

WITH the exception of a few skirmishes and some artillery firing at long ranges the period which has elapsed since the 6th instant at Melilla has been singularly uneventful. The official telegrams from General Macias to the Minister of War and from the naval officer in command to the Minister of Marine report the arrival of fresh troops, and the departure of the ships in which they came for Algeciras or for Malaga. The works connected with the trenches and new fortifications have been delayed at one time by torrential rains, and latterly by severe tempests.

On the 7th, and again on the 9th, the forts of Rostrogordo and Cabrerizas Altas were provisioned without any difficulty, as the convoy was not attacked; the provisions are stated to have been sufficient to last for twenty days. On the 8th, General Macias reported that the Pasha of the district, the Pasha of Magazan, and the officer in command of the troops, had asked for an interview, and had informed him that the Kabyles of the interior alone desired to carry on hostilities, exercising pressure on those living on the frontier, who are described as being desirous of peace, to carry on the war, and asking for a truce of eight days, within which time it was expected that the Sultan's force would arrive and inflict severe chastisement on the rebels. General Macias answered that if at 3 P.M. on the following day a definite petition for peace with an admission of the right to construct a fort at Sidi Guariach had not been made, he would open fire along the whole line.

Accordingly, no answer having been received, the forts opened fire next day on the enemy, who were seen in large force, but who did not return it. The Spaniards also commenced intrenchments at Horcas to protect the camp. Subsequently, the Captain of the "Venadito" reported that the Moors appeared to be fighting among themselves. On the 12th the forts at Cabrerizas and Rostrogordo opened fire, compelling the enemy to retire from the positions taken up.

From the 12th to the 17th hostilities seem almost to have ceased; a considerable number of troops arrived, and so much progress was made with the intrenched camp, that it would be possible for an army of 30,000 men to encamp with security, and General Macias asked for two additional regiments.

On the 18th a reconnaissance was carried out between Cabrerizas Altas and Rostrogordo, a heavy fire being kept up, which compelled the enemy to retire. Later

* Extract from Inclosure in Colonial Office letter of November 2, 1893.

they obtained possession of the heights, and opened a fire on the ridge of Santiago, bu they were dislodged on this occasion, one of the convict force being killed.

On the 19th at 3 P.M. a messenger arrived at Melilla with a letter, stating that the Sultan's brother had arrived and wished to see General Macias, in order to put an end to the frontier difficulties. The General answered that he would be glad to receive the Sultan's brother, but that his orders were so strict, and the treachery of the Moors had been so great, that he could not order a cessation of firing so long as a Moor remained within sight, but that he would give orders that the white should not be fired on in order that the Sultan's brother might approach the fort. Late the same evening the Pasha came to salute the General, giving assurances that the Kabyles would be punished, and asking that the interview with the Sultan's brother might take place on the 22nd. General Macias answered that he would have the honour to receive him, but that he must realize the fact that hostilities would continue, and that if any Moors came within range of the forts or of the infantry practising they would be fired on. The General received assurances that the Riffs of the interior had retired, and that those on the frontier would not fire.

During these days the weather had been extremely bad. The Reina Mercedes, with the 10,000 Mauser rifles, had arrived, and after landing them, which was done with some difficulty, had left for Algeciras.

On the 21st General Macias telegraphed that, in obedience to instructions, the works were being proceeded with without interruption, that a convoy was about to start next day to Cabrerizas Altas and Rostrogordo, and that the Moorish intrenchments in the neighbourhood of Fort X would be destroyed. Three battalions had been armed with the Mauser rifle, and that a large number of men were employed in unloading the "Gerona" and other vessels laden with ammunition and provisions. The Sultan's brother had arrived, and was encamped at a distance of 1 Kilom. from the Mosque of Sidi Guariach.

On the 22nd General Macias received a letter from the Sultan's brother, Muley Araaf, to the effect that he was unable to go to see him that day as arranged, being tired after his long journey, and having many arrangements to make in his camp. It was noticeable that the Moors no longer came near the Spanish lines. The day was spent in taking provisions and water to Rostrogordo and Cabrerizas.

On the 23rd, at midday, the conference took place. Muley Araaf begged the General to assure the Spanish Government of the loyal friendship felt by the Sultan for Spain, that he would spare no means to preserve it, that he recognized the right of the Spaniards to build forts anywhere in their own territory, that he intended to chastise the Kabyles with great severity, and that he asked for a month's truce to give the Sultan time to go to Fez in order to dislodge the Kabyles of the interior.

General Macias answered that he would convey these proposals to his Government, but that he could not for a moment desist from the works which had been commenced or in the movement of troops. Muley Araaf then asked that, in order to soften the bitter feelings between the opposing parties, the Moors might be allowed to come and traffic at Melilla, but this was at once refused.

The Government entirely approved General Macias' language to Muley Araaf, and instructed him to make known their determination not to grant a suspension of arms or of the works undertaken. They repeat their demand that Article VII of the Treaty of Wad Ras should be strictly carried out, making the Sultan's Government responsible for any results arising from its non-execution.

They further observe that, as the arrival of Prince Araaf has made no alteration in the state of affairs, General Macias is to continue the operations already commenced.

No. 310.

Memorandum communicated by Señor del Mazo, November 30.

LE Ministre d'Espagne à Tanger a suggéré au Ministre d'Angleterre la convenance de ce que nos vaisseaux de guerre puissent visiter les bateaux qui hissent le drapeau Anglais quand ils sont poursuivis, sans avoir le droit de le faire. L'idée n'a pas paru mauvaise au Ministre d'Angleterre, et je vous la communique pour le cas que vous jugeriez à propos d'en parler à Lord Rosebery.

Londres, le 29 *Novembre*, 1893.

No. 311.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 30.)

Sir, *Downing Street, November* 30, 1893.

WITH reference to your letter of the 22nd instant respecting the export of arms to Morocco, I am directed by the Marquis of Ripon to transmit to you, for the information of the Earl of Rosebery, a copy of a telegram which was addressed to the Governor of Gibraltar, directing him to make inquiries as to the vessels registered there, together with a copy of his reply.

I am also to inclose a copy of a despatch just received from Sir R. Biddulph, inclosing a list of the vessels registered at Gibraltar, with particulars as to their owners and tonnage.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD WINGFIELD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 311.

The Marquis of Ripon to Governor Sir R. Biddulph.

(Telegraphic.) *Downing Street, November* 17, 1893, 7 P.M.

PLEASE have inquiry made at once as to whether any vessels registered at Gibraltar are not entitled to British registry under section 18, "Merchant Shipping Act, 1854."

Inclosure 2 in No. 311.

Governor Sir R. Biddulph to the Marquis of Ripon.

(Telegraphic.) *(Received November* 21, 1893, 8·30 P.M.)

REFERRING to your telegram of 17th November, 18th section of "Merchant Shipping Act, 1854," appears to have been complied with in each case vessels registered here.

Despatch follows by mail.

Inclosure 3 in No. 311.

Governor Sir R. Biddulph to the Marquis of Ripon.

My Lord, *Gibraltar, November* 22, 1893.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 17th instant, and in continuation of my message of the 21st instant, I have the honour to state that I have caused inquiry to be made into the question whether any vessels registered in this port are not entitled to British registry under section 18 of "The Merchant Shipping Act, 1854," and that I do not find that any vessels have been registered otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of that section.

I transmit herewith a list of these vessels, showing their date of first registry, class, tonnage, and owners, and I have satisfied myself that all the last named are *bonâ fide* British subjects.

Two of the vessels are now used as hulks in the bay, and four others are marked as unknown here at the present date.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ROBERT BIDDULPH.

Inclosure 4 in No. 311.

RETURN showing the Number of Vessels and Owners registered at the Port of Gibraltar.

Registered under Section 18 *of "The Merchant Shipping Act,* 1854."

Year of Registration.	Name of Ship.	Class.	Tonnage.	Owners.	Remarks.
1857	Clementina ..	Sailing ..	43	Miguel Pons, of Gibraltar.	
1862	Le Lion Belge ..	Steamer ..	78	Richard E. Cowell, of Gibraltar.	
„	Robert Mowe, jun.	Sailing ..	121	Wm. B. Newbery, of Gibraltar ..	Not known here.
1863	Atlantic	„ ..	283	Thos. Stott-Pope, of Stanstead, Canada	Ditto.
1865	Five Sisters ..	„ ..	245	Francisco Pace, of Malta ..	Ditto.
1866	Navigator ..	„ ..	18	Elias Carceny, of Gibraltar ..	Ditto.
„	Hercules.. ..	Steamer ..	53	M. H. Bland and Co., of Gibraltar; Louise Foote, of Gibraltar; Caroline Agnes Foote, of London.	
1868	Jackal	„ ..	30	Richard Cowell, of Gibraltar.	
„	Aid	„ ..	6	M. H. Bland and Co. (Limited), of Gibraltar.	
1873	Negrito	Steamer ..	81	Emmanuel Carlo, of Gibraltar.	
1875	Dolphin	„ ..	7	M. H. Bland and Co. (Limited), of Gibraltar.	
1881	Recovery ..	Sailing ..	817	Alex. Mosley, of Gibraltar ..	Hulk.
1882	Johanne	„ ..	61	Anthony Facio, of Gibraltar.	
1884	Mayer	„ ..	78	Manuel Bebeagua, of Gibraltar.	
„	Light Brigade ..	„ ..	1,210	Yamtob Bergel, of Gibraltar ..	Hulk.
„	Yoven Mariana ..	„ ..	98	Lawrence Fava, of Gibraltar.	
1885	Gibel Tarik ..	Steamer ..	123	M. H. Bland and Co. (Limited), of Gibraltar.	
1887	Leon	Sailing ..	43	John Baglietto, of Gibraltar.	
„	Potomac ..	„ ..	276	Ambrose Zino, of Funchal.	
„	Virgen de los Angeles	„ ..	16	Joseph Diaz, of Gibraltar.	
1888	Senno	„ ..	625	Scloador Gauci, of Leghorn.	
1889	Thomas Haynes ..	Steamer ..	776	Benjamin G. Haynes, John Hall Haynes, Creswell D. Haynes, Joseph W. H. Haynes, of Gibraltar.	
1890	Ceto	„ ..	49	Benjamin G. Haynes, Joseph W. H. Haynes, John Hall Haynes, of Gibraltar.	
„	Dollie	„ ..	9	John Hall Haynes, of Gibraltar.	
1891	Gaditano ..	„ ..	10	Ditto.	
„	General Boyd ..	„ ..	879	Francis Imossi, John Azopardi, Peter Puerto, Elijio Balestrino, John Besutich, Jos. Rumbo, B. F. Isola-Rosa Puchini, A. R. Parody, Richard Parody, V. J. Benzaquen, Wm. W. Richards, Bernard Varesse, John Croce, H. J. Recaño, Raphael Rugeroni, John Bartibas, Isidoro Burrell, Wm. Stevens, Luisa Carara, Rudesinda Carara, Aurora Carara Rugeroni, Geo. E. Ross, E. V. Martolini, Adelaide Glassford, Jos. Patron, John H. Imossi, John C. King-Manuel Baglietto, W. James Smith, Eliza Mosley, all of Gibraltar; Robert S. Hunter, Jane Hunter, of Tangier; Geo. Edwardes Jeans, of Storwell; Eva Jeans, Mabel Venn, Charles G. Jeans, Emily Smith, of Lee; James A. Burness, of London; George A. Hodgson, of Malaga.	
1891	Brothers German ..	Sailing ..	626	Salvador Gauci, of Leghorn.	
„	Leonilda Gauci ..	„ ..	639	Ditto.	
1893	Jubilee	Steamer ..	9	Richard Portunato, of Gibraltar.	
„	Africa	„ ..	8	Richard C. Ivison, of Jerez.	

Registered under "Colonial Merchant Shipping Act, 1868."

Year of Registration.	Name of Ship.	Class.	Tonnage.	Owners.	Remarks.
1892	Herminia (late "Nuestra Señora del Risario")	Sailing ..	10	Moses Abecasis, of Gibraltar.	
1893	Vencedor ..	„ ..	5	John Sufredo, of Gibraltar.	
„	Isabel	„ ..	21	Fernando Ruggeri, of Gibraltar.	
„	Adelina	„ ..	12	Joseph Alvarez, of Gibraltar.	
„	San José.. ..	„ ..	6	Abraham de Judah Laredo, of Gibraltar.	
„	San Miguel ..	„ ..	7	Arthur Danino, of Gibraltar.	
„	Naestra Sra de los Angeles	„ ..	25	Joseph Diaz, of Gibraltar.	
„	Angelito ..	„ ..	15	Juan Alvarez, of Gibraltar.	
„	Joven Enrique ..	„ ..	26	Laurence Fava, of Gibraltar.	
„	San Juan Bautista..	„ ..	15	John Sufredo, of Gibraltar.	

No. 312.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 30.)

(No. 103.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November* 30, 1893.

MARSHAL MARTINEZ CAMPOS has received orders to advance to the limits of the Spanish territory, and to commence building the fort at Sidi Guariach. If attacked during these operations by the Moors, he is to advance into their territory as far as circumstances call for.

No. 313.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received November* 30, 10 P.M.)

(No. 104.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, November* 30, 1893, 8 P.M.

I HAVE on good though not official authority the following news from Melilla: At 3 o'clock the works of the fort of Sidi Guariach commenced, without any molestation from the Moors. The Spanish army had taken precautions. Marshal Martinez Campos conversed with the Pasha at the limits of the Spanish territory when the works began. It is believed that the Pasha answers for the preservation of tranquillity.

No. 314.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 169 A. Secret.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 30, 1893.

IN continuation of our interview of yesterday, the Spanish Ambassador called again this afternoon for the purpose of reading to me a letter from Señor Moret relative to the communications respecting Tetuan made by the French Ambassador at Madrid.

Señor Moret explained that M. Roustan had spoken to him as he had spoken to his predecessor at the Ministry of State, and, as Señor Moret supposed, he had spoken to the Queen, respecting the satisfaction with which France would see Spain consolidating her position in Morocco; that during the conversations which had taken place, Señor Moret had alluded to the possibility of war in the event of the Sultan

refusing to carry out the Treaty of Wad Ras, and, on that hypothesis, M. Roustan had stated that, if Spain found it necessary to declare war against Morocco, in his opinion, France, seeing her sympathy for Spain, would not be displeased by Tetuan being eventually occupied, as had happened in 1860; but M. Roustan did not offer French support, much less volunteer a guarantee by France that possession should be permanent.

Señor Moret added that, under the influence of the best possible understanding on the subject, M. Roustan, as well as your Excellency and nearly all the other Ambassadors, had merely told him that if Spain found it necessary to have some small increase of territory, for the sake of securing greater safety round Melilla or other fortified positions, no one would deprecate such action, or consider it a cause for displeasure among the European Powers. It was notorious that France had always maintained friendly relations with the Spanish Government on the question of Morocco; such relations had been, and still were, entirely compatible with loyalty to the international relations maintained by Spain, and M. Roustan had also informed him of what had passed between M. Develle and Lord Dufferin respecting events at Melilla, and had done so with the very proper intention of clearing away any suspicion of the existence of an understanding between France and England, to the detriment of Spain.

Señor Moret concluded by expressing a wish that his letter should be read to me, and that I should be told that his object in writing it was to destroy any cause for distrust or suspicion, as he sincerely believed that what had occurred with regard to this matter had no real importance, and should not be regarded as more than an episode in the many conversations that had taken place with regard to Spain's relations with Morocco.

I requested Señor Mazo to explain to Señor Moret how Lord Dufferin had come to make the remark which was attributed to him. In August 1892, M. Waddington had come to announce the anxiety of the French Government for cordial co-operation with Great Britain in the affairs of Morocco, and since then I had always treated the French Government with the utmost frankness on the subject, for, indeed, I had nothing to conceal. But I had met with no reciprocity, and had received no communication of any kind from the French Government. The other day, therefore, I had thought it well to instruct Lord Dufferin to remind M. Develle of M. Waddington's communication, and of my readiness to act on that basis. M. Develle had expressed satisfaction at this communication, and shortly afterwards we had heard from every capital in Europe of the overtures made by M. Roustan.

Under these circumstances, I did not like to refuse Lord Dufferin permission to make an allusion to M. Roustan's proceedings, which were so incompatible with the French declarations. Moreover, I wished Señor Moret to understand that I had in no respect violated his confidence. What he had told me as a secret I had kept as a secret, but when I heard the news from every quarter of Europe, I felt that I was at liberty to sanction the allusion made to it by Lord Dufferin.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 315.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 1.)

(No. 332. Secret and Confidential.) P.

Madrid, November 28, 1893.

My Lord,

PRINCE GORCHAKOFF, the Russian Minister, dined with me last night, and in the course of conversation made these statements:—

That the object of the understanding between Russia and France is to guarantee peace, that it is of a durable character, and that the Triple Alliance which is the ruin of Italy is now practically broken up.

In the Alsace Lorraine question Russia will not assist France.

When it was proposed that a Russian fleet should enter the Mediterranean, the attitude of Italy in refusing to allow more than three ships in any one of her ports at the same time contrasted with the friendliness of the Spanish Government towards Russia.

Prince Gorchakoff says that he has not been writing to his Government on the events at Melilla, but that the Russian papers have published full details.

Owing to difficulty in finding a suitable Representative, Russia had taken no part in the Morocco Conference of 1887. This had been a subject of annoyance to Spain, but since then Russia had made amends by appointing the Spanish Minister at Tangier Russian Minister with regular letters of credence. Henceforward Russia intends to have a voice in all Mediterranean questions; in the words of Prince Gorchakoff, "Where the others are, we shall be." Admiral Avellan is about to visit Constantinople.

The Minister strongly condemns the policy of the present Spanish Government with regard to Melilla as a blunder which might have been avoided.

I would venture to ask your Lordship that instructions be sent to Mr. Satow to repeat any important telegrams to me, as is done in some other Embassies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

No. 316.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 1.)

(No. 335. Secret and Confidential.) P.

Madrid, November 28, 1893.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram of to-day No. 101, I am informed that the choice lay between a damaging change in the Cabinet and sending General Lopez Dominguez, the Minister of War, to Melilla, which, owing to his unpopularity, might have been the cause of a military revolt, already in preparation, among the officers, and that the Queen-Regent saved the situation by her firm attitude.

Her Majesty declined to accept the resignation of Señores Moret and Lopez Dominguez. Marshal Martinez Campos, already on his way to Madrid from Barcelona (with what object is uncertain), was then appointed to the command in Morocco, as being the only man possessed of sufficient prestige to make a policy of moderation acceptable to the country, and as a concession to the officers and warlike attitude of the press.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

No. 317.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 141.)

Foreign Office, December 1, 1893.

Sir,

I HAVE had under my consideration your despatch No. 158 of the 28th October, reporting the steps that you have taken in the matter of certain robberies of postal couriers between Rabat and Laraiche which have recently been committed by Moorish tribes, in the absence of their Governors.

I have to request that you will furnish me with information as to the arrangements now in force for carrying on the postal service in Morocco, and more especially as to the escorts provided for the couriers.

As regards the question of demanding an indemnity from the Moorish Government on behalf of the Gibraltar Postal Administration, before providing you with instructions for your guidance I should be glad to learn whether any compensation is made by the Moorish Government to their own officials who would appear to have been assaulted, or to Moorish subjects for the loss of valuables contained in registered letters, and also, whether any steps are taken to compensate the French and Spanish Post Offices for losses sustained by them through the outrages in question.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 318.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Foreign Office, December 1, 1893.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Earl of Rosebery to transmit to you herewith, for the information of the Marquis of Ripon, copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Minister

at Tangier,* reporting on certain robberies of postal couriers that have recently occurred between Laraiche and Rabat, together with copy of the reply that has been returned to it.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 319.

Mr. Satow to Foreign Office —(*Received December* 2.)

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, December* 2, 1893.

WITH reference to my private letter of the 17th November last, and Mr. White's despatch No. 54 of the 16th July, 1891, I have received information that Gaiffe, according to his own account, has a promise in writing from the Sultan granting him, in the event of His Majesty having any loan to contract, the Concession; and that Gaiffe is coming here in January to make the necessary arrangements.

No. 320.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 4.)

(No. 337.)
My Lord, *Madrid, November* 30, 1893.

THE "Imparcial," which is supposed to represent the section of the Cabinet influenced by Señor Gamazo, inserts to-day the following paragraph, headed, "How far will the troops advance?"

"The Council of Ministers was occupied last night in the new instructions of a political character which should be given to General Martinez Campos. The formula employed by the General when he passed through Madrid was sufficiently expressive. 'We shall go to where it may be necessary' ('preciso'). And, in fact, the Government considered yesterday that a General-in-chief should take with him to a campaign the most ample powers to proceed according to circumstances.

"But if Señor Martinez Campos desires to know the opinion of the Government, it decided last night that his mission is to secure respect for our interests in Melilla, and the construction of the fort of Sidi Guarriach.

"Furthermore, it appears that the Government maintains that the troops should advance within our territory ['campo' means land or a camp] to the limits of the same, and construct the necessary fortifications; and that in the case of the lives and labours of the Spaniards not being thus sufficiently secured from the hostility of the Moors, then to advance as far as may be required.

"This decision of the Government is in accordance with the idea maintained by the General-in-chief."

The Marshal is reported to have held yesterday a conference with the Sultan's brother, who asked for delay in the advance so as to give time to reduce to order the contumacious tribes. This request the Marshal is said to have refused in these words, "I will wait, but proceed" ("esperaré, pero andando").

It is now said the expenses amount to about 1,000,000 pesetas a-day, and twenty-six General officers have been appointed to the expeditionary force.

The newspapers also make allusion to the supplies furnished to the Riffs by the Kabyles of Muluya, adding that strict orders have been issued on this subject by the French Government to the Military Governor of Oran.

There is one point which seems to give confidence in Marshal Martinez Campos to competent judges, which is that on former occasions he has succeeded as much by negotiation as by fighting. Two officials from the Foreign Office well acquainted with the Treaties have been attached to his staff, from which the conclusion is drawn that attempts may be made for a pacific solution of the campaign.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

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* No. 193. † No. 317.

No. 321.

Señor del Mazo to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 4.)

(Translation.)
My Lord, *Spanish Embassy, London, December* 1, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 29th ultimo, together with a Memorandum respecting the measures adopted by the authorities of Gibraltar to prevent the trade in contraband of war.

In the name of His Majesty's Government I have the honour to thank your Excellency most cordially for the strenuous measures adopted, and beg that such thanks may be communicated to the Minister for the Colonies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. DEL MAZO.

No. 322.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 5.)

(No. 169.)
My Lord, *Tangier, November* 18, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 14th instant letters arrived from the Sultan to his Minister Cid Mohammed Torres stating that on the 28th ultimo His Majesty had dispatched his brother, Mulaï Arafa, from the camp at the head of 400 horsemen, and with instructions to collect soldiers from various tribes as he proceeded down the valley of the Muluya towards the Riff. The letter mentioned eleven days as the time to be occupied on the road, but as no information has yet been received of Mulaï Arafa's arrival in the vicinity of Melilla, it is probable that he has been delayed by difficulties connected with the levying of the required force. I learn, however, from Mr. Vice-Consul Macleod that Mulaï Arafa passed Ksabi-es-Shorfa, at the head of the Muluya valley, about the 8th instant.

The Sultan has sent letters direct to six of the Riff tribes concerned in the hostilities against Melilla commanding them to desist from their opposition to the construction of the Spanish fort, and menacing them with his curse if they are disobedient.

His Majesty further instructed Cid Torres to say to the Spanish Minister that, as soon as the affairs upon which he is engaged permit of his leaving Tafilelt, he will remove to a spot nearer to the Riff. Further, that he is determined to castigate the tribesmen severely in case they should disobey his commands to abstain from opposing the building of the fort, and he expresses the hope that in such a contingency the Spanish Government will not proceed with its construction until he can make his authority effectively felt.

The business alluded to is doubtless the arrangement of a dispute about some lands belonging to the people of Tafilelt, of which they accuse the tribe of Ait Atta of having deprived them, and the consolidation of his influence in those parts. It will doubtless be of importance to His Majesty to arrive at a satisfactory understanding with his brother, Mulaï-er-Reschid, before turning his face homewards. Every day's delay increases the probability of the passes of the Atlas becoming blocked with snow, and by some persons it is even thought possible that he may remain in the neighbourhood of Tafilelt till the spring.

As a précis of Cid Torres' note to the Marquis de Potestad, and a translation of the Sultan's letter to the tribes have been published here, I venture to inclose them. I have reason to feel certain that these documents are authentic.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure 1 in No. 322.

Précis of Note of Cid Mohammed Torres to the Spanish Minister.

(Translation.)

IN the note dispatched yesterday to the Spanish Representative by Cid Mohammed Torres, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the latter says, according to the information which has reached us, that his Sovereign (may God help him) orders him

to acquaint the Spanish Representative, for the information of his Government, that, in consequence of the events at Melilla, he has sent his brother, Mulaï Arafa, with a body of cavalry to the forces of the Riff, at a place called Bu Jenad, in order to warn and admonish the people that they will be chastised unless they abandon their hostile attitude towards Spain, and allow the garrison to construct the projected fort.

That he has dispatched the strictest orders to the Governors of the Riff to join the Prince with their people at the spot already mentioned.

That he has given instructions to his illustrious brother to keep in touch with Cid Torres in whatever relates to this matter until its satisfactory solution for the well-being of both Governments, and he hopes that no trace will remain of anything that might cool the friendly relations existing between them.

He then adds that he hopes the tribes of the Riff will implicitly submit themselves to the desires of the Sultan. In the contrary case, if they do not submit, the Sultan begs the Spanish Government, through the medium of Cid Torres, and as a sacrifice to the maintenance of the friendship between both nations, to defer the construction of the fort which has given rise to this conflict until His Shereefian Majesty arrives in his dominions of the Gharb to subdue the Riffians and inflict on them the condign punishment which they have deserved. The Government, recognizing the rights of Spain, asks its Government to have patience, understanding, as they will, that the Sultan greatly deplores this incident to such a degree that he announces that he will hasten his return to Morocco city with the object of settling the question in accordance with his desires.

Mulaï Arafa left the 28th October, and, as he was to occupy some twelve days in performing the journey, has very probably reached his destination.

The Imperial letter is dated Jumad II, 1311 (October 1893).

Inclosure 2 in No. 322.

Extract from "El Eco Mauritano" of November 18, 1893.

(Translation.)

WE have received the letter reporting that the Governor of Melilla had made arrangements to construct a fort in the vicinity of Sidi Aguariach, and that the adjacent Moors had opposed this. At the same time we have received a complaint from the Spanish Government that the Riffians adjacent to Melilla hinder the authorities and troops of that fortress from constructing a fort within their limits, twice destroying the walls which they had begun to raise for the purpose. That the Spaniards had sent forces to protect the construction, and that the Riffians attacked them in large bodies, there being killed and wounded on both sides, and this in spite of land being concerned bought from the Riffians and ceded to the Spaniards for them to do what they liked with it. What ground existed, therefore, for hindering the said construction, which was within their limits, and without there being any Treaty between them in existence to justify this? All the blame for the misfortunes and blunder committed falls upon the Riffians themselves, since, even supposing that any Treaty existed, they ought to have appealed to the Sultan and waited until he answered, and not offer opposition without an order from the Government. They are responsible for the present trouble, which they have caused by their wrong behaviour, and for the loss they have brought upon themselves, their families, their brethren, and their own country.

As for thee, thy duty was to have prevented thy countrymen from doing all this, to have counselled them and warned them of the consequences, and have contributed on thy side everything requisite to dissuade them.

For this reason, we send our brother with a body of cavalry, bringing orders not to oppose the construction, and, if they had any Treaty to prevent it, that they bring the same forward, and hold themselves submissive until the Sultan inquires into the matter.

We order thee, therefore, to aid our brother in his mission, and that thou cause them to obey his wishes, reminding the Riffians of their duties in order that they may fulfil them if they love their peace and prosperity. In the contrary case, they shall be cursed, and shall be visited with a chastisement the like of which they have never yet seen.

No. 323.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 5.)

(No. 170.)

My Lord, *Tangier, November* 27, 1893.

WITH reference to Mr. White's despatch No. 135, Confidential, of the 22nd August last, transmitting further correspondence regarding Kaïd Bensaïd's stores at Dar-el-Baïda, which the Sultan had granted to the Italian Government, I have the satisfaction to be able to report that the matter has at last been terminated by the delivery of the keys to the Italian Consular Agent at that port on the 20th instant, and the repayment to Messrs. Lamb Brothers of the 500 dollars paid by them in advance for a year's rent.

The delay that has occurred was entirely due to the persistence with which Kaïd Bensaïd evaded carrying out his part of the agreement.

I beg to inclose copy of a letter which Mr. Cantagalli addressed to me on learning of the termination of this affair, as well as of my reply.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure 1 in No. 323.

Mr. Cantagalli to Mr. Satow.

My dear Mr. Satow, *Tangier, November* 25, 1893.

I HASTEN to inform you tbat I have received this morning a letter from our Consular Agent, dated the 21st instant, stating that on the previous day he had been tendered, by the Governor of Dar-el-Baïda, the keys of the two warehouses. The affair is thus finally settled.

While I congratulate myself, however, upon the termination of this little question, I feel I must ascribe to your very kind and active intervention such speedy and satisfactory result. You have thus continued the peaceful work commenced by your Legation, and carried on in a spirit of mutual regard and friendship. I take great pleasure in expressing to you my warmest thanks, and shall acquaint my Government of your very amiable participation in bringing about the desired result.

Yours, &c.
(Signed) R. CANTAGALLI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 323.

Mr. Satow to Mr. Cantagalli.

My dear Mr. Cantagalli, *Tangier, November* 25, 1893.

MANY thanks for your note of to-day, informing me that the keys of the warehouses have been delivered to your Consular Agent at Dar-el-Baïda, and that this affair, which has been so long pending, is now satisfactorily terminated. It is with great pleasure that I take this opportunity of putting on record my sense of the friendly and conciliatory spirit which has animated both yourself and, during your absence, Mr. Gentile in dealing with this business. I trust we may always be able to preserve the same harmony of action in all other matters in which we have common interests.

Believe me, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 324.

Señor del Mazo to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 5.)

(Translation.)

My Lord, *Spanish Embassy, London, December* 2, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency a copy of a despatch, with two inclosures, which I have received from the Secretary of State, on the subject of events at Melilla.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. DEL MAZO.

Inclosure 1 in No. 324.

Señor Moret to Señor del Mazo.

(Translation.)

Madrid, November 25, 1893.

Sir,

THE presence of Prince Muley Araaf, sent by his brother, the Sultan of Morocco, to put an end to the rebellion and excesses of the Kabyles of the Riff, has, unfortunately, not had the immediate result which His Majesty's Government were justified in expecting. You will see from the declarations, made by the Prince to the General Commanding at Melilla, a copy of which I transmit herewith, that the Prince founds his request for a temporary cessation of the military operations which the Spanish army has undertaken in the neighbourhood of Melilla on the rebellious conduct of the tribes, which he has not been able to subdue or pacify, and, since he has come to the Riff unaccompanied by sufficient forces to accomplish the mission intrusted to him by his brother, the Spanish Government has not seen its way to agreeing to the truce, or to allowing the Riff Arabs to trade with the fortress of Melilla, a concession which, apart from its being incompatible with the state of war existing between Spain and the Kabyles, would inevitably have led to reprisals on the part of the Spanish soldiers, who see in the Kabyles the men who have mutilated the corpses of their comrades. If it had been a question of military operations, in the course of which the troops had left the confines of Melilla, and had occupied Moorish territory, the Government would have considered the propriety of acceding to the request of its ally the Sultan; but, seeing that the sole objects of the instructions given to the General Commanding, and of the operations which he has been directed to carry out, are to secure to us the possession of our own territory, to drive the Moors out of it, and to construct forts, all of which the Sultan admits we have a perfect right to do, the Government has decided that it would be derogatory to the national dignity and incompatible with our sovereignty to accede to this request. The Government is well aware that the scanty resources of the Emperor, and the distance which separates him from Melilla, make it difficult for him to enforce his commands; nevertheless, while fully recognizing the loyalty of his intentions, it trusts that all the Cabinets of Europe will understand that the Spanish nation cannot for one moment allow savage and undisciplined tribes to assassinate its soldiers, invade its territory, and make constant attacks on the small detached forts erected in the neighbourhood of Melilla for the protection of those engaged in agriculture. An end must be put to these proceedings at once, either by persuasion or by force; and if the Sultan is unable to enforce the provisions of the Treaty of Wad Rás, Spain will enforce them herself, reserving to herself to make the Sultan responsible later on for the non-fulfilment of the terms of that Treaty.

In communicating the above to the British Foreign Office, you will take care to make it clear that Spain, without departing in the least from the attitude she has taken up in this matter, insists on the execution of the Treaty by the Sultan, and, meanwhile, intends to act energetically for the defence of her territory, and to avail herself of her perfect right to protect herself against aggression.

The Spanish Government is well aware of the difficulties which the non-execution to the Treaty of Wad Rás introduces into the relations between Spain and the Sultan; nevertheless, it trusts that the loyalty of His Shereefian Majesty on the one hand, and the judgment of the European Governments on the other, will make him understand the urgent necessity of taking steps without delay to put an end to this conflict, and of offering to Spain the reparation to which she is entitled, and the necessary guarantees that incidents like those which occurred in October last shall not be repeated.

The exceptional position occupied by Spain in Morocco, where no other European or Christian nation possesses territories surrounded by the Sultan's dominions, imposes on her exceptional duties, which no doubt are well understood by Her Majesty's Government, and, in defending which, Spain trusts that she has the sympathy of that Government, and of public opinion in England.

I inclose a copy of the Royal Order which I am to-day sending to the Spanish Minister at Tangier.

I am, &c.

The Under-Secretary of State,

(Signed) JOAQUIN VALERA.

Inclosure 2 in No. 324.

The General Commanding at Melilla to the Minister for War.

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.) *Melilla, November* 23, 1893, 6·40 P.M.

THE meeting with the Sultan's brother took place by previous agreement at noon to-day, in the middle of the field known as the Field of Instruction. He came preceded by the Pasha of the camp, and escorted by twenty infantry and thirty cavalry-men. I advanced on horseback to salute him, and the regiment of Santiago formed in line and saluted. The brigades were drawn up in camp to avoid a crowd, and one of the tents provided for the Commanding Officer had been pitched beforehand. After the usual salutations, he requested me to inform the Government of the feelings of loyal friendship which the Sultan entertains towards Spain, and to state that he will spare no effort to avoid losing that friendship; that he admits that we have a perfect right to build anything we like in our own territory, and that he proposes to punish the Kabyles severely. He asked for time, in order that the Sultan might come to Fez and pacify the Kabyles in the interior. He repeated this several times. I replied in the name of His Majesty's Government, thanking him for his kind words. I said that I would communicate them to the Government, but that I could not agree to delay for one moment any works or any movements of troops which I might consider advisable, and that, as a soldier, I could not do otherwise than obey blindly the orders given by your Excellency.

He also asked that, in order that hostile feelings might be allayed, the Riff Arabs might be allowed to come and trade in the town. I replied in the negative, and said that this could not be until my Government considered that the national honour had been satisfied, and allowed it. He pressed both requests, but I refused point-blank. He took leave, with repeated expressions of friendship. He promised to do all he could to punish the rebels, and to give satisfaction.

I shall continue the works more actively, with all the means at my disposal.

On taking leave, he presented me with a gun and a sword.

Inclosure 3 in No. 324.

Señor Moret to Spanish Minister at Tangier.

(Translation.)

Madrid, November 25, 1893.

Sir,

THE Cabinet, after carefully considering the inclosed telegram from General Macias, giving an account of his interview with Prince Muley Araaf, has resolved as follows: The result of its deliberations has been communicated by telegraph to the General Commanding at Melilla, in order that he may inform the Prince, as an act of courtesy, in reply to his friendly expressions. The Government wishes to show once more by this action its desire to please His Shereefian Majesty, and its friendship for him, Prince Muley Araaf having come to Spanish territory as the Representative of His Majesty.

The Government has not seen its way to complying with the request that the fortification works and military operations which our troops are carrying on in the neighbourhood of Melilla should be suspended. Even supposing that those operations were limited in the manner described in the note of the Moorish Foreign Office, dated the 15th November, to the Spanish Government, the latter considers that it would be incompatible with its dignity to abstain from taking such steps as it considers necessary for the security of its territory and the protection of the Spanish flag. If the Spanish Government had only to consider the ties of friendship which unite it to a Sovereign who shows his anxiety to fulfil his international obligations, and its wish to please His Shereefian Majesty, it might be inclined to accede to his request. But there are other considerations which cannot be ignored. On the one hand, the uncertainty of the Sultan's position, the impossibility of communicating directly with him, and the consequent absence of guarantees respecting the proposals of His Shereefian Majesty, and the length of time he would require to carry them out, would give to the suspension of operations a vague and indefinite character at variance with the exigencies of the situation.

Unfortunately, the state of things has become more serious every day since the attack of the 2nd October, and the events of the 27th and 28th have so aggravated the insult offered to Spain by the Riff men, that public opinion here, as well as the fundamental principles of Government, which require above all that the sovereignty of the State be upheld, whatever may be the circumstances under which that sovereignty has been

infringed, demand that the attacks which the Riff men continue to make upon our territory should be repelled with the greatest energy.

On the other hand, Muley Araaf's own words show that he cannot answer for the obedience of the rebel tribes, and that it will take some time to subdue those in the interior, which evidently have no intention of submitting. If his words had been accompanied by action, that is, if he had come with a body of troops sufficiently strong to give effect to his words, so that the Emperor's forces might have united with those of the King of Spain, the Spanish people would have considered the Sultan's intervention satisfactory, and likely to be productive of good results. In the absence of these conditions, however, the position of the Spanish army at Melilla, and the attitude of the Riff men, who are rebelling against the Sultan and carrying on war with Spain, force this country to take into its own hands the work of driving the invaders from Spanish territory, and protecting the lives of the Spanish soldiers, without loss of time.

It is equally impossible to grant the request that the Riff men may be allowed to come to trade at Melilla. Such permission, which would be incompatible with the state of war existing with the tribes in question, would seriously endanger the lives of the Moors, in whom the Spanish soldiers see the assassins of their comrades. I must add, nevertheless, that the Spanish Government, adhering to its policy of peace and friendship, repeats what it has stated in its former notes, and urgently requests the Sultan to carry out the stipulations of Article VII of the Treaty of Wad Rás, and is still confident that he will be able to enforce its provisions.

You are authorized to communicate a copy of this despatch to Sidi Mohammed Torres, and to renew to him the assurance of the friendship of the Spanish Government for the Sultan of Morocco, and of their confidence in his loyalty and in his efforts to subdue his rebellious subjects, and to carry out to the letter the provisions of the Treaty of Wad Rás in the manner indicated in your former notes to the Moorish Foreign Office.

I am, &c.
(Signed) S. MORET.

No. 325.

Intelligence Division to Foreign Office.—(*Received December* 5.)

THE Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to forward herewith a statement of the Spanish forces believed to be actually present in Melilla under General Martinez Campos.

18, *Queen Anne's Gate, London,*
December 4, 1893.

Inclosure in No. 325.

"ORDRE de Bataille" of Spanish Forces in Melilla.

ORIGINAL GARRISON.

Infantry Regiment of Africa	845
Discipline Battalion	445
Section of Cavalry	50
Fortress Artillery	90
Engineers	70
Total	1,500

REINFORCEMENTS.

Infantry of the Line.

2nd	Regiment	Reina.	29th	Regiment	Constitucion.
5th	"	Infante.	34th	"	Granada.
6th	"	Saboya.	35th	"	Toledo.
9th	"	Soria.	42nd	"	Canarias.
10th	"	Cordoba.	47th	"	San Quentin.
11th	"	San Fernando.	48th	"	Pavia.
13th	"	Mallorca.	50th	"	Wad-Ras.
15th	"	Estremadura.	53rd	"	Guipuzcoa.
17th	"	Bourbon.	55th	"	Asia.
28th	"	Luchana.	56th	"	Alava.

Total—20 infantry regiments, each of 2 battalions = 40 battalions.

Battalions of Cazadores (Rifles).

1st	Battalion	Catalufia.	12th	Battalion	Segorbe.
3rd	"	Barcelona.	17th	"	Cuba.
5th	"	Tarifa.	19th	"	Puerto Rico.
6th	"	Figueras.			

Total—7 battalions.

The strength of battalions, both for Infantry of the Line and Cazadores, is believed to be, on the average, about 350 men. The total infantry available is, therefore—

Original garrison	1,290
Reinforcements	16,450
Total	17,740

Cavalry.

Regiment of Dragoons (Santiago)	300
Two squadrons of Lancers (Reina)	150
Total	450
Original garrison	50
Total cavalry	500

Field Artillery.

Four field batteries	24 guns.
Four mountain batteries	24 "
Total	48 "

Fortress Artillery.

Eight companies	720
Original garrison	90
Total	810

Engineers.

Six companies	600
Original garrison	70
Total	670

Intelligence Division, War Office,
December 4, 1893.

No. 326.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 5.)

(No. 105.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, December* 5, 1893.

THERE is general dissatisfaction in the Madrid press with the present inactivity at Melilla.

The report is that General Martinez Campos, not satisfied with the strategical position of the fort at Sidi Guariach, intends to erect an unimportant work, merely as an assertion of the right of Spain.

The "Liberal," which is Señor Moret's paper, states that the Minister is pressing for an answer to his demands for reparation, the performance of the Treaty of Wad Ras, the punishment of the ringleaders, and an indemnity, and that it will be considered as a *casus belli* if any of these conditions are not complied with.

The Sultan is expected to arrive at Morocco on the 10th or 12th.

The Moors round Melilla have been quarrelling among themselves. The continued inaction is causing discontent among the Spanish troops.

No. 327.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 5.)

(No. 106. Secret and Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, December* 5, 1893.

THE Minister of Foreign Affairs called on me to-day, as I have been unwell, and confirmed generally the contents of my telegram No. 105. He is not expecting war,

but begs me to apprise your Lordship that the fact of the Sultan's whereabouts being unknown complicates matters, and is a hindrance to the negotiations, since the instructions received by Muley Araaf are insufficient.

His Excellency places entire confidence in Marshal Martinez Campos.

He wishes to thank your Lordship for the language held to M. del Mazo.

No. 328.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 5, 1893.

I AM directed by the Earl of Rosebery to call your attention to my letter of the 8th ultimo, asking for Lord Ripon's observations upon a despatch from Her Majesty's Minister at Tangier, in which he reported a conversation with his Spanish colleague as to the steps to be taken for putting an end to the exportation of arms from Gibraltar and other places to Morocco by vessels flying the British flag.

The Spanish Minister at Tangier suggested that Spanish ships of war might be empowered to visit such vessels, and to detain them if contraband arms, &c., should be found on board.

It will be seen by the inclosed copy of a Memorandum communicated by the Spanish Ambassador* that a proposal to a similar effect has now been made officially by the Spanish Government, who suggest that Spanish cruizers might be allowed to visit vessels navigating under the British flag, "without having the right to do so."

I am to request that Lord Rosebery may be favoured with Lord Ripon's observations upon this question.

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 329.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 171. Secret.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 6, 1893.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 169, Secret, of the 29th ultimo, the Spanish Ambassador read to me this afternoon the following telegram from Señor Moret in reply to my proposals respecting the acquisition by Spain of a small amount of territory around Melilla such as would make the fortress there secure:—

"Your letter of the 29th received to-day. I am extremely obliged to the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the friendly and confidential communication he has made to your Excellency. Please tell him that I am keeping it for when an opportunity occurs, which I hope will be soon."

I told M. del Mazo that I wished to notice ("relever") an observation in Señor Moret's previous letter, recorded in my despatch to your Excellency No. 169 A of the 30th ultimo, which seemed to point to a suspicion of an understanding between France and England as against Spain in Morocco. I desired once more to make it clear that what had passed was this: that in August 1892 M. Waddington had come to me to convey the wish of the French Government for a cordial understanding and intercommunication with respect to Morocco, and that I had expressed a perfect readiness to reciprocate this feeling, and had communicated all I had to say on the subject, notably in regard to Sir West Ridgeway's mission. But in the sixteen months since M. Waddington had made his statement I had received no intimation whatever from the French Government as to what they were doing or contemplating in Morocco. It was consequently clear, even if it were not otherwise self-evident, that there was no understanding of the kind described. I was, however, ready to tell the French Government or any one else my views to-morrow about Morocco, for we had no designs on that country, and no policy with regard to it which could not be openly declared.

I gathered from M. del Mazo's manner that he had had some doubt as to whether there was not a secret understanding between ourselves and the French with regard to Moorish affairs, but that, at any rate, this strange suspicion was now removed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

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* No. 310.

No. 330.

The Earl of Rosebery to Señor del Mazo.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Foreign Office, December* 6, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 1st instant, and I beg leave to inform you that I have not failed to convey to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies the thanks of the Government of Spain for the steps taken by the authorities of Gibraltar with a view to control the storage and exportation of arms and ammunition.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 331.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 6, 1893.

WITH reference to your letter of the 2nd ultimo, I am directed by the Earl of Rosebery to transmit to you herewith, for the information of the Marquis of Ripon, a translation of a note from the Spanish Ambassador at this Court,* conveying the thanks of his Government for the steps taken by the Governor of Gibraltar to control the storage and exportation of arms and ammunition.

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 332.

Consul Finn to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 42.)

My Lord, *Malaga, November* 30, 1893.

THERE left here last night for Melilla Generals Chinchilla and Primo de Rivera, with their respective Staffs, a personal escort for General Martinez Campos, composed of 150 Lancers and 50 mounted Civil Guards, and 124 men of the "Constitution" regiment.

According to the Spanish papers, the forces now at Melilla come to 18,000 men, with 24 Generals.

The hospital arrangements are said to be somewhat improved, though not up to the requirements of so many men, and the Engineers are unable to dig trenches for want of "implements and tools for certain classes of work."

I have, &c.
(Signed) ALEXANDER FINN.

No. 333.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 7.)

Sir, *Downing Street, December* 6, 1893.

WITH reference to previous correspondence respecting the alleged shipment of arms to Morocco from Gibraltar, I am directed by the Marquis of Ripon to transmit to you, for the information of the Earl of Rosebery, a copy of a despatch from the Governor of Gibraltar, reporting the result of the inquiries which he has caused to be made on this subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD WINGFIELD.

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* No. 321.

Inclosure in No. 333.

Governor Sir R. Biddulph to the Marquis of Ripon.

(Confidential.)

Gibraltar, November 27, 1893.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 1st instant, and its inclosure, and to previous correspondence on the subject of the exportation of arms and ammunition from Gibraltar to Morocco, I have the honour to state that I have caused inquiry to be made into the statement of Sir George Bonham, and that I can find no proof that any arms are now being shipped in the manner described, or that the trade has been continued since the Proclamation prohibiting their export.

Shortly after the receipt of your Lordship's despatch under acknowledgment I endeavoured, through the officers charged with the administration of the Revenue and Port Departments, to ascertain whether any such a method of dealing with the arms as is described by Sir G. Bonham was being carried out; and in this connection I think it necessary to draw your Lordship's attention to the fact that the absence of a Custom-house renders such an inquiry most difficult. Masters of vessels arriving here do not produce their manifests, and therefore bales of merchandize in transit are not, as a rule, examined by any official. Some appreciable trade in Manchester goods is still carried on between English ports and those on the Morocco coast, with Gibraltar as a port of transhipment.

The bales, hydraulically pressed and iron-bound, arrive here, are taken in lighters from the entering vessels, and are either at once transhipped to the out-going boats, or are placed on the wharves and stored, pending their re-embarkation for their final destination. These bales are rarely opened here by their receiving and forwarding agents. If the Revenue officials have any reasonable grounds for supposing that such bales contain goods intended for Gibraltar which are either dutiable or contraband, they would, I believe, be fully justified in opening them and acting on that belief. I authorized the testing of certain packages or bales, with the following results.

Four bales arrived consigned to a firm of merchants, who, on a former occasion, some two years ago, had been concerned in handling arms and ammunition, and the Acting Captain of the Port, who is also the Colonial Treasurer, took steps to watch the bales. They were removed from the wharf to the store of the consignees, and two of them were there carefully examined; the remaining bales had been unpacked, and their contents were also carefully examined, and I am satisfied that they contained no arms or ammunition, and that no such goods are at present secreted in bales of merchandize passing into or through this port and harbour.

I am further satisfied that, as far as Gibraltar is concerned, any illicit trade in such articles with Morocco has for the present ceased.

That arms and ammunition previously came here in transit from Eibar and elsewhere I have no doubt; but, since the representations of the Spanish Government on the subject, I feel assured that the practice is no longer continued, and, as already reported, all arms and ammunition found in hulks are carefully stored under official supervision and in official buildings, and their exportation, except to ports of original shipment, is quite impossible.

In this connection I have also the honour to inform your Lordship that I have received several representations from the Spanish Consul here on the subject of certain coasting vessels under French, Spanish, and English colours, which he has suspected of being engaged in carrying arms to Morocco. Every precaution has been taken, and is still being taken, to have any of these vessels which may come here closely watched, and, on a recent occasion, when one of the vessels, a small schooner under the Spanish flag, arrived here, and loaded her cargo for Ceuta, she was under careful observation by day and night, and before clearing, which was delayed at the Consul's request for twenty-four hours, that gentleman was asked whether he desired a search to be made, to which, after consideration, he replied in the negative, but he was given full information of her movements.

With regard to suspected vessels flying flags other than those of England or Spain, except under explicit instructions from your Lordship, I should deem it inexpedient to enforce a search: but I believe that with care, and under the prohibitive announcements that have been made public, it will hardly be possible for any shipment of arms to take place without the knowledge of the port officials. In the case of vessels of Spanish registry, suspected by the Spanish Government, I should act as in the

above-quoted instance, and should consult the wishes of the Spanish Consul before proceeding to order a forcible search.

I trust that the above explanations may enable your Lordship to satisfy the Madrid Government that every possible precaution is taken here to prevent the illicit shipment of arms and ammunition to Morocco, or, indeed, to any other country.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. BIDDULPH.

No. 334.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 107.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, December* 6, 1893.

MARSHAL MARTINEZ CAMPOS has, I understand, advised the Spanish Government to send a considerable force to Ceuta, by way of making a demonstration, and as the natural base of operations in case of hostilities against the Sultan, being on the high road to Tetuan. The Government are considering these proposals, but no decision has been arrived at.

Consul Finn's telegram referring to an understanding between France and Spain has just arrived.

I am now practically dependent for War Office information on the German Military Attaché; the assistance of an officer would be a great convenience.

No. 335.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 108. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, December* 7, 1893.

AN article appears in the "Liberal" newspaper of to-day reporting the desire expressed by the Minister of War that some feat of arms should be performed by the Spanish force at Melilla, and that their advance should proceed as far as may be judged necessary by the Commander-in-chief, who will probably meet with opposition from the Riffs if he carries out his intention of at once marking out the proposed neutral zone.

The paragraph proceeds to say that it is suspected by the Government that influence is being brought to bear on the Sultan from some extraneous source to hold back in the negotiations. No such intrusion will be tolerated, though the Government will act with all circumspection.

Resentment has, I understand, been aroused in the army by some comments in English newspapers on the constitution of the expeditionary force, the number of Generals, and other details. Might not something be done to modify this?

I shall see the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon, and may accordingly have to telegraph later.

No. 336.

The Earl of Rosebery to Señor del Mazo.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Foreign Office, December* 7, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your Excellency's note of the 2nd instant, transmitting copy of a despatch from the Spanish Secretary of State, with two inclosures, on the subject of events at Melilla, and the relations between Spain and Morocco, and I hasten to return to you my best thanks for this communication.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 337.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 8.)

(No. 109.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, December* 7, 1893.

THE Government programme in Morocco is as follows:—

A temporary arrangement between Muley Araaf and the Marshal, a neutral zone to be occupied by the Spanish troops, and hostages to be given by the Moors.

When the fort is constructed, which cannot now be long, the Marshal is to return to Spain, and definitive negotiations through the ordinary diplomatic channels will be entered into with the Sultan.

No. 338.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 144.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 8, 1893.

I HAVE to express to you my satisfaction at the successful settlement of the question regarding Kaïd Bensaid's stores at Dar-el-Baida, as reported in your despatch No. 170 of the 27th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 339.

Foreign Office to War Office.

(Very Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 8, 1893.

I AM directed by the Earl of Rosebery to state, for the information of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for War, that Her Majesty's Ambassador reports, by telegraph, that he has reason to believe that Marshal Campos has suggested to his Government that a large force should be transferred, by way of demonstration, to Ceuta, which is on the road to Tetuan, and which would be the base of any future operations.

The proposal is still under the consideration of the Spanish Government, as there are difficulties in the way of accommodating troops at Ceuta.

In connection with this question, Sir H. D. Wolff calls attention to the fact that he is solely dependent on the German Military Attaché at Madrid for intelligence as to matters of military interest, and urges that the present crisis makes it a matter of much importance that he should be provided with the assistance of a British military officer in the capacity of Attaché, in order to facilitate communication with the Spanish War Office, and to enable him to report all military details for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

I am to inquire whether the Secretary of State for War would consider it advisable to act upon Sir H. D. Wolff's suggestion.

I am to add that, so far as the Foreign Office is concerned, the interest taken in the Spanish campaign is political, not military.

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 340.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 9.)

(No. 110. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, December* 9, 1893.

A CONFERENCE which should have taken place yesterday between the Sultan's brother and Marshal Martinez Campos has been postponed.

In deference to the impatience general among civilians and soldiers, it is possible that the Marshal may endeavour to provoke hostilities and so gratify the national pride. There is a report that he has demanded the surrender of all the arms in the possession of the Riffs, in addition to the conditions laid down by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but the Government is so reticent, and the correspondents on the spot are under such severe restrictions, that nothing definite is known.

Difficulties may arise if the Marshal returns at once, whether dissatisfied or in triumph. These will be complicated by the formidable agitation at present going on against the Commercial Treaties, which the actual Minister of Finance is said to have joined with the Conservatives in organizing.

No. 341.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 11.)

(No. 171.)
My Lord, *Tangier, November* 29, 1893.

THE Spanish Minister, in accordance with instructions received from his Government, has shown to his colleagues a despatch from Señor Moret, announcing that the Spanish Government are unable to accept the proposal of Mulai Arafa, that the construction of the fort of Sidi Guariach should be deferred until the Sultan can reach Fez. He is instructed to make a communication in this sense to Cid Mohammed Torres, and to insist upon the strict observance by the Sultan of Article VII of the Treaty of Wad Ras, by which His Shereefian Majesty is pledged to cause his subjects to respect the territory ceded to Spain by that instrument.

At the same time the despatch reiterates the intention of the Spanish Government to limit their military operations to such as are necessary for asserting the rights of Spain, and not to depart in any degree from their already announced policy of maintaining the *status quo*.

As the resumption by the Spanish forces of the works of construction, and the expulsion of the tribesmen from the inside of the Spanish limits will be at once proceeded with, it is possible that Mulai Arafa may find himself in a dangerous position, and he has therefore been offered a refuge within the walls of Melilla in case of necessity. Should he take advantage of this proposal, added the Spanish Minister, it will be patent to every one that Spain is acting in accord with the Sultan.

The escort of 400 horsemen, which Mulai Arafa was stated to have had with him on starting from the Sultan's camp, to which others were to have been added on the road, finally turned out to number only sixty when he arrived at Melilla, a force obviously insufficient to secure even his mere personal safety, in case the tribesmen should prove hostile to the Sultan's Envoy. It can only be conjectured that the Sultan conceived the events of the 2nd October to be of no greater significance than those of 1890, when a small detachment of Spanish cavalry engaged in exercises was fired on by tribesmen, and some horses were killed, and the matter was settled by the payment of an indemnity of '0,000 dollars, and a salute to the Spanish flag.

Otherwise the proposal to defer any further operations until the Sultan can arrive at Fez, an event to which no date has ever been even proximately assigned, could hardly be regarded as serious.

Up to the present at least no letters have reached Tangier in answer to any but the first representations made by the Spanish Legation, and we have yet to learn whether the more urgent notes dispatched to the Court after the death of General Margallo have aroused in the mind of His Shereefian Majesty any conception of the magnitude of the affair which he has on his hands at Melilla. It is extremely unfortunate that the Sultan should be still so far away that it takes at least twelve days for a courier from Tangier to reach him, and that nothing certain is known of his movements. Over and over again his speedy arrival at Morocco city has been announced as positive, yet he has not yet crossed the Atlas, as far as it is known. Other reports were that he was making his way along the further side of the Atlas back to his southern capital, and the last rumour that has reached me locates him at a point between Tafilelt and Ain Shair. Under these circumstances I venture to think that the Spanish Government could hardly have been expected to wait for an indefinitely long period before proceeding to take active measures for the expulsion of the Riffians from the territory which they have violated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 342.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 11.)

(No. 172.) *Tangier, December* 4, 1893.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 132 of the 18th November, covering a Memorandum drawn up by the Librarian of the Foreign Office respecting the geographical position of the Zafat tribe, and instructing me to abstain from expressing any opinion or taking any action in the meanwhile, I have the honour to inclose copy of a despatch from the Vice-Consul at Mogador giving further information.

Mr. Johnston states that, from inquiries made of credible Wadnoon people, he has reason to believe that the tribe of Zafat—or more correctly Ezafod—is generally located within a few hours' journey south of Oglemeem, the chief town of Wadnoon. The arabs of that country, he adds, are very nomadic in their habits, travelling long distances in search of water and and pastures, which may account for their having some establishment to the south of Terfaya or Juby.

The orthography of Moorish names varies considerably, as does their pronunciation, and accordingly, what Mr. Johnston writes Oglemeem is given in Bianconi's Map as Aouguelmin (apparently following the French Génie Map), and in that of the Intelligence Department as Glimin (Oglemin).

The identification I had ventured to suggest between Zafat and Azouafil of Bianconi's Map is to some extent corroborated by the new reading given by Mr. Johnston—Ezafod—combined with the Azouafit of the French Génie Map, for which latter form Azouafil is clearly a misprint. It is further borne out by the statement that it lies a few hours' journey south of Oglemeem.

The exact position of the mouth of the Wad Draa is apparently uncertain. Bianconi's Map places it considerably to the south of the 29th degree north latitude, while the Intelligence Department put it at 28° 45′, and the French Génie about 28° 40′. But probably none of these are so near to the original source of information as the Admiralty Chart, which locates the mouth in 28° 19′ north latitude. The exact position of the mouth of this river would, I think, scarcely be sufficient to decide the question whether Azouafit or Zafat is in Moorish territory, and indeed, would seem to have but little bearing. The point to be ascertained is its position with regard to the course of that river.

The position of Azouafil of Bianconi is no more the result of a direct observation for latitude than that of the mouth of the Wad Draa as given by that cartographer. Two maps agree in marking the locality ascribed to the Zafat tribe north of the course of the Draa, and all show Oglemeem in such a position that, if the Zafat centre is only a few hours to its south, the latter ought to be located somewhere north of the Wad Draa, even on the maps which do not insert the name.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure in No. 342.

Vice-Consul Johnston to Mr. Satow.

Mogador, November 16, 1893.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch of the 18th October on the subject of Sir Alfred Kirby's dealings with certain tribesmen south of Wadnoon, I have the honour to report that, from inquiries made of credible Wadnoon people, I have reason to believe that the tribe of Zafat—or more correctly Ezafod—is generally located within a few hours' journey south of Oglemeem, the chief town of Wadnoon, and consequently some days' journey, perhaps 100 miles, this side of Cape Juby. The arabs of that country are, however, very nomadic in their habits, travelling long distances in search of water and pastures, which might account for their having some establishment to the south of Terfaya or Juby.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. L. N. JOHNSTON.

No. 343.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 11.)

(No. 347. Confidential.) P.

My Lord, *Madrid, December* 8, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, under separate cover, a copy of the "Correo Español," the Carlist organ, containing an article, evidently inspired from French sources, stating that "We have heard on very good authority that M. Roustan, the French Ambassador in Madrid, presented himself to the Regent and proposed to her, in the name of President Carnot, that Spain should join the Russo-French Alliance, and partition Morocco with France, but that 'Doña Cristina' rejected the proposal."

Further particulars are promised.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

No. 344.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 11.)

(No. 349.)

My Lord, *Madrid, December* 8, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of an article in Wednesday's "Imparcial," giving the strength of the forces of the army of operation at present in Melilla.

I have forwarded a copy of the article in question to Major-General Chapman, Superintendent of the Intelligence Department, War Office.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

Inclosure in No. 344.

Extract from "El Imparcial" of the 6th December, 1893.

The Army of Operations.

(Translation.)

THE forces now believed to be at Melilla according to their organization and the probable strength of the corps are as follows:—

Forces at Head-quarters.

	Men.
The Regiment of Africa	800
Disciplinaires	550
Engineers	500
Fortress Artillery	650
Four Field Batteries	500
Santiago Dragoons	320
Escort..	200
Total	3,520

Forces of the 1st Army Corps.

	Men.
1st Division—	
1st Brigade	1,400
2nd „	1,400
3rd „	1,400
Total	4,200
2nd Division—	
1st Brigade	1,400
2nd „	1,120
3rd „	1,400
Total	3,920
Two Mountain Batteries	240
Total of the 1st Army Corps	8,360

Forces of the 2nd Army Corps.

							Men.
1st Division—							
1st Brigade	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,400
2nd „	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,400
3rd „	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,300
				Total	..	..	4,100
2nd Division—							
1st Brigade	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,400
2nd „	..	..	..	..	..	..	2,400
3rd „	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,400
				Total	..	..	5,200
Two Mountain Batteries	..	..	..	..	..	..	240
			Total of the 2nd Army Corps		..	..	9,540

Aggregate.

							Men.
Forces at Head-quarters	..	..	..	..	..	..	3,520
„ of 1st Army Corps	..	..	..	..	..	..	8,360
„ of 2nd „ „	..	..	..	..	..	..	9,540
Auxiliaries, Medical, Administration, Police, Company of Marines						..	350
				Total	..	..	21,770

The forces in the field amount, therefore, to 21,770 men, 500 horses, and 48 guns.

The Generals, according to the established organization, should number twenty-six who, as there are two army corps, four divisions, twelve brigades, may be classified as follows :—

Commander-in-chief	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Chief of the Staff	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Commanders of Special Corps		..	..	..	..	..	2
Commanders of Army Corps		..	..	..	..	..	2
Chiefs of the Staffs of the above mentioned			..	..	..	..	2
Generals commanding Divisions		..	..	..	..	..	4
Generals commanding Brigades		..	..	..	..	..	12
				Total	..	..	26

Besides these, a Sub-Sanitary Inspector and a Paymaster, and Auditor-General are attached to the above.

No. 345.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 11.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, December* 11, 1893.

APPLICATION has been made to me by Pariente for assistance in obtaining loan contract, and says that his principal is Montagu.

Forde, Vice-Consul, also applied, but did not say anything about principals.

Ought I to give to either a letter to Sultan?

Negotiations are already begun, I am told, with "Crédit Lyonnais" through Benchimol, of Tangier, a French protégé, for 50,000,000 fr. more or less.

No. 346.

Acting Consul Latimer to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 12.)

(No. 2.)
My Lord, *Porto Rico, November* 16, 1893.

BY reason of the recent events in Melilla, Africa, which have obliged the Spanish Government to send troops to that place in order to exact of the Moors a reparation for the insult offered to her flag, there have been published in this island various appeals to the inhabitants to aid the mother country in her enterprise; among others, the one addressed to the people of Mayagüez, which I have the honour to inclose, accompanied by a translation.

As your Lordship will perceive, it contains an attack on Great Britain, and as the first signature at its foot, Miguel Pons, is that of the Mayor of Mayagüez, I have deemed it my duty to bring it to the notice of his Excellency the Governor-General of this island, protesting against the publication. A copy of my communication to his Excellency is herewith inclosed.

On the 12th his Excellency replied by sending to this Consulate his Excellency the General 2° Cabo to express his regrets at the publication, stating that, had the signers all been unofficial persons, it would not have been in his power to give any satisfaction, as the liberty of the press is such that he could not have prevented it, but that as the Mayor was one of the subscribers, he would call him to account. His Excellency further inquired whether I desired to have the Governor-General's reply in writing, which he promised should be done on my answering in the affirmative, and having received it to-day, I have the honour to inclose herewith copy with translation.

Telegrams received on the 13th instant by steamer from Cuba state that it has been necessary to guard Her Majesty's Embassy at Madrid, and that your Lordship has given the Spanish Government assurances of England's neutrality in the settlement of the affairs of Morocco.

Trusting that my action may meet with your Lordship's approval, I have, &c.

(Signed) WILLIAM G. LATIMER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 346.

Printed Sheet.

(Translation.)

To the Inhabitants of Mayagüez.

THE fiercest Kabyles of Moordom, the fanatic Riffs, have bespattered the face of our country with the glorious blood of the brave Spanish Chief, the unconquered General Margallo.

By the side of the hero, and under the weight of the sharp Morocco cutlasses, have also fallen a great many other worthy compatriots.

Great is the calamity and great the sorrow, but it matters not.

The sons of the illustrious and brave nation which in all ages of history have known how to shed their blood in defence of their honour have not degenerated, no, by God, even in this century of miserable positivism and general corruption. Peacefully may our generous forefathers rest in their venerated tombs, in the security that their posterity will neither dishonour them with a cowardice which they have never known, nor with mercenary avarice, for which there is no place in patriotic breasts.

A nation as hypocritical as she is wily, and more false than brave, which, though she helped us one day to combat the Colossus of the Seine, has for two centuries kept our faces purple with shame by a foreign Gibraltar, no doubt encourages the deeds of those African hordes, more fierce each day in their hatred to the Spaniard.

Most powerful are the enemies which we have before us, and if to the savage rage of the audacious votary of Mahommed is added the gold and cunning of the cold and calculating son of the misty Albion, severe shall be the struggle, obstinate the strife.

That so great an enterprise will not terrify us it is needless to declare. Spain never counted her enemies nor reckoned dangers. It is necessary to conquer . . . . . and we shall conquer.

Spanish Americans! Our country is in the throes of affliction, and prepares in a body to chastise those who have provoked her with blood. Let not one of us be wanting at his post of honour, to aid in proportion to his strength. Since the distance prevents us running to the help of our brothers, and shedding gloriously our blood, and, if need be, dying with them around our country's standard, let us at least contribute with the most fervent enthusiasm from our stores. Let us endeavour that the great essential in modern warfare shall not be wanting—gold.

[Here follow the resolutions adopted for raising funds, with signatures at foot.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 346.

Acting Consul Latimer to Señor Daban.

(Translation.) *Porto Rico, November* 10, 1893.

Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Excellency a printed sheet, at the foot of which are several names, some of prominent persons of the city of Mayagüez, containing expressions which are offensive to the nation which I have the honour to represent, and which is on terms of peace with Spain.

I therefore regret to have to protest before your Excellency; but I do so in the conviction that your Excellency, like myself, laments the want of forethought of which this sheet is an evidence, and that you will exact from its authors the due responsibility and satisfaction.

Once again regretting the cause of this communication, I have, &c.

(Signed) WILLIAM G. LATIMER.

Inclosure 3 in No. 346.

Señor Daban to Acting Consul Latimer.

(Translation.) *Porto Rico, November* 15, 1893.

Sir,

ON perusing with regret the printed sheet, published in Mayagüez, which you inclose in your communication of the 9th instant, and of which this Government-General had no knowledge, in lamenting as I do the want of forethought of the signers of the same, intreating in the unseemly manner that they do of a friendly nation such as you so worthily represent, I beg to assure you that I shall impose on its authors the correction which they have deserved to the full extent of the law.

I take, &c.

(Signed) ANT. DABAN.

No. 347.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, December* 12, 1893.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 41, it appears unlikely, from what Cid Mohammed Torres says, that the Sultan's brother, Mulai Arafa, has any power beyond arranging for the construction of the fort and the pacification of the tribes. The proposals which are reported as having been made by Marshal Martinez Campos, namely, the occupation of neutral ground, the giving of hostages, the evacuation of the ringleaders or surrender of rifles, could probably not be accepted until the Sultan, who has not yet arrived at Morocco city, has been referred to.

No. 348.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 353. Confidential.) *Madrid, December* 10, 1893.

My Lord,

SOME days before the departure from Barcelona of Marshal Martinez Campos, the Duke of Tetuan had gone to visit that city. He is a great personal friend and an old comrade of the Marshal. It was said that the object of his journey was twofold:—

1. To organize an agitation in Catalonia against the Commercial Treaties.

2. To profit by the unpopularity of the proceedings at Melilla to persuade the Marshal to head a demonstration, and to induce, or it may almost be said to coerce, the Queen-Regent to dismiss the present Government, and to confide to the Marshal the formation of a "Ministère d'Affaires."

The state of the country would not have admitted of a Conservative Administration without an election, which was impossible.

It was thought, however, that a Cabinet formed by Martinez Campos would be strongly impregnated with an opposition element, and that the Duke of Tetuan might have been appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. In short, it was known that the Marshal intended to come to Madrid, partly to take part in the discussion of the operations in Morocco, with which he was not satisfied; partly on account of the nervousness of his wife and daughter since the dynamite explosions, which were followed at constant intervals by letters threatening a repetition of the outrage.

Señor Sagasta, as I have already informed your Lordship, dexterously turned these circumstances to the advantage of the Government, and Marshal Martinez Campos, on his arrival at the capital, found himself already named Generalissimo in Morocco.

According to public rumour, the activity of the Duke of Tetuan has not yet given way. He and his friends are carrying on a very serious agitation against the Commercial Treaties, and pressure is said to have been brought to bear on the Marshal so to complicate his demands on Muley Araaf as to render unlikely a peaceful conclusion, even of the preliminary local Agreement.

If such be the case, and I cannot give any authority for it but the inferences of the press and of others who are more or less behind the scenes of Spanish politics, matters may become dangerously complicated.

In the unconfirmed reports from Melilla, it is stated that the Marshal has inserted an additional condition in his demands for the preliminary Agreement, that of the surrender of the arms in the hands of the Riffs. If this be true, no doubt resistance will be strengthened.

But the demands of the Government as they stand are of considerable stringency.

The Spanish Government exact that not only shall the neutral zone be evacuated by the Moors, but that it shall be occupied by Spanish troops. This is plausible, if practical, as it merely asks for the fulfilment of Article V of the Treaty of Tetuan (the 26th May, 1860, see State Papers, vol. LI, p. 930). But the execution of such a requirement is not easy

Ever since the Treaty was signed, the Moors have been allowed, not only to encamp, but to build on the neutral zone.

Even a mosque has been erected, and all this has been done with the acquiescence of the Spanish authorities at Melilla.

The immediate occupation of the neutral zone may therefore mean the destruction of the homes of the Moors, and this at a time of year when the cold, as represented by certain Spanish correspondents, is merciless.

The whole history of the fort at Sidi Guariax, as it gradually oozes out, is curious.

At the signature of the Treaty in 1860, a plan was made of the projected fort, and an annual Vote has since been taken for its construction.

This money was either not drawn, or was applied to other purposes. In the recent reorganization of the military commands, Melilla was taken away from the Captaincy-General of Andalusia, and constituted apart. The papers were then transferred from the office at Granada, and sent to General Margallo. That officer, on seeing the bundle, telegraphed to ask General Lopez Dominguez whether or not he should begin the works. The intermediate history was thus ignored, and a commencement was made of the work, which was both aggressive and useless.

The present sufferer from political agitation is Señor Moret, who, as Minister of State, is credited with an overstrained desire for peace, and with a want of patriotism in his advocacy of the Commercial Treaties, the latter charge being aggravated by his occupation of the post of Minister of Fomento, which includes the Commercial Administration.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

No. 349.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 111.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, December* 12, 1893.

IT is reported from Tangier that Mohammed Torres has stated that neither he nor the Sultan's brother have the necessary powers to conclude even a preliminary Agreement with the Marshal, who has been authorized to proceed on the lines already indicated if not satisfied at an interview to-day.

Any local action for the punishment of the refractory Kabyles is not considered as affecting the diplomatic negotiations, and Spain continues to declare her desire for peace with Morocco.

I hope to have an interview with Señor Moret to-day. It is announced that the Marshal will submit his plans to the Government during the forty-eight hours' delay which will be granted.

No. 350.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 13.)

(No. 112.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, December* 12, 1893.

THE following information, which has been sent to the Italian Government from Berlin, has been communicated to me in the most confidential manner by the Marquis Maffei: that fresh overtures are being made at Madrid by the French. It is possible that your Lordship has heard the same intelligence from the Italian Ambassador in London.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs had told me a few minutes previously that, except in reference to Anarchism, he had for some time past heard nothing from the French Ambassador. He read me, however, the report of a conversation between the Spanish Minister at Lisbon and the Russian Minister, in which the latter spoke of the leading part which Spain might exercise in international questions by adhering to the Franco-Russian combination, the force of which on Mediterranean events he pointed out, adding that Spain could thereby obtain Morocco.

No. 351.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 13.)

(No. 113. Secret and Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, December* 12, 1893.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 111, I learn from Señor Moret that should the Marshal be forced to take vigorous measures he will do so as mildly as possible. The Sultan's brother will point out the tribes which merit punishment, and any action will be taken in accord with him.

The Minister told me that the support of friendly Powers had been most useful, and begged that your Lordship would continue your good offices at Tangier.

The Sultan will soon reach Morocco. He is acting loyally.

No. 352.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 13.)

(No. 114.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, December* 13, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, with reference to my telegram No. 112, that the Italian Ambassador wishes the communication to be cancelled, as he thinks the information he gave me must be incorrect.

No. 353.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 13.)

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, December* 13, 1893.

INTELLIGENCE has reached the Spanish Government that the Sultan is sending an army to Fez on the road to the Riff. The news from Morocco has much reassured them.

No. 354.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 13.)

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, December* 13, 1893.

IN continuation of my telegram No. 61 of yesterday's date, I have to report that Cid Mohammed Torres has yielded in consequence of the urgent representations made to him by the Spanish Minister, supported by myself, and has undertaken to send a letter to the Sultan's brother, advising him to make arrangements for hostages being given, and for the evacuation of the neutral zone by the Riffians.

The same points have also been urged by the Italian Minister.

No. 355.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, December* 13, 1893.

MELILLA difficulty.

Spanish Government are anxious that you should continue to support your Spanish colleague energetically in his endeavours to effect a peaceful solution.

Act accordingly.

No. 356.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, December* 13, 1893.

MOORISH Loan.

In reply to your telegram No. 60, Pariente represents English group of financiers. You may give him letter which he requires.

No. 357.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 173 A. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 13, 1893.

A REQUEST was made to me yesterday by the Spanish Ambassador, through Sir Philip Currie, that I would telegraph to Her Majesty's Minister at Tangier urging him to co-operate with his Spanish colleague in endeavouring to obtain a peaceful solution of the questions at issue between Spain and Morocco.

I informed his Excellency, who called upon me to-day, that I had already instructed Mr. Satow, by telegraph, to persevere in the strenuous exertions which he was making for this purpose.

M. del Mazo thanked me for this communication, and then proceeded to speak of the difficulties which beset the Spanish Government, as the army at Melilla, more than 20,000 strong, were anxious for action.

I said that I was quite aware of these difficulties, for on the one hand there was the military ardour of which he spoke, and on the other was the fear that it should lead to a war of which the consequences might be incalculable.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 358.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received December* 14.)

Downing Street, December 14, 1893.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Marquis of Ripon to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 5th instant, with its inclosures, respecting the suggestion that Spanish ships of war should be allowed to "visit" vessels in the neighbourhood of the Moorish coast which are improperly flying the British flag.

As Lord Ripon reads the Memorandum of the Spanish Ambassador (which is worded as if written on his own initiative rather than on instructions from his Government) it is in terms merely a request for permission to search vessels which hoist the British flag without the right to do so. But Her Majesty's Government would not concern themselves with any action that the Spanish cruizers might see fit to take with regard to such vessels, and therefore his Lordship presumes that the object of the present inquiry is to make sure that no diplomatic protest would be made by Her Majesty's Government if a vessel, on being stopped and her papers examined, were found to be really British, there being no question of a search in such cases. The matter appears thus to be rather one for the consideration of the Earl of Rosebery, and Lord Ripon can only suggest that the subject should be referred to the Law Officers of the Crown before an answer is returned to Señor del Mazo.

It might, however, be a matter for consideration whether questions of policy would render it expedient to go beyond the bare suggestion made by the Spanish Ambassador, and to grant a right of searching for contraband of war on board British vessels hovering in the vicinity of the coast, so long as the present military operations continue. The consideration of this subject might obviously be affected by any action taken by the French Government on a similar application if made to them by the Government of Spain; but as to this his Lordship is not in possession of any information, and should Lord Rosebery think it desirable to take any steps in the direction indicated, and be of opinion, after hearing the views of the Law Officers, that such a concession may be safely granted, Lord Ripon would be prepared to consider how far some scheme of this kind might be adopted.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD WINGFIELD.

No. 359.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 14.)

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, December* 14, 1893.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 31 of the 4th September, a reply has been received from the Moorish Government that two of the imprisoned agents will be released, but that the other two, it is alleged, are Sheikhs, and therefore not capable of being agents. Consequently, if this fact is confirmed by inquiry, they cannot be released.

As this seems unsatisfactory, I propose, with your Lordship's approval, to write back and insist on their being released unconditionally.

No. 360.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 185.) *Foreign Office, December* 14, 1893.

Sir,

WITH reference to Sir George Bonham's despatch No. 277 of the 25th October, I transmit herewith, for your Excellency's information, copy of a letter from the Colonial Office,* with copy of a despatch from the Governor of Gibraltar, reporting the result of his inquiries into the alleged exportation of arms and ammunition from that port to Morocco.

You are authorized to communicate the substance of these papers to the Spanish Government should you consider it advisable to do so.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

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* No. 333.

No. 361.

Sir H. MacDonell to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 15.)

(No. 87. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Lisbon, December* 11, 1893.

IN accordance with the instructions conveyed to me in your Lordship's No. 65, Confidential, of the 16th November, 1893, I availed myself of the earliest opportunity to express to the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at the language held to me by his Excellency on a previous occasion respecting the serious difference which has arisen between Spain and Morocco, and its possible consequences.

I likewise informed Senhor Hintze Ribeiro that it is the desire of Her Majesty's Government to continue to afford to Spain their moral support in restoring order at Melilla, and in pressing upon the Moorish Government her just demands for satisfaction and indemnity so far as these do not unduly interfere with the Sultan's prerogatives or disturb the *status quo* in Morocco.

In reply, his Excellency begged me to thank your Lordship, and to state that he attached the greatest value to the opinion entertained by Her Majesty's Government of the present delicate and critical state of things in the Moorish Empire, and that your Lordship may rest assured that the Portuguese Government will not fail in lending their warm and honest co-operation in order to bring about the result which your Lordship has in view.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. G. MACDONELL.

No. 362.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 15.)

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, December* 15, 1893.

NEWS has been brought by Kaïd Maclean that the Sultan left Tafilelt on the 25th November to go to Morocco city, where he is expected to arrive about the end of December.

His Shereefian Majesty is sincerely anxious to afford Spain satisfaction in respect of the Melilla affair, and serious difficulties need not be apprehended.

No. 363.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 15, 1893, 6·10 P.M.

YOUR telegram No. 63 [of 14th instant].

I concur.

No. 364.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 174.)
My Lord, *Tangier, December* 6, 1893.

IN a despatch of Mr. Consul Finn's, No. 6, Commercial, of the 28th October last, which appears in the Confidential print that reached me to-day, there is, I think, a confusion between the Rio de Oro, a small stream disemboguing into the sea within Spanish territory at Melilla, and the Rio de Oro on the West African Coast, near the Tropic of Cancer.

It is to the latter Spanish possession that the article from the "Noticias" manifestly applies.

It will be within your Lordship's recollection that a report, which proved to be entirely false, was spread a short time ago, of the Moors of that part of the continent having laid siege to the Settlement of Rio de Oro, with the object, as was rather absurdly supposed, of creating a diversion in favour of the tribesmen of the Riff.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 365.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 175.)
My Lord, *Tangier, December* 8, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 133 of the 22nd ultimo, inclosing copy of a letter from Mr. George Badger to Mr. Haldane, M.P., and instructing me to report what steps, if any, can be taken to obtain for a brother of Mr. Badger and Mr. Geddes a "Sultan's letter" to enable them to travel in the interior and carry on medical mission work among the people.

It will be within your Lordship's recollection that in 1891 some excitement was reported to have been created in Morocco city by the proceedings of members of the "Southern Morocco Mission," and that subsequently an application was made to the Marquis of Salisbury by Mr. Anderson to instruct Sir Charles Euan-Smith to obtain various privileges for the missionaries of that Society. Among other things, it was requested that Her Majesty's Minister should induce the authorities to grant the usual "mona" to them when travelling on payment in full being tendered. At the same time it was stated that the possession of a "Sultan's letter," which entitles the bearer to "mona," would involve so many restrictions and vexatious interferences with their route and progress that the missionaries preferred to travel without any document of that kind.

Sir Charles Euan-Smith, in reporting on this subject in his despatch No. 120 of the 24th December, 1891, stated that he did not consider the moment a favourable one for making a representation on the subject of the supply of provisions to the missionaries when travelling. He considered that those gentlemen were undoubtedly still looked upon with suspicion and disfavour by the authorities, and he was of opinion that it would be better to abstain from drawing attention to their proceedings.

Mr. Badger writes that his brother and Mr. Geddes, in visiting a number of towns and villages among the Atlas Mountains, were lately much hindered by the want of a written authority to travel about, and found great difficulty in reaching certain places on that account. And he suggests that they should be provided with a document of the very class which their official representative, Mr. John Anderson, in his letter of the 26th November, 1891, to the Marquis of Salisbury, had, with much justice, stated would be a hindrance to them in travelling.

Although no complaints have recently been made on the part of the Moorish Government with regard to the proceedings of missionaries, it would scarcely be prudent, I think, to assume that this fact is due to a growing spirit of tolerance amongst Moslems. On the contrary, I think that the absence of agitation is rather to be ascribed to the unobtrusive manner in which the work of the various Societies is being carried on. It would be injudicious, it appears to me, to take any step calculated to attract the Sultan's attention to the missionaries, more especially if the object of the two gentlemen in question is to travel among the tribes of the Atlas, a region to which the visits of Europeans have always been regarded with jealousy.

At the same time, should a favourable opportunity hereafter occur, I should, if your Lordship approves, be ready to do whatever may lie in my power to obtain facilities for the prosecution of the charitable efforts of these gentlemen.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 366.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 177. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Tangier, December* 11, 1893.

AS an illustration of the feeling of the Sultan towards missionaries, and with reference to my despatch No. 175 of the 8th instant, I think it is desirable to report confidentially to your Lordship an incident that occurred at Fez only a week ago, of which I have received a detailed account in a private letter.

On the 4th instant the Basha sent for Mr. John Edwards, a member of the North Africa Mission, who has opened a day-school for boys, and showed him a letter from the Sultan, in which it was stated that His Shereefian Majesty's attention had been called to reports that he was teaching Moslem children reading and mathematics, of which work His Shereefian Majesty did not approve, and he commanded the Basha to request Mr. Edwards to discontinue it.

Mr. Edwards politely replied to the Basha that he did not see his way to comply with the request, but that at the same time he had the greatest respect for the Sultan. The Basha then said, "Well, I have told you;" to which Mr. Edwards answered that he took note of what had been communicated to him.

In the afternoon the school was opened as usual, and a good number of children entered. Later on one of the boys was arrested by the Mukaddem of the quarter as he was leaving the house, but was released at the instance of a servant of Mr. Edwards.

Mr. Edwards, as I am informed, obeyed the summons of the Basha, after consulting with Mr. Macleod, who thought that the Basha probably wanted medical advice, and that it would be a good opportunity for him to make the acquaintance of so important an official personage. From some remarks of the Basha to Mr. Edwards it seems probable, however, that he intentionally ignored the existence of the British Vice-Consul.

I have privately suggested to Mr. Edwards that it would be a very undesirable result of his work if any of the children or their parents were thrown into prison, and that he should, it anything further is said to him by the Moorish authorities, reply that he will not encourage any subject of the Sultan in disobeying the commands of his Sovereign.

From what I have seen and heard of Mr. Edwards, I am inclined to anticipate that he will act prudently in the matter.

I venture to suggest that if the missionaries as a rule followed the same course as Mr. Edwards in responding to the summons of the Basha, when it is a question of their special work, they would perhaps have a better chance of conciliating the good-will of the Moorish authorities than if they were to insist on being addressed through their Consul.

The intervention of the latter would be none the less effectual on occasions where their personal safety or their property was menaced.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 367.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 178.)
My Lord, *Tangier, December* 11, 1893.

MR. VICE-CONSUL MACLEOD reports from Fez that on the 14th instant a Shereefian letter was read at the Kairawîn Mosque, proclaiming that the Sultan had arrived at Tafilelt and offered up prayers at the tomb of Mulai Ali Sherif. From another source I learn that this accomplishment of the officially-notified object of His Majesty's expedition took place on the 10th ultimo. It was announced also that the tribes were at peace, and that they had paid tribute. The speedy departure of the Sultan for Morocco was also given out.

His Majesty had, however, not moved from Tafilelt on the 17th ultimo. Since then there is no entirely trustworthy news of his movements. But it is reported from the coast that he did, at some later date, make a start from that place in the direction

of Marraksh, and then suddenly wheeling round fell upon the Aït Hadidu tribe, and took a number of prisoners, after which he is said to have marched back to Tafilelt.

It appears to be the general opinion that the Sultan will not in any case arrive at his southern capital before the end of this month, and that his return will probably be delayed till some time in January. Your Lordship has already been made aware of the rumour that he intends to remain on the south of the Altas till the spring. The affairs with which he is occupied in that region are probably of more importance in his eyes than the settlement of the Melilla affair. Although the increasing gravity of the situation, consequent on the death of General Margallo, must have become known to him before the 17th November, up to which date authentic news of his proceedings has been received, he has as yet bestowed no answer on the urgent representations of the Spanish Government, or on those which the Ministers of France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Portugal were instructed to address to him in support of the Spanish claim for reparation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 368.

Sir E. Monson to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 243.) *Vienna, December* 13, 1893.
My Lord,

COUNT KÁLNOKY told me yesterday that in the interview which he had just had with the Spanish Ambassador, the latter had been so engrossed by the subject of Anarchists that he had not touched at all upon Melilla, nor had the Count mentioned it to him.

But Count Kálnoky said that it seemed to him that the Spanish Government had done wisely in sending Marshal Martinez Campos to Melilla, as it is most important to pacify the public impatience, and the Marshal inspires general confidence.

His Excellency added that he had learnt that the Marshal has got more troops than he knows what to do with, and that he will probably transport a portion of them to Ceuta.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 369.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 357.) *Madrid, December* 14, 1893.
My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation of an extract from the telegrams of Marshal Martinez Campos to the Spanish Government, describing his interview with the Sultan's brother on the 12th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

Inclosure in No. 369.

Extract from "El Pais" of December 14, 1893.

(Translation.)

THE following extracts from telegrams from General Martinez Campos have been communicated by the Ministry of State to the press:—

"*Melilla, 12th December,* 7·30 P.M.

"General Commandant to the Minister of State:

"The only persons assisting at the conference were Prince Muley Araaf, General Martinez Campos, the chief of the African Department, Señor Arco, and the Interpreter, Señor Rey.

"All the conditions demanded by the General Commandant for the pacification of the Riff and the punishment of the guilty parties were set forth and discussed.

"Prince Araaf gave every assurance that hostilities should not be renewed, personally responding for anything which might occur, and promising not to leave the district until everything had been satisfactorily settled.

"He undertook that the Riffs should destroy the entrenchments which they had constructed in our territory, and reiterated that the Sultan was sending him an army to punish the rebellious Kabyles in an exemplary manner.

"The General goes on to say that Muley Araaf was most courteous and conciliatory, and that with a singular frankness, unusual among the Moors, he informed him of the regretful surprise which the situation caused him on his arrival in the Riff district, for when he took leave of his brother he believed, as did the whole Imperial Court, that it was merely an unimportant frontier incident, the true gravity of which he had only realized on his arrival.

"The conference lasted about an hour.

"On his arrival and departure the Prince was saluted with the customary honours.

"It was agreed to hold another conference, which will probably take place in the Riff camp."

"*Melilla, 13th December,* 12·15 A.M.

"This afternoon the Riffs began the destruction of the entrenchments in the Spanish lines, according to the agreement with Araaf."

No. 370.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 358. Secret.) P.
My Lord, *Madrid, December* 15, 1893.

I HAVE had a conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs with regard to the offer contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 169, Secret, of the 29th ultimo. His Excellency begs me to give your Lordship his best thanks, and states that if the necessity arises later, he will most gladly avail himself of it.

In the meantime, the assistance given to the Spanish Government by Her Majesty's Representative at Tangier has been most useful, and his Excellency is highly gratified at the salutary effect which it has produced.

I am sending by Lisbon a Memorandum and sketch of the peninsula of Melilla, which I have received from Major von Funcke, the German Military Attaché.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

No. 371.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 360.)
My Lord, *Madrid, December* 15, 1893.

EVERYTHING seems quiet at Melilla, and trade is announced to have been resumed between the Spaniards and the Moors.

Though the final settlement may take some time, it is generally considered that grave complications are past, and unless anything should occur meanwhile, even with the usual procrastination, a definite arrangement may be concluded by the spring.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

No. 372.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 116. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, December* 18, 1893.

MR. BENNET BURLEIGH, correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph," who has just been at Melilla, has just returned here, and tells me that, in his opinon, Marshal Martinez Campos did everything he could to provoke the Moors, whose prudence defeated his object. The pacific result of the expedition has much irritated the Marshal, and the idea that there will be some explosion on their return to Spain is discussed in the army.

He reports that among the Spanish troops there is much sickness, which is likely to increase, while there are very few Moors in the neighbourhood of the fortress.

No. 373.

Foreign Office to Acting Consul Latimer.

(No. 1.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 18, 1893.

I AM directed by the Earl of Rosebery to approve your action in the matter of an attack made upon Great Britain in a local newspaper, as reported in your despatch No. 2 of the 16th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 374.

The Earl of Rosebery to the Marquis of Dufferin.[a]

(No. 130.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, December* 19, 1893.

I HEAR from Sir H. MacDonell that three French iron-clads arrived at Lisbon yesterday, coming from Madeira, and that they are expected shortly to proceed to Tangier. Have you any information concerning this matter?

No. 375.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 20.)

(No. 65.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, December* 19, 1893.

WITH regard to your Lordship's telegram No. 45, I have not heard anything about the French iron-clads in question, but am inquiring.

No. 376.

The Marquis of Dufferin to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 20.)

(No. 124.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, December* 20, 1893.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram asking whether I had had any information as to the reported arrival at Lisbon of three French iron-clads, who were on their way to Tangier, I have the honour to state that Colonel Talbot was making inquiries no later than yesterday with regard to the movement of French ships, but had heard nothing of the three iron-clads mentioned by your Lordship.

Colonel Talbot is continuing his investigations in the matter.

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[a] Also to Mr. Satow (No. 45).

No. 377.

The Marquis of Dufferin to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 20.)

(No. 125.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, December* 20, 1893.

I LEARN that the three vessels alluded to by your Lordship compose the French Training Squadron, and are principally manned by boys and cadets.

It seems unlikely that a naval demonstration should be connected with their mission.

I will give your Lordship further details in a despatch which follows.

No. 378.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 191 A.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 20, 1893.

THE Spanish Ambassador informed me to-day that he had little or no news from Melilla. I understood him, however, to say that Marshal Martinez Campos had demanded the punishment of some Moorish offenders, but had received a reply from the Sultan's brother that as he did not possess the right to inflict the punishment of death, the matter must stand over till His Majesty's return to Fez.

In accordance with instructions from Señor Moret, the Ambassador then suggested that it might be possible, as the Sultan had forbidden the import of arms into Morocco, and possessed no fleet, to prevent that traffic by international agreement among the Powers.

I told his Excellency that we, on our side, were doing our best to stop the import of arms, but that a general agreement presented some difficulty, recent experience having almost made me doubt the practicability at present of any international arrangement with regard to Morocco.

M. del Mazo also touched on the subject of those Spanish boats that hoisted the British flag when pursued.

That subject too, I said, was not free from complications, but I promised to consult my proper legal advisers as to what could be done.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 379.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 21.)

(No. 372. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Madrid, December* 18, 1893.

MR. BENNETT BURLEIGH has just arrived here from Melilla, which he left three days ago.

He saw Marshal Martinez Campos before his departure, who said to him that "unfortunately the whole affair must be considered over."

Mr. Burleigh says that the Marshal did all in his power to provoke hostilities by small acts of aggression, or by laying traps for the Moors to commit them. In corroboration of this statement, a paragraph appears in this morning's paper to the effect that some Moors had seized a raft on the river which had been detached by an inundation, and that, the Spaniards being unable to cross the stream, fire had been opened from the forts. Marshal Martinez Campos is reported to have telegraphed to the Government that it was impossible to describe the pleasure with which the troops heard the sound of the cannonade.

Mr. Burleigh describes the Marshal as being in a state of great irritation at the pacific issue of his expedition. Among the troops the common topic is the possibility or almost certainty of a military *émeute* on their return, and of the proclamation of the Marshal as a Dictator.

According to Mr. Burleigh, the number of Moors round Melilla is under 1,000, and great sickness prevails among the Spanish troops, which is likely to increase as

the weather becomes warmer. He also says that the advance of the Spanish army into the interior is almost impossible, as they have no effective means of transport, and the country is without resources.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

No. 380.

The Marquis of Dufferin to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 22.)

(No. 532.)
Paris, December 21, 1893.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your telegram No. 130 of the 19th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship a despatch which has been addressed to me by Colonel Talbot with regard to the arrival at Lisbon of three French iron-clads.

I have, &c.
(Signed) DUFFERIN AND AVA.

Inclosure in No. 380.

Colonel Talbot to the Marquis of Dufferin.

Paris, December 21, 1893.

My Lord,

WITH reference to the reported arrival at Lisbon, on the way to Tangier, of three French iron-clads, I am informed that these vessels are probably the "Division volante d'instruction," consisting of the "Naïade," 2nd class cruizer, 20 guns, 3,500 tons, bearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Sallandroze; "Nielly," 3rd class cruizer, 15 guns, 2,250 tons; "Rigault de Genouilly," 3rd class cruizer, 8 guns, 1,700 tons. These ships are manned in great part by cadets and boys for the purpose of their instruction at sea.

It is extremely unlikely that anything in the way of a demonstration of naval force should be intended at Tangier or elsewhere in European waters with vessels of such insignificance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. TALBOT, *Colonel*,
Military Attaché.

No. 381.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 22.)

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, December* 22, 1893.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 45, the three French iron-clads are said to be bound for Brest after Christmas.

No. 382.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 23.)

(No. 377.)
Madrid, December 20, 1893.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, in translation, the text of the letter addressed by the Sultan of Morocco to the King of Spain.

This letter has been published in all the principal daily newspapers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

Inclosure in No. 382.

Extract from "La Epoca" of December 19, 1893.

(Translation.)

THE following is the literal text of the letter addressed by the Emperor Muley Hassan to His Majesty King Alphonso XIII:—

In the Name of God, clement and merciful.

There is no power nor strength but in God, clement and great.

From the servant of Allah, who places in His hands the disposition of his affairs.

The Prince of the Faithful, son of the Prince of the Faithful, son of the Prince of the Faithful, son of the Prince of the Faithful, son of the Prince of the Faithful, son of the Prince of the Faithful.

Servant of the Holy Shereefian Office, to whom Allah grant His assistance and grace.

To the beloved, honoured, and respected Sovereign of the most noble Spanish nation, King Alphonso XIII.

After giving glory to Allah at all times, we now protest that the events which have occurred between the people of Melilla and the Kabyles of Calaia have caused us the greatest pain and the most profound sorrow; so that we have reproved the proceedings of the said Kabyles. It therefore pleases us to declare there is no might nor power but in Allah; that if it had been regrettable to us that this should have occurred with any other country with whom our relations were friendly, how much the more do we deplore it when treating with Spain, our neighbour, the nation for whom we feel the greatest affection, and towards whom we profess the most exalted appreciation; sentiments of peace and friendship which have come down to us from the times of our ancestors, and of unimpeachable loyalty which cannot be doubted without depreciating it. These our protestations have been read by those Kabyles who will have to conform to them and to the customs of neighbourliness and friendship.

Thus we openly set our countenance against all that may cause disagreements and conflicts, which, by the Grace of Allah, we are minded to put an end to, and if they desist not from their rebellions and uprisings, it is because they are a people well known for their perverse bearing, their lack of understanding, and their turbulent spirit.

It is already known to you that several tribes of Kabyles of the Garlo (Morocco) have strayed from their obedience, and that we have had to suppress those of the Sahara, all of which has greatly occupied us; but very soon, by the Grace of Allah we shall fall upon the people of the Riff, and mete out to them the just chastisement of their perversity, unless our brother Muley Araaf shall have previously solved these questions.

We therefore earnestly entreat you to give us time, since you on your part hold us bound by the true friendship which we profess towards you, the diminishing of which we could never consent to.

Wishing you all prosperity and untold good fortune, &c.

November 21, 1893.

No. 383.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 150.)
Foreign Office, December 23, 1893.

Sir,

I APPROVE your action, as reported in your despatch No. 177, Confidential, of the 11th instant, respecting the attitude observed towards the local authorities by Mr. Edwards, of the North Africa Mission.

A copy of your despatch has been communicated, confidentially, to the British Missionary Societies working in Morocco.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 384.

Foreign Office to Consul Finn.

(No. 3.) *Foreign Office, December* 23, 1893.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 6, Commercial, of the 28th October, I am directed by the Earl of Rosebery to transmit herewith, for your information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Minister at Tangier,* pointing out that the Rio de Oro referred to in the Spanish newspaper "Noticias" is evidently the river of that name on the West Coast of Africa.

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 385.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 118. Secret and Confidential.) *Madrid, December* 24, 1893.
(Telegraphic.) P.

THE French Minister is, I am informed by Señor Moret, persuading the Sultan not to make the concessions demanded by Spain. I have communicated this to Mr. Satow.

No. 386.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 179.) *Tangier, December* 12, 1893.

My Lord,

IN continuation of my despatch No. 177, Confidential, of the 11th instant, I regret to have to report that Mr. Edwards' refusal to comply with the request of the Basha of Fez to cease teaching the children of Moslems has already been followed by the imprisonment of several of the parents.

The despatch from Mr. Macleod of which I have the honour to inclose a copy, reporting on the incident, reached me yesterday at noon, after the mail had left. I lost no time in addressing to him the inclosed reply, instructing him that he would not be right in taking any official action in the matter, and suggesting that the best course for Mr. Edwards to pursue would be to close his school to the children of Moslems, and to inform the Basha that upon further consideration, and in order not to bring distress upon those whose children he had hoped to benefit, he would comply with the Sultan's desire.

The account given in the letter of Mr. Edwards which is inclosed in Mr. Macleod's despatch does not altogether agree with that of the Vice-Consul as regards the grounds assigned for the imprisonment of the persons mentioned by name, but I think there can be little doubt that Mr. Macleod's explanation of the Basha's action is correct.

I trust that by compliance with the wishes of the Sultan, to which the Basha is, of course, bound to give effect by all the means at his disposal, Mr. Edwards may succeed in obtaining the liberation of the parents of his pupils, and in averting further trouble.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure 1 in No. 386.

Vice-Consul Macleod to Mr. Satow.

Fez, December 5, 1893.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Excellency a copy of a letter Mr. Edwards has addressed to me to-day, in which he asks me to try to obtain the

* No. 364.

release of certain persons who have been imprisoned by the Basha for allowing their children to attend Mr. Edwards' school.

As the Basha's action is founded on an order he has received from the Sultan, I do not see that there would be much chance of my being successful in that endeavour. Had Cid Ali done this at his own instance, I would have tried to do something by personal persuasion. The question raised seems to me to involve the whole missionary question of Morocco.

On these grounds, therefore, I propose to do nothing in the matter until I receive your Excellency's instructions.

For your Excellency's information I would say that Mr. Edwards also does a little medical work, and that the work in healing the sick carried on by other members of the North African Mission has, to the best of my observation, extending over three years, been productive of much good, both in alleviating the sufferings of the sick and poor, also, no less, in making a better feeling towards Europeans in general amongst all classes.

So far as I have been able to ascertain, the opposition to their work is raised not by the people, but by the authorities.

Regarding the missionaries generally here, I would also say that I have observed in them much patience and forbearance, and I have never had any charge or complaint brought against any of them by individual Moors or by the authorities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. MACIVER MACLEOD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 386.

Mr. Satow to Vice-Consul Macleod.

Sir, *Tangier, December* 11, 1893.

IT is with great regret that I learn from your despatch of the 5th instant that the Basha, acting apparently on the orders received from the Sultan, had imprisoned various persons for allowing their children to attend Mr. Edwards' school.

I do not think that you would be right in taking any official action in the matter. As I understand the history of the affair, the Basha asked Mr. Edwards, whom he had informed of the order received from the Sultan, whether he would give up teaching Moslem children, and to this question he returned a decided negative. The imprisonment seems clearly to be the result of this refusal.

Under the circumstances, however much we may regret the intolerance which has led to the issue of an order against Moslem children attending a school kept by a Christian missionary, I think the best course for Mr. Edwards to take would be to close his school to children of Mahommedans, and to inform the Basha that on further consideration, and in order not to be the involuntary cause of distress to those whose children he had hoped to benefit by instruction, he would comply with the Sultan's desire.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure 3 in No. 386.

Mr. Edwards to Vice-Consul Macleod.

Dear Sir, *Fez, December* 5, 1893.

SINCE acquainting you of the unfortunate affair of yesterday, the following Moors have been imprisoned for allowing their children to visit our garden, &c.:—

Seed Abd En Nabel Amour.
Maalem Hadu bin Ibraheem.
El Abbas bin Abd el Kareen.

The son of the first is in my service, and although his father pleaded that he was away in Mequinez, and could not know about the doings of his son, he was forthwith sent to prison.

The second has a little boy who attends to have his arm dressed; also a nephew who brings us our milk every day, and generally wait about in the garden for a little time.

The third named has also a child who attends to have his head dressed.

There are other cases, but I do not know their names.

My servant who saw the proceedings before the Basha states that there are at least six people in prison, and several have fled.

I sincerely trust that you will be able to use your good offices on behalf of these unfortunate and injured men, and I shall ever feel very gratefully yours.

(Signed) JOHN EDWARDS.

No. 387.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 25.)

(No. 180.)

Tangier, December 13, 1893.

My Lord,

THE Spanish cruizer "Isla de Luzon" arrived here on the 6th instant from Melilla, bringing letters from the Sultan's brother be to forwarded to the Court, and from Marshal Martinez Campos to the Spanish Minister with reference to the demands presented by the Spanish Commander-in-chief to the Moorish officials charged with the pacification of the Riffs. These were fourfold, and included, as I understand, the delivery of hostages, the execution of the principal tribesmen concerned in fomenting hostility to the garrison, the surrender of some 12,000 or 13,000 stand of rifles which the tribes are estimated to possess, and leave to occupy one or more strategical positions outside the Spanish limits.

My Spanish colleague spent the 8th and 9th in fruitless endeavours to make Cid Mohammed Torres see the necessity of admitting these demands, but to all that could be urged the only reply of the Sultan's Agent was that neither he nor Mulaï Arafa was empowered to concede anything. The latter had been commissioned by the Sultan to appease the tribesmen, and to restrain them from interfering with the construction of the fort, to the exclusion of all other questions.

On this being reported to the Spanish Government, Señor Moret telegraphed on the evening of the 11th that the attitude of Cid Mohammed Torres was unjustifiable, and instructing the Marquis de Potestad to make fresh endeavours to obtain from him as large a portion as possible of the demands of the Marshal, leaving for subsequent discussion with the Sultan the questions of disarmament and evacuation of the neutral ground. Your Lordship will observe that what had at first been spoken of as an occupation by Spanish troops of points outside the limits was apparently afterwards modified into a demand that the Moors should withdraw beyond the neutral zone stipulated for in Article IV of the Treaty of the 24th August, 1859. This apparent discrepancy is probably owing to a mistake in transmission of a telegram, the original proposal having combined both evacuation by the Moors and occupation of strategical points by the Spanish forces. The latter, therefore, seems to have been afterwards withdrawn.

It appeared, however, to my Spanish colleague that to persist in the demand for the execution of the chief promoters of the warfare carried on by the Riffians was to court a refusal from Cid Mohammed Torres, who would under no circumstances venture to assume the Sultan's prerogative of inflicting the death penalty. He judged it more expedient, therefore, to urge on him the immediate clearance of the neutral zone, which is but 500 yards in width, and the delivery of hostages, a measure which, in spite of its smacking somewhat of the Middle Ages, would be comprehended by the Moors, and doubtless serve as a guarantee for the preservation of peace. Moreover, it was a matter which he had grounds for believing could easily be arranged by Mulaï Arafa.

As I found that my Spanish colleague would welcome my support in pressing these points on Cid Mohammed Torres, I requested Mr. White to call on him later in the day and read to him a Memorandum, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy, adding at his discretion such further arguments as might be suggested by the turn of the conversation.

Mr. White found that Cid Torres, who had already received a visit from the Spanish Minister, was in a yielding mood, and he was able to obtain a promise from him that he would write to Mulaï Arafa recommending him to come to terms with General Martinez Campos on these two points.

If the negotiation is successful, the punishment of the ringleaders and the disarmament of the Riff, which could not be carried into effect without a considerable show of force on the Sultan's part, might be conveniently left for discussion when His Shereefian Majesty reaches Morocco city.

I learn that Signor Cantagalli has spoken to the Sultan's Agent in terms similar to those which I had employed, and that Count Tattenbach has also, independently of our action, impressed upon him the reasonableness of evacuating the neutral zone.

In view of the urgent necessity of inducing Cid Mohammed Torres to depart from the traditional attitude of refusal to accept responsibility, I trust your Lordship will not consider that the language I used was too strong for the occasion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure in No. 387.

Memorandum delivered verbally to Cid Mohammed Torres, December 12, 1893.

HER Majesty's Minister wishes to offer serious advice to Cid Mohammed Torres with regard to the present position of affairs. The Spanish Commander-in-chief has made certain proposals to Mulaï Arafa, which are probably known to Cid Mohammed Torres. These include, as is known for certain, besides other things, the delivery of hostages and the evacuation of the neutral ground, 500 metres broad, as stipulated in the Agreement for delimitation of thirty years ago.

Mulaï Arafa and Cid Mohammed Torres answer, the one to the General-in-chief, the other to the Spanish Minister, that they have no authority from the Sultan to do any of the things which have been asked of them.

Now he asks Cid Mohammed Torres to carefully consider what is likely to be the effect on the Spanish Government and nation of a continued *non possumus* on his part, he being the official placed here at Tangier to transact business with the foreign Ministers.

He entreats him to reflect, because the present moment is a critical one, possibly the turning point, on which hangs the question not of peace and war, but of existence and non-existence for the Empire of Morocco.

It is not wise to presume too far upon the patience of the Spanish people. It is not wise to calculate on the continued forbearance of the 25,000 men under arms at Melilla, who are burning to avenge the affront to their military honour and the deaths of their comrades.

The Spanish Government has made various representations to the Sultan, the latest of which, though dated more than forty days ago, has received no answer. They may perhaps think that the Sultan could easily have replied ere this, and that he is treating them with discourtesy. That will not make them more willing to delay further action.

He is convinced that if Cid Mohammed Torres cares at all for the welfare of his country, or for the prosperity of the Sultan, it is his duty to assume the responsibility of advising Mulaï Arafa to accept the demands of the General, namely, the delivery of hostages and the evacuation of the neutral ground, and he hopes that he will write a letter to Mulaï Arafa to that effect.

Cid Mohammed Torres will thus be rendering a signal service to the Sultan, his master, by facilitating the continuity of the friendly negotiations that have been carried on by the Spanish Minister for more than two months, and the Sultan cannot but approve of his giving this advice to Mulaï Arafa when he learns of the excellent results in the preservation of peace between the two countries. Because, if Cid Mohammed Torres and the Moorish authorities do not arrange these matters with the Commander-in-chief, there is every probability of his taking the matter into his own hands, and obtaining, by the use of force, that which when asked for has been refused to him by those who say they have no power.

Her Majesty's Minister considers this matter of such great importance that he would have called in person on Cid Mohammed Torres to make these observations, but is unfortunately unable to mount his horse, and so presents his excuses to Cid Mohammed Torres.

No. 388.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 25.)

(No. 181.)
My Lord, *Tangier, December* 16, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 137 of the 25th November, inclosing copy of a letter from the Anglo-Jewish Association and Jewish Board of Deputies, calling attention to the renewed persecution of the Jewish inhabitants of Morocco city, as detailed in a communication from Mr. S. Montagu, M.P.; and your Lordship instructs me to make such representations, either alone or in conjunction with my colleagues, as may seem advisable, to induce the Moorish Government to put a stop to the ill-treatment complained of.

My Italian colleague has, I learn, received an account from Mr. Reuben Elmaleh, of Mogador, which is almost identical with that furnished by Mr. Montagu.

As things stand at present, it is reported here that a deputation of Morocco Jews which proceeded to the Sultan's camp at Tafilelt to lay their grievances before His Shereefian Majesty had met with a gracious reception. His Shereefian Majesty is said to have given them a letter to the Basha of the city, enjoining on him to treat the Jews with justice and humanity, adding that when he returned to that capital he would inquire into the recently alleged cases of oppression, and take whatever measures might be necessary to prevent their recurrence. It is even rumoured that the obnoxious Governor is to be removed. I find that the accuracy of this report is accepted by my Italian colleague; but from something that has reached me from a confidential source, I am inclined to suspend my belief for the present in the promise to dismiss the Governor.

The Sultan is expected to arrive at Morocco towards the end of this month, and if by that time the above-mentioned report should be confirmed, there would be no harm in our addressing a letter to the Vizir for Foreign Affairs expressing the satisfaction with which our respective Governments have heard that His Shereefian Majesty has spontaneously acceded to the Petition of his Jewish subjects, and granted the redress of their wrongs. This would serve to keep His Majesty in mind of his promise, without appearing to dictate to him his duty.

My French colleague, to whom I have also spoken on this matter, tells me that he has telegraphed to Paris asking for instructions. He considers that in any steps that we may eventually adopt we ought to carefully weigh beforehand the chances of our representations being attended to.

The Spanish Minister has expressed to me his willingness to co-operate in any action that may be proposed having a charitable and philanthropic end in view, though he has no special instructions to interest himself on behalf of the Jews.

The German Minister states that he cannot undertake to give any assistance.

The condition of the Jews of Morocco, as well as the question of the enlargement of the Mellah at Mogador, formed the subject of instructions which I had the honour to receive from your Lordship in July last, and I have not lost sight of them. But in view of the possibility of my visiting Morocco city in order to present my credentials to the Sultan, I came to the conclusion that that would afford the most fitting opportunity for making representations on the general subject. As regards the extension of the Mellah, however, I have grounds for believing that His Shereefian Majesty has anticipated any action on my part by having already dispatched instructions to the Basha of Mogador to proceed with the construction of the necessary buildings.

Should the rumoured promise of the Sultan with respect to restraining the Basha of Morocco from oppressing the Jews of Morocco ultimately prove to be without foundation, I beg to assure your Lordship that I shall not fail to take a suitable opportunity for making urgent representations to the Moorish Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 389.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 25.)

(No. 182.)
My Lord, *Tangier, December* 16, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 124 of the 7th ultimo, informing me that as Cid Boobeker has spontaneously resigned his post on the ground of ill-health, the investigation which I had been directed to institute need not be prosecuted further, and instructing me to address a letter to him, expressing regret at his infirmity, thanking him for his past services, and extending to him British protection as a private individual.

I have accordingly the honour to inclose a copy of the letter which I have addressed to him in this sense, adding that Her Majesty's Government intend to send him a present in recognition of his long services. I have also caused an intimation to be conveyed to him that the inquiry will not be held.

I should add that British protection was formally extended to Cid Boobeker in 1886, as mentioned in my despatch No. 15 of the 13th October last, and I am assured that the document conveying that protection is still in his possession.

It only remains for me to add the expression of my sincere regret at having, by provisionally withdrawing his letter of appointment pending the result of the investigation, incurred your Lordship's disapproval.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure in No. 389.

Mr. Satow to Cid Boobeker.

3 *Jumad II*, 1311 (*December* 12, 1893).

I RECEIVED your letter of the 3rd Rebia II, in which you said that, owing to age and illness, you desired to retire from being an intermediary between this Legation and the Moorish Government. I sent your letter to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who has now instructed me to write you this letter, expressing the regret of the British Government that infirmity has overtaken you, and I am to thank you very heartily for your past services during the time of my predecessors, Sir John, Sir William, and Sir Charles. Notwithstanding that you are no longer in active service as intermediary, I am sure that you will always be ready to put your services unofficially at the disposal of the British Government. You will understand that the British Government will continue to give you the same protection as before under the XVIth Article of the Madrid Convention. Therefore you need be under no anxiety as to the future, because you are under the protection of the Queen of England.

The British Government intends sending you a present as a recognition of your long services, which I will transmit to you as soon as it reaches me.

(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 390.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 25.)

(No. 183.)
My Lord, *Tangier, December* 16, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of the note which I addressed in August last to the Vizir for Foreign Affairs, announcing to him my having taken charge of Her Majesty's Legation, and wishing the Sultan a safe return from Tafilelt, as well as of Cid Emfadl Gharneet's reply, which reached me two days ago, welcoming me in the name of His Shereefian Majesty to this country.

This reply is certainly in no degree less cordial in tone than those which have been returned on similar occasions to my predecessors, and possibly is intended to indicate a real desire to be on amicable terms with Her Majesty's Government. At the same time, and considering all that has passed, it would be greatly to be desired

that, in addition to well-turned compliments and civil language, the Sultan should give a tangible proof of his friendly disposition by releasing without further delay the agents of British subjects whose imprisonment has from time to time been reported to your Lordship. Until that were done, however desirable it may be from every point of view that Her Majesty's Minister should be in direct personal relations with the Sultan, I should not venture to propose to your Lordship to sanction my paying a visit to the Court. I am anxious that on the occasion of presenting my credentials and conveying to His Shereefian Majesty assurances of good-will on the part of Her Majesty's Government there should be no necessity for at the same time making remonstrances regarding a still unredressed infraction of Treaty rights.

From information which has reached me I am inclined to hope that I may before long be in a position to report to your Lordship that this obstacle to unreserved friendly relations has been removed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure 1 in No. 390.

Mr. Satow to Cid Emfadl Gharneet.

Tangier, August 29, 1893.

(Compliments.)

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I arrived at Tangier this afternoon, and have assumed charge of this Legation as Her Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary.

I request your Excellency, in conveying this information to the Sultan, to present my best respects to His Shereefian Majesty, and to assure His Majesty that it will be my agreeable duty, under the instructions I have received from Her Majesty's Government, to use my utmost endeavours to promote the friendship and good relations that have happily existed for so many generations between the two Governments.

I have learnt that the Sultan is at present engaged on a pilgrimage to the tombs of his ancestors at Tafilelt, and I pray that the Almighty may bring His Majesty back in good health and prosperity from the long and arduous journey His Majesty has undertaken.

(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 390.

Cid Emfadl Gharneet to Mr. Satow.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.)

I HAVE received your letter announcing your arrival at Tangier on the 28th August, 1893, corresponding to the 15th Safer, 1311, and saying that you have entered upon your duties as Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. You also expressed the desire that I should inform His Shereefian Majesty of this, explaining to His Majesty that it is your duty, in accordance with the instructions of your Government, to promote the friendship and good understanding that have so long existed between the two nations, and which have been inherited from father to son, and that I should tell His Majesty that you wish him a happy return from his visit to the tombs of his hallowed ancestors at Tafilelt.

I have communicated your letter to His Majesty, who has understood its purport, and I presented your salutations to him, and His Majesty bids you welcome, and has commanded me to return you very cordial salutations from His Majesty. He has confidence in your wishes, and wishes you everything good; may God receive his prayer!

His Majesty has also instructed me to answer you regarding what you said as to its being your duty to promote friendship and good understanding in accordance with the instructions of your Government; that your endeavours in this direction are of the special province of intelligent intermediaries of friendship, and that whenever any one has come from your friendly Government to this country he has been provided with these instructions, and they have been impressed upon him agreeably with the

true friendship existing between the two nations, and inherited from father to son, and conformably with the relations existing between friends; and that this is a thing for which man is unable to give an adequate return; only his Creator is able to do this, and He will do it, and add to the strength and power and wealth of the friendly Government; and that His Majesty ardently desires all that will render permanent the friendship and good understanding between the two Governments, and strengthen and consolidate it, and that he anticipates and believes in no other result. May you remain in good health.

Finished the 12th Rebia I, 1311 (= 23rd September, 1893).

(Signed) MOHAMMED-EL-MUFADDAL BEN MOHAMMED GHARNEET.

No. 391.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 25.)

(No. 381.)
My Lord, *Madrid, December* 21, 1893.

THE Government are about to disband the Reserves of 1887. By this means about 10,000 will be sent home.

This is considered an indication of the opinion of the Government that the Moorish incident is drawing to a close, and it will probably be followed by the release of other Reserves.

It is also stated that if, in an approaching interview with the Sultan's brother, the prospects of peace are more clearly defined, one of the two army corps now at Melilla—that commanded by General Chinchilla—will return to the Peninsula, to remain in Andalusia as an army of observation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

No. 392.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 25.)

(No. 382.)
My Lord, *Madrid, December* 21, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to inclose translation of some paragraphs in the "Imparcial" of to-day, purporting to give, on good though not official authority, the proposals made by the Sultan's brother as the bases for negotiations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

Inclosure in No. 392.

Extract from "El Imparcial" of December 21, 1893.

(Translation.)

ACCORDING to information which we consider reliable, though not proceeding from a Government source, we have learnt that Muley Araaf's reply to General Martinez Campos' letter of the day before yesterday could not be inspired by stronger desires for peace.

Such, at any rate, are the terms of the letter, the trustworthiness of which time will show.

It appears that the General Commandant adopted a very energetic and even peremptory tone, and that the Sultan's brother replied, acquiescing in our claims with regard to the main question, as well as to the incident of the wooden raft ("balsa de madera").

To summarize our information, it results as follows:—

1. That the guilty parties in the wooden raft ("balsa de madera") incident are five in number. They will be put in irons and conducted to the limits of our territory,

in order that they may be placed on board ship and taken to Tangier, where they will be duly punished.

2. The parties guilty of the attack on the 2nd October will be treated in the same manner.

3. With regard to indemnities, the principle is already recognized, as the Sultan instructed Muley Araaf to indemnify the families of the victims of the 2nd October, the only incident of which the Emperor was aware when he sent his brother. All that remains is to determine the amount of indemnity, which will require the approval of the Sultan.

4. The neutral zone will be delineated, and given a breadth of 500 metres. Muley Araaf offers to clear this completely, even to the disappearance of the mosque and cemetery; but he points out the necessity of expropriating fields and villages, for the payment of which he has received no authority, and asks also for the concession of a period of time to allow the families who now occupy the villages within the zone to get through the present cold weather without being left homeless.

5. The use of the zone shall be common to Moors and Christians, no monopoly of land prejudicial to the rights of others shall be permitted, except by arrangement between both parties. The ownership of the land shall be considered to pertain one-half to Spain, and the other to the Emperor.

No. 393.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received December* 25.)

Sir, *War Office, Pall Mall, December* 23, 1893.

WITH reference to your letter of the 8th instant, on the subject of the appointment of a Military Attaché to the British Embassy at Madrid, I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that Mr. Secretary Campbell-Bannerman does not recommend the creation of such a post.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR L. HALIBURTON.

No. 394.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 26.)

(No. 119. Secret and Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, December* 26, 1893.

THE expediency of asking for increased territory at Melilla appears doubtful to the Spanish Government, who are discussing the amount they will demand for indemnity.

I should be glad if your Lordship were to take an opportunity of repeating to the Spanish Ambassador the caution as to moderation, without, however, alluding to me.

No. 395.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 151.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 26, 1893.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 175 of the 8th instant respecting Mr. Badger's request for a Sultan's letter to enable his brother and Mr. Geddes to carry on medical mission work in the interior of Morocco, and I have to state to you that I approve your views and intentions as therein reported.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

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No. 396.

Foreign Office to Mr. Haldane.

SIR PHILIP CURRIE presents his compliments to Mr. Haldane, M.P., and, with reference to the letter from Mr. Badger, communicated by him on the 17th instant, is directed by the Earl of Rosebery to transmit herewith, under flying seal, for his information, a letter that has been addressed to that gentleman on the subject of his application for a "Sultan's letter" to enable his brother and Mr. Geddes to carry on medical mission work in the interior of Morocco.*

Foreign Office, December 26, 1893.

No. 397.

Foreign Office to Mr. Badger.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 26, 1893.

WITH reference to my letter of the 22nd ultimo, I am directed by the Earl of Rosebery to transmit herewith, for your confidential information, copy of a despatch from Mr. Satow,† Her Majesty's Minister at Tangier, reporting the reasons which render it inexpedient that he should apply for a Sultan's letter to enable your brother and Mr. Geddes to travel in the interior of Morocco and carry on medical mission work among the people.

Lord Rosebery has approved the views and intentions of Mr. Satow, as set forth in his despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 398.

The Southern Morocco Mission to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 28.)

My Lord, 1, *Blythswood Square, Glasgow, December* 26, 1893.

I AM favoured with your Lordship's communication of the 23rd instant, inclosing copy of despatch from Her Majesty's Minister in Tangier, and I beg to assure your Lordship that the suggestions conveyed therein will have the careful attention of all the agents of this Mission in Morocco.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. ANDERSON.

No. 399.

Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 28.)

(No. 67.)
Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, December* 28, 1893.

THE Sultan arrived at the city of Morocco on the 19th December.

No. 400.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 29.)

(No. 120.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, December* 28, 1893.

THIS evening's papers announce the appointment of Marshal Martinez Campos as Ambassador Extraordinary to negotiate with the Sultan of Morocco.

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* No. 397. † No. 365.

No. 401.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 198.) *Foreign Office, December* 29, 1893.

Sir,

THE Spanish Ambassador delivered to me this afternoon a message from his Government, to the effect that Marshal Martinez Campos had been appointed Ambassador Extraordinary to the Sultan of Morocco, with strict injunctions not to depart from the conciliatory and peaceful attitude that Spain had hitherto maintained. His Excellency added that the Marshal would be accompanied from Melilla to the port where he disembarked by a squadron of Spanish ships of war.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 402.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 30.)

(No. 121. Confidential.) *Madrid, December* 30, 1893.

(Telegraphic.) P.

MARSHAL MARTINEZ CAMPOS is to start for Mogador on the 2nd or 3rd January; he will proceed from Melilla by sea, touching at Tangier *en route*.

With regard to the question of indemnity, great reserve is maintained; the Russian Minister thinks that the sum demanded will be for the full amount of the expenses incurred by the Spanish Government, amounting to some 60,000,000 pesetas; and it is thought by others likely to be large.

Señor Moret has been too much occupied to see me.

No. 403.

The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

(No. 197. Confidential.) *Foreign Office, December* 30, 1893.

Sir,

ON receiving your Excellency's telegram No. 107 of the 7th instant, I at once inquired whether Her Majesty's Secretary of State for War would, under present circumstances, consider it advisable to act upon your suggestion that you should be provided with the assistance of a British military officer in the capacity of Attaché to Her Majesty's Embassy.

I have now to inform you that Mr. Campbell-Bannerman is unable to recommend the creation of such a post.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 404.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 154.) *Foreign Office, December* 30, 1893.

Sir,

I APPROVE your action and the steps which you contemplate taking with a view to ameliorate the condition of the Jews in Morocco, as reported in your despatch No. 181 of the 16th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 405.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 155.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 30, 1893.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 180 of the 13th instant, reporting your action in support of your Spanish colleague, and inclosing a Memorandum of observations which you desired Mr. Consul White to read to Cid Mohammed Torres.

I observe that you spoke of "the present moment as a critical one, possibly the turning-point, on which hangs the question not of peace or war, but of existence or non-existence of the Empire of Morocco."

Although this sentence does not purport to be more than an expression of your personal opinion, it appears to me to be couched in language stronger than should have been used in a formal communication without specific instructions.

With this exception, the motive of which I appreciate, I approve the language employed by you, and your proceedings, as reported in your despatch under reply.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 406.

The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow.

(No. 156.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 30, 1893.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 179 of the 12th instant, containing further reports as to the action of the Basha of Fez in regard to Mr. Edwards' missionary school at that place.

I approve the instructions which you have given to Mr. Vice-Consul Macleod on the subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 407.

*Foreign Office to the President of the Anglo-Jewish Association.**

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, December* 30, 1893.

WITH reference to Sir P. Currie's letter of the 25th ultimo, I am directed by the Earl of Rosebery to inform you that, according to a report which has been received from Her Majesty's Minister at Tangier, the deputation of Jews of Morocco city, which proceeded to the Sultan's camp at Tafilelt to lay their grievances before His Shereefian Majesty, is said to have met with a gracious reception.

The Sultan is said to have given them a letter to the Basha of the city, enjoining on him to treat the Jews with justice and humanity, adding, that when he returned to that capital, he would inquire into the recently-alleged cases of oppression, and take whatever measures might be necessary to prevent their recurrence.

Mr. Satow states that it is further rumoured that the obnoxious Governor is to be removed, but he does not personally attach entire belief to this report: he adds that, if the favourable accounts in regard to the Sultan's attitude prove ultimately to be without foundation, he will not fail to take a suitable opportunity for making urgent representations to the Moorish Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

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* Also to the President of the Jewish Board of Deputies.

No. 408.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery.—(*Received December* 31, 4·15 P.M.)

(No. 122.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, December* 31, 1893, 1·20 P.M.

THE Chiefs of the Kabyles have made submission to the Marshal, and trade with the fortress is renewed. The Marshal cannot leave for Morocco till the 7th or 8th, and will probably not touch at Tangier. One army corps is being embarked.